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ABSTRACT OF A THESIS PRESENTED IN THE FACULTY OF SOC-
IAL SCIENCES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM FOR THE DEG-
REE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY ROBERT WILLIAM DYSON, 
OF COLLINGv/OOD COLLEGE, IN THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1979-80. 
T i t l e Nature, Reason and Morality Some Aspects of 
the History of the Doctrine of Natural Law. 
The present work i s concerned w i t h that theme of 
European p o l i t i c a l , moral and leg a l discourse gen-
e r a l l y c a lled 'natural law'. The candidate writes as 
one who i s by temperament and t r a i n i n g more of an h i s -
t o r i a n than a philosopher. Indeed, his purpose i s 
l a r g e l y to bring together, w i t h i n a single volume, a 
more extensive h i s t o r i c a l treatment and d e f i n i t i o n 
than the subject has received i n the past. But, i n 
sp i t e of the t i t l e , i t has also been the candidate's 
aim to glance m a c r i t i c a l s p i r i t at the claims made 
by the exponents of nat u r a l law. This i s not to say 
that he i s concerned w i t h n a t u r a l law as an 'ideology', 
however. Neither i s he concerned w i t h any more gen-
e r a l argument as to how the term 'ideology' might most 
sensibly be used. I n short, i t i s not his i n t e n t i o n 
to t r y to assess or account f o r the force of 'natural-
law t a l k ' as an i n s p i r a t i o n to action. Rather, his 
aim i s the more modest one of discovering what sense, 
i f any, i s to be made of the assertion that (to quote 
from p.1) 'our moral and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ought to 
be carried on m conformity w i t h c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s 
of r i g h t conduct which...are somehov/ ' b u i l t - i n ' to 
r e a l i t y i t s e l f . Undoubtedly, any conclusions reached 
w i l l be exceedingly p r o v i s i o n a l and open to much de-
bate. 
R..V. Dyson 1980. 
Collmgwood College 
INTRODUCTION. 
Before embarking upon an h i s t o r i c a l consideration of 
nat u r a l law, we might do worse than quote Bentham's 
animadversion upon those who 'take f o r t h e i r subject 
the pretended law of nature, an obscure phantom, which 
i n the imagination of those who go m chase of i t , 
points sometimes to manners, sometimes to laws, some-
times to what law i s , and sometimes to what i t ought 
to be'. I f there are ambiguities and confusions to be 
found i n t h i s work, they may m some measure be j u s t -
i f i e d by pointing out that the subject w i t h which i t 
deals i s i t s e l f fraught w i t h ambiguities and confus-
ions. This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the subject-matter, how-
ever, also c a l l s f o r a few prefatory words defining, m 
the broadest terms, what i t i s that we s h a l l be con-
sid e r i n g m the fo l l o w i n g pages. 
At the most general or ' i d e a l - t y p i c a l ' l e v e l , then, 
what we s h a l l c a l l the natural-law t r a d i t i o n may be 
understood m terms of three c l o s e l y - r e l a t e d claims. 
(a) That our moral and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ought to 
be car r i e d on i n conformity w i t h c e r t a i n fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s of r i g h t conduct which, f a r from o r i g i n a t i n g 
m any human f i a t , are somehow ' b u i l t - i n ' to r e a l i t y 
i t s e l f , 
(b) that these p r i n c i p l e s 'stand to reason' - they 
are m some sense available to the f a c u l t y of reason i n 
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v i r t u e of which man i s uniquely equipped to under-
stand and deal w i t h his circumstances, and 
(c) that they are universal i n t h e i r scope. 
This u n i v e r s a l i t y i t s e l f has at least two d i s t i n g u i s h -
able senses. 
( I ) I t indicates that, since the p r i n c i p l e s m ques-
t i o n are absolutely and o b j e c t i v e l y r i g h t 'by nature', 
they apply to a l l men everywhere, regardless of how 
widely human commitments and practices may a c t u a l l y 
vary as between time and place, and 
( I I ) On the assumption that a l l men are equal i n 
morally s i g n i f i c a n t respects, i t indicates that they 
apply equally to a l l men, without regard to what are 
'denounced' as a r t i f i c i a l or a s c r i p t i v e differences -
d i s t i n c t i o n s of race, rank, creed, and so f o r t h . 
Moreover, exponents of n a t u r a l law have f o r the most 
part been concerned w i t h a p r e s c r i p t i v e rather than a 
descriptive treatment of law and j u s t i c e . That i s , 
they have concentrated upon what ought to be rather 
than upon what i s . And t h e i r arguments are to be con-
tras t e d w i t h those of l e g a l and moral p o s i t i v i s t s -
who contend that legal and moral contents are adequ-
a t e l y understood as pure a r t i f a c t s , 'posited' by en-
actment or convention, which do not need, or which can-
not be given, a universal ' r a t i o n a l ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
and which cannot be c r i t i c i s e d or amended by reference 
to 'higher' or ' i d e a l ' or supra-legal standards of r i g h t . 
This i d e a l - t y p i c a l representation of course suffers 
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from the usual self-conscious deficiency. As t h e i r 
'inventor', Max Weber, said of a l l such representations, 
'they are purely mental constructs, the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of which to the empirical r e a l i t y . . . i s problematical 
i n every i n d i v i d u a l case.' But such a broad descrip-
t i o n does provide a loose frame of reference w i t h i n 
which to consider a long-lived and plausible mode of 
understanding moral, p o l i t i c a l and legal experience. 
I t i s w i t h the h i s t o r y and force of t h i s mode or t r a d -
i t i o n that we s h a l l here be concerned. 
The phrase 'natural law' might be thought to be m 
some respects an unsatisfactory one. The word 'law' 
rather blurs the f a c t that 'natural law' figures at 
least as prominently m moral as m more narrowly or 
s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l and leg a l discussion; and na t u r a l 
law i s m any case never presented simply as a c o l l e c -
t i o n of rules as such. Also, of course, there i s a 
f a m i l i a r objection which has been brought forward by 
Professor Popper and others namely, that the term 
'natural law' i n v i t e s confusion between the allegedly 
normative 'laws of nature' and those s c i e n t i f i c 'laws 
of nature' which merely describe or systematise our 
experience of the external world. I must confess that 
I f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to imagine anyone being seriously 
led up the garden path by t h i s ambiguity, and, m any 
event, i t has seemed to me that 'natural law' i s a fam-
i l i a r and serviceable enough shorthand term. For b e t t e r 
or worse, then, I use i t m preference to cumbersome 
periphrases, or to Leo Strauss' 'natural r i g h t ' - an 
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attempt to tr a n s l a t e l i t e r a l l y from the German which i s , 
a f t e r a l l , as ambiguous m i t s own way as i s 'natural 
law'. Also, I tend to r e f e r i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y to 'the 
theory' and 'the doctrine' of n a t u r a l law. This i s not 
a case of mere verbal l a x i t y on my part, since n a t u r a l 
law may indeed be properly understood as both. As 
Paul Sigmund remarks, 'Natural law may be considered... 
both i n terms of i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n to the developing 
science of p o l i t i c s and as an ideology - as the symbolic 
expression of the needs and aspirations of s o c i a l classes 
and groups.' 
The present undertaking i s motivated c h i e f l y by the 
f a c t t h a t , at least to the best of my knowledge, no 
work on the subject m English (and no single-volume 
work m any language) contrives to combine reasonable 
comprehensiveness of treatment w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y of 
c r i t i c i s m . To mention some of the standard w r i t i n g s 
Paul Sigmund, m his Natural Law i n P o l i t i c a l Thought 
(which does not, i n any case, confine i t s e l f to 'pol-
i t i c a l thought'), deals w i t h the period between the 
Milesian cosmologers and A r i s t o t l e m twelve pages, 
devotes only f i v e l i n e s to Pythagoras, and wraps up 
the Stoics i n three paragraphs. Leo Strauss, m his 
Walgreen Foundation lectures Natural Right and History, 
mentions Heraclitus twice and Pythagoras once -
i n d i r e c t l y , m a footnote. Alexander Passerm d'Ent-
reves' exposition i n his Natural Law begins w i t h the 
Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s , and he mentions David Hume only 
twice, both times m passing. More important, perhaps, 
a l l these works are tendentious - they are obviously 
biassed m favour of the doctrine w i t h which they deal 
or whose h i s t o r y they purport to t e l l Professor 
d'Entreves quite f r a n k l y announces his i n t e n t i o n to 
'concentrate on i t s merits'. On the other hand, Otto 
Gierke's Natural Law and the Theory of Society, though 
distinguished by meticulous and dispassionate scholar-
ship, devotes most of i t s a t t e n t i o n to the theory of 
na t u r a l law between roughly 1500 and 1800. 
For my part, then, I have t r i e d to i l l u s t r a t e at 
least the 'commanding heights' of the natural-law 
doctrine throughout i t s e n t i r e h i s t o r y . Having said 
t h i s , however, two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s at once become nec-
essary. F i r s t , I have devoted a great deal of space 
to c l a s s i c a l a n t i q u i t y , d e l i b e r a t e l y to correct the 
present imbalance i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Second, my t r e a t -
ment of what i s usually called 'modern' n a t u r a l law -
i . e . the period from about 1700 onwards - has been r e l -
a t i v e l y s u p e r f i c i a l . I have, m f a c t , been l a r g e l y at 
pains to point to the c o n t i n u i t i e s which subsist bet-
ween 'modern' n a t u r a l law and e a r l i e r forms. This 
r e l a t i v e s u p e r f i c i a l i t y i s due to the f o l l o w i n g r e l a t e d 
considerations. F i r s t , there i s hardly a shortage of 
books on Hobbes, Locke, the American Revolution, 
Human Rights, and what have you. Indeed, as my research 
was n e a r i n 6 completion, there appeared a book (Richard 
Tuck, Natural Rights Theories t h e i r o r i f i i n and devel-
opment ) which, to jud^e from the reviews, bids f a i r to 
become a d e f i n i t i v e work on the subject of nat u r a l 
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r i g h t s as such. Second, i t has been my i n t e n t i o n to 
remain, as f a r as possible, below a c e i l i n g of 80,000 
words, and i t has seemed to me correct to devote most 
of my space to the least well-documented areas of the 
subject I n f a c t , an extra chapter, dealing w i t h nat-
u r a l law as a p r a c t i c a l argument, especially m r e -
l a t i o n to the consent theory of a u t h o r i t y , has been 
l e f t out of the f i n a l version, on the advice of my 
supervisor. As matters stand, I do not doubt that a 
ce r t a i n amount of s u p e r f i c i a l i t y w i l l be detected over 
and above that to which I have already confessed I t 
i s undeniable that much has been l e f t out and s i m p l i i i e d . 
Neither do I doubt that some of my generalisations w i l l 
be thought questionable or inadequately substantiated. 
But I have t r i e d to avoid these - i n e v i t a b l e - blemishes 
as f a r as possible. Above a l l , I have t r i e d to main-
t a i n what Llax //eber c a l l s ' e t h i c a l n e u t r a l i t y ' - to 
present a c r i t i c a l assessment which i s as f a i r , cautious 
and di s i n t e r e s t e d as i t could be made. 
As to technical matters. //here more than one quot-
ati o n would have i l l u s t r a t e d the same point equally 
w e l l , I have usually chosen the shortest. flhere app-
r o p r i a t e , and w i t h due regard f o r the sense, I have 
abridged needlessly-long quotations, modernised archaic 
spellings and punctuations, and a l t e r e d modern punct-
uations to accommodate the quoted passage more com-
f o r t a b l y w i t h i n my own t e x t . The appearance of round 
brackets at points where, i n a p r i n t e d t e x t , square ones 
would be used i s due simply to the l i m i t a t i o n s of the 
standard typewriter keyboard; as i s the absence of 
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accents, umlauts, and so on. I do not imagine that 
these omissions w i l l seriously impede understanding. 
F i n a l l y , f o r reasons not e n t i r e l y of my own choosing, 
t h i s thesis has been w r i t t e n m two years, instead of 
the usual three. So f a r as I can discover, the need 
to hurry has resulted i n nothing worse than some 
melegancies of expression which, had I had more l e i s u r e 
f o r r e v i s i o n , I should not have allowed to remain. I n 
any event, I apologise f o r such marks of haste as may 
be found to d i s f i g u r e my work. 
My i n t e l l e c t u a l indebtedness i s very deep. Whether 
or not i t amounts to bankruptcy i s not f o r me to say. 
But I wish p a r t i c u l a r l y to thank the f o l l o w i n g Pro-
fessor A.J.M. Milne, f o r - but by no means only f o r -
his painstaking and forebeanng supervision, Pro-
fessors vY.M. von Leyden, F.E. Dowrick and i.Iichael 
Stokes, and Mr Henry Tudor, f o r t h e i r ever-helpful 
and penetrating comments and works of supererogation, 
and the s t a f f of the Durham University Library, esp-
e c i a l l y f o r so d e f t l y manipulating the I n t e r - L i b r a r y 
Loans service m my favour. 
I f i t were not absurd f o r a doctoral thesis to bear 
a dedication, t h i s one would be dedicated to my w i f e , 
Valerie. However d e f i c i e n t my assets may prove to be, 
i t i s only due to her encouragement and support that 
« 
I have been able to display them at a l l . 
R.V/. Dyson. 1980. 
Collmgwood College, 
University of Durham. 
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CHAPTER ONE NATURE AND CONVENTION. 
Natural Law and Mythology. 
I t i s as w e l l to stress at the beginning the sheer 
longevity, m some form or another, of the natural-law 
t r a d i t i o n of argument. I t would not be unreasonable 
to remark that there i s something decidedly ' p r i m i t i v e ' 
about i t s assumption that r e a l i t y i s morally as w e l l 
as c o g n i t i v e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e . I t might w i t h some plau-
s i b i l i t y be associated w i t h men whose culture i s d i s -
tinguished by what Karl Popper has cal l e d 'naive mon-
ism' - who ' l i v e i n a closed c i r c l e of taboos, of 
laws and customs...felt to be as i n e v i t a b l e as the 
r i s i n g of the sun, or the cycle of the seasons, or 
s i m i l a r obvious r e g u l a r i t i e s of nature. '^  I n a word, 
we might suggest that such an assumption i s m i t s e l f 
' natural' to anyone r e f l e c t i n g f o r the f i r s t time upon 
his circumstances m r e l a t i o n to other men and his 
environment. The point i s , of course, f a r too spec-
u l a t i v e to push very f a r . But the assumption m ques-
t i o n - or something very l i k e i t - c e r t a i n l y occurs as 
a frequent presupposition m the oldest extant records 
of thought containing attempts to make sense of the 
world and of human experience. I t i s , f o r example, 
extremely d i f f i c u l t to see the force of Leo Strauss' 
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remark that 'There i s no knowledge of natu r a l r i g h t m 
p 
the Old Testament.' The knowledge which Adam and Eve 
are said to have acquired i l l i c i t l y ' i n the midst of 
the garden' was s p e c i f i c a l l y knowledge of good and 
e v i l . Again, the B i b l i c a l version of the widespread 
near-eastern myth of a disastrous world-flood i s not 
merely an account of a na t u r a l cataclysm. I t i s a 
moral story - a didact i c n a r r a t i v e representing the 
forces of nature as being brought i n t o play as the 
punitiv e agents of the w i l l of an af f r o n t e d d e i t y . 
And the most obvious case of a l l , of course, i s the 
o b l i t e r a t i o n of the twin c i t i e s of Sodom and Gomorrah 
f o r an offence which, throughout the Bible, the w r i t -
ings of the Church Fathers, and m Jewish and Chus-
t i a n commentaries down to extremely recent times, has 
been i n s i s t e n t l y condemned as 'against nature', 'unn-
a t u r a l ' , 'the greatest of a l l sins.'^ 
I t i s clear enough that these stock examples of 
'sin' involve a reference to standards which are 'nat-
u r a l ' w i t h i n the usual meaning assigned to the word m 
e t h i c a l contexts 'natural' as d i s t i n c t from man-made 
or 'conventional'. The sin of Adam and Eve involved 
t h e i r exceeding the l i m i t s of what had o r i g i n a l l y been 
intended by God as 'human nature'. I t would, of course, 
be f a i r to point out that they transgressed a p o s i t i v e 
rather than a 'natural' i n j u n c t i o n , even though t h i s 
i n j u n c t i o n was divine rather than human - since a pro-
h i b i t i o n against eating the f r u i t of a c e r t a i n tree 
could hardly be said to 'stand to reason 1 / Indeed, the 
1 0 . 
story of the f a l l i s presented i n terms of a d i r e c t 
communication from God to Adam that he might eat the 
f r u i t of a l l the trees i n the garden save one. This, 
however, i s not the point. The important thing (at 
least f o r our present purposes) about the story of 
the f a l l i s i t s claim that good and e v i l were discovered 
rather than made by human beings, and that our respon-
s i b i l i t y f o r wrongdoing dates from the moment of that 
discovery. Also, m the case of the flood story, we 
notice that what i s at issue i s no mere breach of 
human ordinance, but the moral adequacy of the e n t i r e 
system of p r a c t i c a l arrangements so f a r made by f a l l e n 
man. They f a l ] short of the standards which the mind 
of God f i r s t imposed when the earth emerged from the 
waters of creation. The only remedy i s a re t u r n to 
the waters and a fresh s t a r t . I n short, i n t e g r a l to 
these examples i s the assumption that the universe i s 
not merely a c o l l e c t i o n of random or chance happenings. 
I t i s an ordered and purposive system, containing 
c r i t e r i a of conduct which are simply part of the un-
al t e r a b l e nature of things. We ignore these standards 
at our p e r i l , and t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n i s universal. The 
fl o o d a n n i h i l a t e d high and low a l i k e . What b e f e l the 
c i t i e s of the p l a i n befel them, not because they were 
Sodom and Gomorrah, but because of the i n t r i n s i c or 
objective wickedness of t h e i r c i t i z e n s ' l i v e s . And 
t h i s account of experience teaches that i t i s not only 
manifestly m our i n t e r e s t s to heed these 'natural' 
p r i n c i p l e s , but also that i t i s w i t h i n our power. .Ye 
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do indeed have knowledge of good and e v i l , and by rea-
son of t h i s knowledge i t s e l f - quite apart from any 
statute or w r i t t e n code - we can be held answerable 
f o r what we do. 
We s h a l l presently have occasion to return to the 
B i b l i c a l conception of nature. For the present, we 
note that the idea of a morally-ultimate l e g u l a n t y 
immanent w i t h i n the universe i s also a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of Greek mythology. The most obvious example, perhaps, 
i s the symbol of He]marmene - Fate or Destiny. Heim-
armene i s conceived - m the Homeric poems, f o r example 
- as meluctably regulating the m u l t i f a r i o u s and often-
c o n f l i c t i n g purposes of mortals and immortals a l i k e . 
At the l a s t analysis, i t reduces the chaotic a c t i v i t y 
and d i s p a r i t y w i t h i n the world to a f i n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
or u n i t y . Not even the gods themselves have power to 
c u r t a i l or control i t s operation. Not even they can 
save a man from the fa t e of death, f o r example - we 
r e c a l l that Zeus himself i s powerless to rescue his 
own son Sarpedon from death at the hands of Patroclus.5 
Also, and i n a n o t - d i s s i m i l a r vein, we might notice the 
early development, m the dramatic personifications of 
Homer and Hesiod, of the view that the universe i s m 
some sense permeated by a god-given Orderliness (Themis), 
which i s said to be 'the voice of the gods', from which 
Good Order (Eunomia) m human a f f a i r s comes, and of 
which every i n d i v i d u a l human decision as to what i s 
the Right or Just way (dike) ought to partake. Here 
(and I paraphrase a remark of Jane Harrison) we seem 
1 2 . 
to catch a glimpse of theology on the point of becoming 
transformed i n t o a s o c i a l philosophy.^ 
S t r i c t l y speaking, of course, a l l these examples are 
instances of an attempt to account f o r the world and 
f o r i t s being as i t i s by recourse to story rather than 
theory. I n other words, they f i g u r e m mythological 
na r r a t i v e s , which may or may not be 'the philosophy 
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or science of p r i m i t i v e men", but which, from our con-
temporary standpoint, we should not f e e l i n c l i n e d to 
regard as ei t h e r philosophy or science. At the same 
time, however, such myth-making i s patently not j u s t 
s t o r y - t e l l i n g w i t h a view to amusement. Myths may 
ent e r t a i n ; but they are not f a i r y - t a l e s , and neith e r 
are the stori e s which myth-makers t e l l m a l l cases 
s t r i c t l y speaking f i c t i t i o u s . Rather, they amount to 
an attempt to reduce the diverse and often unnerving 
experiences of the human condition to some kind of 
manageable order. As Henry Tudor puts i t , myth 
'explains the circumstances of those to whom i t i s 
addressed. I t renders t h e i r experience more coherent, 
o 
i t helps them understand the world m which they l i v e . ' 
Thus, the mythopoeic universe i s an anthropocentnc one 
- as we might expect. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t adopts the 
notion of cosmic order as a backdrop against which to 
i n t e r p r e t the facts of human experience, and so to dev-
elop a perspective upon the condition and destiny of 
man. And t h i s theme of a cosmic order common a l i k e 
to the world of human transactions and to nature as such 
begins to become a feature of a more s t r i c t l y p h i l o s -
1 3 . 
ophical debate w i t h i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e of Ionia 
and Magna Graecia during the s i x t h and f i f t h centuries 
BG. I t i s not at a l l implausible to regard such deb-
ate as having been carried over, so to speak, from 
the preoccupations c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the maker of 
myths. 
The number of examples upon which we might possibly 
draw i s considerable. I t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t f o r our 
present purposes to glance at the f o l l o w i n g Anax-
lmander of Miletus, the Pythagorean school, Hera-
c l i t u s of Ephesus, and the Sophists whose a c t i v i t y 
centred ( c h i e f l y ) upon f i f t h - c e n t u r y Athens. 
I I . 
Anaximander of Miletus. 
The evidence which i s now available to us i s comp-
a r a t i v e l y s l i g h t and, m very many respects, problem-
a t i c a l . Nevertheless, m the Ionian commercial c i t y -
state of Miletus during the f i r s t h a l f of the s i x t h 
century, we can at least begin to discern the emergence 
of a recognisably ' s c i e n t i f i c * preoccupation w i t h the 
order of nature. Broadly speaking, cosmogony begins 
to be separated from theogony, an attempt i s made to 
account f o r the r e g u l a r i t i e s of nature without d i r e c t 
recourse to mysteries and dramatic narratives of gods 
and heroes, and the genealogies and personifications 
so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Greek mythological w r i t i n g are no 
longer so c l e a r l y m evidence. Indeed, m pre-Socratic 
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philosophy as a whole, these f e a t u r e s are r e l e g a t e d , 
i f not completely to o b l i v i o n , a t l e a s t to a r e l a t i v e l y 
minor s t a n d i n g . The ' p h y s i c i s t s ' o f M i l e t u s (and the 
term i s A r i s t o t l e ' s ) d e r i v e t h e i r d e s c r i p t i v e language 
not so much from m y t h o l o g i c a l precursors as from the 
p r a c t i c a l a r t s and obse r v a t i o n a t f i r s t - h a n d . I n the 
words o f Emile B r e h i e r , ' A l l the analogies which make 
up t h e i r science show, along w i t h great i m a g i n a t i v e pre-
c i s i o n which, u n l i k e myth, admits o f no mysterious 
background, a greet d e s i r e to understand i n a c c e s s i b l e 
1C 
phenomena by r e l a t i n g them t o the most f a m i l i a r f a c t s . ' 
H.F. Cherniss has shown t h a t the a c t u a l views o f 
these M i l e s i a n p r o t o - p h i l o s o p h e r s - Thales, Anaximander 
and Anaximenes - may w e l l have been s e r i o u s l y d i s t o r t e d 
by t h e i r t r a n s m i s s i o n to p o s t e r i t y through A r i s t o t l e . ^ 
Broadly speaking, however, they a l l address themselves 
to a s i n g l e problem, u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to as t h a t o f 
'the One and the Many'. We may b r i e f l y f o r m u l a t e the 
problem i n the f o l l o w i n g terms. 
From the evidence which i s presented to us by our 
senses, we can h a r d l y help being aware of constant 
change and contingency m the un i v e r s e . The o b j e c t s 
of our experience come i n t o being, undergo changes o f 
vari o u s k i n d s , and e v e n t u a l l y pass away again. Yet, 
f o r a l l t h i s t r a n s i e n c e and d i v e r s i t y , i t s o v e r a l l 
c o n t i n u i t y suggests t h a t there i s some sense m which 
the m a n i f o l d universe i s also One - j u s t as, though an 
i n d i v i d u a l passes through many changes d u r i n g the t r a n s -
i t i o n from b i r t h to death, h i s i d e n t i t y as a re c o g n i s -
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able i n d i v i d u a l p e r s i s t s throughout h i s l i f e . The r a -
t h e r s o p h i s t i c a t e d q u e s t i o n , most c l e a r l y associated 
w i t h P l a t o , of whether the w o r l d o f change c o n s t i t -
utes the whole o f r e a l i t y , or whether there i s i n s t e a d 
a supersensible realm which i s somehow more r e a l , was 
to be r a i s e d , not by the philosophers o f M i l e t u s , but 
by Parmenides of Elea. The question to which the M i l -
esians themselves r e f e r i s o f a r a t h e r more elementary 
k i n d , namely How as i t t h a t t h a t which i s Many can 
also and a t the same time be One9 I n o t h e r words, 
What i s the fundamental or g u i d i n g n e c e s s i t y p e r s i s -
t i n g w i t h i n the contingency which we so c o n s t a n t l y per-
c e i v e 9 And the M i l e s i a n 'monists' each attempt to 
deal w i t h t h i s question m a b r o a d l y s i m i l a r way. They 
do so by proposing t h a t , beneath the m u l t i p l i c i t y and 
f l u x which are apparent to us, u n i t y and s t a b i l i t y 
s u b s i s t because the w o r l d i s made o f some fundamental 
simple substance. The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r 
t h i n g s from one another i s due to t h e i r being made o f 
t h i s substance m d i f f e r e n t forms or c o n f i g u r a t i o n s or 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s - j u s t as, f o r i n s t a n c e , snow, i c e and 
steam are j u s t water m d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s o f p h y s i c a l 
change. And they undergo changes because these forms 
o r c o n f i g u r a t i o n s or c o n c e n t r a t i o n s are not themselves 
i n v a r i a b l e o.r s t a b l e . 
Anaximander 1s view seems to have been somewhat as 
f o l l o w s . Our immediate experience o f the w o r l d suggest 
t h a t i t c ontains f o u r primary elements - e a r t h , a i r , 
vater and f i r e . These primary elements are c l a s s i f i a b l 
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as two p a i r s o f opposites - hot and c o l d on the one 
hand, wet and dry on the oth e r . There i s a sense, 
t h e r e f o r e , m which they are m i m i c a l t o one another, 
and so I t seems to Anaximander t h a t we cannot account 
f o r the universe by p o s t u l a t i n g one o f them as the 
fundamental substance o f which a l l t h i n g s are made. 
For i n s t a n c e , i f we were to propose t h a t water i s the 
fundamental substance, as had Thales, we should at once 
f i n d ourselves i n d i f f i c u l t i e s when we came to e x p l a i n 
the g e n e r a t i o n o f f i r e , since i t i s h a r d l y p l a u s i b l e 
to suggest t h a t water produces f i r e Also, since he 
holds t h a t the process o f coming i n t o being and pass-
i n g away i s e t e r n a l , Anaximander concludes t h a t the 
fundamental subgtance must be i n f i n i t e m extent or 
q u a n t i t y . I t must be such t h a t i t i s never e n t i r e l y 
used up, and h i s assumption i s t h a t no one o f the f o u r 
primary elements s a t i s f i e s t h i s c o n d i t i o n The f u n -
damental substance, t h e r e f o r e , cannot be water o r e a r t h 
or f i r e or a i r . Rather, i t must be something which i s 
com-non to a l l these t h i n g s w h i l e not a c t u a l l y being any 
one o f them. A c c o r d i n g l y , Anaximander proposes t h a t 
the universe m i t s p r i m o r d i a l s t a t e i s 'made o f a 
u b i q u i t o u s and u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d mass o f i n f i n i t e e x t e n t , 
i n which the f o u r elements are p o t e n t i a l l y but not 
a c t u a l l y contained. They are l a t e n t w i t h i n i t , but 
they have not yet come t o be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by reason 
of t h e i r possessing opposing p r o p e r t i e s . And t h i s 
fundamental substance he c e l l s the apeiron - the 
U n l i m i t e d o r Boundless. According t o Anaximander, the 
universe i s e t e r n a l l y i n v o l v e d m a c y c l i c process o f 
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c r e a t i o n , d e s t r u c t i o n and r e c r e a t i o n j ours, i t seems, 
i s o n l y one of an i n f i n i t e succession o f worlds. The 
apeiron i s m constant c i r c u l a r motion. Due (presumably) 
to the c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e o f t h i s motion, the elements 
l a t e n t w i t h i n i t become a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
the apeiron and from one another. Having become sep-
a r a t e d , however, they at once begin to encroach upon 
each o t h e r m a manner d i c t a t e d by t h e i r m u t u a l l y -
m i m i c a ] c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r e evaporates water and 
consumes a i r , e a r t h and water e x t i n g u i s h f i r e , water 
i s h o s t i l e to a i r ( i . e . , i f we are immersed m water 
we drown), and so on. I n s h o r t , i t i s through the 
various combinations o f invasions o f opposites t h a t 
the numerous t h i n g s which we perceive come i n t o being. 
They are compounds o f the f o u r primary elements. But 
although one or o t h e r o f the elements may have the as-
cendancy f o r a w h i l e , the balance i s i n e v i t a b l y redressed, 
and, j u s t as the g e n e r a t i o n of t h i n g s i s explained m 
terms o f the elements poaching on one another's t e r r -
i t o r y and combining, so too i s t h e i r d e s t r u c t i o n acc-
ounted f o r by the eventual r e t u r n o f the elements t o 
the a p e i r o n . And when a l l the elements have f i n a l l y 
c o l l a psed back i n t o the apeiron - when entropy i s complete 
1 3 
- the whole process begins over again J 
There i s no need f o r us to d w e l l on the s u b t l e t i e s 
and d i f f i c u l t i e s o f Anaximander's p o s i t i o n - although 
he does, i n c i d e n t a l l y , o f f e r some remarkable and p r e s c i e n t 
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conjectures as to the o r i g i n s o f l i f e . N e i t h e r need 
we digress i n t o a comparison o f h i s s p e c u l a t i o n s w i t h 
o f Thales and Anaximenes. Rather, what makes Anaximander 
18. 
o f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to us i s the f o l l o w i n g statement 
o f h i s cosmological view, r e p o r t e d by the n e o - P l a t o n i s t 
S i m p l i c i u s 
The heavens and the worlds which are / i t h i n them 
do not d e r i v e t h e i r existence e i t h e r from water 
o r from any o f the oth e r t h i n g s which we c a l l 
elements. Rather, they come from something else 
which i s u n l i m i t e d ( a p e i r o n ) i n i t s n a t u r e . And 
the source from which e x i s t i n g t h i n g s come i n t o 
being i s als o t h a t i n t o which they r e t u r n o f nec-
e s s i t y when they are destroyed. For they g i v e 
j u s t i c e and make r e s t i t u t i o n to one another f o r 
t h e i r i n j u s t i c e , according to the o r d e r i n g o f 
t i m e . 1 5 
I s t h i s j u s t a f i g u r a t i v e way o f speaking 7 Or i s i t 
a mode of understanding phenomena which r e a l l y makes 
no d i s t i n c t i o n between p h y s i c a l laws and moral norms, 
which are s a i d to ho l d 'of n e c e s s i t y ' 9 These are 
questions which we simply cannot answer c l e a r l y . The 
l a s t two sentences o f the passage j u s t quoted are i d -
e n t i f i e d by D i e l s and Kranz as Anaximander's i p s i s s i m a 
verba. But t h i s a t t r i b u t i o n r e s t s upon the words which 
immediately f o l l o w them m the t e x t of S i m p l i c i u s ' 
Physics• 'As Anaximander p o e t i c a l l y puts i t . ' This 
gloss seems both t o i d e n t i f y the words m question as 
a q u o t a t i o n , and t o i n d i c a t e t h a t they are indeed not 
to be understood l i t e r a l l y . On the oth e r hand, how-
ever, we are not j u s t i f i e d m assuming prima f a c i e t h a t 
the judgment o f S i m p l i c i u s can be taken as a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
I n s h o r t , i t i s p l a i n l y impossible t o make a c o n f i d e n t 
d e c i s i o n as t o how e x a c t l y we are t o take Anaximander 1s 
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reference to dike and a d i k i a , j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e . 
At the same time, however, i t i s a t l e a s t w i t h i n the 
bounds o f c r e d i b i l i t y to see here a suggestion, not 
u n l i k e t h a t which we encounter m the l i t e r a t u r e o f 
myth, to the e f f e c t t h a t the universe i s a moral order 
m which j u s t i c e o f n e c e s s i t y e v e n t u a l l y triumphs. I t 
may w e l l be t h a t , f o r Ananmander, there are normative 
p r i n c i p l e s i n t r i n s i c to n a t u r e , to which inanimate and 
animate c r e a t i o n a l i k e are s u b j e c t , and o f the o p e r a t i o n 
o f which we are reminded whenever we r e f l e c t upon change, 
c r e a t i o n and d e s t r u c t i o n . Such norms are not a r t i f a c t s . 
They are simply given as p a r t o f our o v e r a l l experience 
o f the n a t u r a l order. 
I I I . 
The Pythagoreans 
Pythagoras h i m s e l f came o r i g i n a l l y from the I o n i a n 
i s l a n d o f Samos ( i n c i d e n t a l l y , he i s not t o be con-
fused w i t h the o t h e r Pythagoras o f Samos, whose work 
as a s c u l p t o r i s mentioned by P l i n y and Pausanias). I n 
about 533BC, the government of the i s l a n d was seized 
by the t y r a n t P o l y crates ('an o l d r u f f i a n who became 
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immensely r i c h , and had a vast navy.'), w i t h the a s s i s -
tance o f the Egyptian Pharoah Amasis. Pythagoras i s 
s a i d to have become disenchanted w i t h the government 
o f P o l y c r a t e s (who 'was not much t r o u b l e d by moral 
s c r u p l e s , he got r i d o f h i s two brothers...and he 
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used h i s navy l a r g e l y f o r p i r a c y . ' ) He (Pythagoras) 
f l e d from the tyranny a t home to the I t a l i a n c i t y -
20. 
s t a t e o f Groton. On h i s a r r i v a l , he seems immediately 
to have become embroiled m p o l i t i c s . He i s s a i d to 
have founded a community o f some three hundred members, 
whose government was such t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
became to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes an a r i s t o c -
r a c y . 1 8 
Alas f o r Pythagoras, Croton soon became a f f l i c t e d w i t h 
r e v o l u t i o n He was turned out and o b l i g e d to w i t h -
draw to the neighbouring c i t y o f Metapontium, where 
he passed the remainder of h i s l i f e . Diogenes L a e r t i u s 
r e t a i l s the curious s t o r y t h a t he was assassinated by 
p o l i t i c a l opponents at an advanced o l d age, having 
refused t o make good h i s escape on conscientious grounds 
To f l e e would have meant c r o s s i n g a f i e l d o f beans 1^ 
Apart from these h a r d l y - c r u c i a l - and by no means 
s u b s t a n t i a t e d - b i o g r a p h i c a l d e t a i l s , we know almost 
n o t h i n g about Pythagoias' l i f e , d o c t r i n e s , d i s c o v e r i e s 
or immediate d i s c i p l e s . There i s an abundance o f t a l l 
s t o r i e s about him - most o f them h i g h m ent e r t a i n m e n t -
value, but u n f o r t u n a t e l y none o f them can be s a t i s -
f a c t o r i l y confirmed. At a l l events, there i s general 
agreement t h a t the biographies o f Diogenes L a e r t i u s , 
Porphyrius and Iamblichus are l a r g e l y apocryphal. Some 
evidence o f e a r l y date i s t o be found m the extant 
l i t e r a r y fragments o f Xenophanes, H e r a c l i t u s , Emped-
ocles and Io n . But t h i s evidence, which D i e l s and Kranz 
somewhat s t r a n g e l y c a l l ' d e c i s i v e l y i m p o r t a n t ' , veers 
w i l d l y from tne pugnaciously c r i t i c a l to the u n c r i t i c a l l 
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l a u d a t o r y . Indeed, the study o f Pythagoreanism m gen-
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e r a l i s , aa W.K.G. Guthrie remarks, 'perhaps the most 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l subject m a l l Greek philosophy.'*^ 
This n o t o r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y i s due c h i e f l y to three f a c -
t o r s . F i r s t , m the communities which Pythagoras i s 
s a i d t o have founded or i n s p i r e d , there was a r u l e o f 
secrecy so complete and so s t r i n g e n t t h a t 'no Pythag-
orean t e x t s became a v a i l a b l e u n t i l the time o f P h i l o -
22 
l a u s . 1 Second, the d i s c i p l e s o f Pythagoras are s a i d 
to have embraced the modest expedient o f a t t r i b u t i n g 
a l l t h e i r own opinions and d i s c o v e r i e s t o the Great 
Man w h i l s t themselves remaining anonymous. (The 
phrase ipse d i x i t , o r at l e a s t i t s Greek e q u i v a l e n t 
autos epha, i s supposed t o have o r i g i n a t e d w i t h the 
f o l l o w e r s o f Pythagoras.) T h i r d , Pythagoreanism 
seems t o have become d i v i d e d a t an e a r l y stage i n t o 
two more or less separate, and r a t h e r i n c o m p a t i b l e , 
departments the Acousmatics or Pythagoreans, whose 
i n t e r e s t s were m the mam r e l i g i o u s o r m y s t i c a l , and 
the Mathematicians, who concentrated on the s c i e n t -
i f i c s ide o f Pythagoras' teaching. Thanks to a l l t h i s , 
the h i s t o r i c a l evidence i s f u l l o f confusion. I t i s 
impossible to say e x a c t l y what the 'pure' teaching o f 
Pythagoras was, and there i s c e r t a i n l y no basis f o r 
any c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between Pythagoras and Pythag-
oreanism. The i d e n t i t y o f the d i s c o v e r e r o f the famous 
theorem about r i g h t - a n g l e d t r i a n g l e s , f o r example, 
cannot be discovered Thus, i t w i l l perhaps be no bad 
plan t o f o l l o w the cautious example o f A r i s t o t l e m 
the Metaphysics, and to use the terms 'Pythagoras', 
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'the Pythagoreans' and 'Pythagoreanism' i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y 
and as the context r e q u i r e s , w i t h o u t a t t e m p t i n g hope-
less f e a t s of a t t r i b u t i o n . 
So much by way o f i n t r o d u c t i o n . We can a t l e a s t say 
w i t h some.confidence, however, t h a t the schools o r 
communities associated w i t h the name o f Pythagoras 
were by way o f being r e l i g i o u s and moral f r a t e r n i t i e s . 
This much i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by a considerable body o f 
evidence. A f i v e - y e a r n o v i t i a t e , i n v o l v i n g a vow o f 
s i l e n c e , was a c o n d i t i o n o f acceptance i n t o f u l l mem-
ber s h i p , and the l i f e p r e s c r i b e d f o r the member was 
one o f great r i g o u r . The i n i t i a t e was r e q u i r e d to 
a b s t a i n from meat and beans (hence, presumably, the 
founder's f a t a l r e l u c t a n c e to trample over the bean-
f i e l d ) and to observe a number o f curious taboos which, 
according to Diogenes L a e r t i u s , had a symbolic s i g -
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m f i c a n c e f o r those committed to them. These f r a t -
e r n i t i e s have much m common w i t h the Orphic t h i a s o i , 
which spread throughout the Greek world from Athens t o 
Magna Graecia d u r i n g the s i x t h and f i f t h c e n t u r i e s 
w i t h a degree o f success amounting, at times, t o a 
f u l l - s c a l e r e l i g i o u s r e v i v a l ? ^ I n a sense, i t i s per-
haps the case t h a t Pythagoreemsm and Orphism both . 
c o n t r i b u t e d to the meeting o f a w i d e l y - f e l t need. 
The p r e c i s e nature o f the r e l a t i o n between Pythagor-
eanism and the Orphic brotherhoods cannot, m f a c t , 
be a s c e r t a i n e d , but there i s no doubt t h a t they, as 
i t were, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d c e r t a i n m y s t i c a l o r s p i r i t -
u a l c o n v i c t i o n s I n p a r t i c u l a r , the,y taught t h a t a l l 
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l i v i n g t h i n g s are m some way l i n k e d to one another by 
bonds o f u n i v e r s a l k i n s h i p , and t h a t the s o u l i s eng-
aged m a p i l g r i m a g e towards u l t i m a t e p e r f e c t i o n 
through a succession o f p u r i f y i n g r e i n c a r n a t i o n s i n 
human, animal and even c e r t a i n vegetable forms. These 
b e l i e f s ( t h e o r i g i n s o f which are a t t r i b u t e d by Hero-
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dotus to the Egyptians; provide the obvious and s t a n -
dard e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the Pythagorean d i e t a r y r e g u l a t i o n s , 
and o f such well-known yarns as the one t o l d by Xen-
ophanes t h a t Pythagoras once begged a man t o stop 
b e a t i n g h i s dog because he had recognised the voice 
o f a departed f r i e n d m the dog's y e l p i n g . T h e i r s i g -
n i f i c a n c e w i l l become apparent m a s h o r t w h i l e . 
To pass to cosmology The Pythagoreans appear t o 
have h e l d t h a t , m i t s o r i g i n a l s t a t e , the universe 
was a monad o f i n f i n i t e s i m a l magnitude, created we 
know not how, and surrounded by a U n l i m i t e d ( a p e i r o n , 
again) c o n t a i n i n g v o i d , b r e a t h or a i r , and time. This 
p r i m o r d i a l monad ' i n h a l e s ' v o i d , b r e a t h and time from 
the U n l i m i t e d (which explains how th i n g s come t o be 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ) , so t h a t the o r i g i n a l 
monad becomes a dyad, the dyad a t r i a d , and so f o r t h . 
The idea seems to be t h a t the universe s w e l l s l i k e a 
b a l l o o n , w h i l e at the same time d i v i d i n g l i k e a grow-
i n g c e l l , by sucking m the contents o f the U n l i m i t e d 
from w i t h o u t . Moreover, the whole universe i s s a i d to 
be a l i v i n g and b r e a t h i n g c r e a t u r e , v / i t h a u n i v e r s a l 
consciousness o f i t s own m which every p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t y 
has a share One i s reminded o f V/i l l i a m James's reference 
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to 'the vast slow-breathing. .Kosmos w i t h i t s dread 
27 ' abysses and unknown t i d e s . ' ( I n c i d e n t a l l y , vague h i n t s 
o f an a p p a r e n t l y s i m i l a r view are to be found m the 
small l i t e r a r y remains o f Thales and Anaximenes o f 
M i l e t u s . ) The Pythagorean Ecphantus o f Syracuse also 
describes the universe as a form o r i d e a l o f the d i v i n e 
power c a l l e d Mind o r Soul which i s s a i d to be the cause 
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The universe, however, i s not o n l y a l i v e . I t i s a l s o 
an ordered and l i m i t e d u n i t y from which chaos i s ab-
o l i s h e d and m which p r o p o r t i o n and beauty are f i r m -
l y e s t a b l i s h e d . A l l i t s p a r t s are subordinated to the 
o v e r r i d i n g purpose o f m a i n t a i n i n g the l i f e and i n t e g r i t y 
o f the whole, and evidence f o r t h i s o r d e r l i n e s s i s to 
be found m the r e g u l a r i t i e s of the day and n i g h t and 
m the wheeling o f the s t a r s . Indeed, Pythagoras i s 
s a i d to have been the f i r s t to use the word cosmos as 
a t e c h n i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c term, i m p l y i n g order, p r i n -
c i p l e , r a t i o n a l i t y and beauty. The Pythagoreans, l i k e 
Anaximander, h e l d t h a t t h i s o r d e r l y cosmos comes i n t o 
being as a product o f s t r i f e bet.veen opposites - m 
t h i s case, through the conquest o f the U n l i m i t e d by 
L i m i t ( p e r a s ) . This d o c t r i n e ranks as the c e n t r a l 
cosmological tenet o f Pythagoreamsm, and we note 
e s p e c i a l l y t h a t , where Anaximander had been ambiguous, 
the Pythagoreans d e p i c t the process whereby l i m i t s are 
imposed upon chao3 m q u i t e u n e a u i v o c a l l y moral terms. 
Order and l i m i t are good, d i s o r d e r and the absence o f 
l i m i t are e v i l . Thus, the cosmos i s generated by a 
s t r u g g l e between a n t a g o n i s t i c moral p r i n c i p l e s . 
One of the most perennial and best known of the con-
cepts of Pythagoreanism i s t h a t o f the universe being 
an harmonious order For the Pythagoreans, the n o t -
ions of order and l i m i t seem to have been most a r r e s t -
i n g l y e x e m p l i f i e d i n t h e i r d iscovery t h a t the notes 
produced by the two sections o f a s t r i n g s t r e t c h e d 
over a bridge g i v e simple musical i n t e r v a l s when the 
lengths on each side of the b r idge stand to one another 
m a simple numerical r a t i o . The p e r f e c t consonances 
are thus e x p r e s s i b l e as a r i t h m e t i c a l r a t i o s between 
the f i r s t f o u r i n t e g e r s - the f o u r t h by 4 3» the f i f t h 
by 3 2 and the octave by 2 1. I n o t h e r words, w h i l e 
the e n t i r e compass o f sound extending i n d e f i n i t e l y up-
wards and downwards m p i t c h i s a p e i ron, harmony and 
beauty e x i s t w i t h i n the l i m i t s represented by the sys-
tem o f numerical r e l a t i o n s between concordant notes. 
As Professor Cornford puts i t , 'The i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y 
o f sound i s reduced to order by the exact and simple 
law o f r a t i o m q u a n t i t y The system so d e f i n e d s t i l l 
c o ntains the u n l i m i t e d element m the blank i n t e r v a l s 
between the notes, but the u n l i m i t e d i s no longer an 
o r d e r l e s s continuum, i t i s c o n fined w i t h i n an order, 
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a cosmos, by the i m p o s i t i o n o f l i m i t or measure. 1 
So impressed were they by t h i s d i s covery t h a t the 
Pythagoreans came to regard the number ten - t h a t i s , 
the sum o f the f i r s t f o u r i n t e g e r s - as sacred. How-
ever, i t i s necessary to guard against being misled by 
Professor Cornford's remark t h a t t h i s numerical l i m i t 
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or measure i s an ' i m p o s i t i o n ' . I t i s indeed an im-
p o s i t i o n m the cosmological sense already o u t l i n e d -
t h a t i s , an i m p o s i t i o n by process of nature o f order 
upon d i s o r d e r . But i t i s important t o grasp t h a t i t 
i s not claimed t o be a man-madp i m p o s i t i o n . The f u l l 
f o r c e o f the Pythagorean di s c o v e r y l a y p r e c i s e l y m 
the f a c t t h a t i t revealed an o r d e r which i s i n h e r e n t m 
nature - which i s found out r a t h e r than created by 
human i n t e l l i g e n c e . Indeed, A r i s t o t l e suggests t h a t 
the e n t i r e s c i e n t i f i c system o f the Pythagoreans was 
m f a c t b u i l t upon t h i s i n i t i a l d i s c overy 
Since they n o t i c e d t h a t the a t t r i b u t e s and r a t i o s 
of the musical scales are n u m e r i c a l l y express-
i b l e , and since e v e r y t h i n g else then appeared to 
be modelled on numbers, number seemed to be the 
f i r s t t h i n g i n the whole o f n a t u r e , and the whole 
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o f heaven t o be harmony and number. 
I n the words o f Praenkel, 'Behind our w o r l d o f t h i n g s 
and happenings, they saw a r u l i n g w o r l d o f mathematical 
order, which.. gives t o a l l t h i n g s t h e i r appointed quan-
t i t y , form and p r o p o r t i o n , and so the p r i n c i p l e was 
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f o r m u l a t e d 'Number i s the p r i n c i p l e o f the w o r l d ' . ' 
We now come to what i s , f o r our purposes, the c r u c i a l 
p o i n t . Given t h e i r o v e r a l l account o f the universe, i t 
r e a d i l y f o l l o w s f o r the Pythagoreans t h a t to study the 
order o f nature i s to engage, not o n l y m science, but 
m a process o f e t h i c a l discovery as w e l l . IAoreover, 
t h e i r t h e o r y o f a j o i n t cosmological and moral harmony 
- and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e i r p o s t u l a t e t h a t the universe 
i t s e l f i s a l i v i n g and b r e a t h i n g e n t i t y - i s c l o s e l y 
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t i e d i n w i t h t h e i r b e l i e f m the t r a n s m i g r a t i o n o f 
souls and the k i n s h i p o f a l l l i v i n g t h i n g s . For i f a l l 
l i f e i s a k i n and, as i t were, m u t u a l l y interchangeable, 
then man's own i n d i v i d u a l s e l f i s i n v o l v e d m a my s t i c -
a l union w i t h the r e s t o f c r e a t i o n . I n t h i s connection, 
the f o l l o w i n g remarks o f the f i r s t - c e n t u r y polymath 
Alexander ' P o l y h i s t o r ' (paraphrased by Diogenes Laer-
t i u s ) are h i g h l y suggestive 
The a i r which immediately surrounds the e a r t h 
i s stagnant and unhealthy, and e v e r y t h i n g w i t h -
i n i t i s m o r t a l . But the upper a i r , which i s 
c o n s t a n t l y m motion, i s clean and wholesome, 
and e v e r y t h i n g m i t i s immortal, and t h e r e f o r e 
d i v i n e . . . . The s o u l i s a detached p o r t i o n o f the 
upper a i r . . . I t i s immortal, since t h a t from which 
i t has been detached i s immortal . .Hermes i s 
the guardian of souls...and i t i s he who b r i n g s m 
the disembodied souls from land and sea. The pure 
are taken up i n t o the highest r e g i o n , but the 
impure are f o r b i d d e n to approach e i t h e r the pure 
or each other. ..The most important t h i n g m a 
man's l i f e i s the winning o f h i s s o u l to good o r 
e v i l . Fortunate indeed are those who achieve 
goodness o f s o u l , f o r they would otherwise have 
no r e s t , nor any consistency o f purpose m what 
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they do from one day's end to the next. 
There are good reasons f o r supposing t h a t , taken m 
co n j u n c t i o n w i t h our o t h e r sources o f i n f o r m a t i o n , t h i s 
passage provides a s u b s t a n t i a l i n s i g h t i n t o the basis 
of the Pythagorean e t h i c a l l i f e . The upper a i r i s 
the w o r l d - s o u l , the seat o f i m m o r t a l i t y and d i v i n i t y . 
The spark o f s o u l m every man, which i s a detached 
p o r t i o n o f the w o r l d - s o u l , i s i t s e l f immortal, 'and 
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t h e r e f o r e d i v i n e . ' But the s o u l i s i n c a r c e r a t e d w i t h -
i n the body. I t must undergo a process of c a t h a r s i s 
or c l e a n s i n g through successive r e i n c a r n a t i o n s before 
i t can be 'taken up i n t o the highest r e g i o n s ' , there 
t o become one w i t h d i v i n i t y . The proper way o f l i f e 
f o r man, t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t which w i l l enable him to 
achieve s p i r i t u a l reunion w i t h the animate universe t o 
which he i s a k i n . And so a burning question a r i s e s 
I n what a c t i v i t i e s does such a way o f l i f e c o n s i s t 9 
For the Orphic communities mentioned a l i t t l e w h i l e 
ago, i t c o n s i s t e d m a p u n c t i l i o u s observance of the 
minutiae o f r i t u a l and taboo, and Pythagoreanism i t -
s e l f was generously s u p p l i e d w i t h such m i n u t i a e . But 
Pythagoreanism was f a r from being only a system of 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and r i t u a l observance. I t was als o 
a s c i e n t i f i c system whose exponents conceived t h e i r 
d i s c i p l i n e as p r o v i d i n g a key t o the understanding o f 
the n a t u r a l order and t h e r e f o r e o f the moral order a l s o . 
I n s h o r t , i t s e t h i c a l regimen was intended 'to f r e e 
the mind, to l i b e r a t e the d i v i n e p a r t o f the s o u l m 
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us', by f i n d i n g and f o l l o w i n g a v i r t u o u s way o f l i f e , 
n ot simply through r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e , but also through 
a systematic enquiry i n t o the nature o f t h i n g s . 
This l i n k a g e between s c i e n t i f i c o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
understanding and moral development i s perhaps t o be 
seen most c l e a r l y m the Pythagorean conception o f 
the s o u l i t s e l f as 
a k i n d o f harmony - harmony being a b l e n d i n g and 
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r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f opposites. 
29. 
I n o t h e r words - and we s h a l l p r e s e n t l y run across a 
very s i m i l a r p o i n t being made by P l a t o - the human 
p e r s o n a l i t y or 'soul' contains a number of d i s p a r a t e 
elements. The w e l l - o r d e r e d s o u l - what we should now 
c a l l the w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d p e r s o n a l i t y - i s one m which 
these elements are, so to speak, i n tune w i t h one an-
o t h e r . I t i s when t h e i r souls are m such a s t a t e o f 
harmony t h a t men f i n d ' r e s t . . . ( a n d ) . . . c o n s i s t e n c y o f 
purpose i n what they do from one day's end to the next.' 
And since goodness o f s o u l i s m t h i s sense to be 
understood as such a s t a t e , the m a t r i x o f the soul's 
p e r f e c t i o n i s to be found b u i l t - m to the harmonious 
cosmos i t s e l f 
V i r t u e i s harmony. So are good h e a l t h , God and 
a l l good t h i n g s . This i s why ( t h e Pythagoreans) 
say t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s made according to the laws 
of harmony.^ 
The i r every s t i p u l a t i o n as to what should or should 
not be done i s d i r e c t e d towards c o n f o r m i t y w i t h 
the d i v i n e . This i s t h e i r p o i n t o f departure, 
and t h e i r l i v e s are arranged e n t i r e l y w i t h a 
view t o f o l l o w i n g God. This i s the p r i n c i p l e 
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which d i r e c t s t h e i r philosophy. 
The good l i f e , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l be found m an absor-
bed study o f those d i s c i p l i n e s which most r e a d i l y y i e l d 
knowledge of the s t r u c t u r e o f r e a l i t y . And, as we 
might expect, the Pythagoreans counted as c h i e f amongst 
these geometry, a r i t h m e t i c , music and astronomy. The 
o b j e c t o f such study i s t o become more c l o s e l y acqu-
a i n t e d w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s by reason o f which r e a l i t y 
i s cosmion - o r d e r l y . And, m t h i s way, the student 
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h i m s e l f 13 brought more n e a r l y i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h 
these p r i n c i p l e s . The a s p i r a n t ' s own s o u l w i l l app-
roach p u r i t y i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n t o the i n t e n s i t y 
and success o f h i s e f f o r t s , u n t i l the c y c l e o f r e b i r t h 
i s at l a s t broken, and h i s s o u l , brought to a p e r f e c -
t i o n o f harmony, i s r e u n i t e d w i t h the l i v i n g and d i v i n e 
s o u l o f the cosmos. 
I t seems c l e a r , however, t h a t a l l t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s 
something more than a merely p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y . I t 
w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t Pythagoras and h i s three hundred 
adherents r e p u t e d l y turned the Grotonian c o n s t i t u t i o n 
i n t o an a r i s t o c r a c y - a l b e i t a s h o r t - l a v e d one - by 
the excellence o f t h e i r government. I t i s impossible 
to pronounce w i t h confidence on the question o f whether 
Pythagoras r e a l l y d i d organise a r i g h t i s t coup a t 
Croton. Indeed, i t i s impossible to say a n y t h i n g a t 
a l l concrete about the nature and extent of h i s a c t i v i t y 
i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . But a number o f h i s l a t e r f i f t h -
c e n tury d i s c i p l e s undoubtedly were p o l i t i c a l men, and 
- i n h e r e n t l i k l i h o o d apart - there i s evidence to sugg-
est t h a t the t h e o r e t i c a l basis o f t h e i r p o l i t i c s was 
an e x t r a p o l a t i o n from the cosmological t h e o r y t h a t 
o r d e r and l i m i t , and t h e r e f o r e moral excellence, are 
to be understood as m some sense numerical 
They s a i d t h a t j u s t i c e i s the f i r s t square number. 
...On some accounts, t h i s number i s f o u r , since 
f o u r i s the f i r s t square number of a l l . I t i s 
d i v i s i b l e i n t o equal p a r t s , and i t i s m a l l r e -
spects equal, since i t i s the product o f two and 
two According t o o t h e r s , i t i s n i n e , since nine 
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i s the f i r s t square of an odd number. 
31. 
I t would appear, then, t h a t the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f harmony 
o r j u s t i c e w i t h i n the State i s a m a t t e r o f seeing to i t 
t h a t the components o f the State c o n s i s t e n t l y stand t o 
one another i n a r e l a t i o n of e q u a l i t y . Moreover, the 
Pythagoreans also speak o f j u s t i c e as antipeponfchos -
• r e c i p r o c i t y ' or 'redress', and the suggestion here 
would seem to be t h a t the u n j u s t man i s he who has, 
w i t h o u t good reason, made h i m s e l f unequal m r e l a t i o n 
t o h i s f e l l o w s (a suggestion which reminds us of the 
remarks of A r i s t o t l e on the s u b j e c t o f ' p r o p o r t i o n a l ' 
e q u a l i t y ) . Presumably, t h e r e f o r e , harmony w i t h i n the 
State i s t o be preserved by removing from him what-
ever personal b e n e f i t s may have accrued to him through 
h i s u n j u s t p r a c t i c e s . This i s ' r e c i p r o c i t y ' , and such 
r e c i p r o c i t y m human a f f a i r s may be conceived as an-
swering to the mathematical r e g u l a r i t y of the n a t u r e l 
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order i t s e l f . 
IV. 
H e r a c l i t u s o f Ephesus. 
Like Pythagoras, H e r a c l i t u s 'the dark 1 i s a f i g u r e 
around whom b i o g r a p h i c a l and h a g i o g r a p h i c a l legends 
have tended t o p r o l i f e r a t e , so t h a t i t i s again im-
p o s s i b l e to separate f a c t from fancy. We can say 
no more than t h a t many o f h i 3 140-odd s u r v i v i n g f r a g -
ments do indeed have a k i n d of Nietzschean s t r i d o r 
which i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l account o f 
him as a misanthropic and disenchanted a r i s t o c r a t . 
32. 
Diogenes L a e r t i u s , f o r example, r e p o r t s t h a t the f o r -
b i d d i n g s t y l e o f h i s t r e a t i s e On Nature was a d e l i b -
e rate c o n t r i v a n c e to render h i s work incomprehensible 
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t o a l l but the s e l e c t few. 
Of Pythagoras and h i s s p e c u l a t i o n s , H e r a c l i t u s can 
f i n d n o t h i n g good to say 
Learning many t h i n g s i s not enough t o teach a 
man to be wise. I f i t were, i t would have 
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taught...Pythagoras 
Pythagoras, son o f Mnesarchus, engaged i n research 
more than anyone. Having compiled a c o l l e c t i o n 
o f o t h e r people's w r i t i n g s , he then passed them 
o f f as h i s own - as wisdom which was r e a l l y n o t h -
i n g more than quackery and f r a u d . ^ 
We are, m f a c t , safe enough m re g a r d i n g much of what 
H e r a c l i t u s says as a c r i t i q u e o f the Pythagorean p h i l -
osophy. Prom what we can t e l l , h i s e t h i c a l and p o l -
i t i c a l views seem to have been c l o s e r to those o f the 
Pythagoreans than he might have cared t o admit. Both 
Pythagoras and H e r a c l i t u s exemplify the t r a d i t i o n a l 
Greek maxim, a r i s t o n metron - 'moderation (measure, 
r e s t r a i n t , e t c . ) i s best.' But H e r a c l i t u s c e r t a i n l y 
has no time f o r the Pythagorean p i c t u r e o f the universe 
as a s t a b l e , harmonious and enduring order brought 
about through the i m p o s i t i o n o f l i m i t upon the un-
l i m i t e d 
War i s the f a t h e r and k i n g o f a l l . He r e v e a l s 
some to be gods, others men. He reduces some 
to s e r v i t u d e , others he makes f r e e . ^ 
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I t i s e s s e n t i a l to grasp t h a t war i s u n i v e r s a l , 
t h a t j u s t i c e i s s t r i f e , and t h a t e v e r y t h i n g comes 
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about through s t r i f e and n e c e s s i t y . 
H e r a c l i t u s • suggestion i s t h a t e v e r y t h i n g we experienc 
comes i n t o being o n l y through encroaching on or i n -
vading something else - t h i s i s a p p a r e n t l y the p o i n t 
of the dictum t h a t war i s 'the f a t h e r and k i n g of a l l . 
As he also puts i t , 
P i r e l i v e s the death o f e a r t h and e a r t h l i v e s 
the death o f f i r e . 'Vater l i v e s the death o f 
a i r and a i r t h a t o f w a t e r . ^ 
Cold t h i n g s become hot, hot t h i n g s become c o l d . 
That which i s wet d r i e s , and t h c t which i s dry 
i s moistened. ^6 
This r e c u r r e n t m o t i f of oppositeo and t h e i r antagon-
ism (which i s m many respects r a t h e r l i k e the remarks 
of Anaximander) i s employed by H e r a c l i t u s t o answer 
what we have seen t o be one of the fundamental ques-
t i o n s o f p r e - S o c r a t i c philosophy V/hat i s the r e l -
a t i o n s h i p between u n i t y and m u l t i p l i c i t y , s t a b i l i t y 
and change 9 Throughout the fragments which are now 
ex t a n t , H e r a c l i t u s i s c o n s t a n t l y to be found j u g g l i n g 
w i t h the idea o f opposites, and e v i d e n t l y d e l i g h t i n g 
m the paradoxes which the idea generates i n h i s 
c l e a r l y r a t h e r a l l u s i v e mmd 
God i s both day and n i g h t , w i n t e r and summer, 
war and peace. That i s to say, he 13 a l l the 
opposites a t once He changes j u s t as f i r e , 
when i t i s mixed w i t h spices, i s named accord-
i n g t o the perfume o f each. 47 
34. 
Immortals are m o r t a l and mo r t a l s immortal, 
each l i v e s the death o f others and dies t h e i r 
l i f e . 4 8 
I n one sense, H e r a c l i t u s wishes to say t h a t opposites 
are r e a l l y the same - although q u i t e what he means by 
t h i s has been much chewed over and i s very f a r from 
c l e a r , not l e a s t o f a l l because H e r a c l i t u s seldom 
allows h i s readers the l u x u r y o f c l a r i t y . As Michael 
Stokes remarks, however, • p r a c t i c a l l y any a n a l y s i s m 
modern E n g l i s h o f the connection between the oppos-
i t e s i s l i k e l y t o be o v e r e x p l i c i t and to i n t r o d u c e 
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terms which H e r a c l i t u s would not have understood.' ^ 
I t would seem t h a t h i s meaning i s a t l e a s t t h i s t h a t 
t h e r e i s no reason f o r any f i n a l d i s j u n c t i o n betvveen 
any one t h i n g and i t s o p p o s i t e , since a l l t h i n g s are 
c o n s t a n t l y changing i n t o t h e i r opposites. And the 
most fundamental dichotomy which H e r a c l i t u s discerns 
i s t h a t between f i r e on the one hand and the w o r l d o f 
appearance on the other. The universe as a whole i s 
a consuming movement. I n i t , p e r c e p t i b l e o b j e c t s are 
c o n s t a n t l y being transmuted i n t o elemental f i r e , and 
elemental f i r e i s i t s e l f c o n s t a n t l y becoming p e r c e p t i b l e 
o b j e c t s . This elemental f i r e , he suggests, i s d i v i n e , 
e t e r n a l and uncreated, and the process o f t r a n s f o r -
mation m which i t i s engaged i s never-ending. The 
wo r l d , he says, 
was not created by gods or men. I t was, i s and 
ever s h a l l be an immortal f i r e , i g n i t e d i n mea-
sures and e x t i n g u i s h e d m measures 
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A l l t h i n g s are c o n s t a n t l y being exchanged f o r 
f i r e and f i r e f o r a l l t h i n g s , l i k e goods f o r 
g o l d and gold f o r goods. 51 
On the whole, i t would seem t h a t H e r a c l i t u s uses ' f i r e 
as a metaphor f o r constant change, r a t h e r than p o s t u l a t -
i n g i t as the k i n d o f basic s t u f f about which the M i l -
esians speculated. To cut a long and r a t h e r complic-
ated s t o r y s h o r t , however, what he wishes t o say i s 
t h a t n o t h i n g r e a l l y i s . Only change i s r e a l , and a l l 
i s a continuous becoming and passmg-away. I n d i v i d u a l 
t h i n g s are as they are a t any g i v e n time only because 
o f an ever-present t e n s i o n or balance - p a l m t o n o s 
( l i t e r a l l y , 'backward-stretching') - h o l d i n g betv/een 
the opposing forces of change 
I t i s not g e n e r a l l y recognised t h a t what makes 
a t h i n g coherent i s i n t e r n a l t e n s i o n . Harmony 
c o n s i s t s m te n s i o n between opposites, as m the 
case o f the bow or the l y r e . 5 2 
The u n i v e r s e , then, i s o n l y a cosmos m the Pythag-
orean sense t o the e x t e n t t h a t opposing s t r e n g t h s are 
more or l e s s e q u a l l y matched. I f any one element were 
ever to become d e c i s i v e l y s t r o n g e r than the o t h e r s , 
i t would presumably e n g u l f e v e r y t h i n g f o r t h w i t h . 
Such s t a b i l i t y as there i s , t h e r e f o r e , i s the r e s u l t 
o f continuous s t r u g g l e between f i n e l y - b a l a n c e d f o r c e s . 
And there i s no sense m the suggestion t h a t such s t r -
uggle i s somehow re p r e h e n s i b l e or ' u n j u s t ' - j u s t i c e 
i s s t r i f e 
H e r a c l i t u s takes issue w i t h the poet who says, 
' I f o n l y s t r i f e between gods and men might be 
destroyed ' For i f t h ere were no high and low, 
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there would be no musical scale I f there were 
not the opposing p r i n c i p l e s o f male and female, 
there would be no l i v i n g t h i n g s -*3 
The poet m que s t i o n , i n c i d e n t a l l y , i s Homer, who 
'ought to be thrown out o f the contests and whipped' 
- presumably f o r being so misguided as to d e s i r e the 
c o l l a p s e of the n a t u r a l order.54 
I f a l l t h i s be t r u e , then, what i s wisdom, and where 
i s i t t o be f o u n d 9 P l a i n l y , i t cannot c o n s i s t , as f o r 
the M i l e s i a n s and Pythagoreans, m the amassing of 
data about the p h y s i c a l w o r l d , f o r ' i t i s i mpossible 
5b 
t o step twice i n t o the same r i v e r . ' I n o t h e r words, 
whatever i s known about the v/orld at any p a r t i c u l a r 
moment us bound to be f a l s i f i e d sooner or l a t e r by 
the e t e r n a l process o f change And t h i s , presumably, 
i s why ' l e a r n i n g man^ t h i n g s i s not enough t o teach a 
man t o be wise.' (Indeed, the s i t u a t i o n which he d e p i c t s 
i s even worse than H e r a c l i t u s appears t o n o t i c e . I f 
e v e r y t h i n g i s changing i n t o i t s opposite m a never-
ceasing f l u x , then knowledge i t s e l f i s presumably a l -
ways t u r n i n g i n t o ignorance, p e r c e p t i o n i n t o non-
p e r c e p t i o n , and so f o r t h I f we c a r r y the study o f 
H e r a c l i t u s to i t s l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n , we s h a l l be 
compelled to concede t h a t the study of H e r a c l i t u s -
o r o f a n y t h i n g else - i s , i f not impossible, then a t 
l e a s t u t t e r l y f u t i l e . ) 
Nevertheless, H e r a c l i t u s suggests t h a t i t i s poss-
i b l e t o penetrate beyond the c u r t a i n o f ambiguous 
sense-data and contemplate the p r i n c i p l e - the logos -
by reason o f which a l l t h i n g s are c o n s t a n t l y becoming 
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something e l s e . JVisdom, according to H e r a c l i t u s , i s 
t r u e judgment as to the purpose which d i r e c t s 
a l l t h i n g s through a l l things.5& 
Now, t h i s word logos, w i t h i t s very wide spectrum o f 
p o s s i b l e E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t s (word, speech, 
argument, e x p l a n a t i o n , reason, d e f i n i t i o n , r a t i o n a l 
p r i n c i p l e , p r o p o r t i o n , and 30 f o r t h ) i s a n o t o r i o u s 
Gordian knot from the p o i n t o f view o f the t r a n s l a t o r . 
D i s t i n g u i s h i n g common from t e c h n i c a l senses i s a t the 
best of times f a r from easy. I n the case o f H e r a c l i t u s 
t h i s o r d i n a r y d i f f i c u l t y i s compounded by the o f t e n 
extreme o b l i q u i t y o f h i s language, and by the f a c t t h a t 
since h i s w r i t i n g s s u r v i v e o n l y as a c o l l e c t i o n o f 
fragments, we are deprived o f c o n t e x t u a l clues as to 
h i s meaning. Thu3, i n i t s d i f f e r e n t occurrences, the 
logos o f H e r a c l i t u s seems to be God, f i r e , matter, a 
p h y s i c a l i n g r e d i e n t o f t h i n g s , the cause o f change, 
the p r i n c i p l e which accounts f o r change, a p r i n c i p l e 
i n d i c a t i v e of an o v e r a l l purpose in the u n i v e r s e , and 
a r u l e o f conduct. Presumably, h i s o v e r a l l meaning 
i s something along the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s . The logos 
i s the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e o f o r g a n i s a t i o n m a u n i -
verse otherwise c o n s i s t i n g e n t i r e l y o f contingency and 
change. I t i s to be seen m the o r d e r l i n e s s of the 
succession o f t h i n g s , and, from t h i s o r d e r l i n e s s , we 
may i n f e r the presence m the universe of design o r 
purpose. The logos denotes a u n i f y i n g formula o f 
p r o p o r t i o n or moderation which expresses, w h i l e a t 
the same time also m some way c o n t r o l l i n g , the 'meas-
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u r e s 1 i n which f a r e i s i g n i t e d and e x t i n g u i s h e d . I n 
s h o r t , i t r e f e r s to the balance of nat u r e - and, o f 
course, i n s o f a r as the balance of nature i s conceived 
as being the work of God, i t r e f e r s t o God. 
Obscure, odd, and indeed tormented as so many of 
h i s u t terances sound, H e r a c l i t u s ' i n s i s t e n c e upon 
balance o r moderation - upon the p r e c i s e d i s p o s i t i o n 
o f opposed f o r c e s - as a c e n t r a l f e a t u r e o f nature i s 
not r e a l l y very f a r removed from the Pythagorean doc-
t r i n e of l i m i t . Most important o f a l l , apprehension 
o f the logos i s s a i d t o b r i n g w i t h i t not o n l y wisdom 
of the k i n d to which the s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t o r might 
a s p i r e , but moral wisdom as w e l l 
Moderation i s the g r e a t e s t of v i r t u e s , and wisdom 
i s to speak the t r u t h and, g i v i n g heed t o what 
nature r e q u i r e s , t o act a c c o r d i n g l y . 
H e r a c l j tus i s f a r from being a l o v e r of h i s f e l l o w 
men, and c e r t a i n l y no o p t i r r u s t as to the p e r f e c t i b -
i l i t y of human n a t u r e . But he i n s i s t s t h a t i t i s 
because they do not know the logos r a t h e r than out 
of simple wickedness t h a t 'the m a j o r i t y o f men are 
e v i l and only the few good.' ^8 
One must f o l l o w t h s t which i s common. But although 
the logos i s common to a l l , the many l i v e as though 
they had a wisdom p e c u l i a r to themselves 59 
Also, i t i s b r o a d l y i m p l i e d t h a t the logos ought to be 
accepted as the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e o f p o l i t i c a l as w e l l 
as o f i n d i v i d u a l conduct 
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I f we are to speak w i t h understanding, we must 
r e l y upon t h a t which i s common to a l l , j u s t as 
a c i t y must r e l y on i t s laws - indeed, more so, 
since the laws o f men are themselves nourished 
by one d i v i n e law, which has more than enough 
power t o h o l d sway as f a r as i t w i l l . ^0 
R. Singh remarks t h a t a l l subsequent e l a b o r a t i o n s o f 
the theory o f n a t u r a l law may be regarded as f o o t -
er A 
notes to t h i s fragment. ' I t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g , how-
ever, to n o t i c e a reference m H e r a c l i t u s to a k i n d 
of cosmic j u s t i c e r a t h e r r eminiscent o f the remark o f 
Anaximander quoted e a r l i e r - a cosmic j u s t i c e a p p l i c a b l e 
e q u a l l y t o man and t o the heavenly bodies 
The sun w i l l not go beyond i t s measures. I f i t 
does, the Erinyes, maidservants of j u s t i c e , w i l l 
f i n d i t out. 6 2 
H e r a c l i t u s c l e a r l y conceives the logos as a meta-
p n y s i c a l q u a n t i t y . I t has an existence o f i t s own, 
independent of t h a t o f the mind which apprehends i t . 
I n a word, i t i s t here whether we know i t o r n o t . I t 
seems, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t h i s s e v e r a l a l l u s i o n s to the 
logos as being 'common' or 'common to a l l ' do not 
i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s t o be found m those t h i n g s m 
respect o f which common agreement has been reached. 
Rather, i t looks as though the logos i s common m the 
more suggestive sense o f being a p r i n c i p l e v/hich 
a p p l i e s everywhere - which ' d i r e c t s a l l t h i n g s through 
a l l t h i n g s . ' Also, i t would appear t h a t the f o l l o w i n g 
gloss by Sextus Empiricus on H e r a c l i t u s ' account of 
how we a c t u a l l y come to know the logos i s i n c o r r e c t 
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According to H e r a c l i t u s , we become s e n t i e n t when 
we draw m t h i s d i v i n e logos by b r e a t h i n g , and, 
though f o r g e t f u l when asleep, we recover our 
senses when we wake up again. For m sleep, 
when the passages o f the senses are shut o f f , 
the mind w i t h i n us i s deprived o f i t s k i n s h i p 
w i t h the enveloping substance, and b i e a t h m g 
remains as a r o o t , as i t were - as the o n l y 
remaining p o i n t of attachment. Since i t i s 
deprived m t h i s way, the mind loses hold o f i t s 
former power o f memory. But, on waking, i t once 
more emerges through the passages o f sense, as 
i t were through windows, and renews i t s powers 
of reason by meeting w i t h the enveloping sub-
stance. ^3 
I t h i n k i t r a t h e r probable t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s 
suggested by H e r a c l i t u 3 ' complaint t h a t most men l i v e 
as though they were asleep. I t i s d i f f i c u l t , however, 
to see t h a t he r e a l l y could have understood the logos 
m t h i s way - as a k i n d o f a l l - p e r v a s i v e s t u f f which 
fl o w s m through the sense-organs of every man who 
i s a c t u a l l y awake. Quite apart from a n y t h i n g e l s e , 
i t does not, m f a c t , seem to be the case t h a t Hera-
c l i t u s took the view attacked by P l a t o m the f i r s t 
h a l f o f the Theaetetus t h a t knowledge and sensation 
are coextensive. Also, i f the logos were t o be under-
stood m the manner which Sextus Empiricus recommends, 
then there would be no reason why every man whose senses 
were not s e r i o u s l y d e f e c t i v e should not always be f u l l y 
possessed of the logos and t h e r e f o r e always be wise 
and good. Yet t h i s q u i t e c l e a r l y i s not H e r a c l i t u s ' 
view His repeated complaint i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t most 
41. 
men behave as though they were asleep - t h a t i s , they 
b e t r a y almost no consciousness o f the logos at a l l . 
On the whole, i t i s much more s a t i s f a c t o r y to un-
derstand H e r a c l i t u s as embracing what we might c a l l 
an e l i t i s t r a t i o n a l i s m to account f o r the way m which 
the logos comes t o be known by those who know i t . I t 
seems obvious t h a t one might become aware o f i t through 
a study o f the processes o f change m the e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d , and the f l o w i n g m o f sensory impressions 
c l e a r l y i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f our engaging m 
such a study. A f t e r a l l , i f we were not r e c e i v i n g 
such impressions, we should not be having any exper-
iences at a l l - we should be asleep or dead. But 
sensation, though necessary, i s not i t s e l f a s u f f i c -
i e n t c o n d i t i o n , f o r 
Eyes and ears are bad witnesses f o r men whose 
souls do not understand t h e i r language.^4 
I n o t h e r words, i t looks as though knowledge of the 
logos i s u l t i m a t e l y open only to those who have a 
c e r t a i n frame of mmd or d i s p o s i t i o n o f s o u l . Wis-
dom, we remember, i s s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d not t o be 
acquired through l e a r n i n g . And one p o s s i b l e i m p l i c -
a t i o n o f t h i s i s t h a t a form o f wisdom must already 
be present before l e a r n i n g can take place at a l l . 
H e r a c l i t u s conveys the impression t h a t , m one sense, 
t h j s 'wisdom* c o n s i s t s , not p r i m a r i l y m the f o l l o w i n g -
up o f e m p i r i c a l i n t e r e s t s , but m i n t r o s p e c t i o n o r the 
quest a f t e r self-knowledge. His boast i s said t o have 
been t h a t he was no man's d i s c i p l e - t h a t a l l h i s know-
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65 ledge came from w i t h i n h i m s e l f . Less e n i g m a t i c a l l y , 
i t seems m any case obvious t h a t the search f o r w i s -
dom i s not l i k e l y to be undertaken, s u c c e s s f u l l y or 
a t a l l , by anyone who does not a]ready possess a 
c e r t a i n i n n a t e l y c r i t i c a l and i n q u i s i t i v e cast of 
mind. And those w i t h o u t these requirements - the 
masses - simply ' l i v e as though they had a wisdom 
p e c u l i a r t o themselves ' 
Phis e l i t i s m i s c a r r i e d over i n t o the l e a s t obscure 
o f a l l H e r a c l i t u s ' dark sayings h i s trenchant remarks 
about o t h e r people, whicn m t u r n have c l e a r p o l i t i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s 
To me, one f i r s t - r a t e man i s worth ten thous-
s a n d . 6 6 
I n s u b o r d i n a t i o n should be put down w i t h more 
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a l a c r i t y than i f i t were a b l a z i n g f i r e . 
The best men choose one t h i n g above a l l else 
e t e r n a l g l o r y amongst mo 
are l i k e o v erfed c a t t l e . 
m r t a l s . But the masses 
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The usual and q u i t e reasonable guess i s t h a t H e r a c l i t u s 
was an exponent o f an a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l ideology 
tha t he .vould wish t o recommend t h a t man who i s 'best' 
m the sense t h a t he knows the logos as the best man 
f o r the jo b o f m a i n t a i n i n g the S t a t e . Presumably, a l s o , 
' m a i n t a i n i n g the S t a t e ' i s , to H e r a c l i t u s ' mind, a 
question o f s u s t a i n i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e degree of balance 
and t e n s i o n between the forces e x i s t i n g w i t h i n s o c i e t y . 
V/e might p e r f e c t l y w e l l understand h i s thought as 
running along b r o a d l y s i ^ i l o r l m e 3 to those p r e s e n t l y 
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t o be developed more endurmgly by Plato i n the Rep-
u b l i c The evidence does not e n t i t l e us to regard t h i s 
as a n y t h i n g more than a c o n j e c t u i e , but i t i s by no 
means an improbable one. 
V. 
These few examples o f p r e - S o c r a t i c s p e c u l a t i o n i l l -
u s t r a t e something o f two broad m o t i f s which are d i r -
e c t l y o f i n t e r e s t to us. F i r s t , they i n d i c a t e a pro-
nounced departure from the terminology and outlook o f 
the myth-maker. I t i s t r u e t h a t Pate, Necessity, 
d i v i n e a c t i v i t y , and so on a l l have some p a r t to play 
m much o f the l i t e r a t u r e o f p r e - S o c r a t i c philosophy. 
But the i n e v i t a b i l i t i e s of nat u r e are no longer r e -
garded simply as matters which have to be taken on 
t r u s t and accounted f o r i n d i r e c t l y or a l l u s i v e l y , by 
way o f dramatic n a r r a t i v e s o f gods and heroes. Rather, 
t h i n g s are conceived as happening as they do m acc-
ordance w i t h u n i v e r s a l ' n a t u r a l ' p r i n c i p l e s vvhich, 
though knowledge o f them may m some sense be con-
d i t i o n a l upon a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n of mind or a c u i t y 
o f i n s i g h t , human r a t i o n a l i t y can nonetheless d i s c o v e r 
and begin to understand. 
Second, however, the pr e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f myth m a 
sense continue to make t h e i r presence f e l t . These 
u n i v e r s a l n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s are not presented m 
terms o f a d i s t i n c t i o n between p h y s i c a l laws and moral 
norms. Thus, the conclusion - l a t e r to be so fundament 
to Socrates - begins to a r i s e m philosophy t h a t , m 
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order to become a good man, i t i s necessary also t o 
become a wise man. I t i s very d i f f i c u l t to know what 
to make of Anaximander's elemental ' j u s t i c e * , and i t 
would c e r t a i n l y be a mistake to ask the passage from 
S i m p l i c i u s to bear a great deal of weight The mys-
t e r i o u s logos o f H e r a c l i t u s , however, i s c ] e a r l y not 
simply a f o r m u l a t i o n o f p h y s i c a l r e g u l a r i t y or the 
motive f o r c e o f change, although m d i f f e r e n t contexts 
i t i s p o r t r a y e d as both. I t would be f a i r to say t h a t , 
at l e a s t m the fragments which are now extant (and 
q u i t e p o s s i b l y not at a l l ) , H e r a c l i t u s never succeeds 
m 'unpacking' i t e n t i r e l y . Nevertheless, i t i s p l a i n -
l y h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t knowledge o f the logos confers 
not only s c i e n t i f i c or t h e o r e t i c a l understanding, but 
r i g h t - t h i n k i n g a l s o . To H e r a c l i t u s ' mind, the con-
d i t i o n o f the wo r l d i s on the whole u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , 
and he a t t r i b u t e s t h i s p r e c i s e l y to the f a c t t h a t the 
m a j o r i t y o f men t r y to l i v e a t odds w i t h n a t u r e . 
Through ignorance o r f o l l y , they e i t h e r cannot or w i l l 
not become acquainted w i t h the c r u c i a l p r i n c i p l e o f 
measure or moderation which both informs t h a t n a t u r a l 
order and stands as the proper c r i t e r i o n o f a l l 
behaviour. 
I t i s w i t h the Pythagoreans, however, t h a t the e n t e r -
p r i s e o f d e r i v i n g norms from the study o f nature may 
be s a i d t o reach i t s c u l m i n a t i o n m pr e - S o c r a t i c thought 
Here, we f i n d an e n t i r e communal form o f l i f e appar-
e n t l y p r e d i c a t e d upon the d o c t r i n e t h a t personal per-
f e c t i o n and u l t i m a t e reunion w i t h the supernal are t o 
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be achieved, not merely through the observance o f 
r e l i g i o u s e x t e r n a l s , but through r e l i g i o u s devotion 
and observance coupled w i t h a c t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
contemplation. More a c c u r a t e l y , perhaps, the a c t i v i t y 
o f the philosopher i s understood as a c t u a l l y being a 
k i n d o f r e l i g i o u s observance. As John Burnet puts 
i t , 'The o r i g i n a l i t y o f Pythagoras c o n s i s t e d i n t h i s , 
t h a t he regarded s c i e n t i f i c , and e s p e c i a l l y rnathematica 
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study as the best purge of the s o u l . ' Just as the 
universe i s a cosmos, so i s each i n d i v i d u a l a micro-
cosmos I n him are r e p l i c a t e d those same p r i n c i p l e s 
of order and l i m i t which c o n s t i t u t e the n a t u r a l order, 
so t h a t m the l i m i t s which contemplation d i s c l o s e s 
there are also to be found the proper l i m i t s o f human 
conduct. 
V I . 
The Sophists. 
By the middle o f the f i f t h c e n t u r y BG, however, many 
developments were on f o o t - p a r t i c u l a r l y m Athens -
which could h a r d l y f a i l t o u n s e t t l e moral and p o l i t -
i c a l d o c t r i n e s developed from b e l i e f s which had them-
selves taken t h e i r e s s e n t i a l shape d u r i n g the Homeric 
p e r i o d . The f i f t h century began w i t h the Persian and 
ended w i t h the Peloponnesian wars. I t was a p e r i o d 
o f acute and r e l a t i v e l y r a p i d s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and 
economic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , and o f trade and c o l o n i s a t i o n . 
I t was the p e r i o d d u r i n g which Athens h e r s e l f became 
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the c e n t r e of a maritime Empire, the p o l i t i c a l c e n t r e 
of H e l l a s , and a point of c u l t u r a l focus to v/hich i n -
t e l l e c t u a l s were drawn from a l l over the Greek-
speakmg world. I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t was a p e r i o d of 
g a t h e r i n g i n t e r e s t m other peoples and t h e i r c u l t u r e s 
- an i n t e r e s t most c l e a r l y e x e m p l i f i e d , perhaps, m 
the work of Herodotus. A r i s t o t l e t e l l s us t h a t 
A f t e r the P e r s i a n wars, men pushed f u r t h e r a f i e l d , 
t a k i n g the whole of knowledge as t h e i r province, 
making no d i s t i n c t i o n , but seeking ever-broader 
a r e a s of study. , u 
And, as S i r E r n e s t B a rker remarks, ' i f a study of 
anthropology l e d to any s c i e n t i f i c c o n c l u s i o n , i t 
must have d r i v e n men, contemplating the i n f i n i t e 
v a r i e t y of savage customs, to doubt the e x i s t e n c e of 
71 
any n a t u r a l or u n i v e r s a l law.' Such doubts may a l s o 
have been f o s t e r e d by the u l t i m a t e l y r a t h e r dead-end 
c h a r a c t e r of p r e - S o c r a t i c s c i e n c e . Thales supposed 
the world to be made of water, Anaximander of apeiron, 
Anaximenes of a i r , and so on. C l e a r l y , not a l l of 
them could be r i g h t , but no experimental s c i e n c e was 
yet a v a i l a b l e by means of which p u r e l y deductive 
c o n c l u s i o n s about the nature of the world could be 
t e s t e d Broadly speaking, the e f f e c t of the d i s a g r e e -
ments and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of p r e - S o c r a t i c s c i e n c e was 
such as to c r e a t e an atmosphere of s c e p t i c i s m w i t h 
regard to t h e o r e t i c a l study m p u r s u i t of a b s o l u t e 
t r u t h s , and a corresponding i n c l i n a t i o n on the p a r t 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l s to devote t h e i r r e s o u r c e s to the more 
modest ta s k of f i n d i n g s o l u t i o n s to immediate p r a c t i c a l 
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problems. The prevalence of such a s t a t e of mind i s 
w e l l - i l l u s t r a t e d by the a c t i v i t i e s of the l o o s e l y -
c o n s t i t u t e d group of t e a c h e r s c e n t r e d upon Athens 
c a l l e d the S o p h i s t s . 
The u n f o r t u n a t e S o p h i s t s have had a n o t o r i o u s l y bad 
p r e s s - indeed, almost u n r e l i e v e d l y bad u n t i l George 
Grote's n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of them. 
They have commonly been seen as the embodiment of 
what S i n c l a i r c a l l s 'many-sided and unscrupulous 
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c l e v e r n e s s ' , and the word ' s o p h i s t i c a l ' has come to 
have the same overtones of mendacity and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
s h a r p - p r a c t i c e as ' J e s u i t i c a l ' . T h i 3 a t t i t u d e seems 
to begin w i t h P l a t o , whose a t t i t u d e towards S o p h i s t s 
i s g e n e r a l l y e i t h e r one of r i d i c u l e (the Euthydemus) 
or contempt (the S o p h i s t ) . As Hegel puts i t , ' I t i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y through the o p p o s i t i o n of S o c r a t e s and 
P l a t o t h a t the S o p h i s t s have come i n t o such d i s r e p u t e 
that the word now s i g n i f i e s t h a t , by f a l s e r e a s o n i n g , 
some t r u t h i s e i t h e r r e f u t e d or made dubious or some-
t h i n g f a l s e i s proved or made p l a u s i b l e . ' ^ 
P l a t o ' s response to the S o p h i s t s i s not, m f a c t , one 
of u n r e l i e v e d h o s t i l i t y . The p o r t r a i t s of Protagoras 
of Abdera and Gorgias of L e o n t i n i which emerge from 
the P l a t o n i c dialogues named a f t e r them are by no means 
u n a t t r a c t i v e . But i t i s a t the same time w e l l to bear 
m mind t h a t such knowledge of the S o p h i s t s as comes 
to us through P l a t o (and A r i s t o t l e ) r e f l e c t s the d i s -
p o s i t i o n s of authors who <vish e m p h a t i c a l l y to d i s s o c -
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l a t e themselves, i f not from the most i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
i m p r e s s i v e of the S o p h i s t s , at l e a s t from what they 
take to be the p o s s i b l e u n d e s i r a b l e consequences of 
t h e i r a c t i v i t y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e no bad plan to r e -
f l e c t t h a t the word s o p h i s t e s i t s e l f means no more 
than that a man i s sophos - ' w i s e 1 , or 'good' m the 
sense of being h i g h l y - a c c o m p l i s h e d - m r e s p e c t of 
whatever happens to be h i s p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . I t 
i s used, f o r example - and o f t e n m f l a t t e r i n g or 
complimentary contexts - of mathematicians, cosmol-
ogers, poets, and men of p r a c t i c a l I n g e n u i t y m gen-
e r a l . ^ T h e a c t i v i t y of the S o p h i s t s whom we s h a l l 
c o n s i d e r was - c h i e f l y , though not e x c l u s i v e l y -
nothing more s i n i s t e r than that of p r o v i d i n g a course 
of i n s t r u c t i o n designed to turn a young man i n t o an 
e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e . As Jaeger puts i t , they 
s e t out 'to educate the l e a d e r s of the people.'^^And 
the demand f o r such i n s t r u c t i o n i s to be understood 
m the l i g h t of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of 
Athens h e r s e l f . The o l d H e l l e n i c t r i b a l a r i s t o c r a c y 
- of which Homer, Pindar, Hesiod, Theognis and q u i t e 
p o s s i b l y H e r a c l i t u s may be regarded as spokesmen -
had what we might not a l t o g e t h e r f l i p p a n t l y c a l l an 
o l d - s c h o o l - t i e m e n t a l i t y . Broadly speaking, t h e i r 
assumption was that a r e t e - a l l - r o u n d p e r s o n a l ex-
c e l l e n c e , and p a r t i c u l a r l y the a b i l i t y to conduct 
o n e s e l f w e l l m p u b l i c l i f e - i s a q u a l i t y p o s s e s s e d 
by the few and t r a n s m i t t e d only by h e r e d i t y T h i s , 
m i t s e l f , v/as taken to be a p l a i n f a c t of human nature 
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and, as A l b i n Lesky puts i t , 'a c o r n e r s t o n e of a r i s -
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t o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h y . 1 I n h e r i t e d e x c e l l e n c e s might 
indeed b° brought more n e a r l y to p e r f e c t i o n by t r a i n -
i n g . I n p a r t i c u l a r , they might be drawn out and dev-
eloped by a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h and emulation of d i s t i n -
guished men as J a e g e r remarks, 'the nobleman edu-
c a t e s o t h e r s by p r e s e n t i n g to them an e t e r n a l i d e a l , 
to which they have a duty to conform.'^But a man born 
without these e x c e l l e n c e s m h i 3 blood, so to speak, 
could not a c q u i r e them. I n Athens, however, the 
s u c c e s s i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms of Draco, Solon, 
P e r i c l e s and G l e i s t h e n e s had p r o g r e s s i v e l y widened 
and d i v e r s i f i e d the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c -
i p a t i o n , w h i l e at the same time emasculating the p o l -
i t i c a l s tronghold of the t r a d i t i o n a l a r i s t o c r a c y , 
the A r e o p a g i t i c C o u n c i l . Moreover - most t e l l i n g of 
a l l , perhaps - the war a g a i n s t P e r s i a had been won, 
not by o l d - s t y l e Homeric noblemen and t h e i r f e u d a l 
r e t a i n e r s , but by well-armed and w e l l - t r a i n e d c i t i z e n 
armies. To cut a long s t o r y s h o r t the p o l i t i c a l 
h i s t o r y of Athens do\/n to the S o p h i s t s had been the 
h i s t o r y of the displacement from p o l i t i c a l pre-eminence 
of the gentleman by the c i t i z e n - and p a r t i c u l a r l y by 
the n e w l y - r i c h c i t i z e n s made wealthy by the growth of 
trade a f t e r the P e r s i a n tfars. Under the democratic 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , the Athenian c i t i z e n could r i s e to a 
p o s i t i o n of i n f l u e n c e , or indeed eminence, without 
the advantages of noble b i r t h . But, to do so, he 
would need the a b i l i t y to win the support of o t h e r 
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c i t i z e n s , to conduct h i m s e l f to good e f f e c t m the 
lawcourts and p u b l i c a s s e m b l i e s , and, m s h o r t , to 
hold h i s own m a l l forms of c o n t r o v e r s y and debate. 
The education which the ambitious c i t i z e n sought, 
t h e r e f o r e , was one which i n c l u d e d a l a r g e measure of 
t r a i n i n g m the a r t of p u b l i c speaking. And although 
i t would be a mistake to suppose t h a t they had no 
other i n t e r e s t s , i t was upon the c u l t i v a t i o n of t h i 3 
a r t t h a t the S o p h i s t s tended to c o n c e n t r a t e . 
T h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n as not to be understood, however, 
merely as a r a t h e r unworthy peddling of f o r e n s i c or 
r h e t o r i c a l a r t f u l dodges m r e t u r n f o r a f a t f e e . ^ O u r 
acquaintance w i t h the two best-known of the S o p h i s t s , 
Protagoras and Gorgias, suggests t h a t t h e i r t e a c h i n g 
was to a l a r g e extent based upon, or at l e a s t j u s t -
i f i e d m terms of, an a c a d e m i c a l l y p e r f e c t l y r e s p e c -
t a b l e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s c e p t i c i s m . The f o l l o w i n g 
famous fragment i s p r eserved by P l a t o from P r o t a g o r a s ' 
popular t r e a t i s e On Mature ( t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h i s 
t r e a t i s e was 'popular' d e r i v e s from i t s catchy a l -
t e r n a t i v e t i t l e , K a t a b a l l o n t e s - which means, roughly, 
Knock-Dovn Arguments) 
Man i s the measure of a l l t h i n g s of t h i n g s 
t h a t a r e , that they a r e , and of things t h a t 
are not, that they a r e not. ^9 
I t i s not c l e a r what S i r E r n e s t Barker has m mind 
when he s a y s that Protagoras i s here recommending 
'a robust empiricism' as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the pre-
vious attempts of p h i l o s o p h e r s 'to f i n d 3ome hidden 
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u n i t y of the u n i v e r s e . ' Protagoras does not seem to 
be recommending any one method of a c q u i r i n g knowledge 
as a g a i n s t any other. Rather, the account of h i s 
theory of knowledge given m the Theaetetus suggests 
that h i s view harks back to the flux-cosmology of 
H e r a c l i t u s , and amounts to something l i k e t h i s . t h a t , 
s i n c e the world i s so f u l l of change and u n c e r t a i n t y , 
we cannot ever say anything which might unambiguously 
be shown to express knowledge or ep:steme at a l l . 
S t r i c t l y speaking, Protagoras i s t a l k i n g about l a n g -
uage r a t h e r than knowledge, but, f o r p r a c t i c a l pur-
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poses, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not important. To put i t 
v e r y b r i e f l y , he seems to have h e l d that any one 
statement about what i s the case - any one logos -
can always be matched by another and a n t i t h e t i c a l one 
which might e q u a l l y w e l l be t r u e , and which may indeed 
w e l l be 'true* from the standpoint of whoever u t t e r s i t . 
What t h i s b o i l s down to i s the c o n c l u s i o n that a l l 
statements a r e statements of mere o p i n i o n (doxa), and 
t h a t , on the f a c e of i t , there i s no compelling reason 
why your opinions should be accorded any more - or 
any l e s s - weight than mine. S o c r a t e s understands 
him as having supposed t h a t 
Nothing i s one and i n v a r i a b l e , and you could not 
r e a l l y a t t r i b u t e one q u a l i t y to anything at a l l . 
I f you c a l l i t l a r g e , i t w i l l a l s o seem s m a l l . 
I f you c a l l i t heavy i t w i l l a l s o seem l i g h t , 
and so f o r t h . No p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g or q u a l i t y , 
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indeed nothing a t a l l , i s one 
And t h i s i s c l e a r l y a l l a p a r t of f a m i l i a r c u r r e n t 
m e t a p h y s i c a l debate. I n f a c t , Protagoras i s s a i d to 
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have produced a volume of a n t i t h e t i c a l statements 
(th e A n t i l o g i a e ) arranged m such a way as to show 
th a t there i s always more than one s i d e to any argument, 
and that no one of them can c o n c l u s i v e l y be shown to 
be f a l s e . 
Gorgias of L e o n t i n i takes up a somewhat s i m i l a r pos-
i t i o n m h i s t r e a t i s e On Not-Being or On Nature. His 
f i r s t t ask i s to show t h a t , by u s i n g the techniques 
of the p h i l o s o p h e r s , we can appear to demonstrate that 
even p a l p a b l e a b s u r d i t i e s a r e t r u e . H13 own p a r t i c -
u l a r c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s game i s to defend the t h e s i s 
that nothing e x i s t s , and t h i s i s q u i t e p o s s i b l y to 
be understood as a r e t o r t to such f i g u r e s as Zeno of 
E l e a , who by h i s famous paradoxes had seemed to e s -
t a b l i s h on impregnable grounds c o n c l u s i o n s w h o l l y at 
v a r i a n c e w i t h o r d i n a r y experience and common sense. 
Second, Gorgias remarks t h a t we cannot be 3ure that 
our own e x p e r i e n c e s c o n s t i t u t e some ab s o l u t e k i n d of 
knowledge - again, because he can see no way of r e c -
o n c i l i n g c o n f l i c t i n g v iewpoints or a n t i t h e t i c a l l o g o i . 
H i s point here i s t h a t man has no experience, sensory 
or r a t i o n a l , which i s such as to e l i m i n a t e the poss-
i b i l i t y of h i s e x p e r i e n c i n g something e l s e , and can 
t h e r e f o r e make no statement about the nature of t h i n g s 
which can be shown to be e i t h e r more or l e s s t r u e than 
i t s a n t i t h e s i s . F i n a l l y , he holds t h a t , even i f we 
could have knowledge, i t would m any case be of a 
r a t h e r p r i v a t e kind. We could not communicate i t to 
anyone - or, more p r o p e r l y , we could never be sure t h a t 
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we had made anyone e l s e understand our meaning -
s i n c e , s t r i c t l y speaking, language conveys only our 
account of our e x p e r i e n c e s . I t does not convey thp 
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e x p e r i e n c e s themselves. 
There i s undeniably something r a t h e r s t r a n g e about 
t h i s s c e p t i c i s m . F o r i n s t a n c e , the examples g i v e n m 
the Theaetetus convey the im p r e s s i o n t h a t , so f a r as 
Protagoras :s concerned, the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t 'man us 
the measure of a l l t h i n g s ' i s a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n based 
upon those a r e a s of d i s c o u r s e m v/hich the t r u t h of a 
given statement i s r e l a t i v e to the ci r c u m s t a n c e s of 
the man whose statement i t i s . I f you a r e s t r o n g and 
I am weak, the same sack of potatoes w i l l f e e l heavy 
to me and l i g h t to you. I f I am hot and you are c o l d , 
the breeze which f e e l s warm to you w i l l f e e l c o l d to 
me, and so f o r t h . I n such c a s e s as these, there i s 
o b v i o u s l y no f u t u r e m t r y i n g to show t h a t one of us 
i s wrong by proving t h a t a 25 kilogram sack of po-
ta t o e s i s ' r e a l l y ' heavy or ' r e a l l y ' l i g h t . I n a sense, 
i t i s both, and we a r e both r i g h t - given our r e s p e c t i v e 
s t r e n g t h s . And the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n v o l v e d 
m a t t r i b u t i n g both h e a v i n e s s and l i g h t n e s s to the 
same o b j e c t a t the same time i s only apparent. But 
t h i s k i n d of t h i n g does not o b v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
man i s the measure of 'the t o t a l i t y of t h i n g s under-
stood as a c t i o n or as experience', as U n t e r s t e m e r 
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puts i t . I f you and I d i s a g r e e over ( s a y ) the ques-
t i o n of whether poached eggs a r e poisonous o r not, o r 
over whether the water m the swimming-pool i s a s o l i d 
or a l i q u i d , then the means of d e c i d i n g which of us i s 
r i g h t a r e q u i t e ready to hand. I t i s perhaps not 
beyond the l i m i t s of p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t poached eggs 
have suddenly or w i l l unexpectedly become poisonous 
- any more than i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to hold the p o s i t i o n 
that the whole of experience i s a dream, or t h a t there 
a r e no other minds, or whatever s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n 
you happen to fancy. But these a r e not p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of a kind t h a t most people would t r e a t a 3 s e r i o u s 
p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I n o t h e r words, experience 
seems to a s s u r e us t h a t nature i s a t l e a s t s u f f i c -
i e n t l y uniform to enable us to go about our o r d i n a r y 
b u s i n e s s m a r e a s o n a b l y u n c a t a s t r o p h i c - and indeed 
s u c c e s s f u l - way. Perhaps the most t h a t could be s a i d 
i s that there a r e some spheres of d i s c o u r s e such t h a t , 
i f you say one t h i n g and I say another, n e i t h e r of 
our opinions can be shown to be true at the expense of 
the other. But Protagoras and Gorgias appear to hold 
t h a t t h i s kind of u n c e r t a i n t y i n f e c t s a l l d i s c o u r s e , 
and t h i s c l e a r l y won't do. 
Although they may have o v e r s t a t e d the case m t h i s 
r e s p e c t , however, what i s important f o r our present 
purposes i s the s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e i r remarks 
to moral and p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . The f o l l o w i n g remark 
of Protagoras i n d i c a t e s the nature of t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n . 
Whatever seems r i g h t and praise.vorthy to a 
p a r t i c u l a r S t a t e i s r i g h t and p r a i s e w o rthy 
to i t , f o r as long as i t holds i t to be so *^ 
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So f a r as p o l i t i c s i s concerned, the s c e p t i c a l view 
of t h i n g s j u s t o u t l i n e d i n v o l v e s a sharp d i s j u n c t i o n 
between nature ( p h y s i s ) and convention (nomos), and 
an a s s o c i a t e d recommendation t h a t p o l i t i c s be regarded 
as a p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l and, as i t were, l o c a l i s e d a c t -
i v i t y . I n other words, there i s no point m t r y i n g to 
base the c o n v e n t i o n a l arrangements of corporate l i v i n g 
upon standards of a b s o l u t e r i g h t sought out from w i t h -
i n the n a t u r a l order. N e i t h e r i s there any point m 
t r y i n g to e v a l u a t e the arrangements of other S t a t e s 
i n terms of such standards. V/e cannot know e i t h e r t h a t 
such standards ex.ist or what they a r e , and, even i f 
we could, we could not convince anyone whose opi n i o n 
happened to be that we were wrong. P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , 
t h e r e f o r e , i s not a matter of t r y i n g to b r i n g our laws 
and other i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o accord w i t h supposedly 
u n i v e r s a l t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . Rather, i t i s a 
matter of d e s i g n i n g or changing them a c c o r d i n g to what 
i s a p p r o p r i a t e o r expedient to our - p u r e l y contingent 
- c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and w i t h an eye to the s u c c e s s f u l 
achievement of whatever ends we happen to agree m 
d e s i r i n g . C l e a r l y , some d e c i s i o n s w i l l be ' b e t t e r ' 
than o t h e r s i n the sense of more s u c c e s s f u l m s e c u r i n g 
the ends which they are designed to s e r v e . But no 
d e c i s i o n w i l l be ' b e t t e r ' than another m the sense 
of being ' t r u e r * or more c l o s e l y a l i g n e d w i t h some 
'absolute r i g h t ' . The p o l i t i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e man, 
t h e r e f o r e , w i l l be one w i t h i n whom there are two w e l l -
developed a p t i t u d e s F i r s t , there w i l l be that of 
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i d e n t i f y i n g what i s expedient and, second, there w i l l 
be that of i n d u c i n g o t h e r s to form the opinion that 
i t 13 expedient and to a c t a c c o r d i n g l y . Whether a 
man can l e a r n the f i r s t of these a p t i t u d e s , or whether 
- as Gorgias suggests - i t i s simply an i n n a t e f l a i r 
or ' d i v i n e g i f t ' , i s a vexed question. ^B\xt Gorgias 
and Protagoras both agree t h a t the second of them, 
a t l e a s t , i s something which a t e a c h e r might be a b l e 
to communicate to h i s p u p i l s . 
I n h i s e l a b o r a t e r h e t o r i c a l s e t - p i e c e , the Encomium 
of Helen, Gorgias h i n t s at a m e c h a n i s t i c theory of 
human mot i v a t i o n r a t h e r l i k e that subsequently to be 
developed by Hobbes and Spinoza. As he puts i t , 
I t i s a law of nature that the s t r o n g e r i s not 
subordinated to the weaker but the weeker i s 
subjugated and dominated by the s t r o n g e r , the 
s t r o n g e r i s the l e a d e r w h i l e the weaker i s the 
e n t r e a t e r . ^6 
Hi s view seems to be t h a t , m any predicament where 
two or more courses of a c t i o n are open to us, we a r e 
caught m a p l a y of f o r c e s which push us e i t h e r towards 
or away from the v a r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The course of 
a c t i o n upon which we do a c t u a l l y s e t t l e w i l l depend 
simply upon which s e t of f o r c e s e v e n t u a l l y happens to 
prove the s t r o n g e s t . And the immediate point of t h i s 
f o r Gorgias' argument i s t h a t there i s no j u s t i f i c -
a t i o n f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l p r a c t i c e of blaming Helen 
of Troy f o r her d e s e r t i o n of her husband. I t i s t r u e 
t h a t , by so doing, she brought gre a t misfortune upon 
57. 
hei compatriots and t h e i r enemies a l i k e . But she 
acted as she d i d , not out of wickedness or p e r v e r s i t y , 
but simply because the f o r c e s i m p e l l i n g h e r towards 
d e f e c t i o n were the s t r o n g e s t of the f o r c e s to which 
she was s u b j e c t . These f o r c e s i n c l u d e d such t h i n g s 
as p h y s i c a l c o e r c i o n and b o d i l y desire^. But, above 
a l l , they i n c l u d e d the p e r s u a s i v e power of speech. 
P e r s u a s i o n i s a powerful potentate, who w i t h 
f r a i l e s t , f e e b l e s t frame works wonders, For i t 
can put an end to f e a r and make v e x a t i o n v a n i s h , 
i t can i n s p i r e e x u l t a t i o n and i n c r e a s e compassion.^ 
More g e n e r a l l y , the extent of Gorgias' f a i t h an the 
power of p e r s u a s i o n i s i l l u m i n a t e d by h i s remarks i n 
the Gorgias, where r h e t o r i c i s r e p r e s e n t e d as a kind 
of m a s t e r - p r o f e s s i o n 
On many o c c a s i o n s , I have done the rounds v/ith my 
b r o t h e r or o t h e r p h y s i c i a n s and found a p a t i e n t 
r e f u s i n g to take medicine or undergo su r g e r y 
or c a u t e r i s a t i o n . And where the p h y s i c i a n has 
f a i l e d to t a l k him i n t o i t , I have succeeded -
simply and s o l e l y by means of the a r t of r h e t o r i c . 
I g i v e you my solemn word that i f a p h y s i c i a n and 
a r h e t o r i c i a n were to go together i n t o any c i t y 
you c a r e to name, and there speak a g a i n s t one 
another before the Assembly, . f o r the job of 
p h y s i c i a n , you would f i n d the p h y s i c i a n h i m s e l f 
beaten hands-down, and the r h e t o r i c i a n having 
the job f o r the a s k i n g . ®£3 
I n s h o r t , what we do m any given s t a t e of a f f a i r s w i l l 
be m l a r g e measure determined - l i t e r a l l y so, i t seems 
- by how we are persuaded ' I was persuaded' and ' I 
was compelled' amount, f o r the purposes of j u s t i f i c -
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a t i o n , to very much the sane t h i n g . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e 
to demonstrate that any one course of a c t i o n i s m any 
a b s o l u t e sense b e t t e r than another. But i t i s a t l e a s t 
p o s s i b l e to present one s i d e of a question more f o r c e -
f u l l y or more p l a u s i b l y than i t s a l t e r n a t i v e s , and so 
to determine, by means of a k i n d of deception, which 
s i d e i s d i s c a r d e d and which upheld. And the knack of 
doing t h i s i s something which can be taught. I n one 
sense, i t i s the a r t of the poet or d r a m a t i s t , who 
i s a b l e , as i t were, to take command of the imagin-
a t i o n and f e e l i n g of h i s audience. I n another, i t i s 
the a r t of public" speaking, which formed so c e n t r a l 
a p a r t of the Sophi3t c u r r i c u l u m . 
V I I . 
So f a r as we can t e l l , both Protagoras and Gorgias 
were men of eminently mild and moderate v i e A s . We 
n o t i c e , f o r example, the almost t o t a l - embarrassed 7 
- s i l e n c e which Gorgias maintains m the Gorgias 
w h i l e h i s f e r o c i o u s young admirer C a l l i c l e s advances 
and defends what Jaeger c a l l s h i s ' t r a n s v a l u a t i o n of 
a l l v a l u e s . ' D e s p i t e h i s confidence m the sheer 
power of r h e t o r i c , Gorgias i s q u i t e ready to concede 
- although w i t h doubtful c o n s i s t e n c y - that t h i s power 
should not be used improperly, to g a m u n f a i r advan-
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tages or to t y r a n n i s e the weak. Although no stigma 
a t t a c h e s to Helen, h e r ' b a r b a r i a n ' abductor, P a r i s , 
deserves only to be h e l d m contempt. 9°Agam m the 
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Gorgias, Gorgias defends the a c t i v i t y of the r h e t o r -
i c i a n by analogy w i t h that of the boxer. Boxers, 
he p o i n t s out, sometimes put t h e i r a b i l i t i e s to dep-
l o r a b l e uses by a s s a u l t i n g t h e i r p a r e n t s and f r i e n d s , 
but no-one on t h i s account condemns the whole a r t of 
boxing as such. S i m i l a r l y , those who condemn r h e t o r i c 
might f a i r l y be asked to d i s t i n g u i s h between the a r t 
i t s e l f end i t s improper use 
The o r a t o r can speak a g a i n s t anyone and on any 
s u b j e c t m such a way as to win over the crowd 
to whatever c o n c l u s i o n he wishes to be drawn. 
But to say that he can i s not to say that he 
should undermine the r e p u t a t i o n s of p h y s i c i a n s 
or o t h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l people He ought to use 
h i s s k i l l f a i r l y , j u s t as he would use h i s prow-
ess as an a t h l e t e . 91 
For h i s p a r t , Protagoras' view i s r a t h e r l i k e t h a t 
advanced a g a i n s t the r e v o l u t i o n p r i e s of 1709 m Burke's 
R e f l e c t i o n s on the R e v o l u t i o n m France, or the case 
more r e c e n t l y made out by Popper f o r 'piecemeal s o c i a l 
e n g i n e e r i n g . ' To Protagoras' mind, the d e v i l we know 
i s b e t t e r than the d e v i l we don't. He suggests t h a t , 
s i n c e we cannot know or a s s e r t that any one course of 
a c t i o n i s a b s o l u t e l y the best per se, and s i n c e our 
concern i s w i t h c o n t r i v i n g things i n whatever way 
happens to be a p p r o p r i a t e to our circumstances and 
d e s i r e s , i t w i l l be prudent to l e a v e w e l l enough alone 
w h i l e our e x i s t i n g arrangements are working s a t i s -
f a c t o r i l y . Throughout the Protagoras, h i s emphasis 
i s upon t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s end p r a c t i c e s , and 
upon 'doing the done t h i n g . ' He s t r e s s e s the v a l u e of 
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education, of l e a r n i n g the accepted norms of the comm-
u n i t y of which you are a member, of observing c u s t -
omary forms of behaviour, of worshipping the goas -
even though we can know nothing about them, or even 
that there are any gods to worship. I n a n u t s h e l l , 
he recommends t h a t , s i n c e n ature i s c h a o t i c a l l y un-
knowable, we put our i m p l i c i t t r u s t m the d e p o s i t 
of law and o t h e r convention formulated by the wise 
and t e s t e d over time The accumulated wisdom of the 
p a s t i s not s a c r o s a n c t , and the w i s e man w i l l know 
how and when and by how much to a l t e r the s t a t u s quo. 
But i t i s c l e a r l y m our own i n t e r e s t s to approach the 
t a s k of a l t e r i n g the s t a t u s quo V L t h th° utmost cau-
t i o n . 
I t i s c l e a r , however, that i f the a r t of r h e t o r i c can 
indeed be used e f f e c t i v e l y ' a g a i n s t anyone and on any 
s u b j e c t ' , then i t can as w e l l be used by the r a b b l e -
r o u s i n g demagogue as by the c a u t i o u s and moderate man. 
I n o ther words, the i n d i v i d u a l who has mastered the 
techniques of p e r s u a s i o n and who i s equipped to s e t 
the e n t i r e d i r e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s not com-
p e l l e d to s e t only such d i r e c t i o n s as might commend 
themselves to the c o n s e r v a t i v e c a s t of mind. And a t 
l e a s t two v e r y r a d i c a l v i e v p o m t s are indeed a s s o c -
i a t e d w i t h the younger g e n e r a t i o n of S o p h i s t s - with 
those who had s a t at the f e e t of Protagoras and Gor-
g i a s . Here, the point i s not t h a t we can have no 
knowledge of n a t u r e . Rather, i t i s that the know-
ledge w h i c h we do have i n d i c a t e s tnat men are 'by 
n a t u r e ' d r i v e n to a c t m a rampantly l r d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
61. 
way. On the one hand, there 13 the d o c t r i n e of C a l l -
l c l e s , r e p o r t e d i n the Gorgias - a viewpoint which i s 
f r e q u e n t l y , and not i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y , comparec w i t h 
t h a t of N i e t z s c h e . According to G a l l i c l e s , our ob-
s e r v a t i o n of the animal kingdom r e v e a l s that the nor-
mal s t a t e of t h i n g s i n the v/orld i s one of r u t h l e s s 
and unequal s t r u g g l e the s t r o n g e s t s u r v i v e and pro-
s p e r at the expense of the weak. Conventional mor-
a l i t y , as expressed through the medium of lav/, im-
poses an u n n a t u r a l or a r t i f i c i a l e q u a l i t y which i s 
p e c u l i a r to mankind. On C a l l i c l e s ' account, i t a r i s e s 
out of agreements - synthemata - amongst men, which 
are intended to p r o t e c t the weak by d e p r i v i n g the 
strong of the p l e a s u r e s which a i e due to t h e i r n a t -
u r a l s u p e r i o r i t y . True or ' n a t u r a l ' m o r a l i t y , as 
d i s t i n c t from the s y n t h e t i c m o r a l i t y of convention, 
c o n s i s t s simply i n the pushing of power as fax as i t 
w i l l go, and m r e v e l l i n g m the p l e a s u r e which the 
e x e r c i s e o f power brings w i t h i t . The nature of man, 
t h e r e f o r e , does not f i n d i t s t r u e s a t i s f a c t i o n or 
r e a l i s a t i o n w i t h i n the c o n s t r a i n t s l.nposed b,y any 
system of conventions. On the c o n t r a r y , i t would 
only be r e a l i s e d i f a man of u t t e r l y s u p e r i o r 
p h y s i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s were to a r i s e 
and f l i n g p e t t y r e s t r i c t i o n s a s i d e m order to g l o r y 
to the utmost m the p l e n i t u d e of h i s own power. 
'Right' and 'wrong' would be, so to speak, i n c a r n a t e 
m the person of such a man. They would be i n c a r n a t e 
p r e c i s e l y because he h i m s e l f would have the power to 
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d e f i n e them and to compel oth e r people to act accord-
i n g to h i s d e f l a t i o n s . I t i s perhaps not too Q u i x o t i c 
to say t h a t , to C a l l i c l e s ' mind, we l i v e m a Lookmg-
Glass w o r l d 
'V/hen I use a word, ' Humpty-Dumpty s a i d , m 
r a t h e r a s c o r n f u l tone, ' i t means j u s t what 
I choose i t to mean - n e i t h e r more nor l e s s . ' 
'The question i s , ' said A l i c e , 'whether you 
can make words mean so many d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . ' 
•The question i s , ' s a i d Humpty-Dumpty, 'which 
i s to be master - t h a t ' s a l l . ' 
An i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s land o f M a c h t p o l i t i k m a c t -
i o n i s to be found m the r e p o r t o f the dialogue between 
the emissaries o f Athens and the i n h a b i t a n t s o f the 
i s l a n d o f Melos given m Thucydides' H i s t o r y o f the 
Peloponnesian "/ar The i n t r a n s i g e n t i s l a n d e r s had 
r e s i s t e d a l l e f f o r t s t o persuade them to j o i n the 
Athenian confederacy, and had, m f a c t , c o n t r i b u t e d to 
the Spartan war e f f o r t . I n 416BC, d i p l o m a t i c resources 
having f a i l e d , the i s l a n d was invaded and annexed by 
Athens, and a l l men o f m i l i t a r y age vere put t o death. 
Thucydides describes the f r u i t l e s s n e g o t i a t i o n s m 
d e t a i l , ana he a t t r i b u t e s the f o l l o w i n g remarks to the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f Athens 
You know as w e l l as we t h a t men a r r i v e at ' j u s t ' 
s e t t l e m e n t s by n e g o t i a t i o n o n l y v/hen the p a r t i e s 
i n v o l v e d are o f equal s t r e n g t h Otherwise, the 
powerful get what they can take, and the weak gi v e 
what they have to gi v e .Of the gods we know, 
and o f men we b e l i e v e , t h a t as a matter of n a t u r a l 
n e c e s s i t y , the,y m v a r i r b l y r u l e //here the,> have 
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the power to do go. We d i d not make t h i s law, 
n e i t h e r are we the f i r 3 t to take advantage of i t . 
We found i t a lready m exi s t e n c e , end we expect 
t h a t i t w i l l continue i n existence f o r e v e r And 
so we f o l l o w i t - a 3 would you and anyone else 
v/ho had as much pow^r as we have. ^2 
On t h i s account, then, there as indeed an e t e r n a l and 
immutable 'law o f n a t u r e 1 t o which men can look as a 
source of guidance m and j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r 
conduct. But i t contains o n l y a s i n g l e and uncom-
promising p r o v i s i o n t h a t the r i g h t cause i s simply 
the cause which happens t o be the s t r o n g e s t . And t h i s , 
perhaps, i s r e a l l y the most c o n s i s t e n t or l o g i c a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f Gorgias' t h e s i s , t h a t men simply do 
whatever t h e i r circumstances compel them to do. 
Second, there i s the view o f Thrasymachus, asserted 
and discussed m the f i r s t Book of Plato's Republic. 
Having l i s t e n e d w i t h growing impatience to the r e l a x -
ed and mannerly d i s c u s s i o n which has so f a r taken place 
on the nature o f j u s t i c e , Thrasymachus breaks i n t o the 
conversation w i t h h i s do'vnright a s s e r t i o n t h a t ' j u s t i c e 
i s the i n t e r e s t o f the s t r o n g ' During the l e n g t h y 
interchange which f o l l o w s , he i s made to s h i f t h i s 
ground w i t h comparative ease, but he does so m a 
way which serves r a t h e r t o c l a r i f y than to weaken h i s 
p o s i t i o n . I t turns out t o be not r e a l l y h i s view t h a t 
j u s t i c e i s the i n t e r e s t o f the s t r o n g . Rather, he holds 
t h a t 'justice* amounts only to remaining w i t h i n such 
c o n v e n t i o n a l l i m i t s as may be p r e s c r i b e d by the s t r o n g , 
h i s assumption being t h a t the s t r o n g w i l l always make 
such p r e s c r i p t i o n s as seem to them to be m t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t s . On t h i s account, lav/s embody, not the c o l l -
e c t i v e d e s i r e f o r s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n o f the weak, nor some 
cosmic j u s t i c e w r i t l a r g e m the heavens and readable 
there by man, but merely the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d w i l l o f 
the s t r o n g . I t i s m the i n t e r e s t s o f the s t r o n g t h a t 
others be j u s t , and the o t h e r side of t h i s i s t h a t any 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l w i l l achieve h i s i n t e r e s t s o n l y 
t o the extent t h a t he can be u n j u s t . To Thrasymachus' 
mind, the happy and s u c c e s s f u l man w i l l be he v/ho rup-
t u r e s the c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s o f j u s t i c e i n s o f a r 
as i t serves h i s t u r n to do so, and to the extent t h a t 
he can do so w i t h o u t having to put up w i t h unpleasant 
consequences 
I n j u s t i c e on a grana enough scale i s s t r o n g e r , 
more f r e e , more m a s t e r f u l than j u s t i c e . As I 
have alread y s a i d , j u s t i c e i s t h a t which i s sub-
s e r v i e n t to the i n t e r e s t s o f the s t r o n g . But 
what r e a l l y p r o f i t s a man from h i s own p o i n t o f 
view and secures h i s own i n t e r e s t s i s i n j u s t i c e 93 
I n c i d e n t a l l y , we might note m passing t h a t a somevhat 
s i m i l a r view of the r e l a t i o n between l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n 
and personal d e s i r e i s adopted by the Sophist Antiphon 
Doing j u s t i c e i s a matter of not i n f r i n g i n g any o f 
the laws of the State o f which you are a member 
A man would t h e r e f o r e do j u s t i c e to h i s own best 
advantage i f he d i s p l a y e d great v e n e r a t i o n f o r the 
laws vvhen m the company of witnesses and h e l d the 
promptings o f nature m e q u a l l y h i g h esteem when 
alone, w i t h no-one t o see him ^4 
Thrasymachus' case amounts to three d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 
theses. F i r s t , h i s p o i n t i s not the commonplace and 
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obvious one t n a t the very existence and s u r v i v a l o f 
p o s i t i v e law i n d i c a t e s t h a t whoever makes and admin-
i s t e r s the law i s s t r o n g Rather, he wishes to say-
t h a t the meaning of the term 'law'is 'whatever I s l a i d 
down as b i n d i n g b j whoever i s s t r o n g enough to do so 
w h i l e brooking no o p p o s i t i o n . ' Second, he recommends, 
or presupposes, an e g o i s t i c , h e d o n i s t i c and competit-
i v e psychology. His suggestion i s t h a t every i n d i v -
i d u a l wishes t o be as s t r o n g , as f r e e and as m a s t e r f u l 
as p o s s i b l e , and t h i s p u r p o r t s to be a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n 
about human n a t u r e . To t r y to overreach o t h e r men xn 
the s t r u g g l e f o r advantage i s whet men r e a l l y under-
stand n a t u r a l behaviour to be, and m t h e i r h e p r t of 
h e a r t s they regard the p o i n t of l i f e as being n o t h i n g 
more than success m t h i s s t r u g g l e . T h i r d , since on 
t h i s understanding r e s t r a i n t i s c o n t r a r y to human nature, 
i t f o l l o w s t h a t the p u r e l y c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t s em-
bodied i n ' j u s t i c e ' may be disregarded w i t h o u t blame 
by the i n d i v i d u a l who i s able to do so. To Thrasy-
machus, as to C a l l i c l e s , phya1s and nomos, nature and 
convention, are not mere]} d i s t i n c t , they are a c t u a l l y 
opposed 
Whichever of these views be taken, i t seems t h a t the 
conclusion w i l l be t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes the same. 
A p o l i t i c a l order which s a t i s f i e s what are t r u l y the 
requirements o f human nature w i l l not be one i n which 
the p r i n c i p l e s o f r e c i p r o c i t y and harmony apply, as 
f o r the Pythagoreans. S i m i l a r l y , the best l i f e w i l l 
not be tne l i f e o f moderation and r e s t r a i n t recommended 
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by H e r a c l i t u s . Rather, a n a t u r a l p o l i t i c a l order w i l l 
be one nn which the str o n g have bent a l l weaker w i l l s 
i n t o t h e i r s e r v i c e ; and the best l i f e w i l l c o n s i s t 
simply i n the most e f f e c t i v e deployment of power and 
the most single-minded enjoyment of the p l e a s u r e 
which i t s e x e r c i s e b r i n g s . P o l i t i c a l l i f e i s not 
mutual co-operation i n r e l a t i o n to a community of 
i n t e r e s t s , but a c o n t i n u a l zero-sum c o n t e s t f o r the 
s c a r c e r e s o u r c e of power 
I t i s t h i s s t a r k l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c standpoint - so 
p r e v a l e n t a f e a t u r e of Athenian p o l i t i c a l l i f e a f t e r 
the death of P e r i c l e s - that P l a t o and, l e s s d i r e c t l y , 
A r i s t o t l e are concerned to confute. Broadly speaking, 
the^ both s e t out to l a y dovn a r a t i o n a l ground upon 
which to oppose the p r i n c i p l e 'might i s r i g h t * , and 
to develop an a l t e r n a t i v e theory of p o l i t i c s r e s t i n g 
upon t h i s ground. The f o l l o w i n g words of S i r E r n e s t 
Barker v/ere w r i t t e n w i t h r e f e r e n c e to P l a t o ; but, 
w i t h c e r t a i n Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , they might e q u a l l y w e l l 
have been a p p l i e d to A r i s t o t l e ' I t i s h i s m i s s i o n to 
prove that the e t e r n a l laws of m o r a l i t y are no mere 
•conventions', which must be destroyed to make way 
f o r a regime of "nature', but that they a r e , on the 
c o n t r a r y , rooted beyond a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of overthrow 
m the nature of the human s o u l and m the system of 
the universe.'95 
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CHAPTER T.YO NATURE AND PURPOSE 
I . 
Human Good and Oommumty L i f ^ 
Although A r i s t o t l e develops the theme a g r e a t d e a l 
more f u l l y and w i t h a r a t h e r h i g h e r degree of s u b t l e t y , 
both he and P l a t o put forward a g e n e r a l account of the 
world m t e l e o l o g i c a l terms. T h i s t e l e o l o g i c a l a c c -
ount may be taken as our own most a p p r o p r i a t e point 
of departure m t h i s chapter. 
Both P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e a s c r i b e fundamental s i g n i f -
i c a n c e to a n o t i o n v/hich, as we have a l r e a d y seen, i s 
an o l d and deeply-rooted one the n o t i o n t h a t , m a 
normative sense, nature as a whole i s an i n t e l l i g i b l y 
ordered and purposive system. I n the R e p u b l i c , as 
p a r t of h i s e x p o s i t i o n of j u s t i c e , P l a t o proposes the 
view t h a t the t h i n g s which we see around us and of 
which we make use have a s c e r t a i n a b l e purposes. I t 
would seem from what he says that t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i s 
intended as an e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n . The i n t e r r -
ogation of Thrasymachus appears, at t h i s p o i n t , to be 
intended to suggest that i t i s experience which m d i c -
a t e s to us that any one of the o b j e c t s named i s ' f o r 
something'. T h i s i s s a i d to be obvious to us e i t h e r 
because the t h i n g m question has been made w i t h some 
s p e c i f i c purpose m mind, or because i t does uhat i t 
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does b e t t e r than a n y t h i n g else can, or because what 
i t does cannot be done at a l l by a n y t h i n g e l s e , or 
by reason o f some combination o f these. For i n s t a n c e , 
and the example i s P l a t o ' s own, we know t h a t the pur-
pose o f a p r u m n g - k n i f e i s to prune, both because t h a t 
i s what i t s manufacturer intended i t t o be used f o r , 
and because, though at a pinch you might be able t o 
prune w i t h a c h i s e l , you w i l l f i n d t h a t you do a more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y j o b i f you use the a p p r o p r i a t e t o o l . ^And, 
by the same token, the purpose o f horses i s to p u l l 
c a r t s , the purpose of eyes i s t o see, t h a t of ears 
1 
i s to hear, and so f o r t h . 
This theory (which P l a t o leaves m a r a t h e r unelab-
orated s t a t e ) m f a c t contains many more snags than 
might a t f i r s t s i g h t be apparent. For insta n c e , i t 
i s not at a l l d i f f i c u l t to imagine an a r c h a e o l o g i s t 
d i g g i n g up an o b j e c t and not having the f a i n t e s t idea 
of what i t i s f o r - s p e c u l a t i n g over a range of poss-
i b i l i t i e s , guessing wrongly, g i v i n g up m d i s g u s t , 
and so on. I t does not r e a l l y seem to be the case 
t h a t the purpose of an y t h i n g , or even t h a t i t has a 
purpose, i s always immediately d i s c e r n i b l e from i t s 
s t r u c t u r e o r design. Again, we can envisage t h a t the 
purpose a s c r i b e d t o any given a r t i f a c t might be m 
some sense ambiguous or a matter f o r d i s p u t e . For 
example, i s i t the purpose of a brass warming-pan ( m 
the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ) to warm beds or to be hung on 
the w a l l as an ornament ( o r even to smuggle babies 
i n t o r o y a l bedchambers when convenient)'? Also, d i f f -
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i c u l t i e 3 begin to a r i s e a t once as soon as we get 
away from o b j e c t s which are unambiguously man-made 
a r t i c l e s o r t o o l s of some kind. Why, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
should we say t h a t a horse i s b e t t e r answering to i t s 
purpose when i t i s p u l l i n g a c a r t or c a r r y i n g a man 
on i t s back than when i t i s being m a g n i f i c e n t l y w i l d 
and f r e e 9 Leaving these d i f f i c u l t i e s to one s i d e , 
however, the g e n e r a l d r i f t of what P l a t o and A r i s -
t o t l e wish to say i s c l e a r enough the purpose or 
' f i n a l cause' ( t e l o s ) of an acorn, say, i s to become 
an oak-tree. I t i s t r u e that many unforeseen t h i n g s 
can i n t e r v e n e m such a way as to a l t e r the o r d i n a r y 
or ' n a t u r a l ' course of t h i n g s . A l s o , the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of technique or a r t can b r i n g about intended changes 
which would not otherwise have o c c u r r e d . But our 
normal e x p e c t a t i o n - our e x p e c t a t i o n of unimpeded 
nature - i s t h a t the acorn w i l l indeed grow i n t o an 
oak-tree. I t w i l l not become a s t u n t e d parody of an 
oak-tree, or a pine t r e e , or a heap of firewood or 
a sideboard. And we should t h e r e f o r e say t h a t , when 
i t has become a mature oak-tree, a n a t u r a l process has 
been c a r r i e d to i t s a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c l u s i o n . A r i s t o t l e 
wishes to say that what we c a l l the 'nature' of a t h i n g 
i s t h a t which unfolds when i t i s a c h i e v i n g , and t h a t 
which i s f u l l y r e a l i s e d when i t has achieved, i t s t e l o s . 
Moreover, t h i s account of n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s i s one m 
which d e s c r i p t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n a r e merged. I t a s s -
e r t s not only t h a t we can i d e n t i f y the purposes of thi n g s 
as a matter of f a c t , but a l s o t h a t , when we pronounce 
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them good, we do so by reference t o whether they do o r 
do not answer to t h e i r purpose. The t h e s i s i s t h a t 
nature always achieves what i s best, and, as A r i s t o t l e 
puts i t m the P o l l t i c s 
The nature o f a t h i n g i s i t s end, since t h a t which 
e v e r y t h i n g i s when i t s process o f development i s 
complete i s what we c a l ] i t s n a t u r e , be i t a horse, 
a man or a family....Vhat i s more, t h a t end f o r 
2 
which a t h i n g e x i s t s i s also i t s highest good. 
I f a l l t h i s i s t r u e o f nature considered as a whole, 
and given t h a t man i s a p a r t o f n a t u r e , then i t must 
also be t r u e o f human natu r e considered m p a r t i c u l a r . 
P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e both suggest - and the suggestion 
i t s e l f i s commonplace enough - t h a t the n a t u r a l purpose, 
and t h e r e f o r e the highe s t good, of man i s to l i v e a l i f e 
which i s a l i f e o f eudaimona a. E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t o r s 
almost always render t h i s word as 'happiness', but 
t h i s i s h a r d l y the most appropraie choice. Quite ap-
a r t from a n y t h i n g e l s e , we should not be j u s t i f i e d m 
saying t h a t a man's l i f e i s one o f eudaimonia simply 
because he can say, ' I am happy.* P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e 
both consider t h a t a man might consider h i m s e l f rnappy' 
and yet be mistaken, and, m any case, eudaimonia 
i s not any p a r t i c u l a r o r determinate happiness. On 
the c o n t r a r y , i t i s general or a l l - r o u n d w e l l b e m g 
to l i v e a l i f e o f eudaimonia i s to l i v e 'the good 
l i f e ' And A r i s t o t l e remarks t h a t i t i s obvious t h a t 
eudaimonia i s m f a c t the highe s t good f o r man sin c e , 
though o t h e r goods such as r i c h e s and h e a l t h are des-
i r e d as a means to i t , eudaimonia i t s p l f i s d e s i r e d 
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simply f o r i t s own sake. There i s n o t h i n g beyond i t 
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t o which i t i s a means. 
According to A r i s t o t l e , the t e l o s o f an y t h i n g i s 
chieved through i t s being m a s t a t e o f 'engagement' 
(en e r g e i a ) m the f u n c t i o n o r proper a c t i v i t y ( ergon) 
t o which i t i s by nature s u i t e d - f o r which, t h a t i s , 
i t has a s p e c i a l c a p a c i t y or p o t e n t i a l (dynami 3) The 
purpose o f an eye i s to see, i t s ergon i s seeing, 
i t s dynamis i s the c a p a c i t y to see, and so o n / But 
when we come to enquire i n t o the s p e c i f i c ergon o f man, 
matters cease t o be q u i t e so s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d man i s 
not a simple e n t i t y w i t h a s i n g l e and lmmediatel}' ob-
vious f u n c t i o n and c a p a c i t y . But, A r i s t o t l e lemarks, 
i t a t l e a s t seems p l a i n t h a t the s p e c i a l ergon o f man 
qua man cannot li° m mere b i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n g or 
m i n s t i n c t u a l behaviour o r sensation. I t cannot l i e 
m these t h i n g s since man has1 some or a l l o f them m 
common w i t h o t h e r animals and w i t h p l a n t s the hi g h e s t 
good to which the ergon o f man i s d i r e c t e d , he assumes, 
must be something d i f f e r e n t from the highest good of 
a chrysanthemum or an ox. And he and Plato both p o i n t 
out t h a t there i s one o u t s t a n d i n g and obvious respect 
m which man i s u n i q u e l y d i f f e r e n t from - and indeed 
s u p e r i o r to - the r e s t o f c r e a t i o n namely, m h i s 
c a p a c i t y f o r reason. And they i n f e r from t h i s t h a t 
the achievement of man's purpose -nust m some way be 
connected w i t h h i s r a t i o n a l i t y Moreover, A r i s t o t l e 
goes on, j u s t as the oroper f u n c t i o n o f the f l u t e -
p l a y e r l i e s m h i s a c t u a l l y performing on the f l u t e 
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r a t h e r than m h i s merely owning a f l u t e , so too t h a t 
of man as such must l i e , not m h i s mere p r o p r i e t o r -
ship o f reason, but m r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y - P l a t o 
mentions managing, d e l i b e r a t i n g and r u l i n g . Again, 
we should not say t h p t a b l u n t k n i f e or a f l a u t i s t 
who only t o o t l e s a i m l e s s l y 13 good. They are good, 
not simply to the extent t h a t they discharge t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n , but to the extent t h a t they discharge i t 
w e l l . And, m the same way, the highe s t good o f man 
i s t o be achieved through h i s a c t i n g , not on l y r a t i o n -
a l l y , but w e l l - i n the sense o f r a t i o n a l l y choosing 
and f o l l o w i n g the r i g h t means to ends which are them-
selves good, and not j u s t now and again, but through-
5 
out the course of l i f e as a whole. 
Having come t h i s f a r , P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e go on t o 
the f u r t h e r p o i n t t h a t a p r o p e r l y conducted l i f e -
or, f o r t h a t matter, any k i n d o f l i f e - cannot s a t i s -
f a c t o r i l y be l i v e d alone. Protagoras h i m s e l f had p o i n t -
ed out t h a t c o l l e c t i v e l i v i n g i s o b v i o u s l y necessary 
f o r the purposes o f subsistence and p r o t e c t i o n , and 
t h i s i s a modest c l a i m which even the most r a d i c a l 
and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c of the Sophists would s u r e l y have 
to take (Even the vie// t h a t every man r e a l l y wishes 
to t y r a n n i s e o t h e r men presumably r e q u i r e s t h a t the 
t y r a n t engag,e m some form o f c o l l e c t i v e l i v i n g w i t h 
h i s v i c t i m s )^ At the most basic l e v e l , then, you 
cannot l i v e a l i f e of eudaimonia - the l i f e o f a 
r a t i o n a l , c u l t i v a t e d and humane man - i f you are 
s t a r v i n g to death or c o n s t a n t l y at the mercy o f w i l d 
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beasts or aggressive f o r e i g n powers. Also, though 
the r e would be no p o i n t i n u r g i n g an acorn or a prun-
i n g k n i f e t o engage m i t s proper a c t i v i t y , man as 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y able to respond to e x h o r t a t i o n and 
i n s t r u c t i o n . Thus, education and l e g i s l a t i o n are 
a p p r o p r i a t e to the human c o n d i t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , 
a man cannot engage s a t i s f a c t o r i l y m r a t i o n a l a c t -
i v i t y unless he has a c e r t a i n amount o f l e i s u r e and 
freedom from mundane concerns. And a l l these t h i n g s 
can be had only through co-operation w i t h o t h e r peoplp. 
On these grounds, then, p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
as the n e t u r a l way o f l i f e f o r man. I t i s n a t u r a l 
i n the sense t h a t , w i t h o u t i t , he cannot f u l l y be o r 
become what i t i s h i s n a t u r e to be or become a 
c r e a t u r e whose r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y i s e f f e c t i v e l y d i r e c t e d 
towards t h a t which i s good. As A r i s t o t l e puts i t , 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the State i s a n a t u r a l growth 
and t h a t man by nature i s a p o l i t i c a l animal. 
Whoever i s n a t u r a l l y - t h a t i s , not by accident 
- ou t s i d e the State i s e i t h e r superhuman or 7 subhuman. 
Indeed, according t o A r i s t o t l e , because man i s n a t -
u r a l l y dependent upon the s o c i e t y o f o t h e r s , a l l 
the v a r i o u s forms o f a s s o c i a t i o n o f which he i s a 
p a r t are n a t u r a l . The c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e between s m a l l e r 
u n i t s such as the household or the v i l l a g e and the 
State i t s e l f , however, i s t h a t the l a t t e r i s s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t m every respect. I t i s the most com-
p l e t e l y n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n m t h a t i t i s the most 
' f u l l y - g r o w n ' a s s o c i a t i o n , j u s t as a mature oak-tree 
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i s the n a t u r a l c u l m i n a t i o n t o the career o f an acorn. 
The St a t e , p r o p e r l y conceived, i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t m 
t h a t i t c ontains e v e r y t h i n g necessary to the f u l l 
a c t u a l i s a t i o n of the n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i v e tendencies 
o f i t s members. I t i s such t h a t they do not have to 
look o u t s i d e or beyond i t f o r the means of s a t i s f y i n g 
any of t h e i r needs or d e s i r e s . And p o l i t i c s , the 
science o f m a i n t a i n i n g the State on a proper f o o t i n g , 
i s i d e n t i f i e d as the 'master' or a r c h i t e c t o n i c science 
I t s p r a c t i c e i s t h a t which makes p o s s i b l e the p r a c t i c e 
o f a l ] o t h e r sciences, so t h a t even those p u r s u i t s 
which are g e n e r a l l y esteemed as the most noble are 
m t h i s sense dependent upon p o l i t i c s . The mainten-
ance o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s t h a t which makes every o t h e r 
human a c t i v i t y p o s s i b l e . To A r i s t o t l e , then, p o l i t i c s 
i s what r h e t o r i c was t o Gorgias the p r o f e s s i o n t o 
which a l l o t h e r p r o f e s s i o n s are u l t i m a t e l y subordinate 
P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e both recognise t h a t n ot everyone 
w i l l be able to l i v e the good l i f e to an equal degree, 
but i t i s n e vertheless important t o note t h a t they 
both i n s i s t t h a t the good f o r man i s the good f o r man 
as such I t i s n o t , as Thrasymachus and C a l l i c l e s had 
maintained, the good o n l y o f the man who happens con-
t i n g e n t l y t o have pre-eminent s t r e n g t h or pov/er. As 
they see i t , the S t a t e , p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d , i s not an 
o r g a n i s a t i o n m which the e f f o r t s o f the m a j o r i t y are 
bent tov/ards the good o f a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l o r c l a s s . 
N e i t h e r i s i t one m which the m a j o r i t y are merely 
dedicated t o s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n against the depredations 
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o f the rapacious s t r o n g . Rather, i t i s a f u n c t i o n i n g 
system m which a l l have an important p a r t to play -
m which each i n d i v i d u a l takes h i s proper r o l e to the 
extent t h a t he c o n t r i b u t e s to the good o f the whole. 
And the good of the whole, o f course, i n c l u d e s h i s own 
good the State should be a system of what Johannes 
A l t h u s i u s was l a t e r to c a l l 'symbiotic' r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
m which each man c o n t r i b u t e s to the w e l l b e i n g of a l l 
the r e s t , who m t u r n make t h e i r own c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
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h i s w e l l b e i n g . The f a m i l i a r analogy o f the l i v i n g 
body suggests i t s e l f a t once. Just as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 
and f u n c t i o n i n g organism depends f o r i t s w e l l b e i n g 
upon the proper i n t e r r e l a t i o n o f a l l i t s p a r t s , so 
too m the State the proper r o l e o f the c i t i z e n con-
s i s t s m, and h i s own u l t i m a t e advantage depends upon, 
h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the h e a l t h and i n t e g r i t y of the 
whole. As A r i s t o t l e puts i t , 
I f the hand or f o o t be removed from the body, 
i t w i l l no longer be a hand or f o o t a t a l l , 
except perhaps m the loose sense i n which one 
might t a l k o f a hand carved out o f stone. I n 
such a case, i t w i l l be r u i n e d , no longer having 
the ergon and the dynamis by reason o f which i t 
1 o 
i s what i t i s . 
This conception o f what a community o f men should be 
i s captured v i t h convenient cogency i n the f o l l o w i n g 
words o f Hegel 'A system of complete interdependence, 
wherein the l i v e l i h o o d , happiness and l e g a l s t a t u s of 
one man i s interwoven w i t h the l i v e l i h o o d , happiness 
and r i g h t s of a l l ' 1 1 P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e both subscribe 
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to what has since come to be known as the 'Organic 
Theory of the St a t e ' , d e p i c t i n g i t as a complex 
u n i t y whose members are bound t o g e t h e r by ' l i v i n g 
t o g e t h e r , s h a r i n g common e f f o r t s , common dangers, 
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common jo y s and cormon d i s t r e s s . ' I n modern w r i t i n g , 
t h i s Organic Theory i s commonly r e f e r r e d t o p e j o r -
a t i v e l y - or, a t l e a s t , i s r e f e r r e d to p e j o r a t i v e l y 
by most o f those w r i t e r s who t h i n k of themselves as 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t s . 3ut m i t s c l a s s i c a l form, f a r from 
being submerged m or o b l i t e r a t e d by the whole, man 
i s sand to be completed by h i s engagement m the cor-
porate l i f e o f the State. Communal existence and 
c i v i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n provide the c o n d i t i o n s which are 
most a p p r o p r i a t e to whet he i s . 
We n o t i c e e s p e c i a l l y , then, t h a t P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e 
understand man's good m terms which might, a d m i t t e d l y 
w i t h a l a r g e q u a l i f i c a t i o n , be c a l l e d u n i v e r s a l i s t i c . 
The good which i s made p o s s i b l e m a p r o p e r l y - c o n s t i t u t 
State i s the good of a l l the c i t i z e n s , a t l e a s t 
i n s o f a r as they are capable o f ac h i e v i n g i t . The 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s o f course necessary because both P l a t o 
and A r i s t o t l e would regard the m a j o r i t y of persons 
l i v i n g w i t h i n any given t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries as 
u n f i t to assume the r i g h t s and d u t i e s o f c i t i z e n s h i p 
a t a l l . But they at l e a s t m some sense regard the 
human good as the human good, r a t h e r than as a sec-
t i o n a l o r i n d i v i d u a l goal t o be pursued at the expense 
or m d i s r e g a r d of oth e r men. Moreover, since they 
h o l d t h a t the St a t e i s n a t u r a l , having a3 i t s o b j e c t 
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the attainment of t h a t which i s man's n a t u r a l goodj, 
they proceed also t o the conclusion t h a t the c r i t e r i a 
a ccording to which the State should be organised are 
themselves ' n a t u r a l ' m our sense - t h a t i s , non-
con v e n t i o n a l and disc o v e r a b l e by the l i g h t of reason. 
A r i s t o t l e ' s view, t o which we s h a l l come m due course, 
i s r a t h e r complex and ambiguous, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y 
l e s s easy t o di s c o v e r and s t a t e than P l a t o ' s . P l a t o ' s 
treatment of t h i s theme, on the oth e r hand, i s p a r t -
i c u l a r l y extensive and e l a b o r a t e . I t i s a l r e a d y a 
w e l l - t r o d d e n path, but there are three reasons why 
we should do w e l l to explore i t a t some l e n g t h 
( a ) I t i s a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s attempt to solve the n o t -
o r i o u s problem of c o n f l i c t i n g opinions which we have 
a l r e a d y come across, and so to forge a weapon w i t h 
which t o f i g h t the l e g a l and moral p o s i t i v i s m o f the 
Sophists, 
( b ) I n c l a s s i c a l w r i t i n g , i t stands as the apotheosis 
o f reason m r e l a t i o n to p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , and we 
are g e n e r a l l y concerned w i t h a d o c t r i n e which holds 
t h a t c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s o f r i g h t conduct simply 'stand 
to reason', 
( c ) To quote S i r Ernest Barker again, i t i s a weighty 
and p o s i t i v e attempt to show t h a t 'the e t e r n a l laws 
of m o r a l i t y . . . a r e . . . r o o t e d beyond a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of 
overthrow m the natu r e o f the human soul and m the 
system o f the uni v e r s e . ' 
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Reason and P r a c t i c a l A c t i v i t y . 
The R e p u b l i c o f P l a t o 13, a t l e a s t n o m i n a l l y , an 
e n q u i r y i n t o t h e n a t u r e o f j u s t i c e . And t h e c o n c e p t i o n 
o f j u s t i c e vvhich P l a t o d e v e l o p s h a r k s back u l t i m a t e l y 
t o t h e P y t h a g o r e a n and H e r a c l i t e a n i n s i s t e n c e t h a t 
r i g h t conduct depends, a t t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , upon 
o u r r e m a i n i n g w i t h i n c e r t a i n n a t u r a l l i m i t s He 
advances i t a g a i n s t t h e f o r c e f u l l y - a r g u e d case o f 
Thrasymachus w h i c h we have a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d t h a t 
t h e l i f e o f eudaimonia i s t o be f o u n d m s u c c e s s f u l l y 
p a s s i n g o r d i s r e g a r d i n g l i m i t s - m m i n i m i s i n g r e s t r a i n t 
and m o u t d o i n g t h e o t h e r f e l l o w as f a r as p o s s i b l e 
by b r e a k i n g t h e r u l e s . Thrasymachus w i l l n o t a l l o w 
h i m s e l f t o be manoeuvred i n t o s a y i n g o u t r i g h t t h a t 
j u s t i c e i s v i c e and i n j u s t i c e v i r t u e . But he does a t 
l e a s t m a i n t a i n t h a t what i s o r d i n a r i l y c a l l e d i n j u s -
t i c e i s r e a l l y no more t h a n good sense o r shrewd 
judgment, whereas what commonly passes f o r j u s t i c e 
i s mere n a i v e imprudence. Paced w i t h t h i s , P l a t o does 
n o t s e t h i m s e l f t h e t a s k o f r e f u t i n g t h e c l a i m t h a t 
men do m f a c t seek t o maximise t h e i r o r a advantages. 
N e i t h e r does he w i s h t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e y ought n o t 
t o do so. He agrees t h a t a c t s a r e r i g h t i f t h e y do 
i n d e e d promote eudaimonia - t h a t i s , i f t h e y conduce 
t o o u r advantage m i t s most g e n e r a l l y - s t a t e d f o r m . 
And he h o l d s , moreover, t h a t no-one who knows what i s 
good w i l l v o l u n t a r i l y do what i s bad m t h e sense o f 
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m i m i c a l t o h i s own purposes. But h i s p o i n t i s t h a t 
g e n u i n e advantage i s n o t , m f a c t , t o be s e c u r e d by 
a t o t a l d i s r e g a r d o f c o n s t r a i n t s . He p o i n t s m t h e 
f i r s t i n s t a n c e t o c e r t a i n areas o f a c t i v i t y w i t h i n 
w h i c h r e f u s a l t o a c t under c e r t a i n a p p r o p r i a t e k i n d s 
o f c o n s t r a i n t w i l l o b v i o u s l y t h w a r t t h e v e r y purposes 
f o r w h i c h t h e a c t i v i t y was u n d e r t a k e n m t h e f i r s t 
p l a c e . The m u s i c i a n t u n i n g an i n s t r u m e n t , f o r 
example, does n o t screw up t h e pegs o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t 
t i g h t e r and t i g h t e r on t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t he i s 
t h e r e b y s t e a l i n g a march on o t h e r m u s i c i a n s . Sim-
i l a r l y , t h e m e d i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r does n o t go on p o u r i n g 
e v e r - l a r g e r doses o f m e d i c i n e i n t o h i s p a t i e n t m t h e 
b e l i e f t h a t he i s t h u s c o c k i n g a snook a t h i s c o l l -
eagues. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e m u s i c i a n tunes h i s i n -
s t r u m e n t n e i t h e r t o o h i g h n o r t o o low, the p h y s i c i a n 
g i v e s h i s p a t i e n t as much m e d i c i n e as w i l l c u r e him 
and no more. I n s h o r t , we have he r e c e r t a i n l i m i t s 
w h i c h may r i g h t l y be c a l l e d ' n a t u r a l ' m t h e sense 
t h a t , i f t h e y a r e d i s r e g a r d e d , c e r t a i n t h i n g s s i m p l y 
cannot m t h e n a t u r e o f t h e case be do n e . ^ A n d P l a t o ' s 
s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t t h e s e examples a r e o n l y p a r t i c u l a r 
i n s t a n c e s o f a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n w h i c h h o l d s o f i n d i v -
i d u a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e as a whole. The s o u l o r 
p e r s o n a l i t y o f man, he s u g g e s t s , i s a compound o f 
p a r t s o r f a c u l t i e s . T h i s much i s c l e a r , he h o l d s , 
f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t .ve do so f r e q u e n t l y come a c r o s s 
what l o o k l i k e c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n t h e s o u l i f t h e s o u l 
were one, t h e r e c o u l d be no such c o n f l i c t s , s i n c e i t 
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i s n o t p o s s i b l e f o r u n i t y t o be a t odds w i t h i t s e l f . 
And he proceeds t o s p e c i f y t h r e e p a r t s m t h e s o u l 
an a p p e t i t i v e p a r t ( e p i t h y m ^ t i k o n ) , a r a t i o n a l p a r t 
( l o g i q t i k o n ^ t and a ' s p i r i t e d ' p a r t ( t h y n o e i d e s ) 
The i d e a h e i e i s t h a t , t h r o u g h t h e a p p e t i t i v e p a r t , 
we i d e n t i f y t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r d e s i r e , t h r o u g h t h e 
r a t i o n a l p a r t , we choose between t h e s e o b j e c t s o r 
a s s i g n p r i o r i t y t o them and s e l e c t t h e b e s t means o f 
a c h i e v i n g them, and t h r o u g h t h e s p i r i t e d p a r t ( w h i c h 
i s t h e s e a t o f such t h i n g s as courage, a s s e r t i v e n e s s , 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and so on) we pursue t h e s e means. And 
i t i s c l e a r , P l a t o s u g g e s t s , t h a t t h e r e i s a p r o p e r 
r e l a t i o n between a p p e t i t e , s p i r i t and re a s o n w h i c h 
must h o l d i f t h e s o u l i s t o f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y . I f 
we g i v e an e n t i r e l y f r e e r e m t o o u r a p p e t i t e , f o r 
m s t p n c e - w h i c h i s , i n e f f e c t , t h e course w h i c h 
Thrasymachus recommends - we s h a l l v e r y o f t e n f i n d 
o u r s e l v e s m t h e g r i p o f m u t u a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g and 
f r u s t r a t i n g i m p u l s e s . You c a n n o t , a f t e r a l l , g r a t i f y 
e v e r y d e s i r e a t once. Indeed, you cannot g r a t i f y e v e r y 
d e s i r e a t a l l . S i m i l a r l y , s p i r i t , o f i t s e l f , cannot 
make t h e n e c e s s a r y q u a l i t a t i v e c h o i c e s between d e s i r e s 
o r between p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e means o f f u l f i l l i n g 
them. I f we a r e t h i r s t y , i t may be t h a t ve sho.v g r e a t 
s p i r i t m our a t t e m p t s t o s a t i s f y t h e a p p e t i t e f o r 
d r i n k . But i t i s n o t t h r o u g h b o l d n e s s o r a s s e r t i v e n e s s 
o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t t h r o u g h r e a s o n , t h a t ,v° a r e a b l e 
t o know t h a t i t w o u l d be a m i s t a k e t o d r i n k sea-water. 
I n o t h e r .vords, j u s t as an o r g a n i s a t i o n - even i f i t 
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be a band o f r o b b e r s - cannot a c h i e v e what i t w i shes 
t o a c h i e v e i f i t i s t o r n by i n t e r n a l d i s s e n t i o n , so 
t o o t h e s o u l w i l l be u n a b l e t o a c h i e v e i t s g o a l s i f 
i t i s , so t o speak, i n t e r n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o c o mpeting 
f a c t i o n s . ' J u s t i c e ' i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l s o u l , P l a t o 
m a i n t a i n s , i s t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w h i c h o b t a i n s when 
a p p e t i t e and s p i r i t a r e k e p t w i t h i n t h e i r p r o p e r 
bounds by r e a s o n . The f u n c t i o n o f r e a s o n i s t o 'care 
f o r th° whole s o u l . ' ^  ^ t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r p a r t s 
o f t h e s o u l i s , as P l a t o p u t s i t m t h e Phaedrus, l i k e 
t h a t o f a c h a r i o t e e r t o h i s two h o r s e s . As he a l s o says, 
j u s t i c e i s t h e ' v i r t u e ' o f t h e s o u l , m t h e same sense 
as sharpness i s t h e v i r t u e o f a k n i f e - i t i s t h e 
q u a l i t y o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c m v i r t u e o f w h i c h i t i s made 
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a b l e t o do what i t i s f o r . (So f a r as I know, t h i s 
use o f t h e word ' v i r t u e ' m E n g l i s h now s u r v i v e s o n l y 
r a t h e r i n d i r e c t l y , m t h e phrase ' m v i r t u e o f . A 
r e a d i l y - a c c e s s i b l e a r c h a i c example g i v e s t h e i d e a . 
And s t r a i g h t w a y t h e f o u n t a i n o f h e r b l o o d was 
d r i e d up, and she f e l t m h e r body t h a t she 
was h e a l e d o f t h a t p l a g u e . And Je s u s , immed-
i a t e l y knowing m h i m s e l f t h a t v i r t u e had gone 
o u t o f him... s a i d , ' Yho to u c h e d my c l o t h e s 9 ' ) ^ 
Thus, u n l e s s t h e s o u l i s j u s t , t h e l i f e w h i c h i t 
l e a d s cannot be one o f eudaimonia, and P l a t o main-
t a i n s t h a t t h i s i s as much t r u e o f t h e S t a t e as i t 
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i s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . The S t a t e , t o o , has i t s p a r t s , 
a n s w e r i n g t o t h e need f o r d i v i s i o n and s p e c i a l i s a t i o n 
o f l a b o u r , and m some sense analogous o r comparable 
82. 
t o t h e p a r t s o f t h e s o u ] . I t c o n t a i n s p r o d u c e r s , who 
c r e a t e m a t e r i a l w e a l t h , s o l d i e r s , who conduct war and 
ensure d e f e n c e , and, o f c o u r s e , r u l e r s . And t h e bus-
i n e s s o f t h e r u l e r , l i k e t h a t o f t h e ' l o g i s t i c ' p a r t 
o f t h e s o u l , i s t o keep t h e o t h e r c l a s s e s o f t h e S t a t e 
w i t h i n t h e scope o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s , and so t o ensure 
t h a t t h e o v e r a l l purpose o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e can be met. 
Thus, by a n a l o g y w i t h t h e s o u l , a j u s t S t a t e w i l l be 
one m w h i c h t h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
The p r o p e r f u n c t i o n o f t h e p r o d u c e r s , t h e s o l d i e r s 
and t h e Guardians> when each c l a s s i s d o i n g i t s 
own work w i t h i n t h e S t a t e . . . w o u l d be j u s t i c e , 
and w o u l d r e n d e r t h e S t a t e j u s t . ^® 
So f a r , P l a t o i s c l e a r l y r e m i n i s c e n t o f Anaximander 
and P y thagoras and H e r a c l i t u s m r e g a r d i n g j u s t i c e as 
a n a t u r a l harmony o r l i m i t o r r e c o n c i l i e t i o n . I t i s 
n o t e x t e r n a l l y imposed. N e i t h e r i s i t a mere t e c h n i q u e 
w h i c h can be c o n s i d e r e d as e x t r i n s i c t o o t h e r and sep-
a r a t e t e c h n i q u e s . I t i s t h e n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f 
t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d s o u l P l a t o ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e 
p r o p e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p a r t s o f t h e s o u l m r e l a t i o n 
t o each o t h e r i s p r e s e n t e d s i m p l y as a d e f i n i t i o n o f 
a w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d s o u l o r p e r s o n a l i t y . S i m i l a r l y , 
j u s t i c e m t h e S t a t e , t h o u g h c a p a b l e o f b e i n g reduced 
t o o r e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h c o n v e n t i o n , i s n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l 
m i t s n a t u r e , f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s n o t an impos-
i t i o n upon th o s e who engage m i t . The j u s t a r r a n g e -
ment o f t h e c l a s s e s o f t h e S t a t e i s s i m p l y a n a t u r a l 
n e c e s s i t y , m t h e sense o f b e i n g n e c e s s a r y t o t h e f u l l 
r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e i n d w e l l i n g need3 and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
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o f human b e i n g s . 
I I I . 
None o f t h i s , however, y e t t a k e s us t o where we 
r e a l l y want t o be. I t i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e good 
l i f e i s t h e p r o p e r end f o r man, t h a t r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t , 
i s t h e f u n c t i o n by means o f whic h it i s t o be a c h i e v e d 
t h a t we t h e r e f o r e cannot e n j o y eudaimon^ a u n l e s s we 
l i v e r a t i o n a l l y - o r d e r e d l i v e s , and t h a t n e i t h e r can 
t h e S t a t e a c h i e v e i t s purpose u n l e s s i t , t o o , i s r a t -
i o n a l l y o r d e r e d . But we do n o t y e t have any means o f 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g what i s p c t u a l l y good f r o m what i s n o t . 
And f o r as l o n g as v/e are m t h i s p o s i t i o n , t h e poss-
i b i l i t y remains open t h a t ve s h a l l l i v e r a t i o n a l l y -
o r d e r e d l i v e s o n l y t h e more e f f e c t i v e l y t o a c h i e v e 
what i s bad. I t i s o b v i o u s t o P l a t o , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t 
i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l and, by e x t e n s i o n , t h e S t a t e are t o 
secure what i s good, w i s e conduct and government 
a l i k e must be f o u n d e d upon o r i n s p i r e d by knowledge 
o f what r e a l l y is_ good. 
We r e c a l l t h a t t h e s t a t e o f p l a y as P r o t a g o r a s and 
Gorgias had l e f t i t was t h a t knowledge, and s p e c i f i c -
a l l y knowledge o f what r e a l l y o r o b j e c t i v e l y i s good, 
s i m p l y cannot be had - o r , a t l e a s t , cannot be e f f e c -
t i v e l y e x p r e s s e d . Any s t a t e m e n t o f mine p u r p o r t i n g t o 
be about t h e n a t u r e o f goodness i s doxa, mere o p i n i o n 
o r b e l i e f . But t h e n a g a i n , i f you c o n t r a d i c t me, 
y o u r s t a t e m e n t t o o i s no more t h a n doxa. and t h e r e 
i s no i n d u b i t a b l e body o f episteme by r e c o u r s e t o whic 
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t h e s t a l e m a t e between us can be r e s o l v e d . P l a t o , 
however, wish e s t o c l a i m , and as f a r as p o s s i b l e t o 
show, t h a t i t i s i ndeed p o s s i b l e t o have knowledge as 
d i s t i n c t f r o m o p i n i o n H i s v i e w o f t h e m a t t e r 13 t h a t 
t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y , when p h i l -
osophy i s p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d and u n d e r t a k e n , _is 
knov/ledge, and t h a t t h i s i n c l u d e s o r c u l m i n a t e s m 
knowledge o f a b s o l u t e and e t e r n a l Good. I t f o l l o w s 
f r o m t h i s t h a t o n l y t h e p h i l o s o p h e r i s the t r u l y good 
and happy man, b u t t h e s p e c i a l s t a t u s o f p h i l o s o p h y 
a l s o has f a r - r e a c h i n g p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . As 
P l a t o p u t s i t , 
U n l e s s p h i l o s o p h e r s become k i n g s m our S t a t e s , 
o r u n l e s s o u r p r e s e n t r u l e r s become c o n s c i e n t i o u s 
and competent s t u d e n t s o f p h i l o s o p h y , so t h a t 
wisdom and p o l i t i c a l power u n i t e . . . t h e r e can be 
no end t o t h e t r o u b l e s w h i c h b e s e t p o l i t i c a l 
o r d e r s and the human ra c e as a whole. •7 
I n p a s s i n g , i t w i l l be as w e l l t o p o i n t o u t t h a t 
t h e recommendation t h a t 'wisdom and p o l i t i c a l power 
u n i t e ' and the e d u c a t i o n a l and s o c i a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t m t h e R e p u b l i c are o f a r a t h e r 
d i s t i n c t i v e k i n d . For much o f i t s l e n g t h , t h e Rep-
u b l i c i s a U t o p i a n t r a c t , m t h e more o r l e s s t e c h n i c a l 
sense o f t h e <vord ' U t o p i a n ' s u g g e s t e d by George Kateb. 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a work m t h e same t r a d i t i o n as 
More's U t o p i a , Campanella's C i t y o f t h e Sun o r W i l l -
on 
1am T o m s ' re 1,3 f r o m I,o">here. v I t p i c t u r e s a hypo-
t h e t i c a l l y p e r f e c t s o c i e t y m w h i c h p e r f e c t i o n i s 
u n d e r s t o o d c h i e f l y a3 a harmony o f each man . v i t h him-
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s e l f and o t h e r s . But i t i s r e a d i l y conceded - and 
th e c o n c e s s i o n i s n o t t h o u g h t t o be a damaging one -
t h a t t h e a c t u a l c r e a t i o n o f such a s o c i e t y w o u l d be 
a d i f f i c u l t o r i m p o s s i b l e t a s k . As P l a t o p u t s i t , 
Perhaps ( t h e i d e a l s o c i e t y ) e x i s t s o n l y as a 
h e a v e n l y model. Jhoever v/ishes t o do so may see 
i t and make h i m s e l f a c i t i z e n o f i t , b u t i t 
does n o t m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e r e r e a l l y i s such a 
S t a t e , o r w h e t h e r o r n o t i t s h a l l e ver come 
i n t o b e i n g . Cm 
I n s h o r t , t h e R e p u b l i c o f f e r s , n o t a c h e c k l i s t o f 
d i r e c t p r a c t i c a l recommendations, b u t an i d e a l p a r a -
digm t o w h i c h a c t u a l communities w o u l d do w e l l t o 
t r y t o con f o r m themselves even though, m p r a c t i c e , 
t h e y a r e l i k e l y t o succeed o n l y i m p e r f e c t l y m d o i n g 
so. An ac c o u n t i s g i v e n o f t h a t f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h would ansv rer most c o m p l e t e l y t o 
th e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f man's n a t u r e , and such a S t a t e 
i s o f f e r e d f o r e m u l a t i o n even t h o u g h i t i s a d m i t t e d 
t h a t a c t u a l i m i t a t i o n i s u n l i k e l y t o o c c u r . We m i g h t 
say t h a t t h e s e n t i m e n t o f t h e P e p u b l i c i s l i k e t h a t 
o f B rowning's Andrea d e l S a r t o - 'Ah, b u t a man's 
r e a c h s h o u l d exceed h i s g r a s p , Or what's a heaven f o r 9 ' 
P h i l o s o p h e r s , t h e n , s h o u l d r u l e - o r r u l e r s s h o u l d 
become p h i l o s o p h e r s . But what k i n d o f man i s t h e p h i l -
o s o p h e r 9 By way o f p r e l i m i n a r y d e f i n i t i o n , P l a t o says 
t h a t he i s one who 
has a d e s i r e f o r e v e r y k i n d o f knowledge, and 
whose c u r i o s i t y f o r l e a r n i n g i s n e v e r s a t i s f i e d . 2 2 
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But t h e o b j e c t i o n i s a t once r a i s e d t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t -
i o n w o u l d seem t o embrace t h e mere e n e r v a t e d and c u r -
i o u s d i e t t a n t e - t h e a e s t h e t e who f l u t t e r s a i m l e s s l y 
f r o m one t i t i l l a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e t o the n e x t . S u r e l y 
we a r e n o t t o r e g a r d e v e r y such quidnunc as a p h i l o s -
opher. And P l a t o agrees t h a t i n d e e d we a r e n o t . 
Such c r e a t u r e s may on t h e f a c e o f i t appear t o have 
t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c u r i o s i t y o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , 
b u t t h e y a r e m f a c t mere shams, o r s u p e r f i c i a l 
• l o v e r s o f s i g h t s and sounds.* By c o n t r a s t , t h e gen-
u i n e p h i l o s o p h e r i s he 'who l o v e s the v i s i o n o f 
t r u t h 1 , and he i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e 
c o u n t e r f e i t p h i l o s o p h e r m t h e f o l l o w i n g way 
L o v e r s o f s i g h t s and sounds d e r i v e t h e i r s a t i s -
f a c t i o n s i m p l y f r o m b e a u t i f u l sounds and c o l o u r s 
and shapes, and f r o m a l l t h e v a r i o u s c o m b i n a t i o n s 
o f t h ese t h a t i n g e n u i t y can produce. But t h e i r 
i n t e l l e c t s l a c k the power o f comprehending and 
23 
g l o r y i n g m t h e n a t u r e o f b e a u t y i t s e l f . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h P l a t o i s h e r e d r a w i n g e x t e n d s , 
o f c o u r s e , beyond a e s t h e t i c s and i n t o e v e r y f i e l d o f 
human e x p e r i e n c e . Most g e n e r a l l y , what s o r t s o u t t h e 
p h i l o s o p h e r f r o m t h e u n p h i l o s o p h i c a l man i s t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e p r e o c c u p a t i o n s w i t h , on the one hand, 
p a r t i c u l a r appearances o r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h i n g s 
and, on t h e o t h e r , w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s e t h i n g s 
m themselves - w i t h ' t h i n g s as t h e y r e a l l y a r e ' . I n 
s h o r t , a d i s t i n c t i o n i s h e r e b e i n g made between d i f f -
e r e n t k i n d s o r o r d p r s o f e x p e r i e n c e m terms o f P l a t o 
Theory o f I d e a s . E x p r e s s i n g i t as b r i e f l y as p o s s i b l 
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h i s p o i n t i s as f o l l o w s . 
C o n s i d e r i n g t h e a p p a r e n t l y p r o b l e m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n 
between knowledge and o p i n i o n , P l a t o h o l d s t h a t we 
may t a k e i t f o r g r a n t e d t h a t such o p i n i o n s as we 
e n t e r t a i n a r e a t l e a s t 'about s o m e t h i n g ' . Our o p i n -
i o n s cannot be o p i n i o n s about n o t h i n g , s i n c e n o t h i n g 
i s p r e c i s e l y n o t h i n g - ' t h a t w h i c h i s n o t ' cannot f o r m 
t h e s u b j e c t o f any p r e d i c a t e . I t 13 e q u a l l y c l e a r , 
however, t h a t o p i n i o n s about what i s a r e n o t i n s t a n c e s 
o f knowledge o f what r e a l l y i s . I f t h e y v/ere, t h e n 
t h e c o n s t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n w h i c h vve m f a c t 
e x p e r i e n c e w o u l d n o t a r i s e . Thus i f you and I 
e n t e r t a i n c o n f l i c t i n g vie./s about x, o u r views a r e 
v i e w s about x t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e n o t views 
about n o t h i n g . But i f we b o t h knew what x r e a l ! y 
i s , we s h o u l d n o t - P l a t o t h i n k s c o u l d n o t - d i s a g r e e 
about i t two p e o p l e who have complete knowledge o f 
a s u b j e c t w i l l n o t d i f f e r as t o any o f i t s a s p e c t s . 
Such d i f f e r e n c e s can o n l y o c c u r i f t h e knowledge o f 
one o r b o t h p a r t i e s i s i n c o m p l e t e o r f a u l t y . And 
P l a t o wishes t o say, n o t o n l y o f f a u l t y , b u t a l s o 
o f what we s h o u l d c a l l p a r t i a l , knowledge, t h a t i t 
i s n o t r e a l l y 'knowledge' a t a l l . As a whole, h i s 
t h e o r y o f knowledge i s r a t h e r l i k e t h a t o f Hegel. 
He p i c t u r e s r e a l i t y as a complex e n t i t y o f w h i c h any 
e x p e r i e n c e s h o r t o f a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e whole can o n l y 
be an i m p e r f e c t m a n i f e s t a t i o n . 
The w o r l d as o r d i n a r y p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c e i t , however, 
i s p r o b l e m a t i c a l p r e c i s e l y because it does so o f t e n 
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g i v e n s o t o c o n f l i c t s o f o p i n i o n . To t a k e perhaps 
the l e a s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l o f the p o s s i b l e examples 
t h a t w h i c h may appear b e a u t i f u l f r o m 3ome p o i n t s o f 
view may f r o m o t h e r s e q u a l l y w e l l appear u g l y , t h a t 
w h i c h 13 t h o u g h t j u s t by some p e o p l e may be a c c o u n t e d 
u n j u s t by o t h e r s . C e r t a i n l y , and as we have a l r e a d y 
m e n t i o n e d , t h e p r o b l e m o f a m b i g u i t y m t h e w o r l d i s 
nowhere n e a r so a c u t e - o r nowhere n e a r so a c u t e an 
e p ] s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m - as P r o t a g o r a s , G o r g i a s , 
P l a t o and o t h e r s supposed. There a r e many areas o f 
e x p e r i e n c e m r e s p e c t o f w h i c h d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n 
seldom o r n e v e r o c c u r , and m cases where t h e y do 
o c c u r such d i f f e r e n c e s a r e n o t u s u a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o 
account f o r . There u n d o u b t e d l y a r e o c c a s i o n s when 
people who j u d g e t h a t I am m i s t a k e n have t h e same 
reason t o be t h o u g h t r i g h t as I have, b u t i t i s n o t 
easy t o see why P l a t o (and, so f a r as I know, a l l h i s 
p r e d e c e s s o r s ) have f o u n d such t h i n g s as r e l a t i o n a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s so p u z z l i n g . For i n s t a n c e , P l a t o f i n d s 
i t m y s t i f y i n g t h a t , s i n c e s i x i s g r e a t e r t h a n f o u r b u t 
l e s s t h a n t w e l v e , we cannot escape c o n t r a d i c t i o n when 
t a l k i n g o f s i x , w h i c h i s c l e a r l y nonsense. But we 
must l e t t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s pass. S u f f i c e i t t o say 
t h a t , f o r P l a t o , a l t h o u g h we can a f f i r m t h a t t h e w o r l d 
about w h i c h we e n t e r t a i n o p i n i o n s i s n o t n o n - e x i s t e n t , 
we cannot a f f i r - i t h a t i t i s e x i s t e n t m t h e ' f u l l ' 
sense o f t h e .vord - o r i n what he t a k e s t o be t h e ' f u l l ' 
sense o f t h e word. ,/e cannot, t h a t i s , say t h a t i t i s 
conposed o f ' t h i n g s m t h e r r s e l v e s ' Tf i t were, t h Q n 
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o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f i t w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e knowledge. The 
t r u e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s would be i m m e d i a t e l y a v a i l a b l e 
t o us m s e n s a t i o n , and, m t h a t case, t h e w o r l d 
w o u l d be f r e e o f paradoxes. S i n c e t h e ' w o r l d o f 
s i g h t ' ( as he h a b i t u a l l y c a l l s i t ) i s m a n i f e s t l y n o t 
f r e e o f paradoxes, P l a t o c o n c l u d e s t h a t i t must occupy 
a queer and i n d e t e r m i n a t e a r e a somewhere between b e i n g 
and n o t - b e i n g I t i s a w o r l d o f mere appearances. 
But appearances o f w h a t 7 To p u t i t r a t h e r b r i e f l y , 
P l a t o ' s response t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t o suggest t h a t 
t h e r e must m f a c t be two o r d e r s o f r e a l i t y . They 
d i f f e r f r o m one a n o t h e r m t h a t one i s , as i t were, 
a d i l u t e o r a p p r o x i m a t e v e r s i o n o f t h e o t h e r . They 
s t a n d t o one a n o t h e r m t h e same way as a r e f l e c t i o n 
m a m i r r o r s t a n d s t o the o b j e c t whose r e f l e c t i o n i t 
i s m t h e w o r l d o f s i g h t . V/hy, t h e n , can we n o t p e r -
c e i v e t h i s 'more r e a l ' w o r l d o f w h i c h t h e w o r l d w h i c h 
v/e do p e r c e i v e i s a mere a p p e a r a n c e 9 The answer must 
be t h a t , w h i l e t h e w o r l d o f s i g h t i s s e n s i b l e , t h e 
w o r l d o f w h i c h i t i s a copy i s p u r e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e -
i t i s a w o r l d o f I d e a s , and, as such, i t i s seen, so 
t o speak, o n l y w i t h t h e mind's eye. The d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s n e a t l y summed up m t h e f o l l o w i n g anecdote about 
th e r e d o u b t a b l e Diogenes t h e Cynic 
When P l a t o '<as t a l k i n g about I d e a s and u s i n g t h e 
words ' t a b l e n e s s ' and 'cupness', ( D i o g e n e s ) 
r e p l i e d , ' I can see a t a b l e and a cup, P l a t o , 
b u t I c a n ' t see what you c a l l ' t a b l e n e s s ' and 
'cupness'. P l a t o s a i d , 'That i s easy t o e x p l a i n 
You have eyes by w h i c h you see t h e t a b l e and t h e 
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cup, b u t you do n o t have t h e i n t e l l e c t t o app-
rehend t a b l e n e s s and c u p n e s s . ' ^ 
(Diogenes seems t o have gone t o P l a t o ' s l e c t u r e s 
l a r g e l y f o r the sake o f p o k i n g f u n a t P l a t o . P l a t o ' s 
t a r t r e p l y peihaps g i v e s some h i n t o f the r e l a t i o n s 
between t h e two.) 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o be c l e a r , however, t h a t t h e s e 
I d e a s , t h o u g h i n t e l l i g i b l e r a t h e r t h a n s e n s i b l e , a r e 
n e v e r t h e l e s s s a i d t o be r e a l o r s u b s t a n t i a l r a t h e r 
t h a n ' n o m i n a l ' . The I d e a o f Beauty, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
i s n o t j u s t t h e sum t o t a l o f a l l o u r a s c r i p t i o n s o f 
b e a u t y t o e m p i r i c a l l y - o b s e r v e d p a r t i c u l a r s . R a t h e r , 
i t i s an h y p o s t a t i z e d c o n c e p t , by r e a s o n o f w h i c h 
t h e t h i n g s w h i c h we c a l l b e a u t i f u l a r e s o - c a l l e d . 
A g a i n , we c a l l a cup a cup because i t p a r t a k e s , a l b e i t 
i m p e r f e c t l y , o f the I d e a o f Cupness. The i n t e l l i g i b l e 
w o r l d w h i c h t h e r e a s o n may apprehend i s a r e a l w o r l d 
m w h i c h I d e a s a c t u a l l y e x i s t - m w h i c h such t h i n g s 
as 'cupness' a r e , as i t were, l a n d up as t h e s t a n d a r d 
y a r d f o o t and i n c h a r e l a i d up a t Greenwich. And i n 
t h i s w o r l d , because i t i s r e a l , t h e r e i s no a m b i g u i t y . 
I t s c o n t e n t , P l a t o c l a i m s , i s t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , and t h e 
p r o v i n c e o f knov/ledge p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d . Thus, i t 
i s t h e philo'sopher whose a e s t h e t i c judgment, say, 
w i l l be t r u e judgment, f o r i t i s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r and 
o n l y he who w i l l know b e a u t y as i t r e a l l y i s . 
We c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , d i g r e s s i n t o a f u l l - d r e s s con-
s i d e r a t i o n o f i t h e r e , b u t t h e most c u r s o r y i n s p e c t i o n 
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i s enough t o show t h a t t h e Theory o f Ideas a s f u l l o f 
t h e most i n t r a c t a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s . F i r s t , m common 
w i t h a l l Greek s p e c u l a t i o n b e f o r e t h e de/elopment o f 
A r i s t o t l e ' s l o g i c , i t makes none o f t h e c a t e g o r i a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n s f a m i l i a r t o , and r e g a r d e d as e s s e n t i a l 
by, t h e modern mind. I t seems t h a t t h e r e a r e I d e a s 
n o t o n l y o f 'Beauty', ' J u s t i c e ' , 'Redness', and t h e l i k e , 
b u t o f 'Gat', ' B a l l ' , ' E q u i l a t e r a l T r i a n g l e ' , ' I s o s c e l e s 
T r i a n g l e ' , ' S t r a i g h t L i n e ' , o f 'Who', ' T h e r e 1 , ' T h i s ' , 
'Greatness', and so on i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . Second, as 
a p o i n t e r t owards t h e a c t u a l c o m p l e x i t y o f grammar, 
t h e Theory o f I d e a s o c c u p i e s an i m p o r t a n t p l a c e m 
t h e h i s t o r y o f i d e a s ; b u t i t s e v i d e n t muddleheaded-
ness a r i s e s l a r g e l y o u t o f t h e f a c t t h a t P l a t o o f f e r s 
i t as a m e t a p h y s i c a l dogma about s u p p o s e d l y s u b s i s t e n t 
e n t i t i e s . I t i s w e l l known t h a t , m t h e M e t a p h y s i c s , 
A r i s t o t l e l a y s bare a number o f t h e t h e o r y ' s most 
e v i d e n t weaknesses, and i t w o uld t a k e us too f a r 
a f i e l d t o go o v e r t h e g r o u n d w h i c h he t h e r e c o v e r s * 
I n f a i r n e s s t o P l a t o , however, i t ought a l s o t o be 
remarked t h a t ne h i m s e l f was by no means o b l i v i o u s 
o f h i s t h e o r y ' s d e f i c i e n c i e s . The t r e a t m e n t w h i c h i t 
r e c e i v e s m t h e Timaeus i s a b r i e f and somewhat d e f -
e n s i v e one. I t i s s u b j e c t e d t o e x t e n s i v e and p e n e t -
r a t i n g c r i t i c i s m m t h e P h i l e b u s and t h e S o p h i s t , and 
m the Parmenid^s, P l a t o m f a c t a n t i c i p a t e s much o f 
t h e case whi,ch was l a t e r t o be m a r s h a l l e d a g a i n s t i t 
by A r i s t o t l e . So f a r as t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y m 
g e n e r a l i s c oncerned, t h e Theory o f I d e a s i s perhaps 
most i n t e r e s t i n g as t h e e a r l i e s t a t t e m p t t o s t a t e t h e 
s o - c a l l e d 'problem o f u n i v e i s a l s ' . Prom o u r immediate 
p o i n t o f v i e w , hovever, i t s i m p o r t a n c e l i e s m t h e way 
i n w h i c h , m t h e R e p u b l i c , i t i s b r o u g h t m t o s u p p o r t 
a m o r a l d o c t r i n e , and m p a r t i c u l a r t h e c o n t e n t i o n 
t h a t t h e S t a t e , though m a 3ense an a r t i f a c t , ought 
t o be o r g a n i s e d m t h e l i g h t o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t m o r a l 
r e a l i t y w h i c h i s n o t i t s e l f a r t i f i c i a l . 
The c r u x o f t h e m a t t e r i s t h i s So f a r as t h e w o r l d 
o f s i g h t and t h e language w h i c h we use m o u r d i s c o u r s e 
w i t h i n i t a r e concerned, f i n a l l y t o pronounce s o m e t h i n g 
good i s t o a p p l y t o i t - a d m i t t e d l y o n l y as a m a t t e r 
o f o p i n i o n - t h e h i g h e s t and most comprehensive t e r m 
o f a p p r o b a t i o n . T h i s i s s t r a i g h t f o r v a r d enough The 
word 'good' does n o t m e r e l y s i g n i f y a s i n g l e q u a l i t y 
w h i c h we a t t r i b u t e t o t h i n g s . I t d i f f e r s f r o m o t h e r 
a d j e c t i v e s such as ' r e d ' m t h a t i t i s a l s o t h e name 
o f t h a t m terms o f w h i c h we e v a l u a t e t h i n g s ' N o t - r e d ' 
does n o t i m p l y any judgment o f v a l u e ( a t l e a s t , n o t m 
t h e o r d i n a r y way - a l t h o u g h I suppose t h a t t o say o f 
a b u l l f i g h t e r ' s c l o a k o r a D o c t o r o f D i v i n i t y ' s gown 
o r a p i l l a . r - b o x t h a t i t i s ' n o t - r e d ' would be t o i m p l y 
s uch a judgment ) 'hot-good', on t h e o t h e r hand, 
i n v a r i a b l y i s a j u d g m e n t a l t e r m . And s i n c e t h i s i s 
t r u e o f o u r o r d i n a r y and i m p r e c i s e uses o f 'good' m 
t h e w o r l d o f s i g h t , i t w i l l f o l l o w t h a t t h e h i g h e s t 
o f a l l t h e Id e a s m t h e ,Yorld o f Ideas w i l l be t h e 
I d e a o f t h e Good - t h e 'Good-as-such' o r t h e 'good-
m - i t s e l f . ' P u s ; ' i l l n o t o n l y be the mep.iston 
mathema, t h e g r e a t e s t o b j e c t o f k n o v l e d g e . I t w i l l 
a l s o be t h e u l t i m a t e end o r v a l u e - t h e f i n a l s t a n d a r d 
f o r t h e making o f p r a c t i c a l judgments 
The g r e a t e s t o f a l l p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s o f knowledge 
i s t h e I d e a o f t h e Good, f r o m w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g 
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t h a t i s good and r i g h t f o r us d e r i v e s i t s v a l u e . 
I n t h e words o f R.L. N e t t l e s h i p , 'The use o f t h e v/ord 
( g o o d ) i m p l i e s a c e r t a i n u l t i m a t e h y p o t h e s i s as t o 
t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s , namely t h a t t h e r e i s r e a s o n 
o p e r a t i n g m t h e w o r l d , m man and m n a t u r e . T h i s 
r e a s o n shows i t s e l f everywhere i n t h e w o r l d m t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r way, t h a t w h e r e v e r t h e r e a r e a number of-
e l ements c o - e r i s t e n t t h e r e w i l l be f o u n d a c e r t a i n 
u n i t y , a c e i t a m p r i n c i p l e w h i c h c o r r e l a t e s them, 
t h r o u g h w h i c h a l o n e t h e y a r e what t h e y a r e , and m t h e 
l i g h t o f w h i c h a l o n e t h e y can b« u n d e r s t o o d . Thus t h e 
good becomes t o P l a t o b o t h t he u l t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n o f 
m o r a l i t y and t h e u l t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
These a r e n o t two t h i n g s , b u t one and t h e same p r i n -
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c i p l e showing i t s e l f m d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t m a t t e r s . ' 
Thus, t h e r u l e r - o r , more s t r i c t l y , t h e r u l e r o f 
P l a t o ' s p o s t u l a t e d i d e a l S t a t e - w i l l be a man o f 
co m p l e t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l knowledge, who i s equipped t o 
do good by h i s knowledge o_f a l l - e m b r a c i n g and r e a l 
Good. 7/e a r e i m m e d i a t e l y l e d t o ask, however But 
what _is t h e I d e a o f the Good, and how a r e we t o a r r i v e 
a t i t 9 And, when p r e s s e d on t h i s p o i n t , P l a t o i s 
a b l e t o g i v e o n l y an i n d i r e c t and d i s c u r s i v e answer. 
He i s no more a b l e t o d e s c r i b e t h e I d e a o f the Good 
than he had been able to describe tableness and cupness 
f o r Diogenes. I n s h o r t , the / o r l d of Ideas l i e s w h o l l y 
o u t s i d e the w o r l d which language d e p i c t s . Thus, the 
Good i s not amongst the things which can be comnum-
cated by speech (and v/e are probably c o r r e c t m reg-
a r d i n g t h i s as a r e t o r t to the frequent claim o f the 
Sophists to be able to teach a r e t e or p o l l t i k e n r e t e . ) , 
The most t h a t the e s t a b l i s h e d p h i l o s o p h e r n i g h t do, 
Pl a t o suggests, v/ould be t o i n d i c a t e where the Good 
stands m the h i e r a r c h y o f c o g n i t i o n , and so p o i n t a 
way towards i t f o r the guidance o f whoever wishes t o 
discover i t f o r h i m s e l f . And he proposes a semes of 
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i l l u s t r a t i o n s w i t h t h i s m mind. The f i r s t o f these 
i s very b r i e f and p r e p a r a t o r y . He suggests t h a t NP 
regard the Idea o f the Good as being to the i n t e l l i g -
i b l e world what the sun i s to the wo r l d of s i g h t , and 
t h a t v/e s i m i l a r l y consider the eye m the p e r c e p t i b l e 
w o r l d as answering t o the soul m the m t e l l l g i b l e . 
I n t h i s way, knowing i s represented as being to the 
s o u l what seeing i s to the eye. I n the wo r l d o f s i g h t , 
the eye i s able to see because the l i g h t of the sun 
renders o b j e c t s v i s i b l e . And, by the same token, i t 
i s s a i d t h a t the Idea o f the Good i s t h a t which enables 
the soul t o know i t i s the u l t i m a t e source o f mean-
i n g and t r u t h . Prom t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t , Plato pro-
ceeds to two r a t h e r more extended analogies, the pur-
pose of the f i r s t o f which i s t w o f o l d . I t i s intended 
both to i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f e r e n c e s between sensation 
and i n t e l l e c t i o n and a l s o , as Jaeger puts i t , t o des-
c r i b e 'the stages by which knowledge moves from the 
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emptiest sham of appearance to the v i s i o n of the su-
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preme r e a l i t y . ' The purpose o f the second i s not so 
l m n e d i a t e l y c l e a r , but we s h a l l glance at each o f 
them m t u r n . 
I n the f i r s t , we are i n v i t e d to consider the process 
of a c q u i r i n g knowledge m terms of a l i n e d i v i d e d i n t o 
two unequal p a r t s , each o f which i s again d i v i d e d i n t o 
two s m a l l e r p a r t s m p r o p o r t i o n to the d i v i s i o n o f the 
whole 
2 
B 
1 
2 
A 
1 
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Let A and B stand, r e s p e c t i v e l y f o r the world of s i ^ h t 
and the w o r l d o f Ideas. Section A PS a v h o l ^ , t h e r e -
f o r e , i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from s e c t i o n B by i t s r e l a t i v e 
l a c k o f c l a r i t y . Subsection A1 corresponds to t h a t 
department o f sensory experience which i s made up of 
images or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s - r e f l e c t i o n s , p a i n t i n g s , 
shadows and so f o r t h . Subsection A2 answers to t h a t 
p a r t o f the p e r c e p t i b l e / o r l d which i s comprised of 
a l l thp t h i n g s of which the contents o f A1 are rep-
r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t i s , i t stands f o r our normal sen-
sory f i e l d . Subsection B1, which c a r r i e s us i n t o the 
i n t e l l i g i b l e world, represents mathematical knowledge, 
w h i l e the f i n a l subsection stands f o r t h a t p a r t o f 
knowleage which i s acquired - or, more p r o p e r l y , 
e l i c i t e d - and expressed through d i a l e c t i c . I t stands 
f o r knowledge c o n s i s t i n g e n t i r e l y o f Ideas. I n t e l l -
e c t u a l development, t h e r e f o r e , i s represented as a l m 
ear progress from the w o i l d o f p a r t i c u l a r s t o t h a t o f 
pure Ideas, such Ideas being separpted from any p a r t -
i c u l a r o b j e c t or s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . And at the end o f 
the l i n e , as the c u l m i n a t i o n of the aspirant's progress 
stands the sublime and comprehensive Idea o f the Good. 
The complete sequence which P l a t o here wishes to 
represent may t h e r e f o r e now be i l l u s t r a t e d m the 
f o l l o w i n g way 
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THE GOOD 
B. INTELLIGIBLE 
A. PERCEPTIBLE. 
2. D i a l e c t i c . 
1. Mathematics 
2. Objects. 
1. Representations, 
The bridge between p e r c e p t i o n and i n t e l l e c t i o n , and 
thus the most c r u c i a l stage of mental development, i s 
s a i d to be provided by mathematics. This ' b r i d g i n g ' 
f u n c t i o n o f mathematics i s not made c l e a r m the a n a l -
ogy i t s e l f , where mathematics seems to f a l l e n t i r e l y 
w i t h i n the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d ; but t h i s aspect o f 
the matter emerges from Plato's e x p o s i t i o n as a whole. 
Mathematics i s understood as i n c l u d i n g geometry, a s t r o -
nomy and harmony, and the important p o i n t here i s 
t h a t a l l these departments o f enquiry have m common 
the f a c t t h a t they take t h e i r d e parture, as i t were, 
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from the world of s i g h t . I n o t h e r words, our concern 
w i t h them tends t o centre upon or begin w i t h geomet-
r i c a l f i g u r e s , observations o f a c t u a l heavenly bodies, 
and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f musical i n t e r v a l s . They are 
t h e r e f o r e m one seme, or to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , a p a r t 
of the p e r c e p t i b l e w o r l d . Yet m another sense they 
are n o t . They may be s a i d to occupy both branches of 
the n a t u r a l order, and i t i s t h i s d u a l i t y ./hich gives 
the key to t h e i r value as a mode of passage between 
the two. 
This t r a n s i t i o n a l nature o f mathematics i s most 
r e a d i l y i l l u s t r a t e d by an elementary example from geo-
metry. Consider the s o - c a l l e d theoiem o f Pythagoras 
t h a t i n the case o f any given r i g h t - a n g ] Q d t r i a n g l e 
2 2 2 
ABC such t h a t C i s the hypotenuse, A + B = C . I n 
the o r d i n a r y way, the teacher who wished t o communic-
ate t h i s would demonstrate i t by c o n s t r u c t i n g a r i g h t -
angled t r i a n g l e / i t h squares on each of i t s sides and 
p e r f o r m i n g the necessary c a l c u l a t i o n s . But there are 
f o u r t h i n g s to note. F i r s t of a l l , i t i s not s t r i c t l y 
necessary to c o n s t r u c t a c t u a l f i g u r e s at a l l . The 
f i g u r e s are n o t h i n g more than aids to the mmd. They 
do, m f a c t , f u r n i s h only a r a t h e r cumbersome way o f 
i l l u s t r a t i n g something which, m p r i n c i p l e , the reason 
alone can grasp, but which i s r a t h e r e l u s i v e by reason 
of i t s own abstractness and the somevhat slack o r hazy 
c o n d i t i o n o f the u n t u t o r e d mind. (This i s made c l e a r , 
i n c i d e n t a l l y , by Socrates' conversation w i t h Meno's 
slave-boy m the I Teno.^ Second, i t seems t h a t we could 
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not m any case drvw the f i g u r e s and perform the c a l -
c u l a t i o n s p t a l l unless v/e already had some vague 
awareness o f c e r t a i n ideas l i n e , square, square-
r o o t , and so f o r t h The c o n s t r u c t i o n s w i l l 3erve to 
c l a r i f y these ideas and communicate something o f them, 
but our a c t u a l l y having some apprehension o f the ideas 
would appear to be p r i o r to our drawing any f i g u r e s or 
doing pny c a l c u l a t i o n s . T h i r d , tne theorem of Pythag-
oras - or any oth e r g e o m e t r i c a l theorem - 13 a g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n I f t r u e , i t i s t r u e not j u s t o f t h i s o r t h a t 
r i g h t - a n g l e d t r i a n g l e , but o f The Right-Angled T r i a n g l e 
(The f a c t t h a t , t h a r k s to the pioblem o f incommensur-
able numbers, the theorem of Pythagoras i s n o t , m f a c t 
u n i v e r s a l l y t r u e i s awkward, but t h i s need not d e t a i n 
us.) F i n a l l y , i t remains to be po i n t e d out t h a t we 
cannot m any case draw 'proper' t r i a n g l e s o r squares 
at a l l . A t r i a n g l e end a square nre c e r t a i n c o n f i g -
u r a t i o n s o f s t r a i g h t l i n e s , and a s t r a i g h t l i n e i s the 
most d i r e c t route between t./o p o i n t s . But we cannot 
draw the most d i r e c t r o u t e bet'.een t.vo p o i n t s . I t 13 
m any case t e c h n i c a l l y impossible to draw, or oth e r -
wise to produce, a completely s t r a i g h t l i n e - as 
Vhevvell puts i t , 'And so no f o r c e , however g r e a t , 
w i l l s t r e t c h a cord, however f i n e , i n t o a h o r i z o n t a l 
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l i n e /hich s h a l l be a b s o l u t e l y s t r a i g h t . ' Moreover, 
no l i n e can be drawn //hich does not have the dimension 
of w i d t h or thickness m a d d i t i o n to t h a t o f l e n g t h . 
Thus, a l i n e which has w i d t h as w e l l as l e n g t h may be 
s a i d to be only an imp e r f e c t copy or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f 
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t h a t which r e a l l y answers t o our d e f i m t i o n o f a & t r a i g 
l i n e . And the upshot of a l l t h i s i s t h a t P l a t o "vould 
wish to conclude t h a t t r i a n g l e s and squares as we 
draw them are only approximately l i k e the 're a l ' geo-
m e t r i c a l f i g u r e s l a i d up m the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d . 
</hat we assert about geo m e t r i c a l drawings as such i s 
o nly h y p o t h e t i c a l l y t r u e , i t i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y t r u e 
only of the Ideas which the drawings represent. But 
the f a c t remains t h a t geometers do a r r i v e a t the t r u t h 
about ' r e a l ' f i g u r e s , even though they do so only w i t h 
the a i d o f approximations or ' v i s u a l a i d s ' . To the 
extent t h a t they do operate w i t h v i s i b l e f i g u r e s , and 
e s p e c i a l l y to the extent t h a t they tend t o assume 
t h e i r f i n d i n g s to be c a t e g o r i c a l l y t r u e of such f i g -
ures, they are s t i l l t i e d to the wo r l d o f s i g h t . But 
they are nevertheless w i t h i n reach, as i t were, of 
subsection B2 o f the d i v i d e d l i n e , where they 'come 
to a k i n d of knowledge. (which) i s the r e a l o r pure 
logos. I t r i s e s to grasp the hi g h e s t p r i n c i p l e , from 
t h e r e , by h o l d i n g on to what i s j u s t next to i t and 
w i t h i n i t s reach, i t descends again to the end w i t h -
out the help o f sny sense-perception, and thus, 
moving from Ideas to Ideas, i t f i n a l l y r e s t s a t Ideas.' 
I n o t h e r words, mathematics i s the p l a t f o r m from which 
the philosopher i s enabled to launch out i n t o the pur-
est apprehension o f r e a l i t y where, unencumbered by the 
ambiguous e m p i r i c a l , he may e v e n t u a l l y grasp at the 
Idea of the Good i t s e l f . 
I t i s t h i s theory o f i n t e l l e c t u a l development which 
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u n d e r l i e s P l a t o ' s account o f how, through education, 
men might be turned i n t o p h ilosophers, and so made 
i d e a l l y f i t t o r u l e . I n the I d e a l S t a t e , the p o t e n t i a l 
r u l e r s w i l l be sele c t e d from the a u x i l i a r y c l a s s , a l l 
the members o f which - male and female a l i k e - w i l l 
share a common education u n t i l they reach the age o f 
twenty. T h e i r formal i n s t r u c t i o n w i l l i n c l u d e grammar, 
music, and gymnastic and a t h l e t i c t r a i n i n g , and t h e i r 
c u r r i c u l u m w i l l be c a r e f u l l y v e t t e d to keep out any-
t h i n g u n d e s i r a b l e . There w i l l be no p a i n f u l s t o r i e s 
about the h o r r o r s o f the next w o r l d which might weaken 
the m i l i t a r y ardour of those who hear them. There 
w i l l be no l i g h t music, but only s t i m n 6 and m a r t i a l 
tunes. Most g e n e r a l l y (and w i t h o u t d i g r e s s i n g i n t o 
P l a t o ' s theory o f a r t ) , n o t h i n g i < 3 to be i n c l u d e d m 
the s y l l a b u s which might impede the i n d i v i d u a l ' s pro-
gress upwards from p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s towards the realm 
of Ideas. At the age o f eighteen, the students w i l l 
serve i n the army f o r two years. They w i l l then be 
t e s t e d by a l t e r n a t e temptation and f e a r t o see whether 
the q u a l i t i e s so f a r developed m them are e a s i l y 
overthrown; and those who pass the t e s t w i l l proceed 
to f u r t h e r t r a i n i n g as Guardians. During t h i s t r a i n -
i n g , as we might expect, much time w i l l be spent on 
mathematics - which 'leads to the apprehension o f the 
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t r u t h ' . A r i t h m e t i c , plane and s o l i d geometry, a s t r o n -
omy and harmony w i l l occupy the students between the 
ages o f twenty and t h i r t y , and they w i l l then proceed 
to a f i v e - y e a r course of d i a l e c t i c , described as 
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the discovery of r e a l i t y by the unaided l i g h t of 
reason, w i t h o u t the assistance of the senses, 
p e r s i s t i n g u n t i l (the s t u d e n t ) grasps the nature 
of the Good i t s e l f , and so f i n d s t h a t he has 
32 
reached the l i m i t s o f the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d . 
Knowledge of the Good, however, i s not the end o f the 
s t o r y . The f i n a l connection between theory and p r a c t i c e 
s t i l l has t o be made and r e i n f o r c e d bj£ p r a c t i c e . Now 
t h i r t y - f i v e years o l d , those who are destined f o r 
Guardianship w i l l be r e q u i r e d to undertake a f i f t e e n -
year s t i n t o f m i l i t a r y command and v a r i o u s o t h e r sub-
o r d i n a t e o f f i c e s , and, d u r i n g t h i s time, they w i l l 
again undergo t e s t s t o see whether they stand f i r m 
m the face o f a range o f t e n p t a t i o n s or weaken and 
t u r n aside. E v e n t u a l l y , when they are pronounced f i t 
t o undertake the u l t i m a t e f u n c t i o n s o f statesmanship, 
they w i l l become f u l l y - f l e d g e d Guardians. They w i l l 
Raise the soul's eye to the u n i v e r s a l l i g h t which 
i l l u m i n a t e s a l l t h i n g s . They w i l l see there the 
u l t i m a t e Good, the p a t t e r n upon which they are t o 
order the State and the l i v e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , and 
the remainder o f t h e i r own l i v e s a l s o . 
Even then, though a l l w i l l take a t u r n at r u l i n g , they 
w i l l spend most of t h e i r time m study and contempla-
t i o n . Government w i l l be regarded, not as an honour 
or as an end m i t s e l f , but as a necessary duty. By 
t h e i r success m an e d u c a t i o n a l obstacle-course o f 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y d u r a t i o n , they w i l l have shown themselves 
to be something very d i f f e r e n t from the C a l l i c l e a n 
superman or the Thrasymachean s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d lawmaker. 
103. 
They w i l l have come to know the t r u e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y 
i t s e l f , and, m doing so, they w i l l have proved them-
selves to be the best men o f t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n - t a l e n t e d 
m every way, l o v i n g the S t a t e , and r e g a r d i n g i t s i n t -
e r e s t s as t h e i r ovn. 
IV. 
Having described by means of the d i v i d e d l i n e how 
genuine knowledge might come to be acquired, P l a t o 
now passes to the famous and somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c a l 
analogy of the cave. V/e are to imagine a cave or 
subterranean chamber m which men are bound f a s t as 
p r i s o n e r s . They are fastened m such a way t h a t they 
can n e i t h e r move nor t u r n t h e i r heads. Behind them, 
o b j e c t s are being c a r r i e d to and f r o along a parapet, 
behind which again a f i r e i s burning. Pinioned as they 
are, the p r i s o n e r s can see o n l y t h e i r own shadows and 
those o f the o b j e c t s behind them, p r o j e c t e d by the 
l i g h t o f the f i r e onto the w a l l m f r o n t o f them. I t 
i s to be assumed t h a t the p r i s o n e r s have always been 
p r i s o n e r s and, since they have never seen anyth i n g 
e l s e , the w a l l of shadows c o n s t i t u t e s t o t h e i r minds 
the whole of what i s . P r e s e n t l y , however, one of the 
p r i s o n e r s escapes. Turning, he n o t i c e s t h a t the shad-
ows which he has h i t h e r t o taken f o r r e a l i t y are only 
shadows. He makes h i s way to the entrance o f the cave, 
and passes through i t i n t o the s u n l i t w o r l d beyond. 
At f i r s t , since h i s v i s i o n i s unaccustomed to such 
b r i g h t n e s s , he i s only i n d i s t i n c t l y av/are of the t h i n g s 
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o f the outside w o r l d . But h i s v i s i o n p r e f e r t l y ad-
j u s t s i t s e l f to accommodate, f i r s t , the t h i n g s them-
selves and, m due course, the sun by reason o f which 
they are v i s i b l e . His journey completed, he descends 
again i n t o the cave and t r i e s to e n l i g h t e n h i s scorn-
f u l and i n c r e d u l ous former companions. 
The cave i l l u s t r a t i o n i s c l e a r l y m some respects a 
reference back t o the imagery w i t h which Plato's s e r i e s 
o f analogies began. Once again, the sun stands f o r 
the Idea o f the Good. Also, the cave-analogy seems t o 
continue the idea o f a stage-by-stage progression as 
i n i t i a t e d by the analogy of the d i v i d e d l i n e . Both 
analogies set out f o u r stages, and both at f i r s t s i g h t 
seem intended t o show ho./ the i n t e l l e c t may pass by 
degrees out o f the realm o f o p i n i o n and i n t o t h a t o f 
knowledge. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r e f o r e , i t has been 
thought a p p r o p r i a t e to take the cave-story as more 
or less symmetrical w i t h the analogy of the d i v i d e d 
l i n e . The i n i t i a l stage o f the former, when r e a l i t y 
appears to the p r i s o n e r s to be c o n s t i t u t e d e n t i r e l y 
by shadows, i s answered by subsection A1 o f the l a t t e r , 
and so on, p a n passu Thus, as N e t t l e s h i p puts i t , 
'The p r i s o n e r set f r e e from the cave and g r a d u a l l y 
accustomed to bear the s t r o n g e s t l i g h t passes through 
a s e r i e s of ^ t a g e s which correspond g e n e r a l l y to t h a t 
which was symbolised by the d i v i d e d l i n e m the pre-
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ceding s e c t i o n o f the argument.' On c l o s e r i n s p e c t i o n , 
however, matters t u r n out t o be r a t h e r more complex 
than they seem. F i r s t , although he i s r a t h e r i n c l i n e d 
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to labour a p o i n t , why should P l a t o use two major f i g -
u r a t i v e devices m quick succession merely to i l l u s -
t r a t e e x a c t l y the same t h i n g 9 Second, and more sub-
s t a n t i a l l y , w h i l e there i s a c l e a r enough correspondence 
between the l a s t two stages o f each analogy, t h e r e i s 
an e q u a l l y c l e a r l a c k o f correspondence between the 
f i r s t two. Subsection A1 o f the l i n e i s proposed aa 
the province o f mere shadows or r e f l e c t i o n s or r e p r e s -
e n t a t i o n s . Amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , i t i s the province 
o f a r t or mimesis which i s , as P l a t o l a t e r puts i t , 
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'three removes away from the t r u t h . ' That p a r t of 
r e a l i t y o r d i n a r i l y occupied by man - the 'world o f 
s i g h t ' - i s symbolised by subsection A2. Yet when we 
come to the cave, we f i n d t h a t the p r i s o n e r s there are 
s a i d to be denizens of a world which i s i t s e l f 'three 
removes av/ay from the t r u t h . ' T h e i r w o r l d i s a w o r l d 
m which shadows ere b e l i e v e d to form the sum t o t a l o f 
r e a l i t y , and o n l y the occasional escapee t u r n s h i s 
head and so graduates to the stage which, on the d i v i d e d 
l i n e , i s a symbol f o r our o r d i n a r y sensory experience. 
Not u n t i l the p r i s o n e r passes out o f the cave a l t o -
g e ther do we r e t r i e v e the image of the sun, and not 
u n t i l t h i s stage i s reached does he become even dimly 
aware of a n y t h i n g but mimetic o b j e c t s . The o b j e c t s 
which he sees m the f i r s t instance are a r t i f i c i a l ones, 
c a r r i e d to and f r o before an a r t i f i c i a l source o f l i g h t 
by men who are not themselves p r i s o n e r s , but whose i d -
e n t i t y i s not revealed. 
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I t would seem reasonable to suppose, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t , 
m the words of Professor A.S. Ferguson, 'the a l l e g o r y 
( o f the cave) i s not framed to e x h i b i t how o p i n i o n 
mounts by a graduated ladder to knowledge. I t i s not 
even p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the r e l a t i o n o f the sen-
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s i b l e to the i n t e l l i g i b l e . ' I n s t e a d , i t may p l a u s i b l y 
be considered as having a p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l message. 
On t h i s account, i t i s intended, not to show how an 
i n d i v i d u a l might pass through the stages of i n t e l l e c -
t u a l development, but to i l l u s t r a t e the pointed con-
t r a s t which i s one o f the Republic's c e n t r a l themes 
the c o n t r a s t which o r d i n a r i l y holds between the p h i l -
o s o p hical and the p o l i t i c a l ways of l i f e . A f t e r a l l , 
m the analogy o f the l i n e , the emphasis i s placed 
squarely upon the i n d i v i d u a l as seeker a f t e r t r u t h . 
I n the cave, on the o t h e r hand, there i s a s h i f t o f 
emphasis the i n d i v i d u a l i s now considered as one 
among h i s f e l l o w men - as a me-nber of s o c i e t y . And 
t h i s i s r e i n f o r c e d by Plato's s p e c u l a t i o n s as to 
what might happen to the philosopher who, having once 
made good h i s escape, r e t u r n e d to the cave to convert 
the others 
Do you t h i n k i t at a l l remarkable t h a t the man 
who r e t u r n s from the contemplation of t h i n g s 
d i v i n e and once more becomes i n v o l v e d w i t h the 
miserable concerns o f men should be thought 
unimpressive and f o o l i s h i f , w h i le s t i l l un-
accustomed to darkness and p e e r i n g m the poor 
l i g h t , he should be call°d upon to argue m co u r t 
or elsewhere about the sbado /s of j u s t i c e or the 
images thereby such shadows are cest men whose 
minds have neve" g^a^ped .-justice i t s e l f 9 - ^ 
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I n view of a l l t h i s , i t seems c l e a r t h a t the shado/s 
and o b j e c t s m the cave are not p r o p e r l y understood 
as corresponding to those which are s a i d to occupy 
subsections A1 and A2 of the d i v i d e d l i n e , but as 
something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the men who 
are c a r r y i n g the o b j e c t s along the parapet might rea-
sonably be seen as r e p r e s e n t i n g the manipulators of 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n - perhaps as 'the younger gen e r a t i o n 
of Sophists, o f the type a l r e a d y p o r t r a y e d m the 
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Gorgias.' S i m i l a r l y , the shadows on the cave-wall 
might be taken t o s i g n i f y the 'shadows' of j u s t i c e 
and goodness which are created by t h e i r p r a c t i c e s m 
the p u b l i c assemblies and c o u r t s of law. As Profess-
o r Ferguson puts i t , the o b j e c t s which they c a r r y 
'are not a stage m the education, t h e i r sole end i s 
t o cast shadows, t o make i l l u s i o n . . . . As f o r the f i r e -
l i g h t which makes the show p o s s i b l e , we are, I t h i n k , 
e n t i t l e d to c a l l i t the l i g h t o f human o p i n i o n . The 
f i r e too i s p a r t o f the human machinery to produce 
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shadows.' 
Continu i n g t h i s l i n e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t i s reas-
onable also to suppose t h a t the secod stage o f the cave 
analogy - when the escaping p r i s o n e r t u r n s and r e a l i s e s 
t h a t the shadows are only shadows - represents the s t a t 
o f mind of the man who looks d i r e c t l y a t the f a c t s of 
the case w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g h i m s e l f to be l e d up the gar-
den path by the f a s t - t a l k i n g Sophist. But we n o t i c e 
t h a t such an i n d i v i d u a l i s s t i l l very f a r from know-
ledge p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d He has managed to pass s i g -
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n i f i c a n t l y beyond the stage o f unquestioning acceptance 
o f the semblances devised by the p r o f e s s i o n a l r h e t o r -
i c i a n , but he i s s t i l l o p e r a t i n g w i t n i n the »vorld 
of s i g h t and o p i n i o n . That i s more, the i n d i v i d u a l 
who makes even t h i s much progress i s something of 
a r a r e b i r d . As f o r the m a j o r i t y , they do not judge 
according to the f a c t s at a l l - or, at l e a s t , they 
judge according to the f a c t s o n l y i n s o f a r as they have 
access to them through the d i s t o r t i n g medium of per-
suasion. I n the mam, men make judgments o n l y on the 
s t r e n g t h o f what they are t o l d , and only now and again 
i s a man able to d i s r e g a r d the t r a n s m u t a t i o n o f the 
f a c t s by those vvho make i t t h e i r business to present 
them. 
I t i s a l l t h i s , then, which provides the t h e o r e t -
i c a l s u b s t r u c t u r e , as i t were, of P l a t o ' s c l a i m t h a t , 
i d e a l l y , philosophers should r u l e . P r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s 
cannot be conducted s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by those whose 
v i s i o n has not t r u l y and completely transcended the 
v a l e of o p i n i o n . Opinion i s n o t o r i o u s l y l a c k i n g m 
c e r t a i n t y , but, m p u b l i c a f f a i r s , t h i s i s so not 
only because i t i s o p i n i o n r a t h e r than knowledge, 
but also because i t i s so r e a d i l y d i s t o r t e d by the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s o f persuasion, and manipulated by them 
towards ends which themselves r e q u i r e e v a l u a t i o n m 
terms o f something more than o p i n i o n . Government, 
t h e r e f o r e , should be the province o f those //ho do 
indeed have something more than o p i n i o n . I t should 
r e s t w i t h the man who has passed along the d i v i d e d 
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l i n e and a t l a s t grasped at the timeless Idea o f thp 
Good which l i e s behind and informs the n a t u r a l order, 
and by means of which a l l p r a c t i c a l judgments are them-
selves rendered good. 
V. 
A r i s t o t l e as an Exponent of L a t u r a l Lew. 
A r i s t o t l e d i f f e r s from P l a t o m a number o f s i g n i f -
i c a n t respects, and i t i s t r u e t h a t , s u p e r f i c i a l l y , 
much of what he has to say looks s c a r c e l y compatible 
w i t h what we have suggested are the broad claims o f 
n a t u r a l law. His most obvious p o i n t o f divergence 
from h i s teacher l i e s m c e r t a i n m i s g i v i n g s as to the 
r e l a t i o n between theory and p r a c t i c e - m i s g i v i n g s 
which are, m f a c t , not u n l i k e those more r e c e n t l y 
voiced by Professor TvTichael Oakeshott. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , A r i s t o t l e ' s view i s t h a t a r i g o r o u s 
t r a i n i n g as a t h e o r e t i c i a n or philosopher does n o t , 
a f t e r a l l , p rovide the best p r e p a r a t i o n f o r prac-
t i c a l l i f e . He f u l l y agrees w i t h Plato's suggestion 
t h a t the p h i l o s o p h e r i s the supremely happy man. 
There i s , indeed, an obvious S o c r a t i c f l a v o u r to h i s 
remark t h a t there i s something d i v i n e about a p h i l -
osopher's l i f e . But he nonetheless concludes t h a t 
the c u l t i v a t i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c wisdom 
(so p h i a ) does not o f i t s e l f help us to f i n d s o l u t i o n s 
to moral or p r a c t i c a l problems as such. Contemplation 
i s , a f t e r a l l , something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from a c t i o n , 
and, as he puts i t , 
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S o c r a t e s . . . s e t o u t to e n q u i r e i n t o t h e n a t u r e 
o f c o u r a g e and j u s t i c e and v/hat-not. ( b u t ) o u r 
a i m i s n o t to kno'v what j u s t i c e and c o u r a g e a r e 
so much a s to be c o u r a g e o u s and j u s t - m t h e 
same way a s we w i s h a c t u a l l y to be h e a l t h y and 
f i t r a t h e r t h a n j u s t to f i n d out what i t i s 
to be h e a l t h y and f i t . 4 0 
The a c t i v i t y o f s o l v i n g t h e problems w h i c h c o n f r o n t us 
m o u r d a i l y l i v i n g , A r i s t o t l e s u g g e s t s m a f a m i l i a r 
p a s s a g e i n t h e I<icomach°an S t h i c s , i s a m a t t e r o f 
c h o o s i n g a p a t h w h i c h l i e s mid-way between e x t r e m e s 
o f d e f i c i e n c y and e x c e s s , and o f c h o o s i n g m s u c h a 
41 
way a s t o s u i t a c t i o n to c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The p o i n t , 
m s h o r t , i s to a c t on the maxim w h i c h we have a l r e a d y 
e n c o u n t e r e d m c o n n e c t i o n w i t h P y t h a g o r a s and H e r a c l i t u 
' M o d e r a t i o n i s b e s t ' . But t h i s a c t i v i t y , he c o n s i d e r s , 
i s s o m e t h i n g q u i t e d i s t i n c t from t h a t o f the p h i l -
o s o p h e r - t h a t i s , from t h e a c t i v i t y o f a c q u i r i n g 
a b s t r a c t knowledge o f what i s n e c e s s a r y and u n i v e r s a l . 
I t i s d i f f e r e n t p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e the c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
m w h i c h we a r e a c t u a l l y c a l l e d upon to a c t a r e them-
s e l v e s c o n c r e t e , p a r t i c u l a r and c o n t i n g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e 
To borrow one o f the e x a m p l e s u s e d by P l a t o a t t h e 
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b e g i n n i n g o f t h e R e p u b l i c A r i s t o t l e would w i s h t o 
p o i n t out t h a t , i f a man who h a s l e f t h i s weapons m 
y o u r s a f e - k e e p i n g l a t e r comes to you m a f r e n z y o f 
h o m i c i d a l mania s h o u t i n g f o r a sword, the q u e s t i o n 
w h i c h w i l l n m e d i a t e l y s p r i n g to y o u r mind i s n o t , 
'What i s t h e G o o d " o r ",Vhat i s J u s t i c e * ? ' but • /hat 
s h a l l I d o 7 ' I n o t \ e r words, p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n -
111. 
m aking 13 n o t , o r 13 n o t p r i m a r i l y , an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
e n t e r p r i s e . As A r i s t o t l e u n d e r s t a n d s i t , i t c a l l s 
upon t h e c a l c u l a t i v e f a c u l t y o f the mind ( l o g i s t i k o n ) 
r a t h e r t h a n the s c i e n t i f i c o r t h e o r e t i c a l f a c u l t y 
( e p i s t ^ m i k o n ) , and the ' v i r t u e ' a p p r o p r i a t e to i t 
i s m o r a l r a t h e r t h e n i n t e l l e c t u a l . He t h e r e f o r e 
c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e man b e s t e q u i p p e d f o r p r a c t i c a l 
l i f e m g e n e r a l , and f o r the d u t i e s o f s t a t e s m a n s h i p 
m p a r t i c u l a r , i s n o t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , but t h e man o f 
p h r o n e s i s o r p r a c t i c a l wisdom. And p h r o n e s i s , he 
r e m a r k s - h e r e a r g u i n g a g a i n s t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l scheme 
d e v i s e d by P l a t o f o r t h e I d e a l S t a t e - i s b e s t a c q u i r e d , 
n o t t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n a l development e m b r a c i n g e v e r -
h i g h e r l e v e l s o f a b s t r a c t i o n from the p a r t i c u l a r , 
b u t t h r o u g h d i s c i p l i n e a na p r a c t i c e m r e l a t i o n t o t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r . I n a n u t s h e l l , e t h i c s i s n o t p h i l o s o p h y 
o r ' s c i e n c e ' , b u t judgment. V/e c a n n o t e x p e c t t h e 
s o l u t i o n o f a p r o b l e m m e t h i c s to be g i v e n by t h e 
method a p p r o p r i a t e t o , o r to have the f o r m a l p r e c i s i o n 
o f , an a b s t r a c t e n q u i r y d i v o r c e d from mundane c o n c e r n s . 
Our d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be a d e q u a t e i f we make i t 
a s c l e a r a s t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r a l l o w s . The 
same d e g r e e o f a c c u r a c y s h o u l d n o t be r e q u i r e d 
o f a l l e n q u i r i e s . . . . P i n e and j u s t a c t i o n s , w h i c h 
a r e the s u b j e c t o f p o l i t i c s , a d m i t numerous 
d i f f e r e n c e s and v a r i a t i o n s . . . I t i s t h e mark o f 
t h e e d u c a t e d man t o s e e k o n l y so much p r e c i s i o n 
m e a c h k i n d o f e n q u i r y a s t h e n a t u r e o f the s u b j e c t 
p e r m i t s . I t i s a s i n a p p r o p r i a t e to demand demon-
s t r a t i o n m e t h i c s a s i t would be t o a l l o w a 
m a t h e m a t i c i a n to r e l y on m e r e l y p r o b a b l e a r g u -
ments . 43 
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T h e s e a r e r e m a r k s w h i c h might p a r d o n a b l y be t h o u g h t 
odd c o n i n g from an a l l e g e d exponent o f n a t u r a l l a w 
- o f a d o c t r i n e w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y a s s e r t s t h a t 
t h e r e a r e i n d e e d d i s c o v e r a b l e , n e c e s s a r y and u n i v e r s a l 
p r i n c i p l e s o f what i s r i g h t . I n f a c t , t h e y a r e r e m a r k s 
o f a k i n d w h i c h have been c o n s i s t e n t l y a d v a n c e d by 
t h o s e who a r e r i g h t l y r e g a r d e d - and who m many 
c a s e s r e g a r d t h e m s e l v e s - a s more o r l e s s opposed to 
t h e n a t u r a l - l a w t r a d i t i o n P r o t a g o r a s , G o r g i a s , 
Hune, B u r k e , Popper, O a k e s h o t t , and so f o r t h . 
A s i m i l a r comment m i g ^ t oe a p p l i e d to a n o t h e r o f 
t h e f a m i l i a r p o i n t s o f d i f f e r e n c e between P l r t o and 
A r i s t o t l e . F o r , w h i l e P l a t o s e t s out m t h e R e p u b l i c 
to d e l i n e a t e t h e b e s t c o n c e i v a b l e S t a t e m the l i g h t 
o f a s i n g l e and i m p e r i s h a b l e i d e a l , A r i s t o t l e - a s we 
might e x p e c t - i s f a r more i n t e r e s t e d m making p r e -
s c r i p t i o n s w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the b e s t pract-t cr>bIo 
S t a t e . And he does so m r e l a t i o n to v a r i o u s c o n -
f i g u r a t i o n s o f h i s t o r i c a l , c u l t u r a l , economic and 
g e o g r a p h i c a l v a r i a b l e s . I n o t h e r words, he i s much 
more f u l l y and more t o l e r a n t l y aware t h a n P l a t o o f 
t h e a c t u a l d i v e r s i t y o f human c i r c u m s t a n c e s and a r r -
angements. H i s v i e w , g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , i s t h a t a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n o f any form may p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d good, 
p r o v i d e d o n l y t h a t i t i s c o n g r u e n t w i t h t h e way o f 
l i f e o f t h o s e whose c o n s t i t u t i o n i t i s , and t h a t i t 
s e c u r e s t he good o f i t s c i t i z e n s r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y 
t h a t o f t h e i r r u l e r s . Thus, t h e f a c t t h a t c o n s t i t -
u t i o n s d i f f e r w i d e l y from p l a c e to p l a c e and from t i n e 
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to time i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y a r e 
m more o r l e s s a c u t e s t a t e s of d e t e r i o r a t i o n from a 
t r a n s c e n d e n t i d e a l , es P l a t o had su p p o s e d . I t may 
mean no more t h a n t h a t t h e y a r e a p p r o p r i a t e m t h e i r 
own way to a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f a f f a i r s 
At t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , h o / e v e r , A r i s t o t l e ' s a w a r e n e s s 
o f d i v e r s i t y , change and the u n c e r t a i n t y o f e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n s does n o t l e a d him, a s i t had a p p a r e r t l y l e d 
th e S o p h i s t s , i n t o an u n q u a l i f i e d l e g a l o r m o r a l r e l -
a t i v i s m o r p o s i t i v i s - i . I n d e e d , m making t h e p o i n t 
t h a t e t h i c s i s n o t an e x a c t s c i e n c e l i k e m a t h e m a t i c s , 
he o b s e r v e s t n a t i t may be t h i s v e r y i n e x a c t i t u d e 
w h i c h h a s l e d t o t h e common s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t ' f i n e 
and j u s t a c t i o n s . . . a r e m a t t e r s o f c o n v e n t i o n r a t h e r 
t h a n o f n a t u r e . ' ^ A n d t h e c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n h e r e i s 
t h a t s u c h a v i e w i s m i s t a k e n . 
I t c e r t a i n l y h a s t o be a d m i t t e d t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s 
d i s c u s s i o n s o f m o r a l i t y and law - and e s p e c i a l l y o f 
l a w - a r e m many r e s p e c t s f a r from c l e a r . The o p a c i t y 
o f h i s t r e a t m e n t o f law a s i t emerges from t h e H i c o -
machean E t h i c s , t h e P o l i t i c s and t h e R h e t o r i c i s 
c h a r i t a b l y a s c r i b e d by 7/olfgang von Leyd e n to h i s g r a s p 
o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s c o m p l e x i t y and h i s d e s i r e t o s p e c i f y 
t h a t c o m p l e x i t y a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e by c o n s i d e r i n g l a w 
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u n d e r a number o f d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s . P r o f e s s o r von 
Leyde n s u g g e s t s t h a t A r i s t o t l e i s a d o p t i n g a ' p r i n c i p l e 
o f s p e c i f i c a t i o n ' o p p o s i t e to 'Ockham's R a z o r ' , b ut 
a s an a l t e r n a t i v e , o r a t l e a s t a s u p p l e m e n t a r y , ex-
p l a n a t i o n , we might r e f e r to t h e f a c t t h a t t h e N i c o -
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machean E t h i c s and t h e P o l i t i c s - e s p e c i a l l y t h e l a t t e r 
- a r e m a n i f e s t l y s c i s s o r s - a n d - p a s t e documents. They 
a r e c o m p i l a t i o n s - c o m p i l a t i o n s o f v e r y f u l l l e c t u r e -
n o t e s , p e r h a p s - r a t h e r than c o n t i n u o u s c o m p o s i t i o n s . 
And i t may s i m p l y be t h a t A r i s t o t l e d e l i v e r e d d i f f e r e n t 
and n o t a l w a y s e n t i r e l y c o m p a t i b l e v i e w s on d i f f e r e n t 
o c c a s i o n s , o r changed h i s mind w i t h the p a s s a g e o f 
t i m e . Be a l l t h i s a s i t may, however n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
t h e i d e a does seem c o n s t a n t l y t o be a t t h e b a c k o f 
h i s mind t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between r i g h t and wrong 
i s u l t i m a t e l y n o t an a r t i f i c i a l one. 
I n t h e b r o a d e s t and b r i e f e s t t e r m s , h i s p o s i t i o n 
might be s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s . As p r a c t i t i o n e r s - a s 
p e o p l e who w i s h to d e r i v e a p p l i c a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n from 
a t r e a t i s e on p o l i t i c s o r m o r a l s - our b u s i n e s s i s t o 
a c t a p p r o p r i a t e l y m r e l a t i o n t o v/hatever h a s c r o p p e d 
up. As the o t h e r s i d e o f the same c o m , o u r b u s i n e s s 
qua p r a c t i c a l men i s n o t to s p e c i f y what i s r i g h t o r 
j u s t m a b s t r a c t t e r m s d i v o r c e d from t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
c a s e . But man i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y a r a t i o n a l a n i m a l . 
And t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e phronimos - o f t h e man o f 
p r a c t i c a l wisdom - though n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h a t o f 
t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , i s n o n e t h e l e s s a r a t i o n a l i t y , and 
i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to show him m any g i v e n p r e d i c a m e n t 
t h a t t h e r e a r e g e n e r a l ' n a t u r a l ' norms w h i c h ought 
n o t to be d i s r e g a r d e d , even though t h e y must be a d a p t e d 
to t h e s p e c i a l forms and c o n d i t i o n s o f l i f e b e f o r e 
t h e y c a n be d i r e c t l y employed m d e t e r m i n i n g and 
j u d g i n g human c o n d u c t . A r i s t o t l e does n o t d e v e l o p 
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t h i s theme i n any v e r y s y s t e m a t i c o r c o n s i s t e n t way, 
but i t i s u n d e n i a b l y p r e s e n t . And we a r e s u r e l y 
j u s t i f i e d b o t h m t r a c i n g i t s r a t i o n a l e back to t h e 
i n s i s t e n c e t h a t man and t h e S t a t e have a n a t u r a l p u r -
pose t o f u l f i l , and m s u p p o s i n g t h e a c i d t e s t o f 
v/hat i s ' n a t u r a l l y ' r i g h t to l i e m t h e p r a c t i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s p u r p o s e i s 
a c t u a l l y b e i n g met. 
A number o f p e r t i n e n t i l l u s t r a t i o n s a r e to be found 
m A r i s t o t l e ' s w r i t i n g s , and i t w i l l be i l l u m i n a t i n g 
t o b r i n g some o f them t o g e t h e r . Most g e n e r a l l y , he 
r e m a r k s m t h e P o l i t i c s t h a t t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o n d u c t 
o f human r e l a t i o n s h i p s r e q u i r e s t h a t a c e r t a i n n a t u r a l 
h i e r a r c h y o f a u t h o r i t y o r p r e c e d e n c e be o b s e r v e d . 
Men a r e n a t u r a l l y s u p e r i o r to women, p a r e n t s t o c h i l d -
r e n , and f r e e men t o s l a v e s . ^ I n t h e Nicompch^an E t h i c s , 
he d i s t i n g u i s h e s ' a b s o l u t e ' from ' p o l i t i c a l ' j u s t i c e , 
and, though no d e f i n i t i o n i s o f f e r e d o f the f o r m e r , 
h i s meaning i s p r e s u m a b l y t h a t s u c h j u s t i c e i s ' a b s o l u t e ' 
m the s e n s e o f n o t b e i n g r e l a t i v e o r p e c u l i a r t o any 
p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y . ^ I n o t h e r words, i t i s t h a t w h i c h 
would be acknowledged a s j u s t i c e anywhere and m any 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , m h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f 'pol-
i t i c a l ' j u s t i c e i t s e l f , A r i s t o t l e draws y e t a n o t h e r 
d i s t i n c t i o n between ' l e g a l ' j u s t i c e , w h i c h i s ' e s t -
a b l i s h e d by e n a c t m e n t ' and w h i c h v a r i e s from p l a c e to 
p l a c e j u s t a s w°ights and m e a s u r e s v a r y from m a r k e t t o 
market, and ' n a t u r a l ' j u s t i c e , w h i c h 
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ha s t h e same f o r c e e v e r y w h e r e , and w h i c h i s n o t 
b r o u g h t i n t o b e i n g by r e a s o n o f o u r t h i n k i n g 
t h i s o r t h a t . ^ 
The p o i n t o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between ' a b s o l u t e ' and 
' n a t u r a l ' j u s t i c e i s n o t c l e a r . I t would seem to be 
t h a t t h e f o r m e r i s n a t u r a l j u s t i c e between men sub 
s p e c i e h u m a n i t a t i s w h i l e the l a t t e r i s n a t u r a l j u s t i c e 
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between men sub s p e c i e c i v i t a t i s , but i t i s p e r h a p s 
n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o b v i o u s why A r i s t o t l e s h o u l d have 
t h o u g h t i t w o r t h w h i l e to make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . I n 
any e v e n t , however, i t i s c l e a r t h a t he does n o t mean 
us t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t e i t h e r ' a b s o l u t e ' o r ' n a t u r a l ' 
j u s t i c e i s no more t h a n mere custom o r 't h e done t h i n g ' 
T h i s much i s b r o u g h t out by a n o t h e r and q u i t e s e p a r a t e 
d i s t i n c t i o n , l a t e r drawn i n t h e Nicomachean E t h i c s , 
between l e g a l j u s t i c e and c u s t o m a r y o r u n w r i t t e n j u s -
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t i c e . A l s o , a l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e does n o t m t h e s e 
p a s s a g e s g i v e a s p e c i f i c a c c o u n t o f t h e c o n t e n t o f 
' a b s o l u t e ' o r ' n a t u r a l ' j u s t i c e , h i s r e m a r k s may 
i n s t r u c t i v e l y be c o n s i d e r e d m t h e l i g h t o f a t l e a s t 
t h r e e o f h i s o t h e r a s s e r t i o n s . F i r s t , he a r g u e s m 
t h e P o l i t i c s t h a t a w a r c o n d u c t e d a g a i n s t n a t u r a l 
s l a v e s - a g a i n s t t h o s e who 'though i n t e n d e d by n a t u r e 
to be s u b j e c t t o government r e f u s e to s u b m i t ' - i s 
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' n a t u r a l l y j u s t ' . ( T h i s , so f a r a s I know, i s t h e 
e a r l i e s t o f t h e many a t t e m p t s w h i c h have been made t o 
s p e c i f y t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f j u s t w a r f a r e . ) Second, m 
th e I i i c o - ' a c h e a n E t h i c s , he a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r -
t a i n a c t s ( h e names a d u l t e r y , t h e f t and m u r d e r ) w h i c h 
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a r e i n h e r e n t l y bad, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s 
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t h e y a r e s u c h t h a t t h e y can n e v e r be done r i g h t l y . 
T h i r d , m the R h e t o r i c , he s u p p l i e s a l i s t o f t h i n g s 
A h i c h a r e e q u i t a b l e o r f a i r (and s e e p p . 1 2 0 f f i n f r a ) 
I t i s e q u i t a b l e to make a l l o w a n c e s f o r t h e f a i l i n g s 
o f human n a t u r e , t o b e a r m mind the meaning r a t h e r 
t h a n t h e s t r i c t l e t t e r o f t h e law, to c o n s i d e r a 
man's i n t e n t i o n r a t h e r t h a n h i s a c t i o n p e r s e , to 
c o n s i d e r an e v e n t m th e l i g h t o f the whole o f i t s 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and n o t m e r e l y a p a r t , t o j u d g e a man 
on t h e b a s i s o f what he i s now r a t h e r t h a n what he 
h a s been m th e p a s t , t o t h i n k o f b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d 
r a t h e r t h a n o f b e n e f i t s c o n f e r r e d o r i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d , 
t o be p a t i e n t m the f a c e o f wrongdoing, to s e t t l e 
d i s p u t e s by d i s c u s s i o n r a t h e r t h a n by f o r c e , to be 
w i l l i n g t o go t o a r b i t r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n to su e a t 
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la w . Moreover - t h i s t ime m t h e P o l i t i c s - A r i s t o t l e 
a p p l i e s t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t o f n a t u r a l norms t o t h e 
s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . The t a k i n g o f 
i n t e r e s t on l o a n s i s condemned a s an u n n a t u r a l f o r m 
o f a c q u i s i t i o n , and t h e r e a s o n g i v e n i s t h a t money 
i s n o t n a t u r a l l y p r o d u c t i v e o f a n y t h i n g . By n a t u r e , 
i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y to be u s e d o n l y a s a medium o f 
e x change. (A b r o a d l y s i m i l a r form o f t h i s argument, 
c o m p l e t e w i t h a t t r i b u t i o n t o ' t h e P h i l o s o p h e r ' , was 
u s e d by S t Thomas A q u i n a s , n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t p a r 
e x c e l l e n c e , m h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f u s u r y . ) F u r t h e r m o r e , 
r e f e r r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y to an i n j u n c t i o n o f P l a t o m 
t h e R e p u b l i c t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f the G u a r d i a n s s h o u l d 
be owned m common, A r i s t o t l e s u g g e s t s t h a t p r i v a t e 
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o w n e r s h i p and common u s e a r e more m k e e p i n g w i t h 
n a t u r e , 3ince n a t u r e h a s so d e s i g n e d i n d i v i d u a l men 
t h a t t h e y t a k e p l e a s u r e o r have p r i d e m o w n e r s h i p . 
( T h i s argument a l s o i s l a t e r to r e c u r i n A q u i n a s . ) " ^ 
S p e c i f i c a l l y on t h e s u b j e c t o f law, A r i s t o t l e i n -
s i s t s t h a t p o s i t i v e l a w does n o t o r i g m e t e m a g r e e -
ment o r e n a c t m e n t . R a t h e r , he h o l d s t h a t i t h a s i t s 
s o u r c e m g e n e r a l r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e o r l o g o s . B o t h 
m t h e Nicomachean E t h i c s and the P o l i t i c s he u r g e s 
t h a t law p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d ought to be r a t i o n a l m 
t h i s s e n s e o f p r o c e e d i n g from g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d p r u d e n c e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g m t h e mind 
o f t h e l e g i s l a t o r . O t h e r w i s e , he s a y s , t h e r u l e o f 
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l a w would be no b e t t e r t h a n the r u l e o f a w i l d b e a s t . 
And i t i s c l e a r t h a t , t o t h i s e x t e n t , A r i s t o t l e s u b -
s c r i b e s to t h e a p p r o a c h t o e t h i c s a l r e a d y l a i d down 
by P l a t o , and to what was l a t e r t o be c a l l e d t h e 
' r a t i o n a l i s t ' o r ' m t e l l e c t u a l i s t ' t h e o r y and d e f i n -
i t i o n o f law - w h i c h assumes t h a t t h e r e a r e , a s Hume 
put i t , ' e t e r n a l f i t n e s s e s and u n f i t n e s s e s o f t h i n g s 
w h i c h a r e t h e same to e v e r y r a t i o n a l b e i n g t h a t c o n -
s i d e r s them.'56 i n f a c t , A r i s t o t l e ' s v i e w i n t h i s 
d i r e c t i o n i s v e r y l i k e t h a t a l r e a d y expounded by P l a t o 
m t h e Laws. L e g i s l a t i o n i n d e e d r e q u i r e s t e c h n i q u e o r 
a r t m t h a t i t i n v o l v e s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n t e l l i g e n c e 
to human a c t i o n s , but i t a l s o demands a d h e r e n c e t o the 
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p r i n c i p l e s o f n a t u r e . I t would seem t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n 
i s t o be u n d e r s t o o d a s t h e a c t i v i t y , n o t o f making l a w s 
ex n i h i l o , but o f d i s c o v e r i n g them - d i s c o v e r i n g them 
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i n t h e s e n s e o f making p a r t i c u l a r p r e s c r i p t i o n s i n t h e 
l i g h t o f p r e - e x i s t e n t g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s . Laws a r e 
p o s i t i v e o r c o n v e n t i o n a l m t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g d i s -
c o v e r e d and d e c l a r e d , but t h e y a r e n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l 
m t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g t h e o r i g i n a l c r e a t i o n o f t h e 
l e g i s l a t o r . 
I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , i t i s p l a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t 
A r i s t o t l e s h o u l d have made h i s t h r e e f o l d d i s t i n c t i o n 
between l a w s w h i c h a r e m e r e l y e n a c t e d , lav/s w h i c h a r e 
w e l l e n a c t e d m t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g t h e b e s t l a w s f o r 
t h o s e to whom t h e y a p p l y , and l a w s w h i c h a r e a b s o l u t e l y 
t h e b e s t m t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g good from t h e p o i n t o f 
v i e w o f anyone anywhere. But he goes f u r t h e r t h a n t h i s , 
and m a i n t a i n s t h a t p o s i t i v e l a w i s o n l y n e c e s s a r y a t 
a l l to t h e e x t e n t t h a t men a r e i m p e r f e c t b e i n g s ( a 
p o i n t v/hich was to be r e a d i l y t a k e n by C h r i s t i a n 
t h e o r i s t s p r e s u p p o s i n g t h e d o c t n n e o f O r i g i n a l S i n . ) . 
I t i s b e c a u s e men a r e s u b j e c t to c a p r i c e and i m p u l s e 
t h a t t h e y a r e so much m ne e d o f e x t e r n a l l y - i m p o s e d 
r u l e s b a c k e d up by c o e r c i v e s a n c t i o n s . B ut m o r a l 
goodness - t h e i n t e r n a l l y - i m p o s e d and r a t i o n a l goodness 
o f t h e phronimos - s t a n d s above p o s i t i v e l a w . I n d e e d , 
i t i s t h a t w h i c h good l a w s embody o r e x p r e s s . Thus, 
i f a man ' u t t e r l y s u p e r i o r i n g o o d n e s s ' vvere to a p p e a r , 
no p o s i t i v e lav/ n e e d - o r c o u l d - b i n d him 
Such a man would be, a s i t w ere, a god amongst 
men. . . T h e r e i s no law t h a t c a n g o v e r n s u c h 
e x c e p t i o n a l men, f o r t h e y a r e a law m t h e i r 
own r i g h t . 5 8 
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A s i m i l a r p o i n t had a l r e a d y been made by P l a t o , b o t h 
m t he R e p u b l i c and m the LRWS, and i t i s i n t e r e s t -
i n g t o compare h i s words w i t h t h e ones j u s t quoted. 
I n t h e i m p r o b a b l e e v e n t of a p e r f e c t and i n c o r r u p -
t i b l e r u l e r becoming a v a i l a b l e , he s a y s , no w r i t need 
o r s h o u l d r u n a g a i n s t him, f o r 
no l aw o r command i s s u p e r i o r to knowledge i t s e l f . 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e n o t r i g h t f o r r e a s o n to be s u b -
o r d i n a t e to o r bound by a n y t h i n g e l s e . I f i t i s 
r e a l l y t o a n s w e r to i t s name and be f r e e m i t s 
v e r y s e l f , i t must be m a s t e r o f a l l t h i n g s . J 
P e r h a p s t h e r e a d i e s t i l l u s t r a t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e ' s 
v i e w o f t he u l t i m a t e l y n o n - c o n v e n t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f 
what i s r i g h t i s to be found m h i s r e m a r k s m conn-
e c t i o n w i t h t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s when e q u i t y o r a r b i t -
r a t i o n ( e p i e i k e i a ) i s r e q u i r e d - when, t h a t i s , we 
w i s h to d i s c o v e r t h e s p i r i t , t h e u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e , 
o f t h e law, r a t h e r t h a n i t s mere l e t t e r . The d i f f -
c u l t y h e r e a r i s e s from t h e f a c t t h a t , a s a m a t t e r of 
g e n e r a l c o n v e n i e n c e , p o s i t i v e l a w s a r e d r a f t e d v e r y 
b r o a d l y . I t i s e x p e d i e n t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d t a k e a c c -
ount o f a s many c a s e s a s p o s s i b l e m one b r e a t h , so 
t o s p e a k . But t h e p r i c e o f t h i s c o n v e n i e n c e i s t h a t , 
t a k e n a t f a c e - v a l u e , t h e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f l a w may t h r o u g h 
t h e i r v e r y g e n e r a l i t y d e f e a t t h e i r own p u r p o s e s vhen 
t h e y a r e a p p l i e d to t h e s p e c i f i c c a s e . TTo l a w t a k e s 
a c c o u n t o f s p e c i f i c m i t i g a t i n g o r e x t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s >'hich might p o s s i b l y o e a r upon i t s o>m o p e r -
a t i o n . No law i s o f i t s e l f a b l e to i d e n t i f y t h e c a s e s 
t o w h i c h i t s h o u l d n o t a p p l y . Most g e n e r a l l y , I t v/ould 
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bp m p o 3 s i b l e f o r t h e l e g i s l a t o r t o make p r o v i s i o n 
f o r e v e r y p o s s i b l e f u t u r e c o n t i n g e n c y s i n c e , q u i t e 
a p a r t from a n y t h i n g e l s e , he c a n n o t be e x p e c t e d t o 
f o r e s e e e v e r y p o s s i b l e f u t u r e c o n t i n g e n c y . As an 
e l e m e n t a r y i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s k i n d o f d i f f i c u l t y , 
P r o f e s s o r von L e y d e n p o i n t s out t h a t a law f o r b i d d i n g 
p e o p l e t o s t i c k k n i v e s i n t o o t h e r p e o p l e , t a k e n l i t -
e r a l l y , makes t h e p r a c t i c e o f s u r g e r y 1 ] l e g a l . ^ I t 
i s q u i t e p l a i n t h a t t h i s i s n o t what t h e l e g i s l a t o r 
i n t e n d e d . B ut by r e a s o n o f what i s i t q u i t e p l a i n 9 
A n o t h e r example - t h i s t ime A r i s t o t l e ' s own - c o n c e r n s 
t h o s e c a s e s where t h e d i f f e r e n c e between an a s s a u l t an 
an a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i s m doubt, h a s a man who 
s t r i k e s a n o t h e r w h i l e / e a r i n g a r i n g b r o k e n t h e law 
f o r b i d d i n g a s s a u l t w i t h a weapon 9 ( I n much t h e same 
v e i n , I r e c a l l a c a s e - I can n o t r e c a l l t h e name o f 
th e a c c u s e d - m w h i c h t h e a c c u s e d was a l l e g e d t o 
have s t r u c k t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y a f t e r t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y 
had s a i d , 'I'm g o i n g t o g i v e you a bunch o f b a n a n a s . ' 
The p l e a was s e l f - d e f e n c e , and i t was s e r i o u s l y d i s -
c u s s e d w h e t h e r , m t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h a t m y t h i c a l 
l e g a l p e r s o n a g e , t h e ' r e a s o n a b l e man', would have 
e x p e c t e d a p r e s e n t o f f r u i t o r a blow w i t h a f i s t . ) 
I n s h o r t , t h e r e a r e v e r y many c a s e s m w h i c h we r e q u i r 
a n ' u n l e s s * , a c a e t e r i s p a r i b u s p r i n c i p l e , m o r d e r 
t o s o f t e n what G o r g i a s , m t h e F u n e r a l C a p t i o n , c a l l s 
' t h e a r r o g a n c e o f p o s i t i v e r i g h t . ' On t h e s e o c c a s i o n s 
e q u i t y 13 n e c e s s a r y 'to s t o p up a gap l e f t m t h e l a w 
61 
i t s e l f , a s A r i s t o t l e p u t s i t . And, a t l e a s t m the 
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Nicomachean E t h i c s , he makes i t p l a i n t h a t e q u i t y i s 
n o t s i m p l y a n o t h e r k i n d o f p o s i t i v e law ( a s i t i s m 
modern E n g l i s h l aw, f o r e x a m p l e ) , o r even a form o r 
d e p a r t m e n t o f l e g a l j u s t i c e . As he say3, 
T h a t w h i c h i s e q u i t a b l e , though j u 3 t , i s n o t 
l e g a l l y j u s t . On t he c o n t r a r y , i t i s by n a t u r e 
a c o r r e c t i v e o f t h a t w h i c h i s l e g a l l y j u s t . ^ 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h e b e a r i n mind t h a t , m h i s O u t l i n e 
o f H i s t o r i c a l J u r i s p r u d e n c e , S i r P a u l V m o g r a d o f f c a l l s 
a t t e n t i o n to t he r e s e m b l a n c e between t h e Greek con-
c e p t i o n o f e q u i t y m g e n e r a l and t h e Roman i d e a o f 
I u s n a t u r a e . E q u i t y , i t s e e n s , i s c o n c e i v e d a s an 
u n c h a n g i n g s t a n d a r d o f humanity o r f a i r n e s s w h i c h 
l i e s b e h i n d o r above the law, g i v i n g to i t what we 
might c a l l an i n n e r v a l i d a t i n g m o r a l p u r p o s e . 
A r i s t o t l e ' s v i e w i s p e r h a p s b e s t s ummarised m h i s 
own words from t h e R h e t o r i c . However much v a r i a t i o n 
t h e r e may be a t t h e l e v e l o f p a r t i c u l a r s a s between 
t i m e and p l a c e , he c o n c l u d e s t h a t 
t h e r e r e a l l y e x i s t s . . . a n a t u r a l form o f t h e j u s t 
and u n j u s t w h i c h i s common to a l l men, even when 
t h e r e i s no community o r agreement to b i n d them 
t o g e t h e r . I t i s t h i s form t h a t t h e A n t i g o n e o f 
S o p h o c l e s ' p l a y e v i d e n t l y h a s i n mind //hen she 
s a y s t h a t i t was a j u s t a c t to b u r y h e r b r o t h e r 
P o l y n i c e s m s p i t e o f Oreon's d e c r e e t o the c o n -
t r a r y . J u s t , she means, m t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g 
n a t u r a l l y j u s t ^4 
The f i r s t s e n t e n c e o f t h i s p a s s a g e can h a r d l y f a i l t o 
r e m i n d us o f L o c k e ' s r e n a r k about t h e S w i s s and I n d i a n 
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t r a d i n g m t h e backwoods o f A m e r i c a ? - 3 So f a r a s 
A r i s t o t l e i s c o n c e r n e d , D a v i d R i t c h i e , m h i s h i g h l y 
t e n d e n t i o u s book N a t u r a l R i g h t s , somewhat b r u s q u e l y 
waves a s i d e h i s r e f e r e n c e s to n a t u r a l l a w m t h e 
R h e t o r i c . He c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e y amount to no more 
t h a n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f i t a s a handy r h e t o r i c a l 
f l o u r i s h f o r u s e m c o u r t . I n A r i s t o t l e ' s v i e w , s a y s 
R i t c h i e , t h e a p p e a l to n a t u r a l law i s o n l y 'a common-
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p l a c e o f o r a t o r s . ' And i t i s i n d e e d t r u e t h a t , a t 
one p o i n t m t h e R h e t o r i c , A r i s t o t l e does d i s c u s s 
n a t u r a l l a w as a p o s s i b l e r e s o u r c e f o r l a w y e r s w i t h 
a weak c a s e to a r g u e o r a s t r o n g c a s e t o a n s w e r . At 
t h e same time, nowever, i t i s p a t e n t l y c l e a r t h a t 
he does n o t r e g a r d i t a s no more t h a n t h a t . I n d e e d , 
I v e n t u r e to s u g g e s t t h a t i t w o u ld n o t o c c u r t o any 
commentator to suppose t h a t he d i d , u n l e s s t h a t com-
m e n t a t o r were, l i k e R i t c h i e , engaged m an e x t e n d e d 
a t t a c k upon t h e whole d o c t r i n e o f n a t u r a l l a w and 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s . The p a s s a g e quoted above c e r t a i n l y 
does n o t b e a r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n w h i c h R i t c h i e would 
h a v e u s put upon i t , and i t i s m any c a s e o n l y 
f a i r t o a s k t h a t i t be t a k e n m c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
t h e o t h e r r e m a r k s w h i c n we have a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d . 
T h e s e r e m a r k s , v i e w e d a s a w h o l e , s h o ^ t h a t , however 
ambiguous, c o n f u s i n g and i m p e r f e c t l y - f o r n e d h i s 
t r e a t m e n t -nay be, t h e r e m a n i f e s t l y i s a b a s i c s u b -
s t r a t u m m A r i s t o t l e ' s t h o u g h t v h i c h e n t i t l e s u s t o 
l o c a t e h i m s q u a r e l y w i t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f n a t u r a l 
l a w . 
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V. 
Summary Thp Good L i f e and t h e P o l i s 
7/e may b r i e f l y sum up th° r e m a r k s o f P l a t o and 
A r i s t o t l e , i n s o f a r a s t h e y c o n c e r n u s , m t h e f o l l -
owing f o u r p o i n t s 
( a ) Men have a ' h i g h e s t good' h i c h i s r e a l i s e d t h r o u g h 
t h e s u c c e s s f u l a c h i e v e m e n t o f what i s t a k e n to be 
t h e i r ' n a t u r a l ' p u r p o s e . T h i s good i s n o t what i t 
i s b e c a u s e l e g i s l a t i o n o r agreement s t i p u l a t e s o r de-
f i n e s i t . N e i t h e r c o u l d i t c e a s e t o be what i t i s 
a t t h e b e h e s t o f any s u c h c o n v e n t i o n o r agreement. 
( b ) N e i t h e r l i f e i t s e l f n o r t h e good l i f e c a n be l i v e d 
o t h e r w i s e t h a n m community w i t h o t h e r man, s i n c e men 
h ave n o t o n l y p h y s i c a l , b u t a l s o m o r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
n e e d s w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t s a t i s f y a l o n e . The S t a t e i s 
a work o f a r t m t h e s e n s e t h a t i t s c r e a t i o n and main-
t e n a n c e r e q u i r e the s y s t e m a t i c a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n g e n u i t y . 
But s u c h i n g e n u i t y i t s e l f d e r i v e s i t s d i r e c t i o n , we 
might s a y i t s 'rhyme and r e a s o n ' , from man's n a t u r a l 
n e e d s . 
( c ) The good l i f e f o r man - o r , more c o r r e c t l y , t h e 
good l i f e f o r t he c i t i z e n - i s t h e good l i f e f o r the 
c i t i z e n a s s u c h , and n o t f o r any one c i t i z e n o r any 
l i m i t e d group o f c i t i z e n s to t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s . 
The S t a t e i s t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r l y to be c o n c e i v e d a s a 
m o r a l community, m w h i c h a l l the m e r b e r s work t o -
g e t h e r f o r t h ^ good o f the w h o l e . 
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( d ) S i n c e t h e good f o r nan i s a n a t u r a l good, t h e 
d i r e c t i o n s w h i c h he must f o l l o w i f he i s to a c h i e v e 
i t , though t h e y may be e x p r e s s e d o r made p a r t i c u l a r 
t h r o u g h c o n v e n t i o n , do n o t o r i g i n a t e m c o n v e n t i o n . 
They a r e n o t made, b u t d i s c o v e r e d t h r o u g h t h e e x e r -
c i s e o f t h a t f a c u l t y o f r e a s o n w h i c h i s t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e human s p e c i e s . 
I t i s t o be n o t e d m a l l t h i s , however, t h a t t h e 
argument m q u e s t i o n i s d e v e l o p e d and a p p l i e d o n l y 
w i t h i n a s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d c o n t e x t . I t p r e s u p p o s e s 
one, and o n l y one, fo r m o f p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n . 
T h i s i s t r u e even o f A r i s t o t l e the ' p o l i t i c a l s c i -
e n t i s t ' , w i t h h i s h i g h l y - d e v e l o p e d c o m p a r a t i v e s e n s e . 
N e i t h e r he n o r P l a t o c a n c o n c e i v e o f t r u e p o l i t i c a l 
engagement o t h e r t h a n w i t h i n t h e c i t y - s t a t e o r p o l l s . 
The p o l i s , on t h e i r v i e w , p r o v i d e s t h e optimum s e t t i n g 
w i t h i n w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a n p r a c t i s e m o r a l and 
p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e , and t h e i r whole c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e 
good l i f e - o f t h e l i f e o f e u d a i m o n i a - i s i n e x t r i c a b l y 
bound up w i t h t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n . A l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e 
a t one p o i n t m e n t i o n s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e G r e e k s 
might r u l e t h e w o r l d i f o n l y t h e / were p o l i t i c a l l y 
u n i t e d , we may t a k e i t t o be a s c e r t a i n a s any s u c h 
t h i n g c a n be t h a t he would have d e p l o r e d any Greek 
w o r l d - d o m i n a t i o n bought a t the p r i c e o f d e s t r o y i n g o r 
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w e a k e n i n g t h e p o l l s . B o t h he and P l a t o a b h o r and f e a r 
change, w h i c h t h e y e q u a t e w i t h d e c a y T h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
i d e a l i s an u n c h a n g i n g , r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l , s e l f - s u f f i c i e n 
c i t y - s t a t e . 
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This preoccupation - or, r a t h e r , t h i s preoccupation 
on the p a r t of A r i s t o t l e - i s r e a l l y r a t h e r remarkable. 
I t i s w e l l known t h a t A r i s t o t l e was i n t i m a t e l y conn-
ected w i t h the a r c h i t e c t s o f the Macedonian Empire. 
I n about 343BC, he was i n v i t e d to P e l l a by P h i l i p 
o f Macedon t o act as t u t o r to h i s son, the f u t u r e 
Alexander the Great. He served the f a m i l y m t h i s 
c a p a c i t y f o r about e i g h t years, and he o u t l i v e d h i s 
i l l u s t r i o u s p u p i l by one year. Thus, d u r i n g h i s l i f e -
time, he witnessed the d e s t r u c t i o n of the great Per-
si a n Empire and the concomitant growth o f a vast and 
u n i f i e d t e r r i t o r i a l conglomerate extending through-
out Asia Minor, S y r i a , Egypt, Babylonia, P e r s i a , 
Samarcand and i n t o I n d i a . Yet A r i s t o t l e i s c o n s i s t e n t l y 
u n w i l l i n g - i t i s a temptation to say c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
unable - f u l l y to consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f i m p e r i a l 
hegemony. He i s a p p a r e n t l y q u i t e o b l i v i o u s of the f a c t 
t h a t the independence o f the p o l i s was d e c l i n i n g , and 
o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y - d e c l i n i n g adequacy of a moral 
and p o l i t i c a l philosophy presupposing i t . 
As F.H. Sandbach p o i n t s out, i t would be a mistake 
to exaggerate the r a p i a i t y w i t h which the p o l i s d e c l i n e d . 
S i m i l a r l y , i t would be a mistake t o make too much of 
the probable e f f e c t of the d e c l i n e upon the d a i l y 
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l i v e s of o r d i n a r y people. I n i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , 
however - m the moral schools which emerged roughly 
contemporaneously w i t h the l i f e o f A r i s t o t l e - there 
i s an unmistakable broadening o f the terms o f reference 
of moral and p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , which i s a t l e a s t 
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p l a u s i b l y read as a response t o the broadening hor-
izons o f p o l i t i c a l experience. Of these schools -
Cynicism, Epicureanism, Scepticism and S t o i c i s m -
i t i s S t o i c i s m which i s most d i r e c t l y of i n t e r e s t t o 
us. ( I n passing, however, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t i c e 
t h a t the Sceptic Carneades, a determined opponent of 
the S t o i c Panaetius, seems to have he l d views r a t h e r 
l i k e those of the Sophists.) I t i s to S t o i c i s m , then, 
t h a t we now t u r n . 
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CHAPTER THREE. BEYOND THE POLIS. 
I . 
The S t o i c s Mature and Submission. 
On the whole, authors of general works on the h i s -
t o r y o f moral and p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g d i s p l a y a very 
marked readiness t o regard the S t o i c s as being i n 
some sense the ' o r i g i n a t o r s ' o f the d o c t r i n e o f n a t -
u r a l law. This a s s e r t i o n i s u s u a l l y made w i t h only 
the barest o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n s - u s u a l l y i n c l u d i n g a 
reference t o Sophocles' Antigone and, o f course, a 
mention o f the logos of H e r a c l i t u s . And i t r e a l l y i s 
not easy t o see why t h i s view should have become so 
g e n e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d as an orthodoxy, f o r what we 
have s a i d i n the previous chapters i s enough to show 
t h a t a recognisable v e r s i o n o f n a t u r a l law ,/as w e l l 
under way long before the S t o i c s . Moreover, i t i s 
almost e q u a l l y m y s t i f y i n g t o f i n d i t so widely b e l -
ieved t h a t the S t o i c v e r s i o n of n a t u r a l lav/ i s the 
f i r s t 'systematic' account to appear m the d o c t r i n e ' s 
h i s t o r y . On the one hand, i t has t o be granted t h a t 
the account which t h e i r predecessors g i v e i s not 
'systematic'. They do not f u r n i s h u i w i t h a l i s t of 
the p r o v i s i o n s which n a t u r a l lav/ i s supposed to con-
t a i n , they c e r t a i n l y do not set out a l i s t of a l l e g e d 
' n a t u r a l r i g h t s ' or ' r i g h t s o f ^ an'. On the oth?r hand, 
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however, i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o s p e c i f y e x a c t l y v/hat 
i t i s about Stoic thought whuch i s supposed t o be 
1 
'systematic' m the r e q u i r e d sense 
The study of the S t o i c s i s w i t h o u t doubt a very 
complex under t a k i n g And matters are made as complex 
as they are l a r g e l y by the f a c t t h a t the very term 
'the S t o i c s ' embraces so much. I t does not denote a 
s i n g l e 'school o f thought' whose tene t s can be i d e n -
t i f i e d and set out p r e c i s e l y or completely. V/hen we 
come to discuss the S t o i c s , we m f a c t run across a 
considerable, not t o say b e w i l d e r i n g , v a r i e t y of themes 
which are not always comfortably combined. Ye also 
come across f a i r l y major s h i f t s o f a t t i t u d e and emph-
a s i s w i t h regard to such c r u c i a l matters as cosmology, 
determinism, choice, and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and value 
of p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . And t h i s Protean or s y n c r e t -
i s t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t o be accounted f o r l a r g e l y by 
reference t o the continuous existence o f S t o i c i s m 
i n some form or other over a considerable p e r i o d o f 
time - some f i v e hundred years. C h r i s t i a n i t y , which 
i s i n many ways a comparable case, i s capable of acc-
ommodating w i t h i n i t s even longer h i s t o r y f i g u r e s 
temperamentally and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y as f a r apart as 
Cyprian of Carthage and Rudolf Bultmann. But we could 
not express C h r i s t i a n i t y - at l e a s t w i t h any p l a u s i b i l i 
- m terms of a s i n g l e 'system'; and so, too, w i t h 
S t o i c i s m . S t o i c i s m , l i k e C n r i s t i a n i t y , might f a i r l y 
be set down as a way of t h i n k i n g r a t h e r than as a 
r e a d i l y - c i r c u m n a v i g a t e d school o f thought. 
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The o l d e s t department o f the S t o i c 'school', the 
s o - c a l l e d 'old Stoa*, o r i g i n a t e d m about 300BC m 
the porch - i . e . the stoa - of Zeno of C i t i u m . I t 
was re-founded, or, more c o r r e c t l y , e x t e n s i v e l y r e -
formed, m about 230BC by Chrysippus of S o l i -
l a r g e l y m response t o the c r i t i c i s m s o f Chrysippus' 
o l d e r contemporary, A r c e s i l a u s o f Pitane. I n f a c t , 
t h ere was a tendency m a n t i q u i t y f o r Zeno to be some-
what overshadowed by Chrysippus - Diogenes L a e r t i u s 
r e p o r t s the saying t h a t , w i t h o u t Chrysippus, there 
would have been no S t o i c i s m . A second phase, l a b e l l e d 
by h i s t o r i a n s as the 'Middle Stoa', and d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
by the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a l a r g e measure of Platonism, 
emerged d u r i n g the f i r s t and second c e n t u r i e s BC, 
under the t u t e l a g e o f Panaetius o f Rhodes and Posid-
onius o f Apamaea. Moreover, t r a d i t i o n has i t t h a t m 
about 140BC, Panaetius s t r u c k up a f i r m f r i e n d s h i p 
w i t h S c i p i o A f r i c a n u s the Younger, and t h a t i t was 
l a r g e l y due to Panaetius' contact w i t h S c i p i o ' s 
c u l t i v a t e d c i r c l e of acquaintance m Rome t h a t the 
S t o i c philosophy f i r s t came to be introduced i n t o 
Roman i n t e l l e c t u a l s o c i e t y . ( I n t h i s connection, i t 
i s o f passing i n t e r e s t t h a t the f i r s t two books of 
Cicero's De O f f i c u s are acknowledged by the author 
to have been i n s p i r e d by Panaetius' t r e a t i s e P e r i 
Kathekontos (On Duty).) This s o - c a l l e d 'Late' or 
'Roman' Stoa, whose members placed a s p e c i a l emphasis 
on the importance o f p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y end s t a t e s -
manship, i n c l u d e d such l u m i n a r i e s as Lucius Annaeus 
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Seneca, the released but c r i p p l e d slave E p i c t e t u s of 
H i e r a p o l i s , and Marcus A u r e l i u s Antoninus Pius, Em-
peror o f Rome from AD 161 t o AD 180. (To the best o f 
my knowledge, Marcus A u r e l i u s i s the only philosopher 
- w i t h the p o s s i b l e exception o f Lenin - ever t o have 
measured up t o Plato's s p e c i f i c a t i o n t h a t philosophers 
should r u l e . His M e d i t a t i o n s i n d i c a t e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
enough, t h a t he found r u l e r s h i p a burden sometimes 
b a r e l y supportable. I n any case, and u n f o r t u n a t e l y 
f o r P l a t o ' s t h e s i s , h i s P r m c i p a t e was a r a t h e r u n d i s t -
inguished one. Also, i t i s one o f the minor i r o n i e s 
o f h i s t o r y t h a t Marcus A u r e l i u s , o f a l l people, should 
have been the f a t h e r o f the Emperor Commodus, 'to 
whom l u s t - r i d d e n and b r u t i s h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . . q u i c k l y 
. 2 
became second n a t u r e . • ) 
I n view o f i t s l o n g and v a r i e d h i s t o r y , then, gen-
e r a l i s a t i o n s p u r p o r t i n g to be about 'the S t o i c p h i l -
osophy' are bound to be e x c e p t i o n a l l y v u l n e r a b l e t o 
o b j e c t i o n s i n respect t o p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s . At the 
same time, however, and bearing t h i s caveat m mind, 
i t may be s a i d w i t h some confidence t h a t S t o i c i s m 
embodies an e s s e n t i a l l y close connection between e t h i c s 
and cosmology o f much the same k i n d as we have already 
observed m our c o n s i d e r a t i o n of H e r a c l i t u s and the 
Pythagoreans. Indeed, the cosmology o f the S t o i c s -
e s p e c i a l l y o f the 'Old Stoa' - i s i t s e l f c h a r a c t e r i s t -
i c a l l y backward-looking or, so t o speak, co n s e r v a t i v e 
and unadventurous. i t s indebtedness to the mysterious 
sayings of H e r a c l i t u s i s q u i t e beyond d i s p u t e . ^ The 
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re t r o g r a d e nature o f the S t o i c cosmology i s , m f a c t , 
c l e a r l y seen i f we consider i t alongside the r e l a t i v e l y 
b o l d s c i e n t i f i c s p e c u l a t i o n s o f A r i s t o t l e , and i t i s 
a t l e a s t not unreasonable t o i n t e r p r e t i t as symp-
tomatic of a n o s t a l g i a induced by the p o l i t i c a l 
changes associated w i t h the r i s e o f the Macedonian 
Empire. 
The c e n t r a l p o s t u l a t e o f t h i s cosmology i s one 
w i t h which we are already f a m i l i a r from the Pythagor-
eans. Indeed, i t i s one which occurs again and again 
throughout p r e - S o c r a t i c Greek thought, namely, t h a t 
the universe i s one vast and i n t e g r a t e d l i v i n g organ-
ism. I t i s s a i d to be somehow permeated throughout 
by a r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e - a logos, again. I t i s com-
posed of m a t e r i a l f i r e which does not vary i n q u a n t i t y , 
and which i s i n t e r n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o an a c t i v e and a 
passive p r i n c i p l e . The a c t i v e p r i n c i p l e i s m t u r n 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h God, who i s h i m s e l f i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
the logos. and i t i s God who causes p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s 
t o come i n t o being by a c t i n g c r e a t i v e l y upon the pass-
i v e p a r t o f matter. The remark i s a t t r i b u t e d to Zeno 
by T e r t u l l i a n t h a t God may be conceived as permeating 
matter m the way t h a t honey flows through a honey-
comb. Matter as such i s e t e r n a l and w i t h o u t form, 
but i t i s capable of being moulded l i k e wax i n t o 
innumerable i n d i v i d u a l forms, and i t c o ntains w i t h i n 
i t s e l f the seeds - the l o g o i s n e r m e t i k o i - o f every 
p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g t h a t v a i l e v e n t u a l l y come to be. The 
process of cosmic change i s seen, m the f a n i l i a r Greek 
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way, as one o f coming-to-be and passing-away. I n the 
course o f t h i s process, p a r t of the elemental f i r e 
becomes transformed or r a r e f i e d i n t o a i r . The a i r 
i n t u r n becomes water, p a r t of the vater becomes 
e a r t h , and p a r t of i t becomes a i r again v rhich, being 
once more r a r e f i e d i n t o f i r e , r e t u r n s t o God whence 
i t came.^ A l l t h i n g s , t h e r e f o r e , e x i s t m a ceaseless 
s t a t e of f l u x . Indeed, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note the 
way m which I'arcus A u r e l i u s r e c a l l s one of the fam-
i l i a r images of H e r a c l i t u s , comparing the sequence 
of phenomena t o the f l o w i n g o f a r i v e r . Coherence 
and purpose m the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y o f the universe 
i s s a i d to be sustained by the presence w i t h i n i t o f 
tonos - t e n s i o n ( t h i s , we r e c a l l , i s another idea which 
seems t o have o r i g i n a t e d w i t h the f e r t i l e H e r a c l i t u s ) , 
and the d i s c r e t e elements which emerge and become d i s -
t i n c t from one another from w i t h i n the p r i m o r d i a l f i r e 
are separated from each other by t h e i r r e l a t i v e den-
5 
s i t i e s . 
A l l t h i s ( a t l e a s t m r e l a t i o n to Greek thought as 
a whole) i s v ery mundane, and there i s no need f o r us 
to pursue i t m any great d e t a i l . V/hat i s i m p o r t a n t , 
however, i s t h a t t h i s cosmological scheme i s presented 
from a s t a n d p o i n t of thoroughgoing determinism. The 
suggestion i s t h a t n o t h i n g m the universe could be 
otherwise than i t i s . Moreover, the un i v e r s e i s i d -
e n t i f i e d as a purposive system. E v e r y t h i n g i s 3 a i d 
t o have been ordered according to the unchanging i f 
i n s c r u t a b l e purposes o f God's providence ( p r o n o i a ) . 
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Indeed, J.B. Gould remarks t h a t the t e l e o l o g y embraced 
by Ghrysippus i s f a r more thoroughgoing than t h a t of 
e i t h e r P l a t o or A r i s t o t l e . I t i s , he suggests, the 
most r a d i c a l form o f t e l e o l o g y t o be found anywhere I n 
c l a s s i c a l philosophy. The Stoics also m a i n t a i n - m 
a manner r a t h e r reminiscent o f Anaxmander - t h a t the 
present universe i s only one o f an i n f i n i t e number o f 
univ e r s e s , which replace one another m an endless 
succession o f cycles or p e r i o d o i . At the end o f each 
periodos, e v e r y t h i n g which has come i n t o being i n e v i t -
a b l y collapses once more i n t o the e t e r n a l f i r e m a 
u n i v e r s a l w o r l d - c o n f l a g r a t i o n . This Gotterdammerung 
i s , however, o n l y the s i g n a l f o r the whole process o f 
coming-to-be and passmg-away t o begin a l l over again. 
I n one sense, then, the p e r i o d i c c o n f l a g r a t i o n i s por-
t r a y e d , not as a d e s t r u c t i v e or t e r m i n a l event, but 
as an occasion o f change and renev/al. On the o t h e r 
hand, however, i t i s asserted t h a t each of the succ-
essive p e r i o d o i e x a c t l y resembles every one of the 
others i n a l l respects. Thus, the S t o i c view o f the 
wo r l d makes no allowance f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of any 
u l t i m a t e progress or h i s t o r i c a l development. (Vhat 
i s happening now i s only an exact r e p l i c a o f what has 
happened on innumerable occasions b e f o r e , and the 
same p a t t e r n o f events w i l l go on being e x a c t l y rep-
roduced i n t o the endless f u t u r e . The whole process 
operates according to a vast and all - e m b r a c i n g 
causal nexus c a l l e d Pate (Heimar^ene), from which 
n o t h i n g t h a t has occurred or i s o c c u r r i n g o r w i l l 
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occur i s exempt 
Fate i s the chain of c a u s a l i t y o f e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , 
o r the logos according t o which they are arranged.*^ 
( I t i s ) the power which moves matter, o p e r a t i n g 
always m the same way and according t o i d e n t i c a l 
r u l e s . I t i s one and the same w i t h providence 
and n a t u r e . ® 
I n some of the S t o i c fragments, m f a c t , there occurs 
a v e r s i o n or an echo of the dictum most commonly ass-
o c i a t e d w i t h L e i b n i z - t h a t we l i v e i n the best o f a l l 
p o s s i b l e worlds S t r i c t l y speaking, o f course, i t 
has t o be s a i d t h a t t h i s i s r a t h e r an u n f o r t u n a t e way 
o f p u t t i n g i t . Anyone who r e a l l y wanted to hold such 
a view would at once s u r e l y f i n d h i m s e l f confronted 
by an unanswerable question, namely Best compared to 
what 7 I n o t h e r words, we cannot s i g n i f i c a n t l y c l a i m 
t h a t we l i v e i n the best o f a l l p o s s i b l e worlds since 
we cannot p o i n t to a n y t h i n g t h a t the w o r l d m which we 
l i v e i s b e t t e r than. But t h i s i s r e a l l y a q u i b b l e . 
What the dictum m question i s intended to convey, m 
e f f e c t , i s simply t h a t the w o r l d j u s t i s as i t i s , 
i n e v i t a b l y and unchangeably. I n a very v i v i d way, 
then, the S t o i c s recognise the o p e r a t i o n o f 'laws 
o f n a t u r e ' m the f a m i l i a r , modern, ' p h y s i c a l ' sense 
o f the phrase. 
Man h i m s e l f , o f course, i s also determined i n s o f a r 
as he i s a mere p h y s i c a l body and, as such, a component 
of the m a t e r i a l universe I n the words of Chrysippus, 
paraphrased by Diogenes L a e r t i u s , 'our own natures are 
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p a r t of the nature of the uni v e r s e . ' But man, alone 
of a l l created t h i n g s , i s s a i d t o have w i t h i n h i m s e l f 
the c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y and choice. He i s 
s a i d (and t h i s i s y et another m o t i f already f a m i l i a r 
from Pythagoreamsm) to co n t a i n w i t h i n h i m s e l f a 
fragment o f the pervasive and d i v i n e r a t i o n a l i t y o r 
logos of the universe. How t h i s logos can a t one and 
the same time be a l l - p e r v a s i v e and fragmented i s a 
mystery which, so f a r as I can discover, i s nowhere 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explained, but there i t i s . As Zeno 
puts i t , 'Some thi n g s are w i t h i n our power, w h i l e o t h e r 
t h i n g s are n o t ' . And, br o a d l y speaking, the t h i n g s 
which l i e w i t h i n a man's power are two m number. 
F i r s t , he i s equipped to study and understand the 
universe o f which he i s a p a r t . I t i s l i v i n g and r a t -
i o n a l , and he i s l i v i n g and r a t i o n a l - there i s an 
a f f i n i t y between them, and, m v i r t u e o f t h i s , man 
i s not merely a h e l p l e s s p a r t i c l e caught m an incom-
preh e n s i b l e v o r t e x of chaos. Second, having understood 
the w o r l d , he i s f r e e t o accept the f a c t t h a t what-
ever happens happens because i t must, and t h a t i t 
cannot be avoided or changed. Such acceptance, i t 
v/ould seem, i s the u l t i m a t e g o a l o f education f o r the 
S t o i c s . Odd as i t may seem t o the t w n t i e t h - c e n t u r y 
mind, i n t e l l e c t u a l mastery over nature does n o t , on 
t h e i r view, equip man f o r what we should now c a l l 
e n g ineering or technology. ^ ' ' i t does not m any sense 
prepare the way f o r him to a l t e r o r c o n t r o l e x t e r n a l 
circumstance. But, having achieved such mastery, he 
137. 
can at l e a s t be conscious of the u n a l t e r a b l e nature 
of t h i n g s . He can s t i l l only do what he would have 
had t o do m any case. But at l e a s t he can now do i t 
w i l l i n g l y , w i t h o u t s t r u g g l i n g m u l t i m a t e l y p i t i f u l 
f u t i l i t y to l i v e at odds w i t h what h i s "studies r e v e a l 
t o be n a t u r a l n e c e s s i t y . 
The view of l i f e which the Sto i c s develop - a view 
which commentators g e n e r a l l y f i n d depressing, but 
which has a c e r t a i n austere and i n f l e x i b l e d i g n i t y 
o f i t s own - i s not u n l i k e t h a t l a t e r t o be developed 
by Spinoza. I t seems t h a t , to t h e i r minds, wisdom 
c o n s i s t s m two t h i n g s . F i r s t , i t c o n s i s t s i n i n t e l l -
e c t u a l mastery o f what we might c a l l a s c i e n t i f i c , 
but not a t e c h n o l o g i c a l , character. Second, i t con-
s i s t s m a calm ethicn.! submission t o the f a t e d i n -
e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h i n g s . The second does n o t , s t r i c t l y 
speaking, f l o w from the f i r s t , and the r e l a t i o n between 
the two i s a p u r e l y contingent one. But the f i r s t 
might a t l e a s t be s a i d to prepare the way f o r the 
second. Chrysippus, f o r example, recommends t h a t 
every e t h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n be preceded by an enquiry 
i n t o the way m v/hich the universe i s arranged. And 
the S t o i c 'sage' - the i d e a l l y wise man - would pre-
sumably be one who had achieved both these goals to 
p e r f e c t i o n . The Old Stoa, m p a r t i c u l a r , tended t o 
draw the d i s t i n c t i o n between wisdom and f o l l y very 
s h a r p l y . I t s members were r e l u c t a n t to admit any 
i n t e r m e d i a t e grad°3 of e n l i g h t e n - e n t a man i s e i t h e r 
a wise man or a f o o l . Moreover, they i n s i s t e d t h a t 
most men can only ever hope to reach a rough approx-
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i m a t i o n to the i d e a l of wisdom. Chrysippus, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , does not consider t h a t e i t h e r he or any o f 
h i s p u p i l s are vvise men. Indeed, he remarks t h e t 
there have probably o n l y ever been one or two wise men 
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i n the whole o f h i s t o r y . Also, although the Roman 
St o i c s drevv the d i s t i n c t i o n between the wise man and 
the f o o l f a r more l e n i e n t l y , even Seneca i s compelled 
to admit t h a t the t r u l y wise nan i s a 3 r a r e as the 
Phoenix. But, m the sphere o f e t h i c s , such a man, 
r a r e b i r d though he be, would be one »vho had com-
p l e t e l y mastered h i s passions. He would have r e a l i s e d 
t h a t , since the w o r l d cannot be ot h e r then i t i s , 
t here i s no p o i n t m a l l o w i n g oneself t o g i v e way 
to emotions of a t t r a c t i o n or r e v u l s i o n i n r e l a t i o n 
t o any o f the o b j e c t s of experience, or to pay any 
a t t e n t i o n t o such t h i n g s as pleasure, d e s i r e , f e a r 
or p a i n . And, through t h i s r e a l i s a t i o n , he would 
have achieved what Zeno and Ghrysippus both c a l l a 
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•smoothly-flowing l i f e ' - a s t a t e o f s p i r i t u a l peace 
or emotionlessness (apatheia or euthymia) as d i s t i n c t 
— from the-'normal' human d i s p o s i t i o n o f f u t i l e r e b e l l -
i o n , o f k i c k i n g a g a i n s t the goads. As Diogenes L a e r t i u s 
r e p o r t s , 
Zeno was the f i r s t man to d e f i n e the end as ' l i f e 
i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h nature'....He was f o l l o w e d i n 
t h i s respect by Gleanthes m h i s .vork On Pleasure, 
by Posidonius, and by Hecato m h i s work On Ends. 
Chrysippus, too, m Book One of h i s work On 5nds, 
says t h a t to l i v e v i r t u o u s l y i s t o l i v e m accord-
ance w i t h the a c t u a l course of n a t u r e . . . . The end 
may t h e r e f o r e be def i n e d as l i f e . . . m accordance 
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not only w i t h our own human n a t u r e , but also v/lth 
the nature o f the universe i t s e l f . ^ 
Perhaps the p u r e s t , or a t l e a s t the most a p h o r i s t i c , 
expression o f the S t o i c i d e a l o f v i r t u e i s t o be found 
m the f o l l o w i n g sayings of Seneca and E p i c t e t u s r e s -
p e c t i v e l y 
I do not obey God. Rather, I agree w i t h him. 
I go w i t h him, not because I must, but w i t h my 
so u l . 
I have placed my impulses under obedience t o God. 
I f i t i s h i s w i l l t h a t I should catch a f e v e r o r 
t h a t I should o b t a i n something, then i t i s my 
w i l l too. I f he does not wish i t , then n e i t h e r 
do I . 1 6 
The locus c l a s s i c u s o f S t o i c f o r t i t u d e m the presence 
of s u f f e r i n g i s probably f u r n i s h e d by T a c i t u s ' account 
of the death of Seneca a t the order of the Emperor 
Nero m AD 65. 1 7 
I I . 
The S t o i C 3 Nature and Choice. 
So f a r , then, i t would seem t h a t , i f the S t o i c s 
embrace an e t h i c a l d o c t r i n e of n a t u r a l law at a l l , 
i t contains o n l y one p r o v i s i o n - t o w i t , 'do w i t h 
gladness t h a t which you must do i n any case.' This, 
perhaps, can h a r d l y f a i l t o s t r i k e the reader as a 
r a t h e r barren moral philosophy - i f , indeed, i t i s 
to be c a l l e d a moral philosophy (es d i s t i n c t from a 
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p u r e l y p r i v a t e c o n s o l a t i o n ) a t a l l . I t i s not imm-
e d i a t e l y easy t o see how anyone s e r i o u s l y c l a i m i n g to 
be committed t o the body of d o c t r i n e which we have j u s t 
o u t l i n e d could also consider h i m s e l f adequately equipped 
w i t h an e t h i c a l basis f o r choice and p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
The d o c t r i n e s themselves seem to be c o n s i s t e n t o n l y 
w i t h the standpoint o f the d i s i n t e r e s t e d s p e c t a t o r -
w i t h t h a t o f the man who, since he knows t h a t he does 
what he does only because he could not do otherwise, 
makes no c l a i m a t a l l to be w i l l i n g or choosing, or 
even r e a l l y ' a c t i n g ' . And such indeed was the stand-
p o i n t o f a t l e a s t one o f the S t o i c s - A r i s t o o f Chios, 
a contemporary o f Cleanthes of Assos and Chrysippus. 
To A n s t o ' s mind, the only good i s v i r t u e i t s e l f , and 
the only e v i l the absence of v i r t u e . E v e r y t h i n g f a l l -
i n g w i t h i n these two poles i s merely adiaphoron -
i n d i f f e r e n t , w i t h o u t e i t h e r value o r d i s v a l u e , and 
v i r t u e i t s e l f i s understood simply as 'apathy', which 
i s contempt f o r or i n d i f f e r e n c e towards e x t e r n a l t h i n g s . 
Yet the S t o i c s were f o r the most p a r t men who i n t e r -
ested themselves m questions concerning p r a c t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y . Zeno and Chrysippus, f o r example, are both 
r e p o r t e d to have w r i t t e n t r e a t i s e s on the State. Chry-
sippus h i m s e l f , as i t happens, made a p o i n t o f ab-
s t a i n i n g from p o l i t i c a l l i f e , but h i s reasons f o r 
doing so were not those which one might expect. His 
response, when asked t o e x p l a i n h i m s e l f , vas to remark 
t h a t a bad p o l i t i c i a n i s h a t e f u l t o the gods w h i l e a 
good p o l i t i c i a n i s h a t e f u l to h i s f e l l o w pen. I n 
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other words, h i s a t t i t u d e i s not t h a t p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
i s f u t i l e , but simply t h a t i t i s f o o l i s h to play a game 
t h a t you can't win. And, m any case, t h i s p o s i t i o n 
i s a l t o g e t h e r u n t y p i c a l of S t o i c i s m considered m gen-
e r a l . Both Zeno and Panaetius regard a c t i v e and e f f -
e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n m p u b l i c l i f e as a duty, and 
t h i s p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e to p r a c t i c a l conduct i s , o f 
course, p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r l y seen amongst the members 
of the Roman Stoa - f o r whom, as Sabine puts i t , 
'Panaetius (had turned) S t o i c i s m i n t o a k i n d o f 
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philosophy o f humanitarianism.' As we have already 
p o i n t e d out, S t o i c i s m underwent a number of modif-
i c a t i o n s d u r i n g i t s h i s t o r y , and i t s apparent i n -
c o n s i s t e n c i e s appear f a r less g l a r i n g i n a f u l l -
scale e x p o s i t i o n than they do m such a b r i e f survey 
as t h i s . Nevertheless, even considered very g e n e r a l l y , 
there i s , m Stoicis m , an unmistakeable t e n s i o n between 
the thenes o f determinism, r e s i g n a t i o n and f o r t i t u d e 
on the one hand, and, on the o t h e r , t h a t of p r o p e r l y -
d i r e c t e d moral a c t i / i t y . Oat o f t h i s t e n s i o n a r i s e s 
an obvious question. Where i s the famous e t h i c a l 
d o c t r i n e of n a t u r a l law which the St o i c s are s a i d 
to have recommended as the basis o f p r a c t i c e , and what 
i s i t s c o n t e n t 9 
I I I . 
The answer to the f i r s t p a r t o f t h i s question i s 
t h a t the normative content o f n a t u r a l l a v i s t o be 
found out through the exercise o f reason - or, more 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y , of r 3 t reason, reason once a g a i n being 
p o s t u l a t e d as the unique p o s s e s s i o n of mankind. Dio-
genes L a e r t i u s t e l l s us of Zeno, Cleanthes, P o s i d o n i a s , 
Hecato and Chrysippus that they understood a l i f e of 
v i r t u e as being 
one during which we r e f r a i n from e v e r y t h i n g t h a t 
i s forbidden by the law common to a l l things -
tha t i s to say, by r i g h t reason, which pervades 
e v e r y t h i n g , and which 13 i d e n t i c a l w i t h God, 
pi 
the l o r d and r u l e r of a l l . 
T h i s i n s i s t e n c e upon ' r i g h t ' reason - upon reason as 
a d i s t i n c t i v e l y moral r a t h e r than p u r e l y c a l c u l a t i v e 
f a c u l t y - i s perhaps most s t r o n g l y seen m C i c e r o , 
who gave 'to the S t o i c d o c t r i n e of N a t u r a l Law a 
statement m which i t was u n i v e r s a l l y known throughout 
/ e s t e r a Europe from h i s own day down to the nme-
* 
t e e n t h c e n t u r y . ' C i c e r o ' s f u l l e s t statement i s 
worthy of quotation a t some l e n g t h 
There r e a l l y i s a law - r i g h t reason i n accordance 
w i t h n a t u r e - which a p p l i e s u n i v e r s a l l y , and which 
i s constant ard e v e r l a s t i n g . I t summons to duty 
by i t s commands, and by i t s p r o h i b i t i o n s i t d e t e r s 
from v/i ongdomg. ... I t i 3 r e " e r r i g h t to i n v a l i d a t e 
t h i s lav/ by l e g i s l a t i o n , nor i s i t r i g h t to r e -
s t r i c t i t s operation; anJ to do avay with i t a l -
together i s i m p o s s i b l e . N e i t h e r the Senate nor 
the people can absolve us from i t s o b l i g a t i o n s , 
and we need not look beyond o u r s e l v e s f o r an ex-
p o s i t o r or i n t e r p r e t e r of i t . N e i t h e r w i l l there 
be one lav; f o r Rome and another f o r Athens, nor 
one f o r no*/ and arothex' f o r the f u t u r e . Rather, 
ther= w i l l be one e t e r n a l and unchangeable law, 
22 
v a l i d f o r a l l n a t i o n s and a t a l l times. 
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So f a r as the second p a r t of our question, t h a t of 
content, i s concerned, i t may be answered v e r y bropdly 
i n terms of tvo g e n e r a l i n j u n c t i o n s . These a r e , 
( i ) Make ch o i c e s only a f t e r f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and then m such a way as to 
ach i e v e the most advantageous p o s s i b l e outcome; 
( 1 1 ) Remember that a l l men are a t the l a s t a n a l y s i s 
equal, and so behave towards a l l men w i t h kindness and 
good'vill. 
I t has to be admitted that t h i s twofold f o r m u l a t i o n i s 
somewhat o v e r s i m p l i f i e d , and that i t c o n c e a l s a g r e e t 
d e a l of ambiguitv and s u b t l e t y . F o r our purposes, 
however, i t w i l l adeouately serve the ends of expos-
i t i o n , and i t w i l l be u s e f u l to look a t each of the 
two i n j u n c t i o n s m tu r n . 
( 1 ) I f we were to p r e s s the S t o i c s hard over the matte: 
of making c h o i c e s between a l t e r n a t i v e s m the e x t e r -
n a l world, they would presumably have e i t h e r to abandon 
t h e i r o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n of determinism, or to concede 
th a t such c h o i c e s are i m p o s s i b l e - or that they a r e , 
a t l e a s t , only a p p a r e n t l y ' c h o i c e s ' . The S t o i c s r a i s e , 
m an acute form, questions of determinism v e r s u s f r e e -
w i l l , of •hard' and ' s o f t ' determinism, and so on, 
which we cannot d i g r e s s f a r enoug-i to c o n s i d e r indep-
endently. S u f f i c e i t to say, however, t h a t , broadly 
speaking, they do not choose to abandon e i t h e r of 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , and the common p r a c t i c e of a n c i e n t 
and modern commentators a l i k e has b^en to regard the 
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S t o i c d o c t r m o of choice as something of an excrescence 
- as an af t e r t h o u g h t , or a l o g i c a l l y r a t h e r unfortunate 
c o n c e s s i o n to p r a c t i c e . To be f a i r , however, they are 
f o r the most p a r t c o n s i s t e n t to the extent of hol d i n g 
t h a t such choices as can be made cannot be con s i d e r e d 
c h o i c e s between 'absolute good' and 'absolute e v i l ' 
S i n c e e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y i s a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s i t a t e d , 
nothing can be a b s o l u t e l y good or a b s o l u t e l y e v i l , 
s i n c e e v e r y t h i n g that i s n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i s . I t 
cannot be changed e i t h e r f o r the b e t t e r or f o r the worse 
and the s e c r e t of the 'smoothly flowing' or good l i f e 
- of eudaimor1a - c o n s i s t s i n f u l l y t a k i n g t h i s point 
But although i t makes no sense to t a l k m terms of 
ab s o l u t e good or ab s o l u t e e v i l , we are n e v e r t h e l e s s 
capable of p e r c e i v i n g t h a t , i n any given s e t of c i r -
cumstances, c e r t a i n t h i n g s w i l l a t l e a s t be more 
advantageous than others (proeg^ena, or, m the L a t i n 
l i t e r a t u r e , v a r i o u s l y producta, promota, praecipua, 
p r a e l a t a , p r a e p o s i t a and conmoda.). On the ot h e r 
s i d e of the com, >ve are e q u a l l y able to p e r c e i v e t h a t , 
i n any given s e t of cir c u m s t a n c e s , c e r t a i n t h i n g s w i l l 
be disadvantageous - apoproegnena, or remota, r e i e c t a 
and inconmoda (When C i c e r o r e p o r t s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
as made by Zeno and Posidonius, he does so i n terms o f 
advantageous things being secundum raturam and d i s -
advantageous th i n g s being c o n t r a naturam. <Ye seem by 
t h i s time to have f o r g o t t e n , however, t h a t , i f every-
t h i n g i n nature were c a u s a l l y n e c e s s i t a t e d or determined 
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nothing could be c o n t r a r r t u r a r ) 
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The S t o i c s remarks on the s u b j e c t of choice are 
r a t h e r r e m i n i s c e n t of the i n s i s t e n c e which ve found 
m the work of Protagoras and Gorgias upon the nec-
e s s i t y erf matching a c t i o n to circumstance. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , the d i s t i n c t i o n between proegmena and 
apoproegme-na reminds us to Protagoras' dictum t h a t , 
although no one statement can be ' t r u e r ' than any-
other, some statements ere ' b e t t e r ' than o t h e r s f o r 
o p e r a t i o n a l purposes. The S t o i c s ' i d e a , e s s e n t i a l l y , 
i s t h a t the wise man a c t s a p p r o p r i a t e l y or 'according 
to duty' (kathekon) when he c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e s the 
d i s t i n c t i o n beWeen proegmenp and apoproegmena i n 
the circumstances m which he happens to be, and, 
having i d e n t i f i e d the most advantageous course, f o l l o w s 
i t . The c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e to things which a r e advan-
tageous i s to accept them as such, and to a c t i n ways 
which may be expected to b r i n g them about. S i m i l a r l y , 
the wise man w i l l , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , a c t m such a 
way as to avoid those t h i n g s which a r e , m the circum-
s t a n c e s , disadvantageous. Obvious examples of t h i r g s 
which might be proegnena are l i f e , h e a l t h and w e a l t h . 
E q u a l l y obvious examples of things which might be 
the r e v e r s e are i l l n e s s , death and poverty. ilhen we 
come to f i n e r or l e s s obvious d i s t i n c t i o n s , there i s , 
as we might expect, l i t t l e unanimity. N e i t h e r i s t h e r e 
much unanimity over the question of e x a c t l y how much 
i n the ways of advantages a v i r t u o u s man a c t u a l l y needs. 
But, m broad terms, the point i s c l e a r enough, and 
the u l t i m a t e l y or i d e a l l y wise man would, of course, 
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be i n an e s p e c i a l l y favoured p o s i t i o n w i t h regard to 
such c h o i c e s as he might have to make. Having e n t i r e l y 
conquered h i s p a s s i o n s and c u l t i v a t e d a sublime i n -
d i f f e r e n c e to the world, h i s d e c i s i o n s would be com-
p l e t e l y r a t i o n a l ones, serene and unswayed by adven-
t i t i o u s p e r s o n a l or emotional f o r c e s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
I n f a i r n e s s to the c o n s i s t e n c y of S t o i c e t h i c s , 
i n c i d e n t a l l y , i t ought to be pointed out th a t t h e i r 
remarks on p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y do not u l t i m a t e l y det-
r a c t from the b a s i c theme of r a t i o n a l submission to 
circumstance. A3 Seneca puts i t , 
I t i s not m any man's power to have whatever he 
wants, but i t i s i n h i s power not to want what 
he does not have, and c h e e r f u l l y to make use of 
whatever comes h i s way.^4 
I n o ther words, the wise and v i r t u o u s man w i l l not 
experience d i s t r e s s i f he f a i l s to secure what i s 
advantageous. S i m i l a r l y , i f he has to accept things 
which are disadvantageous, he w i l l do so i n a s p i r i t 
of calmness and s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n . No misfortune can 
touch him, and the p r i c e which he hps to pay f o r h i s 
peace of mind, presumably, i s t h a t no good fortune can 
gladden him e i t h e r . 
( i i ) S t o i c i s m i s widely, indeed almost u n i v e r s a l l y , 
regarded by i t s c h r o n i c l e r s as having been, i n o r i g i n , 
a r e a c t i o n to the wide-ranging p o l i t i c a l changes i n i t -
i a t e d by P h i l i p o f ITacedon and h i s son. As we have 
a l r e a d y remarked, t h i s i s perhaps as good an expl a n a t i o n 
as any of the ' n o s t a l g i a ' /hich appears to pervade 
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S t o i c cosmology. But the most important tnene of 
S t o i c i s m from the point of view of the h i s t o r y of 
n a t u r a l law i s t h a t m r e s p e c t of wh: ch i t most obvious-
l y goes 'beyond the p o l l s ' - beyond the accepted soc-
i a l and p o l i t i c a l world order of i t 3 p r e d e c e s s o r s . 
The theme m question i s i t s i n s i s t e n c e upon the 
e q u a l i t y of a l l human beings - a theme founded upon 
a conception of the u n i t y and brotherhood of the whole 
human r a c e . J u s t as, as part of t h Q development of 
the Athenian p o l i s , the pla c e of the gentleman //as 
g r a d u a l l y taken by the c i t i z e n , so the S t o i c s see m 
contemporary p o l i t i c a l developments the supp>rs ossion 
of the c i t i z e n by the i n d i v i d u a l . And i t i s p r e c i s e l y 
t h i s theme of e q u a l i t y as between i n d i v i d u a l s , of 
course, which has subsequently provided the most 
fundamental point of departure f o r n a t u r a l - l a w o r i e n -
t a t e d c l a i m s . 
I n S t o i c i s m , we again come a c r o s s the f a m i l i a r d i c -
tum or t r u i s m that man i s by nature a p o l i t i c a l animal 
- t h i s time r e i t e r a t e d by Ghrysippus. The f a c t t h a t 
men everywhere d e s i r e to l i v e m the company of ot h e r s 
i s taken to be as much a f a c t of t h e i r nature as th a t 
they have two l e g s , two arms, pnd so on. And, i n 
t h i s connection, the S t o i c s develop a conception of 
a c e r t a i n n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e which they c a l l o i k e i o s i s . 
I t i s pointed out th a t c e r t a i n of the things w i t h which 
we come i n t o contact are such t h a t we experience a 
n a t u r a l f e e l i n g of 'belonging' m r e l a t i o n to them 
they a r e pik^ i c t Th<=> vord o i k e i o s i s i s o b v i o u s l y 
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derived from oikos, house, the root i d e a presumably 
being t h a t we f e e l 'at home' w i t h those things which 
are o i k e i o n m r e l a t i o n to us. I n i t s most p r i m i t i v e 
or undeveloped form, t h i s n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n or a t t -
r i b u t e m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f simply as the unadorned im-
p u l s e towards s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n - s i n c e every l i v i n g 
t h i n g i s s a i d to experience i t s most b a s i c or p r i m a l 
o i k e i o s i s towards i t s e l f . I n t h i s form, of course, 
i t i s r e a d i l y to be seen m the behaviour of animals. 
Indeed, the n o t i o n of o i k e i o s n s may w e l l have o r i g i n -
ated m an e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n from the f a c t t h a t 
a l l c r e a t u r e s are observed always to seek t h e i r own 
p r e s e r v a t i o n as Spinoza and Hobbes were l a t e r to 
remark, th e r e i s no coratus towards s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . 
Human beings, however, n a t u r a l l y undergo a p r o c e s s of 
maturation or development which c a r r i e s them away 
from t h i s v e r y b a s i c urge towards m e r e s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i 
and t h i s process d i f f e r s from anything of a s i m i l a r 
k i n d i n animals inasmuch as i t a l s o i n c l u d e s the 
aspect of moral development. I t i s suggested that 
the n a t u r a l development of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s o i k e i o s i s 
as p a r t of t h i s process i s , as i t were, a p r o g r e s s i o n 
outwards to encompass s u c c e s s i v e l y f a m i l y , f r i e n d s , 
a cquaintances and f e l l o v human beings w i t h i n the scope 
of h i s ov/n compassion and concern. Ex hypo the s i , 
o i k e i o s i s m any i n d i v i d u a l case would only be f u l l y 
developed when i t had extended so as to i n c l u d e the 
whole of mankind. And i t i s f u r t h e r suggested t h a t 
one of the d u t i e s of the man who a s p i r e s to l i v e v i r -
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t u o u s l y i s to extend h i s own o i k e i o s i s as f a r as he 
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p o s s i b l y can. 
T h i s , then, i s one aspect of the S t o i c view t h a t human 
horiz o n s are not to be thought of as c i r c u m s c r i b e d by 
the t e r r i t o r i a l or p o l i t i c a l l i m i t s of t h i s S t a t e or 
t h a t . Rather, they are f i x e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r i s i n g 
out of the very nature of man. I n p a r t i c u l a r , they 
are f i x e d by the supposed f a c t t h a t ' a l l men are 
br o t h e r s and kinsmen by natu r e , s i n c e they a r e a l l 
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sons of God.' The model of p o l i t i c a l l i f e f o r the 
S t o i c s , t h e r e f o r e , i s not a p o l l s which i s h e l d to be 
i d e a l , or which i s s a i d to be the best a t t a i n a b l e on 
the grounds t h a t i t answers to a c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n 
m terms of s o c i a l composition, education, s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y , and so f o r t h . Rather, i t i s a u n i v e r s a l 
or w o r l d - s t a t e - a p o l l s c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h the cosmos. 
a cosmopolis. ( I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, i n c i d e n -
t a l l y , t h a t t h i s i d e a i s a c t u a l l y s a i d to have been 
d e r i v e d from S o c r a t e s and from Diogenes of Sinope, 
both of whom, when asked 'of what S t a t e are you a member 9 
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would r e p l y , 'of the cosmos.') 
I n s h o r t , then, men are not to regard themselves 
p r i m a r i l y as being members of a rac e or c i t y , but of 
a s o c i e t y spanning the whole v/orld and r i s i n g above 
c o n v e n t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s . As Chrysippus puts i t , 
J u s t as the word p o l i s i s used i n two sen s e s , 
to mean both a p l a c e to l i v e and the e n t i r e S t a t e 
and i t s c i t i z e n - b o d y , so too i s the whole u n i v e r s e 
a k i n d of vol i s , i n c l u d i n g gods anu men, m which 
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the gods r u l e and the men obey. Men and gods 
are able to have such t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h one another 
because they are both p o s s e s s o r s o f reason. 
T h i s i s lav/ by nature, and i t i s f o r t h i s t h a t 
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a l l t h ings have come i n t o being. 
I t should be noted, however, t h a t t h i s cosmopolitanism 
i s not, m f a c t , ' a n t i - p o l i s ' e i t h e r i n i t s i n s p i r a t i o n 
or i t s recommendations. The S t o i c s did not f o l l o w 
the C y n i c s m holding the a m e n i t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of organised l i f e m contempt, and they do not deny 
th a t men ought to c u l t i v a t e a measure of d i g n i f i e d 
l o y a l t y o r p a t r i o t i s m towards t h e i r n a t i v e p l a c e s . 
Zeno and Gleanthes, f o r example, are both r e p o r t e d to 
have d e c l i n e d the honour of Athenian c i t i z e n s h i p on 
the grounds that to accept i t would be to imply a 
d i s r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r own b i r t h p l a c e s . At the same 
time, however, the S t o i c s i n s i s t t h a t the f u l l r e a l -
i s a t i o n of the e t h i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of human l i f e 
does not l i e w i t h i n c o n v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l forms. 
However convenient f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes the e x i s -
tence of such forms may be, they do not, as P l a t o and 
A r i s t o t l e had supposed, c o n t a i n w i t h i n themselves a l l 
the c o n d i t i o n s which a r e r e q u i r e d by man's n a t u r e . 
I n a l l important r e s p e c t s , the S t o i c s c l a i m , every man 
i s the equal of every other. A l l men pre to a c e r t a i n 
e x t e n t v i c t i m s of u n c o n t r o l l a b l e circumstance - sometimes 
v e r y m i m i c a l circumstance; and a l l men share the r a t -
i o n a l i t y through which they can understand t h e i r p r e-
dicament and a c t m \ ays most consonant w i t h i t . The 
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p e r f e c t l y wise man may be hard - perhaps even i m p o s s i b l e 
- to f i n d . But, a t a l l events, each man has an a t 
l e a s t roughly equal c a p a c i t y ™'ith every one of h i s 
f e l l o w s to a s p i r e to v i r t u e . A l l men have a share 
i n the logos which informs the u n i v e r s e , and, i n 
view of t h i s shared p o s s e s s i o n , the t r a d i t i o n a l 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s as 
Greeks and f o r e i g n e r s or s l a v e s and freemen t u r n out 
to be d i s t i n c t i o n s founded uoon c r i t e r i a which a r e 
simply i r r e l e v a n t . The u n i v e r s a l i t y of the moral 
f a c u l t y of reason i s s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h t h a t a l l 
men are by nature c i t i z e n s of the cosmopolis. Each 
has an equal c l a i m upon the goodwill of every o t h e r 
and, m i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , a l l should l i v e i n common, 
without any s o c i a l or economic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s a t a l l . 
I t would, of course, be dangerous to read too much 
back i n t o wh nt the S t o i c s have to say, but t h i s 
does look v e r y l i k e a p r e f i g u r i n g of the f a m i l i a r 
d o c t r i n e of n a t u r a l r i g h t s which are s a i d to hold 
between man and man even m a ' s t a t e of n a t u r e ' . ^ 
An e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r i d e a i s to be found m the 
De Lep-ibu-: of C i c e r o . I n the l i g h t of h i s dictum 
t h a t 'we need not look beyond o u r s e l v e s ' m order 
to d i s c o v e r what i s r i g h t , C i c e r o develops the theme 
of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y m such a way as to remind us 
v e r y s t r o n g l y of S t o i c cosmopolitanism 
Out of "11 the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
d i s c o u r s e , t here s u r e l y emerg°s nothing of 
g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e than t^e r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t 
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we a r e born f o r j u s t i c e , nnd that r i g h t i s based, 
not upon human opinion, but upon na t u r e . As soon 
as one a c h i e v e s a proper understanding of man's 
f e l l o w s h i p and u n i t y w i t h h i s f e l l o w men, t h i s 
f a c t w i l l immediately be c l e a r . F o r no s i n g l e 
t h i n g so e x a c t l y resembles anything e l s e as we 
o u r s e l v e s res^mblp on*3 another. Indeed, i f bad 
h a b i t s and f a l s e b e l i e f s did not c o r r u p t weaker 
minds and l e a d them i n t o the paths of t h e i r own 
i n c l i n a t i o n s , a l l men would be as much l i k e 
o t h e r men as any one man i s l i k e h i m s e l f . . . . 
For those c r e a t u r e s »vho have r e c e i v e d from 
na t u r e the g i f t of reason have a l s o r e c e i v e d 
r i g h t reason. Therefore, they have r e c e i v e d 
the g i f t of lav/, which i s r i g h t reason a p p l i e d to 
command and p r o h i b i t i o n . - ^ 
I t would seem, then, that there i s a s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n 
to be a p p l i e d without d i s t i n c t i o n to the whole of 
mankind. A l l men resemble one another m t h e i r poss-
e s s i o n of reason, and m t h e i r c a p a c i t y to t u r n t h i s 
p o s s e s s i o n m the d i r e c t i o n of 'command and p r o h i b i t i o n ' 
There may, of course, be i n c i d e n t a l d i s p a r i t i e s between 
i n d i v i d u a l i n t e l l e c t u a l achievements. S i m i l a r l y , 
a b e r r a t i o n s may a r i s e out of the bad h a b i t s which 
become superimposed on human natu r e , or out of the 
d i v e r s i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l circumstance. I n s p i t e of 
these t h i n g s , however, a l l men are at the l a s t a n a l y -
s i s capable of s t r i v i n g f o r v i r t u e under the t u t e l a g e 
of r e c t a r a t i o . F o r example, i t r e q u i r e s no enacted 
law ( a c c o r d i n g to C i c e r o ) to i n d i c a t e to us t h a t 
I t i s more c o n t r a r y to nature f o r a man to take 
something from h i s neighbour and so to d e r i v e bene-
f i t from h i s neighbour's l o s s than i s death or 
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poverty or p a i n or anything e l s e which can a f f e c t 
e i t h e r our bodies or our e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^ 
A.J. C a r l y l e - p u t t i n g the matter somewhat too s t r o n g l y , 
perhaps - suggests that these remarks embody much the 
same theory of man and s o c i e t y as that more f a m i l i a r l y 
summed up i n the French r e v o l u t i o n a r y slogan, ' L i b e r t y , 
E q u a l i t y , F r a t e r n i t y . ' Dr G a r l y l e p o i n t s to C i c e r o ' s 
dictum - l a t e r to be echoed by St Ambrose - that 'we 
are by nature disposed to l o v e men, t h i s i s the found-
a t i o n of law.' And he suggests that the word ' F r a t -
e r n i t y ' as i t occurs m the r e v o l u t i o n a r y tag i s o nly 
another way of conveying what C i c e r o e x p r e s s e s i n 
these words.32 
To put i t a t i t s most g e n e r a l , and without engaging 
i n i n v i d i o u s h i s t o r i c a l c r o s s - r e f e r e n c i n g , so to 
speak, we might suggest t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l importance 
of the S t o i c s l i e s not, as has so f r e q u e n t l y been 
claimed or i m p l i e d , i n t h a t they o r i g i n a t e d an e t h i c a l 
t h e o r y of n a t u r a l law. Rather, i t l i e s i n the f a c t 
t h a t , m t h e i r hands, the theory transcended the r e l -
a t i v e l y narrow p e r s p e c t i v e of the c l a s s i c a l p o l l s . 
A s E.V. Arnold remarks, the p o l i t i c a l thought of 
S t o i c i s m ' c a l l s f o r a r e v o l t a g a i n s t n a t i o n a l i s m , 
a n t i q u i t y , custom, pr i d e and p r e j u d i c e , and a new 
c o n s t i t u t i o n based upon u n i v e r s a l reason and m d i v -
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l d u a l l i b e r t y . ' 
1 5 4 . 
IV. 
I u s N a t u r a l e and the Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s 
The ambitious c o d i f i c a t i o n of the whole accumulated 
body of Roman law undertaken under the a u s p i c e s of 
the Emperor J u s t i n i a n stands as the cu l m i n a t i o n of 
a lengthy and i n t r i c a t e development. Indeed, t h i s 
development reaches f a r back i n t o the h i s t o r y of rep-
u b l i c a n Rome - to the appearance, m about 450BC, of 
the e a r l i e s t kno,,rn w r i t t e n Roman law, the T v Q l v e Tables. 
Moreover, J u s t i n i a n ' s was not, m f a c t , the e a r l i e s t 
attempt to b r i n g a u n i v e r s a l l e g a l order i n t o the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of an i n c r e a s i n g l y unwieldy and t r o u b l e -
ridden empire. The '/ork which he commissioned was 
i t s e l f m l a r g e measure based upon three e a r l i e r com-
p i l a t i o n s of law. These were the Codex Gregorianus 
and the Codex Hermogenienus, which had been pie c e d 
t o g e t h e r from the I m p e r i a l A r c h i v e s i n about AD 2 9 4 
and AD 3 3 4 r e s p e c t i v e l y , and the Codex Theodosianus, 
made by a commission appointed by the Emperor Theo-
dosius I I m about A.D 438. There has never been any 
doubt, however, of the supreme importance of the 
J u s t i m a n i c c o d i f i c a t i o n , from the point of view of 
an understanding of both the h i s t o r y of Roman j u r i s -
prudence and the subsequent development of European 
l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l thought and i n s t i t u t i o n s . J u s -
t i n i a n ' s work was u n i v e r s a l l y taken to be the statement 
of Roman law m i t s d e f i n i t i v e form. As such, i t was 
s t u d i e d ( a l b e i t o f t e n only m the form of summaries, 
155. 
commentaries and t r a n s l a t i o n s ) throughout the Middle 
Ages; and t h i s came to be e s p e c i a l l y true a f t e r the 
foundation, m about 1088, of the c e l e b r a t e d law-school 
a t Bologna, which ' a t t r a c t e d thousands of undergrad-
uates from a l l c o u n t r i e s of Europe ' 34/\.s a g e n e r a l -
i s a t i o n , i t would be f a i r enough to say that something 
of Roman law i s to be found somewhere i n a l l modern 
l e g a l systems. F o r example, the J u s t i n i a n i c law 
was adopted ( o r , m the customary terminology, ' r e c -
e i v e d ' ) as the foundation of the remodelled l e g a l 
systems of Germany and Holland which emerged during 
the f i f t e e n t h end s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s ; and i t was 
upon a f u s i o n of Roman law w i t h l o c a l custom that 
both the Napoleonic Code C i v i l e of 1804 and the Ger-
man C i v i l Code of 1900 were based I n s h o r t , to 
borrow the words of Walter Ullmann, 'To say th a t 
(the J u s t i n i a n i c ) c o d i f i c a t i o n became one of the most 
formative agencies m Europe would be no overstatement. 
The g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g to j u s t i c e , to the 
concept of law, the d i v i s i o n of law, i t s enforcement, 
and so on, became c e n t r a l to the medieval conception 
of law....And the Codp of J u s t i n i a n was l a t e r , when 
i t came to be the s u b j e c t of s c i e n t i f i c treatment m 
the medieval u n i v e r s i t i e s , one of the m°in sources of 
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the d o c t r i n e s r e l a t i n g to government ' 
The whole vork, now known as the Corpus I u n s C i v i l i s , 
i s made up of three p a r t s the Codex, the D i ^ e s t a 
(sometimes a l s o r e f e r r e d to as the P°ndect f ie) and the 
I n s t i t u t i o n e s . The Codev and the D i g e s t a are compil-
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a t i o n s of the tvo branches of w r i t t e n law recognised 
w i t h i n the Roman l e g a l t r a d i t i o n the I m p e r i a l 
C o n s t i t u t i o n s ( P l a c i t p ) pnd the opinions of eminent 
l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s (R°sponsa Pruderitium). The I n s t i t -
u t i o n e s i s p r i m a r i l y a handbook of a r e l a t i v e l y elem-
ent a r y k i n d . I t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y intended f o r the 
use of lew students - and addressed to cupidae legum 
l u y p r t u t i , although t ^ i s pnrt of the work wrs a l s o 
given f u l l l e g a l standing and f o r c e by the Emperor. 
( I n c i d e n t a l l y , the le g e s or c o n s t i t u t i o n s n o v e l l a e , 
which have long been p r i n t e d n s p a r t of the Corpus 
I u r i s C i v i l i s , a r e not, m f a c t , an i n t e g r a l p a r t of 
i t . J u s t i n i a n had o n g m e l l v intended t h e t h i s m^ny 
l e g i s l a t i v e i n n o v a t i o n s should be mcorporpted from 
time to time m a s e r i e s of updated e d i t i o n s of the 
Codex, but t h i s plan was never c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t . ) 
H i s t o r i a n s of l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l thought °lmost 
i n v a r i a b l y a s s e r t t h a t the Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s 
bears c l e a r t r a c e s of S t o i c ' i n f l u e n c e ' As Sabine 
s a y s , 'There can be no question that ( t h e ) e a r l i e s t 
attempts a t s y s t e m a t i c j u r i s p r u d e n c e were made by 
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men s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by S t o i c i s m ' On the face 
of i t , t h i s seems quite obvious. But such a s s e r t i o n s 
of i n f l u e n c e a r e , however, questi o n a b l e m any c i r -
cumstances other than those m which the documents 
concerned c o n t a i n c l e a r and d i r e c t a t t r i b u t i o n s . 
(The c o n t r o v e r s y surrounding what i s supposed to be 
the ' i n f l u e n c e ' of ^obbes on Locke i s an example of 
the kind of confusion which can a r i s e here ) So f a r 
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as the g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between Roman law and 
S t o i c i s m i s concerned, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note 
that Qumtus Mucius Scaevola, who i s s a i d by the 
j u r i s t Pomponius to have been the f i r s t man ever to 
have produced a c o d i f i c a t i o n of the lav/ ( m eighteen 
volumes) was a member of the ' S c i p i o n i c c i r c l e ' , a 
p u p i l of P a n a e t i u s and a minor luminary of the Roman 
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Stoa. But there i s , m the Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s , no 
d i r e c t - a t t r i b u t i o n - no d e c l a r a t i o n of indebtedness -
to the S t o i c s as such. Indeed, the a t t i t u d e to p h i l -
osophy expressed at the beginning o f the Di g e s t a i s 
p o l i t e l y d i s m i s s i v e the i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t men 
would deploy t h e i r i n t e l l e c t s much b e t t e r i f they stuck 
to p r a c t i c a l b u s i n e s s and gave a wide b e r t h to a b s t r a c t 
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s p e c u l a t i o n . On the one hand, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s perhaps 
as w e l l not to bandy about the word ' i n f l u e n c e ' too 
f r e e l y . On the other hand, however, t h i s much may 
r e a d i l y be granted t h a t the treatment of n a t u r a l 
law and of the concept of e o u a l i t y m the Corpus i s 
conducted m a s p i r i t which looks v e r y much l i k e 
t h a t of S t o i c i s m . 
I n Roman j u r i s p r u d e n c e , n a t u r a l law - i u s n a t u r a l e 
- takes i t s p l a c e , broadly speaking, alongside two 
other kinds o r d i v i s i o n s of law I U S c i v i l e and 
I U S gentium. The d i s t i n c t i o n bet./een I U S c i v i l e and 
i u s gentium i s i t s e l f a p e r f e c t l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
one. B r i e f l y , I U S c i v i l e - l e t us c a l l i t the ' c i v i c 
law' - i s the law of the c i v i t a s as such. I t i s the 
formal e x p r e s s i o n of the i n t e r e s t of one p a r t i c u l a r 
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p o l i t i c a l community - namely, the c i t y of Rom*3 i t s e l f . 
I n o t her words, i t i s that body of law which i s s p e c -
i f i c a l l y b i n d i n g upon the Roman c i t i z e n as such; and 
i t i s by reason of such law t h a t , f o r example, the 
Apostle P a u l was able to demand and g«t s p e c i a l t r e a t -
ment as a Roman c i t i z e n . Moreover, such law grew 
w i t h the passage of time, as i t was i n t e r p r e t e d and 
expanded a c c o r d i n g to need by the s o - c a l l e d I U S 
honorarium - i . e . the body of c a s e - l a v e n s h r i n i n g 
the d e c i s i o n s made m set t l e m e n t of d i s p u t e s by the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l m a g i s t r a t e s , the p r a e t o r urbanus and 
the curules a e d i l e s Commercial a c t i v i t y and t e r r i t -
o r i a l expansion, however, i n e v i t a b l y r e q u i r e d a t an 
e a r l y stage t h a t the I U S c i v i l e be supplemented by 
r e c o g n i t i o n of a body of law having wider and more 
f l e x i b l e a p p l i c a t i o n s . I n f a c t , as e a r l y as the 
t h i r d c e n t u r y BG, we n o t i c e the emergence of a s p e c i a l 
m a g i s t r a t e , the p r a e t o r p e r e g n n u s or p r a e t o r i n t e r 
p e r ^ g r i n o s , who 1? 0 f u n c t i o n i t i s to s e t t l e d i s p u t e s 
between non-^ora°n c i t i z e n s f a l l i n g under the j u r i s -
d i c t i o n of Rome, or between f o r e i g n e r s and Roman 
c i t i z e n s . And the law i n the l i g h t of which such 
s e t t l e m e n t s were reached i s the I U S gentium. 
S i r Henry Maine suggests t h a t t h i s I U S gentium 
came m the course of time to be regarded by Roman 
lawyers as p a r t of a ' l o s t code of nature* which 
was thought to have obtained m a 'golden age' m the 
remote p a s t , and of which subseouent law was thought 
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to be a debased or 'devalued' form or echo. V/e s h a l l 
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p r e s e n t l y have some more to say about the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p between m s gentium and I U S n a t u r a l e , but S i r 
F r e d e r i c k P o l l o c k remarks that he can f i n d no evidence 
to support the c o n c l u s i o n that e i t h e r lawyers o r p h i l -
osophers have ever approached the I U S Pentium i n 
e x a c t l y t h i s w a y ^ Also, i t i s not immediately obvious 
what S i r Henry Maine i s d r i v i n g a t when he says t h a t 
the 'code of natu r e ' was reckoned to have been ' l o s t ' . 
I t i s t r u e t h a t some of the S t o i c s were i n c l i n e d to 
make w i s t f u l r e f e r e n c e to a past Golden Age when a l l 
was w e l l w i t h mankind. The i d e a i s found m the 
w r i t i n g s of Seneca, f o r expmple, and i t i s not u n l i k e 
the J u d a e o - C h n s t i a n notions of the Garden of Eden and 
the f a l l of Adam. But the S t o i c s c e r t a i n l y did not 
wis h to suggest that n a t u r a l law had been ' l o s t * 
w i t h the passing-sway of t h i s Golden Age. Indeed, 
the whole c l a s s i c a l conception of n a t u r a l law i s t h a t , 
whatever e l s e m the world may be mutable o r p e r i s h a b l e , 
n a t u r a l lew a t l e a s t cannot be l o s t . I t i s a potent-
i a l point of r e f e r e n c e f o r everyone. I t i s t h e r e , 
b u i l t into the n a t u r a l order of t i l i n g s , or as an 
i n s e p a r a b l e element of human nat u r e , w a i t i n g to be 
read o f f and a p p l i e d by the man of sonhie or ph r o n e s i s 
or r e c t a r a t i o , as the cas<= may be. The more u s u a l 
- and much the more p l a u s i b l e - p r a c t i c e , m f p c t , i s 
to regard the L a t i n phrase I U S gentium simply as a 
l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n of the Greek komos nomos -
'common1 or ' u n i v e r s a l ' law. I n t h i s sense, i t need 
not be i n v o l v e d w i t h any h i s t o r i c a l or m v t h o l o g i c e l 
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p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . I t need i n d i c a t e only those elements 
which are, as a matter of p l a i n f a c t , to be found i n 
a l l o r most known systems of law. This i s c e r t a i n l y 
the understanding most r e a d i l y conveyed by the Di g e s t ? 
i t s e l f 
The law of n a t i o n s ( I U S gpntium) i s t h a t law 
which the human race as such observes.42 
A l l the peoples who are governed by law and 
custom observe laws which are p a r t l y t h e i r own 
and p a r t l y common to a l l mankind. 43 
Als o , m the I n s t i t u t i o n e s , t h ^ f o l l o w m p d e f i n i t i o n 
i s g i v ^ n 
The law of n a t i o n s , . i s common to the "/hole 
human r°ce.. ."^rom the law of na t i o n s come 
v i r t u a l l y a l l c o n t r a c t s , such as s a l e , h i r e , 
b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t i o n s , d e p o s i t , loan and i n n -
umerable o t h e r s . ^ 
I t i s important, at t h i s p o i n t , to be c l e a r , however, 
t h a t the law of n a t i o n s , understood m t h i s way, i s 
not the same t h i n g as a modern w r i t e r would mean i f 
he were to r e f e r to ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law'. I n oth e r 
words, the p r o v i s i o n s of the I U S g°ntium pre not 
e n t i r e l y contained m t r e a t i e s or agreements f o r m a l l y 
r e g u l a t i n g the r e l a t i o n s between S t a t e s . Such r e g u l a t i o n s 
might on o c c a s i o n - and w i t h some ambiguity - be t r e a -
ted as though they were p a r t of the I U S gentium hence 
the frequent use of the phrase by h i s t o r i a n s - e s p e c i a l l y 
L i v y - when speaking of t^e s p n c t i t y of t r e a t y - r e l a t i o n s 
or the immunity of ambassadors. T e c h n i c a l l y speaking, 
however, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law m the s t r i c t sense f a l l s 
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under a d i s t i n c t sub-heading of i t s own ( I U S f e t i F l e ) , 
and i u s Pentium i t s e l f i s an a l t o g e t h e r broader concept. 
I n s h o r t , because i t was known t h a t c o n t r a c t s of v a r -
i o u s kinds - ' s a l e , h i r e , b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t i o n s , 
d e p o s i t , loan and innumerable o t h e r s ' - were as a 
matter of course regarded by other n a t i o n s m much 
the same way as they were by Rome, i t was assumed 
th a t the o b l i g a t i o n s f l o w i n g from such t r a n s a c t i o n s 
r e s t upon l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s which are f e l t everywhere 
to be b i n d i n g i n the same way. 
T h i s assumption t h a t there are v e r y fundamental 
l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s which command such u n i v e r s a l accep-
tance r a i s e s , of course, an immediate and obvious 
question - a question 'vhich had a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d to 
the compendious mind of A r i s t o t l e . I f e m p i r i c a l 
o b s e r v a t i o n a s s u r e s us - as i t seems to - t h a t there 
a r e c e r t a i n elements common to a l l or most known 
l e g a l systems, are we not e n t i t l e d to i n f e r from t h i s 
that human nature i s everywhere such t h a t i t cannot 
f u n c t i o n m the world of p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s without 
g i v i n g heed to the p r i n c i p l e s which these elements 
e n s h r i n e 9 To put i t another way does not the very 
e x i s t e n c e of I U S gentium e n t i t l e us to conclude that 
there i s , a t the h e a r t of a l l d i v e r s i t y and change, 
a c e n t r a l core of 'law' which i s ' n a t u r a l ' m the sense 
t h a t , i f i t i s not recognised, human beings simply 
cannot achieve t h e i r p u r poses 9 T h i s i s a s u g g e s t i o n 
which, q u i t e apart from i t s e a r l i e r echoes, appears 
m the w r i t i n g s of C i c e r o - who remarks m the Tusculan 
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D i s p u t a t l o n q , f o r example, that 
The common agreement of a l l n a t i o n s i s to be 
regarded as the law of n a t u r e . ^ 
A l s o , although they do not make any mention of a ' l o s t 
code of n a t u r e ' or a 'Golden A.ge' m which such a code 
h e l d sway, a s t r o n g c u r r e n t of opinion amongst Roman 
j u r i s t s bears out the same view. Thus, the second-
c e n t u r y j u r i s t Gaius has t h i s to say 
Those laws which each people has given to i t s e l f 
a r e c a l l e d I U S c i v i l e , s i n c e they are p e c u l i a r to 
each c i t y . That which n a t u r a l reason d i c t a t e s 
to a l l men, however, i s c a l l e d I U S Pentium, s i n c e 
""' 4.6 
i t i s the law p r a c t i s e d by the whole of mankind. 
We n o t i c e t h a t , m t h i s passage, the term i u s n a t u r a l e 
does not occur at a l l . vVe note a l s o , however, t h a t , 
a c c o r d i n g to Gaius, the f a c u l t y by which the I U S 
gentium comes to be known i s n a t u r a l i s r a t i o - n a t u r a l 
reason. I t would seem, then, that there i s here an 
a t l e a s t i m p l i e d equation betveen I U S gentium and 
I U S n a t u r a l e . And the view that Gaius wishes to pro-
pose such an equation r e c e i v e s independent c o n f i r m a t i o n 
when we t u r n to h i s own I n s t i t u t i o n e s , m which the 
term i u s n a t u r a l e does occur. He d i s c u s s e s the r u l e s 
governing the a c q u i s i t i o n and a l i e n a t i o n of property 
as p a r t of the I U S n a t u r a l e , and he d e c l a r e s t h a t i t 
i s m accordance , r i t h n a t u r a l i s r a t i o to conclude t h a t 
an i n d i v i d u a l may a c q u i r e a t i t l e to a p i e c e of property 
by being the f i r s t to make use of i t - an argument which 
i s , of course, p r e c i s e l y the same as t h a t l a t e r to be 
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47 pressed i n t o s e r v i c e by Locke. A l s o , Gaius elsewhere 
a s s e r t s t hat the i u s gentium i s as o l d as the human 
race i t s e l f , and that i t has been taught to mankind 
as a whole by n a t u m l i s r a t i o . I n a n u t s h e l l , then, 
Gaius seems to be u s i n g the two terms I U S gentium 
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and I U S n a t u r ^ l e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . And we f i n d a v e r y 
s i m i l a r s tandpoint occupied by the t h i r d c e n t u r y 
j u r i s t P aulus. 'Law 1, says Paulus, 
may be spoken of m d i f f e r e n t s e n s e s . I n one 
sense, when that which i s always e q u i t a b l e and 
good i s c a l l e d law, i t i s I U S n a t u r a l e . I n 
another, what i s p r o f i t a b l e m each c i t y f o r 
everyone or many Is c a l l e d I U S c i v i l e ^ 
Here, i t i s the I U S gentium of which no mention i s 
made. The only d i s t i n c t i o n of which Paulus takes 
n o t i c e i s one between 'that which I s . . . p r o f i t a b l e f o r 
everyone or many' m a p a r t i c u l a r c i v i t ^ s and ' t h a t 
which i s always e q u i t a b l e and good'. I n sh o r t , i t 
looks r a t h e r as though Paulus wishes to conclude, as 
C i c e r o had concluded before him, t h a t the f a c t of 
there being common or u n i v e r s a l elements m l e g a l 
systems counts m some sense as evidence f o r the 
u l t i m a t e l y n a t u r a l foundation of law. F i n a l l y , we 
might note the d e f i n i t i o n of I U S gentium given m 
the I n s t i t u t i o n s of J u s t i n i a n 
That n ^ t u r a l i s r a t i o has e s t a b l i s h e d amongst e l l 
men i s observed e q u a l l y by a l l peoples, and i s 
c a l l e d I U S gentium. 
Not a l l the j u r i s t s "/ho c o n t r i b u t e to the Corpus, 
however, take the view which we have j u s t d i s c u s s e d . 
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On the c o n t r a r y , s e v e r a l of them w i s h to draw a c l e a r 
d i s t i n c t i o n between I u s gentium and I u s n a t u r a l e . But 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y these j u r i s t s who l a y p a r t i c u l a r emph-
a s i s upon the h i s t o r i c a l l y - c r u c i a l - and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
S t o i c - n o t i o n of n a t u r a l human e q u a l i t y . Ulpianus, 
a contemporary of Paulus, has t h i s to say 
P r i v a t e law i s t r i p a r t i t e . I t may be gathered 
from the pre c e p t s of nat u r e , from those of n a t i o n s , 
or from those of the c i t y . N a t u r a l lav/ i s t h a t 
which nature has taught a l l animals. As such, 
i t i s not confined merely to the human r a c e . . . . 
Prom t h i s law comes the c o n j u n c t i o n of mple and 
female which we c a l l marriage, and the p r o c r e a t i o n 
and r e a r i n g of c h i l d r e n . The I U S gentium i s t h ^ t 
law which mankind observes, and i t i s e°sy to see 
tha t t h i s l2w d i f f e r s from the n a t u r a l inasmuch 
as the one belongs to a l l animals w h i l e the o t h e r 
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i s p e c u l i a r to man. J 
I t seems t h a t Ulpianus would w i s h to say that n a t u r a l 
law i s r e a l l y a k i n d of i n s t i n c t or d r i v e - i s t h a t 
'which nature has taught a l l animals.' Something 
r a t h e r s i m i l a r had, m f a c t , been s a i d long ago bv 
Democritus of Abdera; and t h i s understpnding of 
' n a t u r a l lav/' much more s t r o n g l y resembles the 
remarks of some of the S o p h i s t s (Antiphon, C a l l i c l e s , 
Thrasymachus) than those of the S t o i c s . So f a r as 
Roman law i s concerned, however, Ulpipnus' remark 
would seem to be, as Jolowicz puts i t , only 'an 
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i s o l a t e d opinion m l e g a l l i t e r a t u r e . ' .At any r a t e , 
i t o ccurs nowhere e l s e m the D i g e s t a and, though i t 
does r o c u r m the I n s t i t u t i o n e s , i t s appearance t h e r e 
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i s c l e a r l y only another r e f e r e n c e to Ulpianus - whose 
a c t u a l words are quoted - r a t h e r than to some indep-
endent source. 
I f I U S n s t U T r l p i s to be c o n c e i v e d as a k i n d of 
i n s t i n c t or p s y c h o l o g i c a l d r i v e common to a l l a n i m a l s , 
however, then i t must s u r e l y be a t t r i b u t e d to th^m 
without regard to the question of r a t i o n a l i t y or 
moral agency. And, i n t h i s case, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see how i t can bear any e t h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a t 
a l l . Yet, however i n c o n s i s t e n t l y , Ulpianus h i m s e l f 
does proceed to d e r i v e from i t a number of n o r m a t i v e 
c o n c l u s i o n s . F o r example, he remarks that the man 
who has the r i g h t to use the produce of a p i e c e of 
property may be s a i d to possess the property 'by n a t u r e ' 
Elsewhere, he d e c l a r e s t h at i t i s n a t u r a l l y e q u i t a b l e 
f o r one man to enjoy the g e n e r o s i t y of another o n l y 
f o r as long as the other t h i n k s f i t to bestow i t ; 
and t h a t i t i s n a t u r a l f o r a c o n t r a c t to be d i s s o l v e d 
by the same process as that by which i t was made. 
Most important of a l l , Ulpianus i n s i s t s t h a t , under 
the I U S n a t u r a l e , a l l men are equal. P r o v i s i o n s 
governing the manumission of s i e v e s , he s a y s , a r e 
to be regarded as f a l l i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e 
of I U S gentium. They cannot be s a i d to f a l l under 
the I U S n a t u r a l e f o r the simple reason t h a t , by 
n a t u r e , a l l men are e q u a l l y f r e e a l r e a d y . And sim-
i l a r remarks apply when we come to the ' c i v i c ' l a w 
those p a r t s of the I U S c i v i l e which have to do w i t h 
the holding of s l a v e s diverge from the I U S n n t u r a l e 
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s i n c e , so f a r as the l a t t e r i s concerned, omnps 
53 
homines aequales sunt. 
The t h i r d - c e n t u r y j u r i s t C l a u d i u s Tryphonmus lends 
a measure of support to the account given by U l n i a n u s . 
For h i s p a r t , he provides no d e f i n i t i o n of e i t h e r I U S 
gentium or i u s n a t u r a l e . But he says that dommatio, 
the m a s t e r s h i p of one man over another, i s a c r e a t i o n 
of the I U S gentium, whereas l i b e r t y belongs to the 
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law of n a t u r e . And h i s contemporary F l o r e n t m u s 
e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s that the i n s t i t u t i o n of s l a v e r y i s 
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c o n t r a naturam. ^ I n t h i s connection, i t i s a l s o i n t -
e r e s t i n g to note the i n v e n t o r y given by Hermogenianus 
( c o m p i l e r of the Codex of ca. A.D 334) of i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and p r a c t i c e s which f a l l s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h i n the ambit 
of the I U S gentium. He names the conduct of wars, 
the d i v i s i o n of mankind i n t o s e p a r a t e S t a t e s , p o l i t i c a l 
and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of s u b o r d i n a t i o n and super-
o r d m a t i o n , and r e g u l a t i o n s governing property owner-
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s h i p and commercial a c t i v i t y . A s i m i l a r s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
o f the I U S gentium - which may or may not owe something 
to t h a t of Hermogenianus - occurs m J u s t i n i a n ' s 
I n s t i t u t i o n e s . Here, i t i s e x p l a i n e d t h a t , m the 
sense a l r e a d y o u t l i n e d , the I U S gentium i s a u n i v e r s a l 
system of law observed by a l l mankind, r e p r e s e n t i n g 
the experience of the human r a c e , and c o n t a i n i n g pro-
v i s i o n f o r such t h i n g s as war, c a p t i v i t y and s e r v i t u d e 
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- quae sunt l u n n a t u r a l ! c o n t r a r i a e . The point of 
these remarks seems to be that the i u s gentium d e a l s 
p r e c i s e l y w i t h those i n s t i t u t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s ,/hich 
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a r i s e from r a t h e r than c o n s t i t u t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
human c o l l e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . And m the I n s t i t u t i o n e s 
(though not m the Hermogenianus passage) i t i s once 
agai n s t a t e d that i n s t i t u t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s of t h i s 
k i n d a r e 'contrary to the n a t u r a l law. f C l e a r l y , whnt 
i s here being presented i s the f a m i l i a r d i s t i n c t i o n 
between nature and convention. 
V. 
Given t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n - and 
t h a t they do r e c o g n i s e i t seems quite beyond d i s p u t e 
- i t has seemed strange to some commentators (Dr 
A.J. G a r l y l e i s an i n s t a n c e ) that the Roman j u r i s t s 
and so many of .their medieval s u c c e s s o r s should have 
been so ready to accept without complaint i n s t i t u t i o n s 
which they unambiguously d e c l a r e d to be c o n t r a naturam. 
S i m i l a r l y , to look backwards f o r a moment, i t might 
seem odd that C i c e r o , f o r whom 'no s i n g l e t h i n g so 
e x a c t l y resembles pnythmg e l s e as we o u r s e l v e s resemble 
one another', should f i n d i t a p p r o p r i a t e to defend 
s l a v e r y w i t h an argument s i m i l a r to that m Book I 
of A r i s t o t l e ' s P o l i t i c s (Dr C a r l y l e presumably f a i l s 
to n o t i c e t h i s when he f i n d s m C i c e r o an advocate of 
' L i b e r t y , E q u a l i t y , F r a t e r n i t y ' ' ) 
To f i n d these t h i n g s m y s t i f y i n g , however, i s to 
misread the s o u r c e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s to succumb 
to the temptation to read the c l a s s i c a l sources from 
a modern p e r s p e c t i v e of 'human' or ' n a t u r a l r i g h t s * . 
And modern h i s t o r i a n s - d'Entreves, Kantorowicz, 
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N i c h o l a s , Schulz - have taken g r e a t pains to point 
t h i s out as a mistake. These more r e c e n t h i s t o r i a n s 
tend to r e s e n t the undeniable tendency of t h e i r p r e-
d e c e s s o r s to adopt the q u e s t i o n a b l e methodological 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n memorably bap t i s e d as 'the Vhig view 
of h i s t o r y ' the view t h a t Human R a t i o n a l i t y Made 
Continuous Progress u n t i l , a t l a s t , Men of Right 
Reason came to see t h a t t here R e p l l y Are N a t u r a l R i g h t s 
P r o f e s s o r d'Entreves, f o r example, s p e c i f i c a l l y d i s -
s o c i a t e s h i m s e l f from those - he names S i r F r e d e r i c k 
P o l l o c k and S i r E r n e s t B a rker - who would s»e n a t u r a l 
law as having 'a p e r f e c t l y continuous h i s t o r y ' which 
'runs from the S t o i c t e a c h e r s of the Porch to the 
American Revolution of 1776 and t^e French Revolution 
58 
of 1789.' And i t i s c e r t a i n l y c l e a r t h a t n e i t h e r 
C i c e r o nor the Roman j u r i s t s nor the m a j o r i t y of med-
i e v a l c i v i l i a n s or c a n o n i s t s m^de anything of what has 
subsequently come to be seen as the r a d i c a l p o t e n t i a l 
o f n a t u r a l l^w. On the c o n t r a r y , f o r much of the 
middle ages, n a t u r a l law was used, m Paul Sigmund's 
words, 'to r e l a t e f e u d a l oower s t r u c t u r e s to a h i e r -
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a r c h i c a l order m the u n i v e r s e ' - that i s , to p r e s e r v e 
r a t h e r than to overthrow the s t a t u s QUO. I n s p i t e of 
h i s i n s i s t e n c e that n a t u r a l lav/ s i o u l d not, and a t 
the l a s t a n a l y s i s cannot, be abrogated by any human 
f i a t , C i c e r o does not e*en h i n t a t the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f an appeal to n a t u r a l law being made m j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of the overthrowing of a m o r a l l y - d e f e c t i v e p o s i t i v e law 
and n e i t h e r do the j u r i s t s whose work i s excerpted m 
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the D i g e s t " . 
The apparent r e t i c e n c e of the c l a s s i c a l sources over 
t h i s point i s not, m f a c t , d i f f i c u l t to understand. 
Indepd, the d i f f i c u l t y only a r i s e s at a l l out of the 
w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g of r e l a t i v e l y modern l i b e r a l w r i t e r s 
who w i s h to r e i n f o r c e the r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of ' n a t u r a l 
r i g h t s ' by a s c r i b i n g to the d o c t r i n e 'a p e r f e c t l y con-
tinuous h i s t o r y . ' C i c e r o , a f t e r a l l , WPS a man of 
pre-eminently c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c a l t e s t e s . His 
i d e a l of c i v i l a s s o c i a t i o n was the Rom°n r e p u b l i c a n 
c o n s t i t u t i o n es i t had been before the r e v o l u t i o n ^ r v 
t r i b u n a t e of the ielder Gracchus. He takes PS h i s 
exemplar of p u b l i c r e c t i t u d e the o l d - f a s h i o n e d p r o b i t y 
- the ' s t r e n g t h of c h n r a c t e r and u n f l i n c h i n g courage' 
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- of Marcus A u r e l i u s Cato. I t i s c e r t a i n l y no p a r t 
of h i s purpose to s t r i k e out i n t o the arena of r a d i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l change. As f o r the j u r i s t s of the D i g e s t a , 
i t must be borne i n mind t h a t t h e i r w r i t i n g s are the 
remarks of men who were p r o f e s s i o n a l lawyers - who 
were engaged, i f one may so put i t , simply m p u t t i n g 
one foot i n f r o n t of the other i n the d a i l y r o u t i n e 
of l e g a l p r a c t i c e . They " r e not l e g a l or s o c i a l p h i l -
osophers, p r i m a r i l y or a t a l l ; and they are c e r t a i n l y 
not ideologues - or, at l e a s t , not c o n s c i o u s l y so. 
They use the concept of I U S n a t u r a l e as a means of 
a p p l y i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g e x i s t i n g law i n normal 
(= ' n a t u r a l ' ) circumstances - they use i t m much the 
same way as i t has from time to time been used by 
the United S t a t e s Supreme Court, f o r example. Most 
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b r i e f l y s t a t e d , the o b j e c t i v e of the Roman j u r i s t s 
i s ' to f i n d - w i t h i n the s p e c i f i " d framework - the 
r u l e s a r i s i n g out of the nature of the t h i n g i t s e l f , 
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out of c o n d i t i o n s ps they a r e . ' T h i s i s an understand-
ing of 'nature' which i s c l e a r l y r e m i n i s c e n t of A r i s -
t o t l e ; and, as Vmogradoff p o i n t s out, the appearances 
of I U S n a t u r a l e i n p r a c t i c e remind us ve r y s t r o n g l y 
of the Greek conception of e q u i t y which i s e x e m p l i f i e d 
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m the w r i t i n g s of A r i s t o t l e . The concept of I U S 
n a t u r a l e was used m l e g a l p r a c t i c e to provide a 
t h e o r e t i c a l or h e u r i s t i c u n d e r g i r d m g to such p r i n c i p l e s 
as e q u a l i t y before the law, f a i r d e a l i n g m matters of 
c o n t r a c t , the o b l i g a t i o n to p r o t e c t dependants, and 
the primacy of cla.ims a r i s i n g out of f a m i l y r e l a t i o n -
s h i p s . I n other words, i t was a p p l i e d as a r e g u l a -
t i v e standard m r e l a t i o n to such things as the conduct 
of t r i a l s , the law of c o n t r a c t , f a m i l y law and the 
law of s u c c e s s i o n . Also, i t c o n t r i b u t e d to some 
extent, although not as a r a d i c a l ideology, to the 
pr o c e s s e s of s o c i a l and l e g a l reform. I t was appealed 
to as a means of reducing the ab s o l u t e c o n t r o l of the 
P a t e r f a m i l i a s over the belongings and persons of h i s 
c h i l d r e n ; of i n c r e a s i n g the independent c o n t r o l of 
married women over t h e i r property, of p r o t e c t i n g 
s l a v e s a g a i n s t c r u e l and a r b i t r a r y treatment; and of 
i n c r e a s i n g the o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to them of 
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s e c u r i n g manumission. I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t , 
a f t e r the great r e v i v a l of s y s t e m a t i c l e g p l s t u d i e s 
m the tvvelfth century, i t was from time to time deemed 
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p o s s i b l e to d e t e c t and e x p l o i t r a d i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
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m the J u s t i m a n i c law. I n Roman j u r i s p r u d e n c e as such, 
hovpver, we f i n d i u s n p t u r a l e used by l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
as an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e device and as a means of e f f e c t i n g 
gradual chrnge, but not as an o v e r t and a b r a s i v e c r i t -
ique of the e x i s t i n g order. 
To r e t u r n b r i e f l y to the question of S t o i c ' i n f l u e n c e ' 
whatever may be the d i r e c t i n t e l l e c t u a l r e l a t i o n between 
S t o i c i s m and the development of Roman l e g a l thought, 
i t i s c l e a r that the dominant themes of S t o i c i s m are 
indeed to be read m the d e f i n i t i v e Corpus I u r i s 
C i v i l i s . J u s t i n i a n ' s c o d i f i c a t i o n brings t o g e t h e r a 
body of l e g a l p r i n c i p l e which bases i t s c l a i m to u n i -
v e r s a l v a l i d i t y upon the deeper c l a i m to c o i n c i d e w i t h 
or to embody n a t u r a l j u s t i c e I t stands, not upon f o r c e , 
and u l t i m a t e l y not even upon the a u t h o r i t y of the Em-
peror h i m s e l f , but upon reason. I u s n a t u r ^ l p i s once 
again s a i d to be a v a i l a b l e to us through an i n n a t e 
moral f a c u l t y , n a t u r a l i s r a t i o . I t i s u n i v e r s a l i n 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n - the j u r i s t s of the D i g e s t a do not 
make any unanimous d i s t i n c t i o n between the l a 1 " of 
nature and the l a w of ' n a t i o n s ' which i s common to the 
whole human ra c e , "/hat i s more, when such a d i s t i n c t -
ion i s made (as by U l p i a n u s ) i t i s made m such a way 
as to s e t up I U S n a t u r a l e as a standard of p e r f e c t i o n 
to which o t h e r forms of lav/ may be compared. S l a v e r y 
and v a r i o u s other forms of i n e q u a l i t y , which a r e pro-
vided f o r underthe terms of the I U S gentium and the 
i u s c i v i l e , are not p a r t s of the I U S n a t u r a l e . They 
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are even s a i d to be c o n t r a naturam. At the l a s t 
a n a l y s i s , j u s t i c e i s not p o s i t i v e . I t i s r a t i o n a l , 
and, s i n c e r a t i o n a l , n a t u r a l , and, s i n c e n a t u r a l , 
u n i v e r s a l - imposing c e r t a i n morel minima upon a l l 
men everywhere. I t i s 
a constant and p e r p e t u a l w i l l i n g n e s s to g i v e 
every man h i s due. The law teaches us to l i v e 
honourably, to i n j u r e no-on^, and to g i v e every 
man what i s due to him. L^w i s a knowledge of 
t h i n g s human and d i v i n e , the s c i e n c e of the j u s t 
and u n j u s t . ^ 
I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t i c e t h a t the presence 
i n the world of n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i s 
e x p r e s s l y a t t r i b u t e d m the I n s t i t u t i o n e s to the 
a c t i v i t y of something s u p e r i o r to the w i l l of any 
e a r t h l y l a w g i v e r 
Now the laws of n a t u r e , which are observed by a l l 
peoples e q u a l l y , remain always f i r m and immutable, 
c o n s t i t u t e d as they are by a d i v i n e providence.^6 
The a t t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l laws to a d i v i n e p r o v i d -
ence - a 'providence' v h i c h reminds us of the pronoia 
of the S t o i c s - c l e a r l y i m p l i e s t h a t they r e p r e s e n t 
premanent p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e and humanity which 
should be taken as the standard f o r a l l o t h e r forms 
of law. 
The numerous p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s of the middle 
ages who emphasise the r u l e of law and the u l t i m a t e 
s o v e r e i g n t y of impersonal j u s t i c e p r e drawing upon 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s understanding of the nature of law and 
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j u s t i c e . I t i s t r u e t h a t th^y p l a c e g r e a t s t r e s s 
upon the r o l e s of custom and s c r i p t u r e m determining 
the content of j u s t i c e . I t i s a l s o t r ue t h a t e a r l y 
medieval t h e o r i s t s m p a r t i c u l a r have a s t r o n g pre-
d i l e c t i o n f o r what i s , m e f f e c t , a deeply c o n s e r v a t i v e 
theory of k i n g s h i p - which, m t u r n , a n t i c i p a t e s the 
Lutheran end Tudor d o c t r i n e of n o n - r e s i s t a n c e , and 
which runs somewh°t as f o l l o w s . The k i n g i s bound to 
obey the laws of nature; but he i s bound, not by 
any agreement to do so s u b s i s t i n g between h i m s e l f and 
h i s s u b j e c t s , but by reason of h i s having been e n t r u s -
ted w i t h h i s kingdom as a t r u s t e e s h i p from God. I n 
the event of h i s t u r n i n g out to be an u n j u s t steward, 
t h e r e f o r e , the people have no r i g h t to enforce a 'con-
t r a c t ' a g a i n s t him - f o r the simple reason t h a t there 
i s and can be no such c o n t r a c t . T h e i r best r e c o u r s e 
i s to pray to God f o r d e l i v e r a n c e - or, of course, to 
approach the Pope, who i s t v e e a r t h l y guardian and 
i n t e r p r e t e r of God's wishes and who has, amongst h i s 
o t h e r powers, that of deposing a king and of a b s o l v i n g 
h i s s u b j e c t from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s to him. These 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , however, do not d e t r a c t from our cen— 
t r a l theme Law i s not p r i m a r i l y something which i s 
c r e a t e d by l e g i s l a t i o n or as an a c t of the s o v e r e i g n ' s 
w i l l . Rather, the proper - the m o r a l l y proper -
f u n c t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n i t s e l f i s to enact t h a t which 
has been immemorially r e c o g n i s e d as being b i n d i n g upon 
man a p r i o r i . God, s a y s an anonymous Fr e n c h e p i c 
poet of the t w e l f t h centurv, has not c r e s t e d the king 
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so t h a t he may g r a t i f y h i s o.vn desires and rob the 
poor, but so t h a t he s n a i l t r e a d a l l wrongs under f o o t , 
l x s t e n to the complaints o f the poor man, and redress 
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h i s grievances. P o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , m ot h e r words, 
f i n d s i t s o n l y r a t i o n a l e m the discharge o f a moral 
f u n c t i o n the purpose of k i n g s h i p i s t o 'give every 
man what i s due t o him, p r o t e c t thp pious, d e s t r o y 
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the lmDious, and a d m i n i s t e r j u s t i c e to a l l . ' And 
A.J. C a r l y l e , w r i t i n g o f the e l e v e n t h and t w e l f t h 
c e n t u r i e s , remarks t h a t there i s ample evidence m 
the works of the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s o f the p e r i o d 
t o show t h a t they conceived of the m o r a l i t y o f r u l e r -
s h i p 'under the terms o f the c o n t r a s t between the n a t -
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u r a l and c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n . ' To auote p t g r e a t -
er l e n g t h from Otto Gierke's P o l i t i c * 3 ! Theories o f 
the Middle Age, ' a l l were agreed t h a t there was n a t u r a l 
law, which, on the one hand, r a d i a t e d from a p r i n c i p l e 
transcending e a r t h l y power, and, on. the o t h e r hand, 
was t r u e and p e r f e c t l y b i n d i n g law. Men supposed, 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t before the State e x i s t e d the n a t u r a l 
law already p r e v a i l e d as an o b l i g a t o r y s t a t u t e , and 
t h a t immediately o r mediately from t h i s flowed those 
r u l e s o f r i g h t t o which the State owed even the poss-
i b i l i t y o f i t s own r i g h t f u l o r i g i n . And men also taught 
t h a t the h i g h e s t oower on e a r t h was subject t o the 
r u l e s o f n a t u r a l law. They stood above the Pope and 
above the Emperor, above the Ruler and above the Sov-
ere i g n Peoole, nay, above the whole Community of 
M o r t a l s . ' 7 0 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OP NATURAL 
LAW. 
I . 
Natural Law m the New Testament and the Fathers. 
The Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s , though commissioned and 
published by a C h r i s t i a n Emperor and promulgated i n 
nomine Domini n o s t n Iesu C h r i s t i , displays no fun-
damental sign of having been 'in s p i r e d 1 by a d i s t -
i n c t i v e l y C h r i s t i a n view of human r e l a t i o n s . I n 
sp i t e of the close a s s o c i a t i o n between Church and 
Emperor which was so marked a feature of the Byzantine 
Empire, 1 the Empire...embraced within i t s borders a 
very heterogeneous population....Even the most force-
f u l l y C h r i s t i a n Emperors did not venture wholly to 
1 
uproot the old law' - i . e . the long-standing secular 
t r a d i t i o n of Roman jurisprudence i t s e l f , or the pre-
v a i l i n g networks of l o c a l custom and law. Neither, 
we might add, were Emperors i n v a r i a b l y disposed to 
show p a r t i a l i t y , f a r l e s s s e r v i l i t y , towards the 
C h r i s t i a n Church - as the furious quarrels between 
the Emperor Theodosius and St Ambrose of Milan so 
v i v i d l y i l l u s t r a t e . Timothy Barnes and others have 
c a l l e d attention to the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Tert-
u l l i a n whose writings are c i t e d and excerpted i n the 
I n s t i t u t i o n e s and Digesta i s none other than the f o r -
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midable C h r i s t i a n apologist T e r t u l l i a n . But, even i f 
t h i s be so (and the p o s s i b i l i t y seems to be reasonably 
strong), the somewhat sparse J u s t i n i a n i c samples of 
T e r t u l l i a n ' s De Castrensi Peculio and Quaestiones 
'give l i t t l e idea of the scope or competence of e i t h e r 
3 
composition', and c e r t a i n l y have nothing about them 
which i s p e c u l i a r l y C h r i s t i a n . Broadly speaking, there 
i s no doubt that the Roman j u r i s t s ' doctrine of na t u r a l 
law i s not primarily derived from or 'influenced by* 
C h r i s t i a n conceptions as such. Equally, i t i s c l e a r 
that the C h r i s t i a n doctrine as i t appears i n the 
writings of the Fathers owes r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e to 
Roman Law. Rather, both the Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s and 
the emergent moral theology of C h r i s t i a n i t y seem to 
have independent roots m the common background of 
c l a s s i c a l e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . This i s a ge n e r a l i s -
ation which must, of course, be made with caution; 
but i t i s a generalisation which finds adequate support 
i n the av a i l a b l e evidence. 
In considering the ear l y h i s t o r y of the C h r i s t i a n 
Church, one can hardly f a i l to be struck by the marked 
antipathy - indeed, the considerable antagonism -
displayed by a s i g n i f i c a n t number of C h r i s t i a n i n -
t e l l e c t u a l s towards many of the most cherished i d e a l s 
of the c l a s s i c a l mind. This i s to be seen with par-
t i c u l a r c l a r i t y i n the polemical writings of Ter-
t u l l i a n himself. Thus, f or example, 
What has Jerusalem to do with Athens 7 Or the 
Church with the Academy9 Or the C h r i s t i a n with 
the unbeliever' Our p r i n c i p l e s come from the 
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Porch of Solomon ( i . e . not from the atoa of the 
S t o i c s ) , who taught that the Lord i s to be sought 
i n s i m p l i c i t y of heart. So I have no use for a 
Stoic or Platonic or d i a l e c t i c a l C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
Since the coming of C h r i s t , we have no need of 
speculation; since receiving the Gospel, we 
have no need of scholarship. 4 
Indeed, i f any document could be guaranteed, by reason 
of i t s vehement and c a l c u l a t e d l y i n s u l t i n g repudiation 
of Graeco-Roman culture, to provoke violent suppress-
ion of the Church on the part of the a u t h o r i t i e s , that 
document i s surely the Apologeticus of T e r t u l l i a n . 
T e r t u l l i a n , l i k e a number of his contemporaries, 
a c t u a l l y went out of h i s way to court martyrdom, 
and •Pew', remarks R.W. Evans, 'had so learned an 
acquaintance with heathenism, and could expose i t s 
f o l l i e s with a more b i t t e r sarcasm...or whip i t s 
5 
wickedness with a heavier l a s h . ' I n a n u t s h e l l , 
i t may be s a i d that the l i t e r a t u r e of early C h r i s t -
i a n i t y abounds with splendid gestures of condemnation 
and renunciation. At the same time, however, i t i s 
possible to make a good deal more of these gestures 
than i s warranted by t h e i r currency and duration. 
The tendency towards suspicion and exclusivism, at 
l e a s t i n i t s most extreme and heresy-hunting form, i s 
(a) a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Church during the fraught 
period before the conversion of Constantme; and 
(b) the pe c u l i a r province of r a d i c a l and a n t i -
i n t e l l e c t u a l minorities, such as the Montanists of 
Phrygia and the Donatists of North A f r i c a . The 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c world-renouncing i n c l i n a t i o n s of c h i l -
i a s t i c r e l i g i o u s movements has been amply i l l u s -
trated by Professor Gohn. We may i n any case spec-
ulate that, for those by whom God 'was conceived as a 
Being capable of... implacable jealousy, rage and 
7 
desire for vengeance 1, any amount of renunciation 
and introspection was worthwhile f o r the sake of 
maintaining a comfortable margin of safety. We 
should not, however, take minority sects as t y p i c a l 
of the whole Church; and there i s a considerable 
p o s i t i v e side to the account. D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, 
fo r example, sets out 'to say something...to counteract 
the idea that C h r i s t i a n i t y n e c e s s a r i l y ignores t h i s 
world i n favour of the next; that i t n e c e s s a r i l y 
involves denigration of the world and the f l e s h , 
and i n e v i t a b l y completes the satanic t r i a d by a s s -
8 
oci a t i n g them with the d e v i l . ' I n pursuing t h i s aim, 
he documents a response to the Greek understanding of 
humanity and nature on the part of the Eastern Fathers 
( B a s i l , Ongen, Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus of 
Antioch, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzus, et a l . ) 
which, while c e r t a i n l y not one of u n c r i t i c a l and un-
q u a l i f i e d admiration, i s nevertheless p o s i t i v e , con-
s t r u c t i v e and sympathetic. Indeed, i t would be d i f f -
i c u l t to f i n d a more ent h u s i a s t i c exponent of a part-
i c u l a r department of pagan thought - neo-Platonism -
than Gregory of Nysaa, whose 'whole doctrine of unity 
i s a wonderful and s u c c e s s f u l example of the use of 
P l o t i n i a n philosophy i n the s e r v i c e of C h r i s t i a n theol-
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9 ogy.' Also, R. Stob has provided a b r i e f and cogent 
account of the ways i n which the Fathers (notably 
Athenagoras, Mmucius F e l i x , Clement of Alexandria, 
Irenaeus, Origen, B a s i l , St Ambrose and St Augustine) 
accord a conscious place i n t h e i r writings to the an-
thropological, e t h i c a l and cosmological themes of 
the Stoic philosophers. 1 ^  We cannot, of course, dig-
re s s very f a r into these matters. But to put i t as 
b r i e f l y as possible, there i s no reason to doubt that 
those who exerted important formative influences 
upon the C h r i s t i a n world-view were, for the moat 
part, at ease i n the world of pagan philosophy, and 
were, moreover, ready to make p o s i t i v e use of i t s 
achievements i n s o f a r as those achievements were not 
a c t u a l l y i n i m i c a l to C h r i s t i a n commitments. 
I n any case, i t i s hardly necessary to point out 
that Stoicism and C h r i s t i a n i t y occupy a large area 
of common ground. The conception of the universe as 
a moral order, pervaded throughout by a divine r a t i o n -
a l i t y and purpose 'as honey runs through a honeycomb1; 
the affirmation of the u n i v e r s a l brotherhood of a l l 
mankind as children of God; the e t h i c a l non-relevance 
of conventional socio-economic rankings; the emphasis 
upon r e c i p r o c a l j u s t i c e , generosity and goodwill; 
and the supposed ' o r i g i n a l ' or 'natural' freedom and 
equality of a l l mankind - a l l these motifs are as 
much c e n t r a l to C h r i s t i a n i t y as they are to Stoicism. 
And there i s , i n f a c t , enough evidence m the New 
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Testament i t s e l f to e n t i t l e us to speak of a d i r e c t 
Stoic 'influence' upon the development of C h r i s t i a n 
thought. Two passages come to mind at once. 
F i r s t , of course, there i s the opening paragraph 
of the Gospel According to St John. 
In the beginning was the logos, and the logos 
was with God, and God and the logos were one. 
The logos was with God from the beginning. 
A l l things came into being through him, and 
no s i n g l e thing was made without him. I n him 
was l i f e , and that l i f e was the l i g h t of man. ' 
This Protean term logos was to become one of the key 
words i n the 'tec h n i c a l ' vocabulary of Chnstology; 
and i t had already undergone a complex process of 
modification and colouring as part of the cross-
f e r t i l i z a t i o n between Jewish and H e l l e n i s t i c c u l t -
ure which occurred during the s o - c a l l e d mtertestamental 
period. Made f a m i l i a r already to the Jewish i n t e l l -
i g e n t s i a by the writings of Philo Judaeus, the word 
i s held to require no further glossing by the author 
of the Fourth Gospel: i t makes i t s appearance at the 
beginning without a word or comment by way of i n t r o -
duction. And the impression i s at once created that, 
i n the words of Archbishop Bernard, 'the Prologue i s 
the recommendation of the Gospel to those who have 
approached i t through metaphysics rather than through 
12 
h i s t o r y . ' However many d i s t i n c t i v e or elaborated 
meanings i t may already have acquired v i a i n t e r -
testamental Judaism of questionable orthodoxy or from 
the C h r i s t i a n kerygma as such, i t s t i l l s i g n i f i e s at 
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l e a s t 'a mode of divine manifestation, or a divine 
1 ^  
law.' -The logos of the Johannine Prologue i s the 
cosmic-divine potency introduced into cosmological 
speculation by Heraclitus and elaborated by the 
S t o i c s . I t i s immanent i n the world, holding sway 
throughout i t and providing the tonos through which 
i t i s drawn together and held m unity. I t reduces 
chaos to order -
the l i g h t shines always i n the darkness, and 
the darkness has never overcome i t . ^ 
I t has to be conceded that, when we come to the sarx 
egeneto clause of the Fourth Gospel's exposition, the 
p a r a l l e l with the Stoic logos-cosmology ceases to be 
so c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e . At t h i s point, the term 
ceases to be the name of a concept, or even of an 
immanent divine power, and becomes instead one of the 
proper names of God the Son. But i t i s nonetheless 
c l e a r enough that the author (or redactor) of the 
Fourth Gospel has selected a point of departure which 
poises the Gospel towards an audience already at home 
with the Stoic family of ideas. 
The second of the passages i n question occurs as 
part of the account given i n the Acts of the Apostles 
of St Paul's address on the H i l l of the Areopagus to 
the people of Athens: 
Men of Athens. I see that you are by way of 
being a r e l i g i o u s people. As I was passing 
along, I took note of your objects of r e l i g i o n . 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , I came across an a l t a r upon which 
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was ins c r i b e d the words, 'To an Unknown God.1 
And I now disclose to you who i t i s that you 
worship unknowingly. 
The God who created the world and everything 
i n i t , and who i s lord of Heaven and earth, does 
not l i v e i n shrines made by human hands. I t i s 
not because he i s i n need of anything that he 
accepts the se r v i c e s of men. For i t i s he him-
s e l f who i s the giver of l i f e , of breath, and 
of everything e l s e . He created the whole of 
mankind from a single o r i g i n , to occupy the e n t i r e 
face of the earth. He determined the phases of 
t h e i r h i s t o r y and the l i m i t s of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . 
They were to search for God and, perhaps, to 
find him and touch him. Indeed, he i s very 
close to us a l l ; f o r m him we l i v e and move 
and have our being. As some of your own poets 
1 5 
have said, 'We also are his c h i l d r e n . 1 
Martin Dibelius has remarked that the address of which 
t h i s passage forms a part 'became a symbol of C h r i s t -
ian theology i n the environment of Greek c u l t u r e . ' ^ 
I n connection with i t s markedly Stoic flavour, we 
note that i t was indeed s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed to 
an audience containing 'some of the Epicurean and 
17 
S t o i c philosophers' who had given St Paul such a mixed 
reception on h i s a r r i v a l i n Athens. More important 
(or at l e a s t more d e f i n i t e ) i s the f a c t that the 
'poets' mentioned i n connection with the words 'we 
also are h i s children' turn out to be none other than 
the Stoics Aratus of Chios (a younger contemporary and 
pupil of Zeno of Citium) and the venerable Cleanthes 
of Assos. The phrase m question occurs verbatim m 
Aratus' long poem Phaenomena, and something very close 
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to i t appears i n Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus. Having 
noted t h i s a t t r i b u t i o n , and reverting f o r a moment 
to the 'markedly Stoic flavour' of St Paul's words, 
i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare the passage from the 
Acts j u s t quoted with the following extract from 
Aratus' poem. 
Let us begin with God, whose name i s always on 
the l i p s of men. A l l the s t r e e t s , a l l the 
meeting-places of men, the sea and i t s harbours, 
are f u l l of God. We a l l have need of God at a l l 
times, for we also are his children....He i t was 
who placed signs i n the heavens and marked out 
the s t a r s , and appointed the s t a r s to be the 
ch i e f guides for men of the seasons of the year, 
so that a l l things might grow without f a i l . 1 8 
I n passing, there i s the further p o s s i b i l i t y (mentioned 
by Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Syriac commentator 
Ishodad of Merv) that the words 'i n him we l i v e and 
move and have our being' are likewise an a l l u s i o n to 
a Stoic o r i g i n a l . Unfortunately, however, i t i s not 
possible to v e r i f y t h i s suggestion. 1 ^  
F.F. Bruce remarks, with reference to the address 
on the Areopagus, that St Paul 'consistently endea-
vours to have as much common ground as possible with 
20 
h i s audience.' (We are reminded of the preservation 
i n the F i r s t E p i s t l e to the Corinthians, of St Paul's 
recommendation of the cont r o v e r s i a l p r i n c i p l e of 
catechesis subsequently patronised by Newman and 
excoriated by Kmgsley: that of giving 'children' 
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'milk' before weaning them onto ' s o l i d food'.) This 
i s true enough, but, at l e a s t from our point of view, 
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a l i t t l e beaide the point. What, on the face of 
i t , i s impressive here i s that St Paul should be so 
deeply imbued with S t o i c thought and with i t s l i t e r a r y 
expression as to be able to f u r n i s h such common ground 
on demand, m a speech which betrays no sign of having 
been researched i n advance. To say t h i s , of course, 
i s to l a y oneself open to an obvious source of c r i t -
icism: i t i s to prescind altogether from the numerous 
questions r a i s e d by the i n t r i c a c i e s of New Testament 
textual c r i t i c i s m . But, even i f i t be suspected -
or shown - that we do not here have the i p s i s s i m a 
verba of St Paul, the f a c t s t i l l remains that t h i s 
passage stands as a c l e a r i n d i c a t o r of the closeness 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p - we might almost say 'interchange-
a b i l i t y ' - between Stoic and C h r i s t i a n ideas. 
Against t h i s briefly-sketched background, and through 
the medium of Dominical as w e l l as Pauline utterances, 
f a m i l i a r Stoic themes are thrown into r e l i e f i n the 
New Testament. In p a r t i c u l a r , both Christ and St 
Paul make repeated use of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c S t o i c 
notions of natural equality and cosmopolitanism; and 
they correspondingly emphasise the e t h i c a l non-relevance 
of d i s t i n c t i o n s between Jew and g e n t i l e , j u s t as the 
S t o i c s had emphasised a s i m i l a r irrelevance i n r e l -
ation to the d i s t i n c t i o n between Greek and barbarian: 
And I t e l l you that many s h a l l come from east 
and west, and s h a l l take t h e i r seats i n the 
Kingdom of Heaven with Abraham and Isaac and 
Jacob. 
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There i s n e i t h e r Jew nor Greek nor slave nor 
free man; for you are a l l one i n Jesus C h r i s t . 
Whether we are Jews or g e n t i l e s , slaves or free 
men, we are a l l baptised into a single body. 2 ^ 
Most conspicuous of a l l , however, i s the following 
famous passage from St Paul's E p i s t l e to the Romans. 
With God there i s no p a r t i a l i t y . As many as have 
sinned outside the sphere of the law s h a l l also 
p e r i s h outside the sphere of the law; and as many 
as have sinned within the sphere of the law s h a l l 
be judged within the sphere of the law. For i t 
i s not those who hear the law who are vindicated 
before God, but those who act on i t . And when 
the g e n t i l e s , who do not have the law, never-
theless do by nature the things which the law 
enjoins, then, not having the law, they are a 
law i n t h e i r own r i g h t . They 3how that the 
requirements of the law are written into t h e i r 
hearts, and that t h e i r conscience and thoughts 
t e s t i f y to them, accusing or exonerating them as 
the case may be. ^ 
By way of what K a r l Barth has somewhat mysteriously 
c a l l e d t h i s 'obscure and provocative piece of i n f o r -
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mation', St Paul incorporates into his theology of 
s a l v a t i o n the p r i n c i p l e that i t i s possible 'by 
nature and m the n a t u r a l order (to) do the law.' 
I t may be, as he goes on to elaborate i n the next 
chapter, that a l l men without exception are m fact 
'subject to s i n ' ; but h i s point i s that, p o t e n t i a l l y , 
the capacity for r i g h t conduct i s not the exclusive 
preserve of men as Jews - i . e . as r e c i p i e n t s of the 
Torah or Mosaic Law - but the common property of men 
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as men. Thus, against the exclusivism of the Jewish-
C h r i s t i a n community at Rome, i t i s s a i d of the Gen-
t i l e s that 'in t h e i r God-created n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n 
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they are a law m themselves.' I t may be that St 
Paul came by t h i s notion v i a the H e l l e n i s t i c culture 
of h i s native c i t y of Tarsus ( i n C i l i c i a ) , or through 
contact with educated 'Hellenismg' Jews of his mature 
acquaintance as an expositor of the law i n Jerusalem. 
One more s p e c i f i c p o s s i b i l i t y , mentioned by C.K. 
Barr e t t , i s that he here has m mind Philo, who 
speaks of the P a t r i a r c h s (who, since they l i v e d before 
Moses, had no access to a written law) as being i n 
themselves 'laws endowed with l i f e and reason.' I t 
i s , however, impossible to s e t t l e t h i s question; and 
that i t i s does not, of course, matter i n the l e a s t 
f o r our purposes. Neither need we concern ourselves 
with the purely tec h n i c a l questions of authorship or 
28 
Redaktionsgeschichte. Again, whether the passage i n 
question a c t u a l l y comes from the pen of St Paul or not, 
and whatever i t s immediate antecedents may be, i t 
remains of s i g n a l i n t e r e s t that there should be, i n 
the New Testament i t s e l f , such a c l e a r affirmation of 
nat u r a l law. 
This i s an affirmation which we subsequently f i n d 
elaborated i n the writings of the Fathers (assuming a 
Pauline o r i g i n ) as an authentic understanding of poss-
i b l e moral experience. Thus, for example, 
A l l men are born a l i k e with a capacity for f e e l i n g 
and an a b i l i t y to reason which does not depend 
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upon age or sex of status. Neither do they a t t a i n 
wisdom by fortune. Rather, they have i t implanted 
by nature....And so i t i s that wealthy men, who 
are i n love with t h e i r r i c h e s , have been accustomed 
to concentrate upon gold rather than upon heaven, 
while poor people l i k e ourselves have both d i s -
covered wisdom and communicated i t to others by 
teaching. 2^ 
There are three kinds of law. The f i r s t i s that 
of the Hebrews, which the Apostle ( i . e . St Paul) 
c a l l s 'the law of s i n and death'. Then there i s 
that of the g e n t i l e s , which he c a l l s the law of 
nature. Third, there i s the truth of which 
the Apostle speaks when he says, 'The law of the 
s p i r i t of l i f e i n Jesus C h r i s t has made me free 
from the law of s i n and death'. J 
As f a r as the general P a t r i s t i c attitude to natural 
law i s concerned, we are j u s t i f i e d i n taking the r e -
marks of St Augustine - regarded as d e c i s i v e l y auth-
o r i t a t i v e down to the thirteenth century - as a 
d e f i n i t i v e statement. F i r s t of a l l , i t i s as w e l l 
to note that, having acquired an intimate acquaintance 
during h i s omnivorous youth with i t s l i t e r a t u r e , 
Augustine always remained sympathetically-enough 
disposed towards Platonisra to be quite at home with 
the idea of d i s c e r n i b l e , e s s e n t i a l values which are 
part of the n a t u r a l order. Second, neither Augustine 
nor any of the Fathers was m a position to hold that 
the n a t u r a l order i s irremediably corrupt, or, indeed, 
that nature as a whole, whatever may be the present 
condition of man himself, i s at the l a s t a n a l y s i s 
anything but good. P l a i n l y , t h i s i s a simple matter 
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of d e f i n i t i o n : the universe i s the handiwork of a 
Creator who 'saw everything that he had made, and, 
behold, i t was very good.1 ^ 1Ihus, for Augustine, as 
for the St o i c s , we l i v e i n the best of a l l possible 
worlds. The ordo n a t u r a l i s must i n e v i t a b l y be seen 
as a repository of value, since i t i s the creation of 
a God whose every creation i s n e c e s s a r i l y perfect. 
In short, the sentence, 'The natural order i s good' 
i s a synthetic a p r i o r i statement - that i s , a statement 
which i s both l o g i c a l l y and f a c t u a l l y true. 
To Augustine's mind, then, there are indeed change-
l e s s moral truths which are i n t r i n s i c to the very 
nature of things. And such truths are, i n p r i n c i p l e , 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . God has designed nature as a whole to 
be a model for our emulation. He has located everything 
i n i t s appropriate place and has established such 
r e l a t i o n s between things as are f i t t i n g to t h e i r nat-
ures. I t i s also worthy of note that Augustine, l i k e 
Plato, constantly r e f e r s to these truths by way of an 
analogy with l i g h t . The ru l e s of conduct which moral 
r e f l e c t i o n d iscloses are, he t e l l s us, lumma v i r t u turn. 
They are l i g h t s which shed moral il l u m i n a t i o n upon the 
mind, i n the same way that t h e o r e t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n 
sheds s c i e n t i f i c i l l u m i n a t i o n . C o l l e c t i v e l y , these 
moral l i g h t s comprise the natur a l law; and our imm-
ediate awareness of th i s law i s c a l l e d conscientia. 
Moreover, and as we might expect, t h i s doctrine i s 
a ssociated with the b e l i e f that s o c i a l l i f e i s n a t u r a l 
to man. Even before the f a l l of Adam, God's intention 
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was that man should be a s o c i a l creature. As soon as 
he had made Adam, he saw that ' i t i s not good for man 
to be alone', and made Eve to be a wife and companion 
to him. And t h i s husband-and-wife r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
presently extended to take i n t h e i r children as wel l , 
i s the fundamental 'natural bond of human society'. 
As s o c i a l beings, men are by nature i n c l i n e d to love 
t h e i r fellow men. This love embraces (or, more 
s t r i c t l y , would i d e a l l y embrace) the whole of human-
i t y - strangers and even enemies, as w e l l as r e l a t i v e s 
and friends. And t h i s , of course, i s very l i k e the 
S t o i c doctrine of o i k e i o s i s . 
There i s no-one m the entire human family towards 
whom kindly a f f e c t i o n i s not due by reason of the 
bond of shared humanity, even though i t may not 
be due on the ground of love which i s reciprocated. 32 
God's o r i g i n a l c reative intention, then, was that 
the whole of nature should be good, and that human 
a c t i v i t y within the natural order should be i n t r i n s i c -
a l l y right a c t i v i t y . But God's o r i g i n a l c r e a t i v e 
intention alone does not ensure that such a c t i v i t y 
w i l l a c t u a l l y take place; f or there i s a f l y i n the 
ointment. Moral a c t i v i t y w i l l only take place i f 
the agents whose a c t i v i t y i t i s have a healthy i n t e l l -
ect and a healthy w i l l ; since every a c t i v i t y i s a 
conjoint operation involving both i n t e l l e c t i o n and 
v o l i t i o n . (An unwilled 'good' action - that i s , a 
•good' action performed unconsciously or by accident 
- i s not, of course, morally good at a l l . Morally 
good actions are those which are intended to be such.) 
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Healthy, however - i . e . r i g h t l y disposed - i s p r e c i s e l y 
what the human i n t e l l e c t and w i l l , taken as they now 
stand, are not. For man i s the i n h e r i t o r of the d i s -
abling g u i l t brought upon humanity by Adam's f a l l . So 
f a r as human excellence i s concerned, Augustine leaves 
us m no doubt that the apparent v i r t u e s of courage, 
temperance, and so forth, displayed by the notables 
of antiquity were not r e a l l y v i r t u e s - i . e . charac-
t e r i s t i c s a r i s i n g out of the exercise of healthy 
reason and w i l l - at a l l . They merely r e f l e c t a 
b a s i c a l l y ignoble desire for glory and praise. And 
when t h e i r p r a c t i t i o n e r s win such praise 
they have achieved the l i m i t of t h e i r reward -
a vain reward for vain men.33 
When God created the w i l l of man, that w i l l , l i k e 
every creation of God, was of n e c e s s i t y the best of 
i t s kind that could possibly be: God would not (and 
perhaps cannot) create anything which f a l l s short of 
perfection. But the w i l l which God gave to the 
o r i g i n a l man was not only a good w i l l ; i t was a free 
w i l l also - a w i l l under the d i r e c t i o n of which 
genuine moral a c t i v i t y might occur. I n other words, 
Adam could, by h i s own u n r e s t r i c t e d choice, e l e c t 
e i t h e r to s i n or to r e f r a i n from sinning. Thus, 
h i s f a l l from the 'natural' state of perfection was 
possible, not through any flaw i n God's creation, but 
through the choices of the created man. The f a l l was 
possible, though i t was not necessary. When, contingently, 
Adam did f a l l , 
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he was driven into e x i l e , and, by h i s s i n , the 
whole race of which he was the root was corrupted 
i n him, and thereby made subject to the penalty 
of death. And so i t comes about that a l l who 
are descended from him and from the woman who 
had led him into sin...weie polluted by the 
o r i g i n a l s i n , and by i t led through numerous 
errors and sufferings into that l a s t and eter -
na l punishment, which they s u f f e r together with 
the f a l l e n angels, who are t h e i r corrupters and 
masters and the sharers i n t h e i r doom. And thus, 
through one man, s i n entered the world and, 
through s i n , death. And so death passed into 
a l l men, for a l l men have sinned. 
E s p e c i a l l y (although not by any means e x c l u s i v e l y ) 
i n h i s polemical writings against the h e r e t i c a l sot-
enology of Pelagius, Augustine repeatedly s t r e s s e s 
the point that f a l l e n man cannot save himself by any 
exertion of his own. When the f a l l occurred, human 
nature was not only disgraced by i t s act of defiance. 
I t was a c t u a l l y and r a d i c a l l y changed or flawed. Spe-
c i f i c a l l y , man became incapable of distinguishing 
between righteousness and unrighteousness, and con-
sequently incapable of either knowing what i s good 
or w i l l i n g himself to pursue i t . The penalty of death 
therefore attaches equally to a l l - 'for a l l men have 
sinned 1, both i n t h e i r own righ t and, as i t were, by 
inheritance from t h e i r f i r s t father. 
Even at the cost of a short digression, i t i s not 
improper to mention that t h i s doctrine of damnosa 
haereditas presents i t s defenders with a problem 
i n t r a c t a b l e enough to make i t d i f f i c u l t to see why 
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the doctrine should have proved aa perennially popular 
as i t has. On Augustine's own account, i t i s part 
of the d e f i n i t i o n of g u i l t that i t attaches to those 
acts which are performed by a free agent: Adam was 
•driven into e x i l e ' p r e c i s e l y because, having freedom 
to do otherwise, he chose to s i n . Yet Augustine also 
wishes to urge that, a f t e r and as a r e s u l t of Adam's 
s i n , human beings are unable f r e e l y to do anything at 
a l l . They are 'polluted by the o r i g i n a l s i n and led 
by i t through numerous errors and sufferings'; they 
cannot now help sinning. Adam's act was g u i l t y because 
i t was a conscious act of disobedience; yet the help-
l e s s s i n f u l n e s s of his successors i s understood as a 
punishment for an act which they did not commit and 
did not w i l l . And t h e i r condemnation i s i n no way 
mitigated by the f a c t that they cannot now act r i g h t -
l y . Augustine himself i s not unaware of t h i s d i f f -
i c u l t y ; but - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y - he takes a short 
way with i t , and appeals d i r e c t l y to the authority of 
sc r i p t u r e . According to sc r i p t u r e , the human con-
d i t i o n i s as he describes i t , and i f s c r i p t u r e pro-
vides no answer to such d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h i s must be 
because i t i s not necessary to our sa l v a t i o n for us 
to know. The view which he expounds of the f a l l e n 
nature of man i s offered, not as a matter of reason, 
but as a point of f a i t h . 
I n p r i n c i p l e , then, morally ri g h t conduct springs 
from the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e f l e c t i n g upon the ordo n a t u r a l i s 
and acting, under the spur of conscientia. according to 
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i t s i n d i c a t i o n s . Since the f a l l , however, t h i s has 
been impossible for man as such. What, then, w i l l 
restore the a b i l i t y to discover good ends and to follow 
right means? Only, Augustine contends, the i n t e r -
vention and illumination of God's grace. 
I t i s grace which separates the saved from the 
l o s t , because, through t h e i r common ori g i n , a l l 
have been involved m one common perdition. 
I t must be noted i n addition, however, that such grace 
cannot by any means be earned* A l l men are deserving 
of damnation. Those who receive the grace of f a i t h 
receive i t by an unmerited act of God m hi s mercy. 
Some are predestined to enjoy such mercy; others are 
not. And those who are not are simply damned without 
hope of reprieve or remission to an ete r n i t y of pain. 
No-one can say why th i s i n d i v i d u a l should be saved and 
that damned; but, i n e i t h e r case, human a c t i v i t y or 
personal merits do not enter the reckoning. Only 
a f t e r h i s i n t e l l e c t and w i l l have been restored to 
t h e i r 'natural' state by grace does the i n d i v i d u a l have 
a chance of acting upon i n t e l l i g i b l e p r i n c i p l e s of 
rig h t , of abstaining from s i n , and of repenting of 
such s i n s as he does happen to commit. In short, St 
Augustine i s c l e a r that there are such i n t e l l i g i b l e or 
natura l p r i n c i p l e s . But he i s equally c l e a r that we 
are cut off from them by the dis a b l i n g e f f e c t s of s i n 
unless and u n t i l God choose to release us. 
In order that the discussion be not e n t i r e l y con-
fined to St Augustine, l e t us also look b r i e f l y at the 
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remarks of his older contemporary and teacher, St 
Ambrose of Milan. On Ambrose's account, the 'moral 
law', which i s the w i l l of God, i s presented to us, 
not only i n s c r i p t u r e , but also i n nature, reason and 
conscience. I n the l i g h t of t h i s , Ambrose r e a d i l y 
repeats a f a m i l i a r Stoic maxim: 
Let us imitate nature. Conformity with nature 
furnishes us with a pattern of d i s c i p l i n e and 
a standard of right conduct. 
Whatever i s according to nature i s n e c e s s a r i l y virtuous 
- since the author of nature has made everything as 
good as i t could possibly be. By the same token, 
whatever i s contrary to nature i s n e c e s s a r i l y shameful. 
Ambrose holds that nature i t s e l f , through the media of 
reason and conscience, teaches men to behave with mod-
esty; to seek the truth and follow i t ; to act with 
j u s t i c e ; to be moderate; to be f a i t h f u l m marriage; 
to keep hi s appetites under the r e s t r a i n t of reason; 
to requite kindness with kindness; to r e f r a i n from 
seeking to secure his own advantage at the expense of 
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others; and so on. In a word, there i s a law which 
i s innate m man, d i s t i n c t from and a n t e r i o r to any 
w r i t t e n or enacted law, implanted within the human 
heart by God himself. As Ambrose puts i t . 
Law i s twofold - natural and unwritten. The 
nat u r a l law i s i n the heart, and the written 
law on tables. F i r s t of a l l , nature h e r s e l f 
teaches us to do what i s good, afterwards came 
that law which was given through Moses. 38 
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I f there i s such a natu r a l law written into the heart, 
however, the question i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e s : Why do we 
also require a 'written law on tables' and those 
injunctions of s c r i p t u r e which are not coextensive 
with the natural law 9 St Ambrose's reply to t h i s 
i s not the f a m i l i a r ( A r i s t o t e l i a n ) one - that n a t u r a l 
law i s too general to be adequate without i n t e r p r e t -
ation, p a r t i c u l a r i s a t i o n , and so forth. Rather, he 
maintains that the natu r a l law has been weakened or 
obscured or corrupted i n us by the f a l l . I t i s 
therefore i n need or res t o r a t i o n and confirmation 
through the written law. But t h i s confirmation 
cannot occur without the c a t a l y s t , as i t were, of 
divine grace. Like Augustine, Ambrose accepts the 
problematical doctrine of damnosa haereditas. He 
i n s i s t s that, unless the whole man i s recreated by 
the operation of divine grace, there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of moral action. I t i s only by 'divine a s s i s t a n c e ' , 
'heavenly protection', 'the grace of God', 'the 
favour of God', that he can achieve even an approx-
imation to v i r t u e - only when he has within him, not 
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h i s own l i f e , but the l i f e of C h r i s t . I n short, 
human v i r t u e or excellence - the Greek arete i n i t s 
most d i r e c t l y moral sense - i s a supernatural g i f t . 
I t cannot be attained by unaided human e f f o r t , and 
i t cannot be taught. I t i s made and given through 
the grace of God. 
When a l l i s sa i d and done, however, i t has to be 
conceded that the ideas so f a r discussed i n t h i s 
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chapter occupy only a r e l a t i v e l y small amount of 
space i n the l i t e r a t u r e i n question. I n p a r t i c u l a r , 
although they constitute a moral theory, t h i s theory 
i s not to any great degree extended into the sphere 
of s p e c i f i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l discourse. After a l l - and 
as an obvious and uncontroversial g e n e r a l i s a t i o n -
we may remark that the preoccupations of the authors 
i n question were predominantly eschatological. That 
i s , they look forward to the consummation of a l l 
things at the end of the world, rather than to the 
present d e t a i l s of d a i l y l i v i n g as such. And i n t h i s 
respect, of course, they d i f f e r markedly from the 
concern of Plato and A r i s t o t l e with the achievement 
of moral perfection through c i v i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
Although they are not unconcerned with c r i t e r i a of 
rig h t conduct, they tend to be concerned with them 
only mediately - only, that i s , to the extent that 
such conduct bears upon personal s a l v a t i o n . And, 
i n view of t h i s , i t i s not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g to find 
that they do not develop what subsequently came to be 
seen as the r a d i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of natural law. 
I n t h i s respect, they resemble the j u r i s t s of the 
Corpus I u r i s G i v i l i s . When we come to St Paul's 
treatment of slavery, for example, we find, on the 
one hand, that he, l i k e the Stoics and the Roman lawyers, 
i n f e r s from the supposed f a c t of n a t u r a l equality 
that slavery i s not part of the order of nature. I t 
i s contra naturam, or at l e a s t not secundum naturam, 
i n the sense of not being part of God's o r i g i n a l 
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c r e a t i v e intention. But th i s i s not seen as an occ-
asion for c r i t i c i s m , nor does i t form a point of de-
parture f o r any recommendation for i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
change or reform. Indeed, St Paul's response to 
' i n s t i t u t i o n s ' i s quite uncompromising. 
Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; 
fo r there i s no power but of God: the powers 
which are m existence are ordained by God. 
Thus, whoever r e s i s t s the power r e s i s t s the 
ordinance of God; and those who r e s i s t s h a l l 
receive damnation f o r themselves. ^0 
As with the Roman lawyers, we have i n the New Test-
ament and the Fathers a conservative doctrine of 
na t u r a l law which, from the 'modern' perspective, 
might be thought a l i t t l e odd. Why should an i n s t i t -
ution i d e n t i f i e d as 'unnatural' be thought tolerable 
by those who see naturalness as a moral guide 9 
St Paul's own position i s c l e a r l y set out i n the 
b r i e f E p i s t l e to Philemon. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that 
the Philemon to whom the E p i s t l e i s addressed i s the 
C h r i s t i a n owner of a runaway slave, Onesimus. Since 
h i s bid for freedom, Onesimus has been converted to 
C h r i s t i a n i t y - apparently by St Paul himself, and he 
i s now v o l u n t a r i l y returning to servitude. I n h i s 
l e t t e r to the Church of the Galatians, St Paul had 
i n s i s t e d that 'there i s neither...slave nor free.' 
Yet we now fin d that he does not for a moment doubt 
the propriety of sending Onesimus back to h i s master 
with an amiable covering l e t t e r . I n other words, the 
198. 
standing of Onesimus as a slave - h i s l e g a l status -
i s not a point at is s u e . Neither are we i n v i t e d to 
do anything but accept that Philemon i s p e r f e c t l y 
within h i s r i g h t s as a C h r i s t i a n i n owning a slave 
or s l a v e s , and that Onesimus, having undergone the 
moral transformation of conversion, i s acting r i g h t l y 
i n returning to servitude. Indeed, the c l e a r sugg-
estion i s that he would be acting wrongly were he 
not to go back to h i s master. I n short, St Paul 
does not pronounce adversely upon e i t h e r the morality 
or the l e g a l i t y of slavery - even though 'there i s 
neither...slave nor free.' Rather, h i s position i s 
that the s o c i a l r e a l i t y of sla v e r y i s no more than a 
purely external condition. I n foro interno, i t does 
not matter one way or the other. Whatever may be h i s 
standing m conventional terms, no man i s a moral or 
s p i r i t u a l slave - a slave 'by nature', i n A r i s t o t l e ' s 
phrase - unless h i s soul i s m bondage to s i n . And 
t h i s , too, i s a theme taken up by the Fathers i n t h e i r 
account of the human condition: 
Some w i l l say, 'Are there not i n your company 
some people who are poor and others who are 
r i c h 9 Some who are servants and some who are 
masters 9 I s there not at l e a s t some difference 
between i n d i v i d u a l s 9 ' There i s none; and the 
fac t that we believe ourselves to be equals i s , 
of course, why we each c a l l one another 'brother'. 
For since we evaluate a l l human things by referenc 
to the s p i r i t rather than to the body, we have no 
servants, even though there are indeed differences 
of bodily condition. We speak of them as 'brother 
i n s p i r i t and as fellow servants m r e l i g i o n . ^ 
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Servants ought to be warned not to despise t h e i r 
masters, for fear that, by conducting themselves 
with pride, they offend God by denying h i s ordin-
ance. In the same way, masters ought to be warn-
ed that, i f they do not acknowledge those whom 
they hold m subjection by reason of t h e i r con-
d i t i o n to be t h e i r equals by reason of t h e i r 
common nature, t h e i r pride i s contrary to the 
wishes of God concerning h i s g i f t . ^ 
Although outwardly i n the condition of servitude, 
a man may be free so long as he i s not bound by 
love of th i s world, nor by the chains of greed 
or the shackles of fear ( f o r nothing i s more 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the state of slavery than to 
be always a f r a i d ) : when, m short, he can view 
the present with confidence and look forward to 
the future without trepidation.43 
The cynic might suppose that t h i s i s a very conven-
ient doctrine indeed, unless you happen to be a slave 
but, be that as i t may, i t i s very widely taught. 
S i m i l a r passages appear, for example, i n Salvian, 
i n 'Ambrosiaster' and i n I s i d o r e of S e v i l l e . 
These remarks a l l give us p a r t i c u l a r instances of 
a general tendency on the part of the Fathers to con-
ceive purely p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l matters i n terms of 
a sharp disjunction between the natural and the con-
ventional. Once again, we may properly take St Aug-
ustine as a stalking-horse. His view i s that, f a r 
from being i n t e g r a l with the n a t u r a l order (as Plato 
and A r i s t o t l e had supposed) s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s and 
the p o l i t i c a l mechanisms which i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e them 
constitute a remedial or d i s c i p l i n a r y system which 
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God allowed to become imposed upon the natural order 
a f t e r the f a l l . Such i n s t i t u t i o n s are, i n a sense, 
d i v i n e l y intended, but they are not 'natural' -
t h e i r existence" i s made necessary p r e c i s e l y by the 
unnatural condition of Adam's descendants. (Ernst 
Troeltsch suggests that they can be c a l l e d 'natural', 
but i n a secondary or r e l a t i v e sense of the term. 
They are 'natural' i n that they answer to what i s 
now the na t u r a l condition of ' f a l l e n ' man. This i s 
undoubtedly a point; but i t i s not an in t e r p r e t a t i o n 
which, as f a r as I can make out, finds any support 
i n the texts themselves.)44 
The function of such i n s t i t u t i o n s i s 'remedial' i n 
that they e x i s t to r e s t r a i n the e v i l impulses which 
took possession of man a f t e r the f a l l . They are 
necessary l e s t , without such r e s t r a i n t , such impulses 
should cause the natural order to collapse altogether 
i n a welter of lust-driven s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . The 
founder of the f i r s t c i t y , we r e c a l l , was Cam, the 
f r a t r i c i d a l son of Adam. O r i g i n a l l y , God had not 
intended that human beings should stand towards one 
another i n r e l a t i o n s of s u p e r i o r i t y and i n f e r i o r i t y -
His did not intend that h is r a t i o n a l creatures, 
made i n the image of himself, should have dom-
inion over any but the non-rational part of 
creation - not man over man, but man over the 
beasts. 45 
Now, however, both as a r e s u l t of and as a remedy f o r 
s i n , p o l i t i c a l arrangements have come into being to 
ameliorate the worst e f f e c t s 'of the cupiditas which 
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engendered by Adam's disastrous lapse. And the same 
i s true of private property, imperialism, slavery, 
and so on. ( I n c i d e n t a l l y , i t does not occur to St 
Augustine, or to any of the many l a t e r exponents of 
t h i s view, to wonder why i t i s that, i f s l avery i s a 
punishment for s i n and a l l men are sinners, only some 
men are 3laves.) 
Man, then, i s n a t u r a l l y sociable - i . e . God made 
him sociable. But he i s not n a t u r a l l y p o l i t i c a l -
p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s a l a t e r and contingent supervention. 
I n Augustine's mature thought, therefore, the theme 
of natural law, though present, i s developed as a 
moral rather than as a p o l i t i c a l theory, for pol-
i t i c s i t s e l f i s n e c e s s a r i l y separated from morality. 
Indeed, i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y splenetic moment, Augustine 
remarks that States d i f f e r from gangs of bandits only 
i n point of s i z e . I say 'in Augustine's mature thought' 
- making the assumption that 'mature' and ' l a t e r ' come 
to much the same thing - because h i s views do, i n 
f a c t , seem to have undergone c e r t a i n changes. I n h i s 
e a r l i e r writing, he more than once suggests that 
p o l i t i c a l arrangements are not merely adventitious to 
nature, and that they ought to conform to a na t u r a l 
model. He also suggests (as Cicero had suggested, and 
as Aquinas was to suggest) that a law not i n conform-
i t y with nature does not deserve the status of law.46 
At t h i s point i n his career, i t i s c l e a r that Augustine 
was s t i l l keeping c l o s e l y to a Stoic-type model of 
human ass o c i a t i o n . As H.A. Deane has pointed out, how-
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ever, 'in none of the works written duting the r e -
maining forty years of his l i f e ( i . e . a f t e r the De 
Vera Religione) does Augustine ever s t a t e that p o s i t i v e 
law must conform to God's eternal law or to the law of 
nature to be valid.'47 
Even i n h i s mature thought, of course, Augustine 
holds as a matter of n e c e s s i t y that the requirements 
of natural law ought to take precedence over those 
of custom and convention; but he, l i k e many medieval 
and l a t e r t h e o r i s t s , does not f i n d i t inconsistent 
to hold t h i s view i n conjunction with a doctrine of 
non-resistance (a doctrine which i s i t s e l f , of course, 
u s u a l l y traced by i t s exponents back to the Apostle 
P a u l . ) . Augustine's point i s that, m the event of 
a r u l e r ' s attempting to force the C h r i s t i a n c i t i z e n 
to act against conscience (say, by i n s i s t i n g that he 
s a c r i f i c e to J u p i t e r ) , the proper recourse of the 
c i t i z e n i s not protest, but martyrdom. The obligation 
upon the b e l i e v e r placed i n t h i s predicament i s not 
to oppose the power of h i s earthly sovereign, but to 
entrust himself to the greater power of God. He does 
not r e a l l y disobey. Rather, when he cannot obey both 
God and h i s sovereign, he must obey God. 
The Apostle says, 'Let every soul be subject to 
the higher powers, for there i s no power but of 
God: the powers which are m existence are 
ordained by God. Thus, whoever r e s i s t s the 
power r e s i s t s the ordinance of God.' But 
what i f i t command that which you ought not to do 9 
I n t h i s case, by a l l means ignore the power f o r 
f e a r of the Power.48 
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In f a c t , not even i n the ea r l y writings mentioned 
above does Augustine suggest that, i f a r u l e r , through 
unwisdom or wickedness, f a i l s to frame h i s laws i n 
accordance with a n a t u r a l or eternal good, the subject 
has no obligation to obey such laws. He does not 
say that subjects are e n t i t l e d to discover for them-
selves, by reference to the na t u r a l law, whether or 
not a p o s i t i v e law i s properly framed. I t i s also 
notable that Augustine i s l a r g e l y concerned with the 
s p e c i f i c and t o p i c a l issues r a i s e d by the r u l e r who 
wishes to seduce or coerce the f a i t h f u l into a part-
i c u l a r s i n - namely, that of apostasy. I n matters 
touching purely external considerations, where quest-
ions of r e l i g i o n are not at issu e , Augustine i s con-
tent to exhort the f a i t h f u l to obey even a r u l e r who 
i s patently wicked 
J u l i a n was an unbelieving Emperor - an apostate, 
a wicked man, a worshipper of images. I n the 
s e r v i c e of the unbelieving Emperor were C h r i s t i a n 
s o l d i e r s . When they came to the cause of C h r i s t , 
they acknowledged only him who was m heaven. 
I f ever he ( J u l i a n ) required them to worship 
images or to o f f e r incense, they put God before 
him. But whenever he ordered them to form a 
l i n e of b a t t l e or to march against t h i s nation 
or that, they complied at once. They distinguished 
t h e i r eternal from t h e i r temporal master; but 
f o r the sake of t h e i r eternal master they were 
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obedient to t h e i r temporal master. 
While the 'temporal master' remains within h i s proper 
sphere, the injunction of St Paul to obey holds without 
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reference to any abuses of power on h i s part within 
that sphere; for, a f t e r a l l , 
What does i t matter under whose rul e a man l i v e s 
for the duration of t h i s b r i e f mortal l i f e , 
provided only that h i s r u l e r s do not compel 
him to do what i s wicked? 5° 
In a l l t h i s , i t seems at f i r s t sight that Augustine 
i s departing very r a d i c a l l y from the Pl a t o n i c -
A r i s t o t e l i a n t r a d i t i o n towards which he i s i n other 
respects not unsympathetic. This departure, however, 
i s not as marked as i t might appear. I t i s not, i n 
fa c t , St Augustine's wish to develop the argument that 
membership of a communitas has no bearing whatever 
upon the fulf i l m e n t of human moral p o t e n t i a l . Rather, 
hi s contention i s that no earthly p o l i t i c a l organis-
ation can m pr a c t i c e discharge the moral requirements 
of such a communitas. Such organisations serve to 
r e s t r a i n men; but they do not perfect them. Thus, 
although the end towards which they tend - that of 
pax - i s worthy enough as f a r as i t goes, p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l associations i s not properly to 
be conceived as a moral enterprise. And, i n t h i s 
connection, Augustine takes s p e c i f i c i s s u e with 
Cicero's theory of c i v i l s o c i e t y - not as a theory 
about what a moral community would be, but in s o f a r as 
i t i s offered as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the way of l i f e 
of a p a r t i c u l a r c i v i l society, namely, Rome. 
Cicero had characterised a c i v i l s o c i e t y as somehow 
'public' or 'popular' m i t s e s s e n t i a l character. I t 
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i s a res publica or a res populi - the common property 
of the people whose society i t i s . And what makes a 
people a people - what imparts a cohesive element to 
a community - i s a common agreement as to what i s 
ri g h t . I t i s Cicero's contention that, i n a community 
where there i s such common agreement, j u s t i t i a - the 
giving of every man what i s due to him - w i l l p r e v a i l . 
But, St Augustine now wishes to ask, 
Where i s the j u s t i c e of a man who abandons the 
true God and makes himself over to e v i l demons' 
I s t h i s giving to everyone what i s due to him 9 
Or i s he who witholds a piece of land from i t s 
purchaser and gives i t to a man who has no t i t l e 
to i t unjust, while he who witholds himself from 
the God who made him and serves e v i l s p i r i t s 
j u s t 9 5 1 
I t may be that Augustine's a s s a u l t on Cicero's p o s i t -
ion i s , i n the words of Donald E a r l , 'wholly i l l i c i t 
from the point of view of s t r i c t argumentation'. But 
t h i s c r i t i c i s m would only be to the point i f Augustine 
were at a l l concerned with ' s t r i c t argumentation'. As 
i t i s , h i s intention i s not so much that of refuting 
Cicero as of making an urgent and competing claim to 
moral a l l e g i a n c e . The point which he wishes to make 
i s that the only moral communitas i s the C i v i t a s Dei; 
and the C i v i t a s Dei i s not a State distinguished by 
common agreement amongst i t s members as to what i s 
r i g h t . I t i s a community with no t e r r i t o r i a l -
indeed, no t e r r e s t r i a l - boundaries, whose members 
are r e l a t e d to one another by a common love of God. 
Without such a common love of God, St Augustine holds, 
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there cannot i n any case be agreement as to what i s 
r i g h t . Thus, 
Two c i t i e s have been brought i n t o being by two 
kinds of love - the earthly by love of s e l f and 
contempt f o r God, and the heavenly by love f o r 
God and contempt f o r s e l f . The one g l o r i e s i n 
i t s e l f , the other i n the Lord; f o r the one 
seeks glory from men, while the greatest glory 
of the other i s God....The one holds i t s head 
high i n i t s own glory; the other says to i t s 
God, 'Thou a r t my glory and the u p l i f t e r of 
my head.52 
He who sets himself the task of l o v i n g God and 
his neighbour as himself, not by the standards 
of men but by those of God, i s because of t h i s 
love said to be of good will....The r i g h t w i l l , 
then, i s w e l l - d i r e c t e d love, whereas the wrong 
w i l l i s i l l - d i r e c t e d love.53 
Moral r e c t i t u d e , i n short, i s n e i t h e r produced nor 
impaired by p o l i t i c a l transactions as such. I t 
springs from a personal r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g between 
God and the reason and w i l l of the redeemed i n d i v i d -
u a l . 
Glancing, f o r comparative purposes, at the p o l i t i c a l 
remarks of St Ambrose, we f i n d that Augustine has once 
again followed h i s teacher closely. To St Ambrose, as 
to St Augustine, s o c i a l l i f e i s n a t u r a l while p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e i s the reverse. That mankind i s d i v i n e l y i n t e n -
ded to l i v e m communities can be i n f e r r e d , Ambrose 
suggests, from the f a c t that God, having created Adam, 
saw that i t i s not good f o r man to be alone, and 
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created Eve to be a help f o r him. The union of these 
two i s , he remarks, both the o r i g i n and the i d e a l 
pattern of organised society: Communities were 
intended by God to consist, not of networks of sub-
ordi n a t i o n and superordination, but of persons r e -
la t e d to one another by t i e s of mutual love and ser-
vice, and directed by a common sense of j u s t i c e . 
And j u s t i c e i s conceived, not m the narrow sense 
of 'giving to each his due', but i n the broader and, 
we might say, the r i c h e r sense of p r e f e r r i n g others 
to s e l f . The i d e a l or 'natural' association of men 
i s l i k e that of a f l o c k of bi r d s , i n which 
the laws are common to a l l and kept by a l l w i t h 
a common commitment, ( m which) what i s l a w f u l 
and unlawful i s the same without exception, 
(and i n which) a l l share the same dwelling-
place, obey the same ordinances, and take part 
i n the same deliberations. 54 
I n such a society as t h i s , each member would take a 
tu r n at r u l i n g and being ruled. No-one would be 
e i t h e r a perpetual r u l e r or a perpetual subject. 
But the f a c t that t h i s does not happen may be explained 
i n terms of the greed and l u s t f o r power character-
i s t i c of f a l l e n man. Once an i n d i v i d u a l acquires 
power over others, he i s u n w i l l i n g to r e l i n q u i s h i t . 
The great m a j o r i t y of men, permanently excluded from 
a share i n government, and reduced, i n e f f e c t , to 
servitude, are, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , disaffected. The 
mi n o r i t y whose members exeroise a u t h o r i t y without 
i n t e r r u p t i o n or corr e c t i o n are, also not s u r p r i s i n g l y , 
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arrogant, overbearing and capricious. Monarchy, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , i s a d e t e r i o r a t i o n from the n a t u r a l and 
proper state of things. But, at the same time, and 
given e x i s t i n g conditions, i t i s a necessary e v i l . 
I t i s a consequence of s i n , a r i s i n g out of the s i n f u l 
l u s t f o r power. But i t i s also remedial: people who 
are themselves s i n f u l and f o o l i s h stand i n need of 
r u l e r s who w i l l subject them to d i s c i p l i n e and compel 
them to obey. And s i m i l a r remarks apply to slavery: 
God and nature created a l l men equal (and t h i s ess-
e n t i a l equality i s recognised by the Church. The 
sacraments, f o r example, are available to a l l who 
are i n a state of Grace, regardless of rank - or not, 
as the case may be. Ambrose, we r e c a l l , was the man 
who refused point-blank to say Mass while the unshnven 
Emperor Theodosius I remained i n the Church.). Slavery, 
l i k e monarchy, i s a r e s u l t of s i n and foolishness. 
Yet, things being as they are, i t i s b e t t e r f o r a 
weak and f o o l i s h man to be a slave than to be free ; 
so that i t i s r e a l l y 'a blessing that such a state of 
servitude i s given.' J J 
To sum up t h i s rather long section as b r i e f l y as 
possible: We may say that both the New Testament and 
the P a t r i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e do indeed contain a recog-
nisable doctrine of n a t u r a l law, but that t h i s doc-
t r i n e has added to i t a C h r i s t i a n superstructure b u i l t 
upon the features previously developed by pagan authors. 
Broadly speaking, i t diverges from the c l a s s i c a l account 
m two connected respects. F i r s t , i t stresses the 
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primacy of f a i t h as over against reason. Second, i t 
emphasises the u t t e r dependence of f a l l e n human nature 
upon divine g r a t u i t y . Faith, and the grace through 
which f a i t h i s i t s e l f made possible, are the essen-
t i a l prerequisites of a l l enterprises. I t provides 
the context w i t h i n which, and only w i t h i n which, 
human aspirations and a c t i v i t i e s become coherent and 
wel l - d i r e c t e d . As Augustine puts i t , n i s i c r e d i d e n t i s , 
non m t e l l i g e t i s . 
I I . 
Canon Law. 
I n s p i t e of the eschatological and r e l a t i v e l y a p o l i t -
i c a l character of i t s spokesmen's concerns, however, 
that part of the Civi t a s Dei undergoing i t s earthly 
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pilgrimage was i n e v i t a b l y faced w i t h the problems of 
coming to terms w i t h temporalities. At an early stage 
- although precisely how early i t i s impossible to 
say - the Church began to evolve an increasingly 
i n t r i c a t e mode of organising i t s e l f which owes much 
of i t s i n s p i r a t i o n , and not a l i t t l e of i t s content, 
to the Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s . And that an i n s t i t u t i o n 
of the size, and occupying the c u l t u r a l m i l i e u , of 
the medieval Church should g r a v i t a t e , so to speak, 
towards such a l e g a l mode of organisation i s a dev-
elopment which, of i t s e l f , requires no explanation. 
I t i s surely rather quixotic of Walter Ullmann, f o r 
example, to t r y to formulate such an explanation m 
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terma of the 'influence 1 of T e r t u l l i a n . As i t happens, 
however, we do not come across a comprehensive or def-
i n i t i v e statement of canon law, as d i s t i n c t from num-
erous l o c a l and u n o f f i c i a l c o l l e c t i o n s , u n t i l the 
appearance of the Concordantia Discordantium Canonum, 
oompiled by Gratian i n about 1139 (probably at the 
law school of the University of Bologna.). The Con-
cordantia Discordantium Canonum i s more usually known 
as the Decretum Gratiani or Deereturn. For b r e v i t y ' s 
sake, we s h a l l r e f e r to i t as such i n what follows. 
As B. Kurtscheid and P. Wilches have shown, the 
h i s t o r y of canon law down to the time of the Decretum 
i s so very complex as almost to defy generalisation 
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altogether. We may say, however, t h a t , i n the mam, 
i t s sources are f i v e f o l d : s c r i p t u r e i t s e l f ; the 
decrees of the General Councils of the Church; Papal 
l e t t e r s on a v a r i e t y of subjects of public or j u d i c i a l 
import; the P a t r i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e ; and the Corpus 
I u r i s C i v i l i s . But, l i k e a l l law, that of the Church 
i s i n e v i t a b l y f l e x i b l e and organic i n character, 
undergoing a continual process of adaptation i n res-
pose to s p e c i f i c circumstances and requirements, and 
of synchretism w i t h l o c a l secular codes. Before the 
Decretum, something i n excess of f o r t y e a r l i e r c o l l e c -
tions of varying comprehensiveness had been made. (The 
most sub s t a n t i a l of these were the Liber de Misencordia 
et I u s t i t i a of Alger of Liege (ca. 1105) and the Sen-
tenti a e Sidonensis (ca. 1130-1135).) The Decretum. 
however, i s by f a r the most extensive and, by reason 
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of i t s breadth and a u t h o r i t y , the most important. I t 
would be f a i r to say that the Deereturn stands i n the 
same r e l a t i o n to the law of the Church down to the 
t w e l f t h century as that of the Corpus I u n a C i v i l i s 
to the e a r l i e r law of Imperial Rome. I t provided the 
standard handbook f o r students i n the Canon Law f a c u l t i e 
which were developing i n the U n i v e r s i t i e s during the 
t w e l f t h and t h i r t e e n t h centuries. Also, Gratian's 
work was continued by a large number of canonists -
amongst them his p u p i l , Roland B a n d i n e l l i , who, i n 
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1159, became Pope Alexander I I I . These approached the 
Decretum i n much the same way as t h e i r c i v i l i a n counter-
parts approached the Corpus I u r i s C i v i l i s - producing 
commentaries and glosses, by means of which they con-
tinued Gratian's enterprise of systematically expound-
ing and applying the t e x t s . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y of a l l 
from the point of view of the medieval h i s t o r i a n , the 
canonists •evolved the theory of the universal domin-
ion of the Papacy, which came to embrace the claim 
to p o l i t i c a l supremacy over a l l the peoples of the 
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world.' The Decretum i t s e l f , w i t h the ad d i t i o n of 
subsequent o f f i c i a l compilations of Papal l e g i s l a t i o n , 
formed the substance of the Corpus I u r i s Canonici of 
1580, which, i n t u r n , was to stand as the a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
l e g a l code of the Church u n t i l the promulgation, i n 
1917, of the much more s h o r t - l i v e d Codex I u r i s 
Canonici of Pope Benedict XV. 
The Decretum Gratiani i s very f a r from being a mere 
compilation of t e x t s . The documents which i t brings 
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together (arranged i n subject-order rather than, as 
was the e a r l i e r and confusing practice, i n chronol-
o g i c a l order) are accompanied by an o r i g i n a l comm-
entary which points up the d i s t i n c t i v e features of 
the various opinions i n question, while at the same 
time attempting to reconcile the disunanimities 
w i t h i n each subject group. I n t h i s respect, i t would 
not be unreasonable to conjecture that Gratian's 
work owes something to the famous Sic et Non of 
Abelard, which m turn stands i n a d i a l e c t i c a l t r a d -
i t i o n traceable back to the l o s t Antilogiae of 
Protagoras. But, at the same time and more broadly, 
t h i s method of noting and re c o n c i l i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s 
i s wholly t y p i c a l of medieval philosophical debate at 
large. 
Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to us, of course, i s the 
understanding of the character of law which l i e s at 
the heart of Gratian's undertaking. I t i s an under-
standing which i s derived d i r e c t l y from the Etymologiae 
of I s i d o r e of S e v i l l e - although i t c l e a r l y does not 
or i g i n a t e w i t h him. I s i d o r e mentions two possible 
methods of c l a s s i f y i n g laws. F i r s t , he proposes the 
three headings of ius c i v i l e , ius gentium and IUS 
naturale which we have already considered i n r e l a t i o n 
to Ulpian and his colleagues. I n ad d i t i o n , however, 
Isi d o r e suggests that law i s properly to be divided 
i n t o two components, 'human law' and 'divine law', 
the l a t t e r being that which i s established 'by nature' 
and the former that which has i t s o r i g i n i n custom or 
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convention. And the Deereturn, while i t accepts both 
these systems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , places especial 
emphasis on the second. Thus, 
The human race i s governed i n two ways - by 
nat u r a l law and by custom. Natural law i s that 
which i s contained i n the Old and New Testaments. 
I t commands that each man should do to others 
what he would have done to himself. I t f o r b i d s 
him to do to another anything that he would not 
have done to himself. Thus, Christ says i n the 
Gospel, 'Whatever you wish men to do to you, 
do the same to them; f o r t h i s i s the law and 
the prophets.^ 
A l l laws are e i t h e r divine or human. Divine laws 
come from nature, and human laws from custom. 
This i s why the two d i f f e r - f o r different.peoples 
are responsive to d i f f e r e n t laws. ^ 
The thought here i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as that embod-
ie d i n the P a t r i s t i c w r i t i n g s : that n a t u r a l laws are 
obli g a t o r y standards of conduct i n v i r t u e of t h e i r 
having been made, not by man, but by a beneficent 
creator. I n the above passages, we notice that a l l 
law which i s not a human a r t i f a c t i s said to be n a t u r a l . 
As such, i t i s said to be divine i n character, con-
tained i n the canonical s c r i p t u r e s . But t h i s way of 
p u t t i n g i t should not mislead us i n t o the cardinal 
e r r o r of here supposing that n a t u r a l law i s held to 
depend on r e v e l a t i o n . I f i t were, then, of course, 
i t s claim to u n i v e r s a l i t y would be destroyed. I t 
would be available only to those who were members of 
the Church and/or had access to the canonical s c r i p -
214 
tures; and t h i s would be a d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n of 
the teaching of St Paul i n the Epis t l e to the Romans. 
Gratian's view i s not that n a t u r a l law depends upon 
re v e l a t i o n , but that i t i s f u l l y confirmed by rev-
e l a t i o n . I n i t s e l f , he says, 
I t came i n t o being w i t h the very creation of man 
as a r a t i o n a l creature; and i t does not vary 
w i t h time, but remains immutable. 
We notice also t h a t , i n the second of the two pass-
ages quoted on the previous page, there i s a reference 
to the most s a l i e n t point of difference between the 
two types of law. Human laws vary widely, as functions 
of variable circumstances. Natural laws, on the other 
hand, are the same always and everywhere. This d i s t -
i n c t i o n i s , i n i t s e l f , straightforward and f a m i l i a r 
enough. But what i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g here 
i s the way i n which, i n the Decretum, i t i s affirmed 
that n a t u r a l law not only d i f f e r s from p o s i t i v e law 
i n t h i s way, but that i t constitutes a higher law 
before which defective p o s i t i v e law ought a c t u a l l y 
to give way, and i n the l i g h t of which undesirable 
customs and conventions ought to be changed. The 
fo l l o w i n g remarks are high l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
The n a t u r a l law takes precedence i n point of 
d i g n i t y over custom and l e g i s l a t i o n . Anything 
accepted as custom or incorporated i n t o l e g i s -
l a t i o n which i s contrary to n a t u r a l law i s to 
be considered n u l l and void.65 
Nothing i s commanded by the law of nature except 
what God wishes. Nothing i s p r o h i b i t e d by i t 
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unless i t i s prohibited by God. And there i s 
nothing i n the canonical scriptures which i s 
not also found i n the divine law (which i s i t s e l f 
consistent w i t h nature). I t i s clear, then, 
that whatever can be shown to be contrary to the 
divine w i l l or to the canonical scriptures or 
to the divine law i s also opposed to n a t u r a l law. 
Thus, when something i s i d e n t i f i e d as part of 
the divine w i l l or the canonical scriptures or the 
divine law, i t i s thereby also i d e n t i f i e d as part 
o-f the n a t u r a l law. Thus, any l e g i s l a t i o n , 
whether secular or e c c l e s i a s t i c a l , which i s 
shown to be contrary to nature must be d e c i s i -
vely rejected. 
(There c l e a r l y are drawbacks to t h i s view, which we 
must mention and leave alone. The canonical s c r i p -
tures, divine law and n a t u r a l law are treated as 
e s s e n t i a l l y one and the same thing. But the canon-
i c a l scriptures enjoin a number of contradictory 
things - that one should and should not marry one's 
deceased brother's w i f e , f o r example. Also, many 
of the i n j u n c t i o n s of s c r i p t u r e are of purely cere-
monial or q u a i n t l y formal import. I do not imagine, 
f o r instance, that Gratian would wish to say that a 
man w i t h a f l a t nose ought not to become a p r i e s t -
although the Book of Leviticus does contain t h i s 
s t r i c t u r e . Yet Gratian's model does not f u r n i s h a 
p r i n c i p l e by reference to which we can d i s t i n g u i s h 
minor matters from weightier ones. I t would seem 
that we are to hold the L e v i t i c a l d i e tary regulations 
(many of which are i n any case palpable absurdities) 
and the Ten Commandments i n the same esteem; and so 
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f o r t h . These were d i f f i c u l t i e s of which the canon-
i s t s were not unaware; but we cannot go f a r enough 
a f i e l d to consider t h e i r attempts to deal w i t h them. 
On the subjects of slavery and pr i v a t e property, 
the Decretum follows the d i r e c t i o n taken by the 
Fathers. These things are punishments and remedies 
f o r s i n . Thus, though they are, s t r i c t l y speaking, 
contra naturam, i t does not follow that they should 
be 'considered n u l l and void' - except, of course, 
i n the i n t e r n a l moral and s p i r i t u a l sense already 
mentioned. More generally, however, the i n d i v i d u a l 
i s no longer merely urged to 'ignore' the wrongful 
i n j u n c t i o n s of the c i v i l power and thereby, i f things 
so f a l l out, to win the crown of martyrdom. Also, 
such wrongful i n j u n c t i o n s are no longer i d e n t i f i e d 
simply i n terms of t h e i r invasion of the s p i r i t u a l 
r e l a t i o n between God and the i n d i v i d u a l . I n the 
Decretum, the e a r l i e r detachment of n a t u r a l law from 
matters p o l i t i c a l i s abandoned. I t i s asserted 
( w i t h s p e c i f i c exceptions made f o r slavery and p r i v -
ate property) that any p o s i t i v e s t i p u l a t i o n , 'whether 
secular or e c c l e s i a s t i c a l ' , which breaches n a t u r a l 
law i s to be 'decisively rejected'; and t h i s i s 
c l e a r l y a c a l l to non-compliance. But the question 
i s : What does t h i s mean i n p r a c t i c a l terms 9 More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , who i s to be the judge of when such an 
infringement has taken place 9 And t h i s i s a question 
which the canonists were keen to answer i n a p a r t -
i c u l a r way. Again, we cannot dwell on the matter at 
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length; but i t i s important to note the close conn-
ection between the work of the canonists and a con-
troversy which i s traceable at least back to the 
correspondence of the f i f t h - c e n t u r y Pope Gelasius I I , 
and which came dramatically to a head i n the protrac-
ted controversy between the Emperors Henry IV and V 
and Popes Gregory V I I , Urban I I and Paschal I I . 
Broadly stated, the essence of the matter i s as f o l l -
ows. 
Regnum and sacerdotium. the secular and s p i r i t u a l 
powers or realms, each appear to have separate spheres 
of competence. And i t would seem th a t , i n the very 
nature of the case, each sphere i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
i n i t s terms of reference from the other: the one 
deals w i t h worldly, the other w i t h other-worldly 
matters. One basis of t h i s concept of Regnum and 
Sacerdotium i s the Dominical saying, 'Render unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the 
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things that are God's.' Another i s the c r y p t i c u t t -
erance of Jesus i n the Garden of Gethsemane, as reported 
by St Luke: 
And they said, "Lord, behold, here are two swords.' 
And he said unto them, ' I t i s enough.^ 
I t i s w i t h t h i s second passage i n mind that medieval 
p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s so often r e f e r to two swords' -
meaning two kinds of power, one appropriate to 
s p i r i t u a l and the other to worldly matters. But t h i s 
notion of an e a r t h l y status quo comprising two s e l f -
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contained areas of j u r i s d i c t i o n proved to contain 
problems of p r i n c i p l e s u f f i c i e n t to render i t l a r g e l y 
untenable i n pr a c t i c e . What i s to happen i f the 
secular invade the s p i r i t u a l realm 7 Has not the 
Church the r i g h t to require the Prince to raise his 
sword-arm i n order to protect i t and enforce what i t 
commands? What i f the Prince refuse 9 What i s to be 
done i n cases of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l dispute or over-
lapping - f o r example, i n respect of the i n v e s t i t u r e 
of Bishops or the t r i a l of c l e r i c s on c r i m i n a l 
charges 7 (This l a t t e r , i t w i l l be re c a l l e d , was the 
chief occasion of the momentous quarrel between Henry 
I I of England and Archbishop Beckett.) F i n a l l y (and 
t h i s i s the most fundamental grounding of a l l the 
claims of the Church), i s not the f i n a l s u p e r i o r i t y of 
the Church, embodied i n the power of the Papacy to 
give or wi t h o l d absolution, established by the auth-
o r i t y of sc r i p t u r e i t s e l f . For did not Christ say 
to the f i r s t of the Popes, 
'Thou a r t Peter, and upon t h i s rock I w i l l b u i l d 
my Church; and the gates of h e l l s h a l l net pre-
v a i l against i t . And I w i l l give unto thee the 
keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever 
thou shalt bind on earth s h a l l be bound i n heaven: 
and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth s h a l l be 
loosed i n heaven. '*?70 
The contest between Regnum and Sacerdotium which 
distinguishes so much of the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of 
the middle ages i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , a contest over how 
f a r and i n t o what areas t h i s 'power of the keys' can 
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be construed as extending. I t i s , i n short, a contest 
between disparate f o c i of a u t h o r i t y , n e i t h e r of which 
i s prepared to see m the other a f i n a l judge, f o r 
potestas i u r i s d i c t i o n i s on earth. As Mcllwain remarks, 
i t i s i n a broad sense a struggle 'between the canon 
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law and the ius c i v i l e of Rome', w i t h (generally speaking) 
the c i v i l i a n s ranged on the royal and the canonists 
on the Papal side. This dichotomy i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
sharply seen i n the b i t t e r contest (ca 1303-1313) 
between Pope Boniface V I I I and P h i l i p IV, 'the Pair', 
of Prance. On the Papal side, "canon lawyers and 
other Papal t h e o r i s t s were redoubling the Pope's 
claim to possess 'fullness of power' over the Church 
and a l l Christendom. This plenitudo p o t e s t a t i s made 
him the fountain of law and j u s t i c e , whose secrets 
were locked i n his own bosom....'He rules and disposes 
a l l things, orders and governs everything as he pleases 
....He can deprive anyone of his r i g h t , as i t pleases 
him, f o r w i t h him his w i l l i s r i g h t and reason; what-
ever pleases him has the force of law.• This account 
of the Pope's plenitudo p o t e s t a t i s was w r i t t e n i n 1332 
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by a Spanish Franciscan, Alvarez Pelayo." I n short, 
the Pope may u t t e r divine law - he may, that i s , 
i n t e r p r e t or extend Holy Writ - by reason of the power 
to which, as St Peter's successor, he i s h e i r . But 
i f divine law and n a t u r a l law are one and the same, 
as the canonists wish to i n s i s t , then i t follows that 
•his w i l l i s r i g h t and reason; whatever pleases him 
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has the force of law', and, by the same token, that 
whatever displeases him i s ' u t t e r l y n u l l and void'. 
I n practice - at lea s t , w i t h i n the terms of t h i s 
theory - i t i s w i t h m the power of the Pope to d i s -
pense subjects from t h e i r oath of allegiance; to 
command a crusading army to invade the t e r r i t o r y of 
an intransigent prince; to place the t e r r i t o r y of 
such a prince under Papal i n t e r d i c t - i n short, to 
do anything he l i k e s , answering only and personally 
to God himself. As Otto Gierke puts i t , ' A l l human 
laws (leges) f i n d t h e i r boundaries set and t h e i r 
spheres of competence assigned to them by the law 
s p i r i t u a l (canones). For t h i s reason, the temporal 
power i s subject to and should obey the s p i r i t u a l . 
For t h i s reason the o f f i c e s of Emperor, King and Princ 
are e c c l e s i a s t i c a l o f f i c e s . ' 
The polemical l i t e r a t u r e surrounding the so-called 
• i n v e s t i t u r e controversy' alone - and t h i s i s , as i t 
were, the h i s t o r i c a l bench-mark of the c o n f l i c t betwee 
regnum and aacerdotium - i s very extensive and recon-
d i t e . There i s , however, no need f o r us to dwell 
any f u r t h e r upon the r o l e of the canonists as ideo-
logues, or the fun c t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as 
props to what Walter Ullmann designates as 'Caesaro-
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papalism'. I t i s enough to note the way i n which, 
l a r g e l y during the course of such i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t 
the canonists develop a conception of n a t u r a l law, not 
only as an unmade standard of r i g h t , but also as a set 
of higher s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l norms by reference to which 
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e x i s t i n g custom and l e g i s l a t i o n can be rendered ' n u l l 
and void'. 
The general impression created by the Christian 
doctrine of na t u r a l law as we have so f a r considered 
i t , however, i s of an ad hoc c o l l e c t i o n of themes 
l i f t e d from c l a s s i c a l w r i t i n g s and given a rough doc-
t r i n a l coating. This i s something of an oversimp-
l i f i c a t i o n ; but i t i s not too serious a d i s t o r t i o n . 
I t must be borne m mind that the New Testament authors 
or redactors, the Fathers, and the canonists were a l l , 
i n some sense, p r i m a r i l y polemicists and only second-
a r i l y , i f at a l l , moral or l e g a l philosophers. What 
they have to say on the subject of morality i s l a r g e l y 
generated, not by the wish to b u i l d a system, but by 
the need f o r a response to some p a r t i c u l a r exigency -
be i t the exclusivism of the Jewish-Christian community 
at Rome, pagan responses to Christian claims, or the 
contest f o r s u p e r i o r i t y between Church and Empire. 
At t h i s point, however, we depart from a more or less 
o v e r t l y polemical l i t e r a t u r e and turn to the sys-
tematic exposition given to the doctrine of n a t u r a l 
law as part of St Thomas Aquinas' theory of p o l i t i c s 
and morality. 
I I I . 
St Thomas Aquinas. 
The great bulk of t h i s exposition i s to be found i n 
the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica. I t i s w i t h 
222. 
t h i s p a r t o f St Thomas' pr o d i g i o u s output t h a t we s h a l l 
be f o r the most p a r t concerned; alt h o u g h we s h a l l 
a l s o look elsewhere - mainly at o t h e r areas o f the 
Summa Theologica and a t some o f h i s remarks i n the 
De Regimme Pnncipum. I n f a c t , a part from the I n 
L i b r o s P o l i t i c o r u m E x p o s i t i o ( i . e . the Commentary on 
A r i s t o t l e ' s P o l i t i c s ) . Aquinas has l e f t no complete 
work on p o l i t i c s ( t h e De Regimme i s u n f i n i s h e d ) , 
and most o f what he has to say on s o c i a l and p o l i t -
i c a l matters has to be dissected out o f h i s t h e o l o g -
i c a l w r i t i n g s . I t i s a t once apparent, however, 
not o n l y t h a t he gives systematic c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the 
l e g a l and e t h i c a l m o t i f s w i t h which we have so f a r 
been concerned, but a l s o t h a t t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
forms p a r t o f a l a r g e - s c a l e a r c h i t e c t o n i c s y n t h e s i s 
o f C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e and the l a t e l y 'recovered' 
metaphysical, e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s o f A r i s -
t o t l e . St Thomas, c o n t i n u i n g the work o f h i s teacher 
A l b e r t u s Magnus, i s , more than anyone e l s e , r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r the disengagement o f the b u l k o f A r i s t o t e l i a n 
philosophy from the I s l a m i c a s s o c i a t i o n s which, i n 
1215 > moved the Papal l e g a t e t o p r o h i b i t a l l l e c t u r i n g 
a t the U n i v e r s i t y Of P a r i s on A r i s t o t l e ' s Physics 
and Metaphysics. And the most a r r e s t i n g f e a t u r e of 
t h i s A n s t o t e l i a n i s m , from our p o i n t o f view, i s the 
way i n which i t leads St Thomas to a t t r i b u t e a w h o l l y 
u n - P a t n s t i c element o f d i g n i t y and w o r t h t o p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e and r e l a t i o n s h i p s as such. 
Aquinas' a t t i t u d e t o the philosophy o f A r i s t o t l e may 
b r i e f l y be depicted as f o l l o w s . On the one hand, what-
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ever may have been made of him i n p a r t i b u s m f i d e l i u m 
- by a l - K m d i , a l - F a r a b i , Avicenna, Avenpace, Averroes, 
and so on - A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f i s not i n e r r o r . On 
the o t h e r hand, however, h i s w r i t i n g s do not express 
the whole t r u t h . They c e r t a i n l y do not c o n s t i t u t e 
the complete and r a t i o n a l w o r l d - c e n t r e d philosophy 
f o r which the I s l a m i c e d i t o r s and commentators had 
sought. The c o r r e c t assessment i s t h a t h i s work 
captures t h a t p a r t o f the t r u t h which i s capable of 
being discovered by the i n t e l l e c t alone, w i t h o u t the 
assistance o f r e v e l a t i o n . And, as f a r as i t goes, 
d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n has not a n n u l l e d i t . Thus, f o r 
example, Aqumas q u i t e r e a d i l y accepts t h a t a l l t h i n g s 
have a t e l o s and t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r t e l o s o f man i s 
eudaimoma. But he remarks al s o t h a t , a l t h o u g h 
w e l l b e i n g o f a k i n d - and a wo r t h w h i l e k i n d - may 
indeed be achieved on e a r t h , man has a h i g h e r end than 
such w e l l b e i n g : namely, e t e r n a l b e a t i t u d e i n contem-
p l a t i o n o f the v i s i o n o f God. A r i s t o t l e , o f course, 
could not have known about t h i s h i g h e r eudaimonia. 
Had he known about i t , he would have recommended i t , 
s i nce he i s c l e a r t h a t a l l men seek t h e i r h i g h e s t 
p o s s i b l e good. And the u l t i m a t e good o f e t e r n a l 
b e a t i t u d e i s p o s s i b l e o n l y i n the next l i f e . As 
Aquinas puts i t , 
The o b j e c t o f the w i l l - t h a t i s , o f the human 
a p p e t i t e - i s t h a t which i s u n i v e r s a l l y good, 
j u s t as the o b j e c t o f the i n t e l l e c t i s t h a t which 
i s u n i v e r s a l l y t r u e . I t i s t h e r e f o r e evident t h a t 
n o t h i n g can s a t i s f y man's w i l l except t h a t which 
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i s u n i v e r s a l l y good. And t h i s i s t o be found, 
not i n an y t h i n g created, but only i n God, since 
every c r e a t e d t h i n g has goodness o n l y by p a r t -
i c i p a t i o n . Thus, o n l y God can f u l f i l the w i l l 
o f man.... Therefore God alone c o n s t i t u t e s the 
b e a t i t u d e o f man. ^ 
I n h i s s p e c i f i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g , A r i s t o t l e had 
set out t o examine the c o n d i t i o n s which might best 
enable men t o secure the end which i s proper t o 
humanity. He had, as Aquinas puts i t , d e a l t w i t h the 
76 
ultimum e t perfectum bonum m rebus humanis. And, t o 
Aquinas' mind, A r i s t o t l e was p e r f e c t l y m the r i g h t 
t o suppose t h a t the good l i f e on e a r t h can be secured 
by p o l i t i c a l means. What Aquinas adds t o A r i s t o t l e , 
o f course, i s the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t the way t o u l t i m a t e 
blessedness can i t s e l f o n l y be prepared w i t h i n the 
c o n d i t i o n s provided by another s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n -
namely, the Church. According t o Aquinas, then, 
A r i s t o t l e ' s t heory o f man and s o c i e t y may be adopted 
by the C h r i s t i a n b e l i e v e r w i t h o u t f e a r o f e r r o r -
provided o n l y t h a t i t i s recognised as a non-
exhaustive t h e o r y , v a l i d w i t h i n l i m i t s but never-
t h e l e s s incomplete. With t h i s s i n g l e r e s e r v a t i o n , 
Aquinas accepts the A r i s t o t e l i a n conception o f c i v i l 
s o c i e t y . By the same token, he r e l i n q u i s h e s the by 
now time-honoured Augustiman conception o f p o l -
i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n as an u n n a t u r a l o r d i s c i p l i n a r y 
order. On h i s account, the s e c u l a r power i s n o t a 
d i s t a s t e f u l though necessary excrescence upon n a t u r e . 
I t i s not a contender w i t h the Church i n a zero-sum 
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game f o r the a l l e g i a n c e o f men. N e i t h e r does p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n e x i s t merely t o provide the e x t e r n a l con-
d i t i o n s o f peace and s e c u r i t y which enable the Church 
t o do i t s own work. On the c o n t r a r y , i t has p o s i t i v e 
moral and e d u c a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s o f i t s own. I t can, 
so t o speak, do p a r t of the Church's j o b f o r i t by 
teac h i n g men t o be m o r a l l y b e t t e r than they are. When 
i t comes t o s l a v e r y , Aquinas p r e f e r s t o side w i t h St 
Augustine r a t h e r than w i t h A r i s t o t l e . Considered 
under the aspect o f God's p r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n , a l l men 
are equal - no-one i s a slave 'by n a t u r e ' . The f a c t 
t h a t s l a v e r y now e x i s t s i s t o be explained m the 
us u a l way - i . e . i n terms o f s i n and i t s consequences. 
Slavery a p a r t , however, Aquinas a s s e r t s t h a t human 
i n s t i t u t i o n s f i g u r e amongst the e s s e n t i a l requirements 
of human natu r e and t h a t , as such, they would have 
e x i s t e d even i f t h e r e had been no f a l l . His p o s i t i o n 
may be more f u l l y o u t l i n e d as f o l l o w s . 
St Augustine (Aquinas remarks) had h e l d t h a t , had 
the f a l l n o t occurred, no man would have been i n sub-
j e c t i o n t o any o t h e r . This view i s based upon t h r e e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . F i r s t , man i s a r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e , 
made i n the image o f God. On the face o f i t , t h e r e -
f o r e , i t i s obvious t h a t God's o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n (made 
e x p l i c i t m the Book o f Genesis) was t h a i human beings 
should be sovereign, not over others o f t h e i r own 
k i n d , but over the n o n - r a t i p n a l p a r t o f c r e a t i o n . 
Second, the f a c t t h a t s u b j e c t i o n and domination are 
punishments i n t r o d u c e d a f t e r the f a l l i s made c l e a r 
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by God's words t o Eve, 'Your husband s h a l l r u l e over 
you.' T h i r d , man's s t a t e before the f a l l was one o f 
p e r f e c t i o n . I n t h i s s t a t e , he n e c e s s a r i l y had poss-
ession o f every good t h i n g and s u f f e r e d n o t h i n g e v i l . 
S u b j e c t i o n to the w i l l o f another, however, i s by 
common consent one o f the g r e a t e s t o f e v i l s , and 
freedom from such s u b j e c t i o n one o f the most h i g h l y -
p r i z e d o f goods. I t f o l l o w s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t sub-
j e c t i o n could not have e x i s t e d before the f a l l . 
Against a l l t h i s , however, Aquinas n o t i c e s what i s , 
g i v e n h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , an obvious o b j e c t i o n . 
R e l a t i v e l y elevated as i t was, the human c o n d i t i o n i n 
the o r i g i n a l s t a t e o f grace was nevertheless lower than 
t h a t o f the angels. Yet we know from s c r i p t u r e t h a t 
the angels themselves are arranged i n a h i e r a r c h y o f 
descending ranks, w i t h the h i g h e r ranks e x e r c i s i n g a 
form o f r u l e r s h i p over the lower. R u l e r s h i p as such, 
t h e r e f o r e , cannot be h e l d to be inco m p a t i b l e w i t h the 
d i g n i t y o f man, since i t i s p l a i n l y not i n c o m p a t i b l e 
w i t h the h i g h e r d i g n i t y of the angels. There i s , 
then, a d i s t i n c t i o n t o be drawn between two senses 
o f the word ' r u l e r s h i p ' . On the one hand, Aquinas 
remarks, we can speak o f the r u l e r s h i p o f the man who 
keeps a s l a v e . On the oth e r , however, we can a l s o 
speak o f the r u l e r s h i p of one who governs o r d i r e c t s 
a f r e e man. The hea r t o f the d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t the 
owner o f a slave r u l e s h i s slave ( t o paraphrase A r i s -
t o t l e ) as though the slave were a l i v i n g implement. I n 
ot h e r words, the slave-master d i r e c t s the slave towards 
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ends which are the slave-master's r a t h e r than the 
slave's. The r u l e r who governs a f r e e man, on the 
oth e r hand, d i r e c t s the f r e e man towards h i s own ends 
or, i f he governs more than one f r e e man, towards the 
common good. (This p o i n t i s n o t , o f course, o r i g i n a l 
t o Aquinas. Socrates had sa i d something v e r y s i m i l a r 
t o Thrasyraachus m the Republic, and A r i s t o t l e takes 
i t up f u l l y . ) I f we consider the phenomenon o f 
r u l e r s h i p i n the f i r s t o f these senses, we s h a l l see 
at once t h a t i t i s an e v i l . No man w i l l f i n d i t con-
g e n i a l t o be i n v a r i a b l y f o r c e d t o t o i l towards objec-
t i v e s which are not h i s own. We may conclude, t h e r e -
f o r e , t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f master and slave i s 
indeed a p u n i t i v e and 'u n n a t u r a l ' consequence o f the 
f a l l . The dominion o f a r u l e r over f r e e s u b j e c t s , 
however, i s p l a i n l y a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t k e t t l e o f f i s h ; 
and Aquinas wishes t o suggest t h a t i t i s i n t h i s 
sense t h a t r u l e r s h i p would have e x i s t e d even i f the 
f a l l had not occurred. He r e i t e r a t e s the dictum o f 
A r i s t o t l e , t h a t man i s not on l y s o c i a b l e but p o l i t i c a l 
and h i s p o i n t here i s t h a t any form o f corporate l i v -
i n g , however good, w i l l r e q u i r e a measure o f c e n t r a l 
d i r e c t i o n i f i t i s t o achieve i t s n a t u r a l end, the 
common good. Since men, however w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d , 
have d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l ends and preoccupations, 
* 
and do not i n v a r i a b l y see t h e i r own ends i n r e l a t i o n 
t o the whole o f which they are a p a r t , r u l e r s h i p would 
have been necessary even i f i l l - w i l l had not been 
i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the proceedings by Adam. Moreover, 
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men are not a l l i d e n t i c a l l y equipped i n p o i n t o f 
p h y s i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t y . I t i s ( a c c o r d i n g 
t o Aquinas) a f a c t o f nature t h a t some men are c l e v e r e r 
or s t r o n g e r than o t h e r s ; and i t i s , he suggests, 
n a t u r a l l y r i g h t and proper t h a t the s t r o n g e r and w i s e r 
should d i r e c t the whole community towards the common 
good. ( I n r e p l y t o the a s s e r t i o n o f C a l l i c l e s o r 
Thrasymachus t h a t i t i s n a t u r a l f o r the s t r o n g man 
t o manage p u b l i c a f f a i r s i n h i s own i n t e r e s t s , Aquinas 
would presumably have s a i d t h a t such management i s 
no more than the r u l e r s h i p o f slaves, and so not 
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' n a t u r a l 1 at a l l . ) 
This view of p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n i s c l e a r l y most 
congenial to a d o c t r i n e o f n a t u r a l law. I t c e r t a i n l y 
e s t a b l i s h e s i t on a f a r l e s s ambiguous f o o t i n g than 
i t occupied - or could occupy - w i t h i n the A u gustmian 
t r a d i t i o n . And Aquinas' v e r s i o n i s , i n f a c t , presented 
as p a r t o f a f o u r f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f law as e t e r n a l , 
n a t u r a l , d i v i n e and human. (Aquinas, u n l i k e G r a t i a n , 
does not h o l d t h a t d i v i n e law and n a t u r a l law are one 
and the same - thus overcoming o b j e c t i o n s o f the k i n d 
mentioned on p. 215.) The f i r s t and most g e n e r a l 
type i s the eternal law - which may be s a i d t o stand i n 
d i r e c t l i n e o f descent from the logos-cosmology o f 
H e r a c l i t u s and the S t o i c s . Aquinas defines i t as 
the reason e x i s t i n g i n the mind o f God, according 
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to which the e n t i r e u n i v e rse i s governed. 
And he goes on to develop an account o f t h i s e t e r n a l 
law i n a way which reminds us somewhat of Montesquieu. 
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I t i s , he suggests, to be understood i n two senses. 
F i r s t , i t c o n s i s t s o f n a t u r a l n e c e s s i t y - t h a t i s , 
i t comprises 'laws o f n a t u r e ' i n the sense i n which 
( l e t us say) Newton's laws o f motion are laws o f 
n a t u r e . I n t h i s sense, o f course, i t holds w i t h o u t 
d i s t i n c t i o n over b o t h the r a t i o n a l and the n o n - r a t i o n a l 
p a r t s o f c r e a t i o n : 
A l l t h i n g s which are under the d i v i n e d i r e c t i o n 
are s u b j e c t t o the r e g u l a t i o n and measure o f the 
e t e r n a l law. 
I f ( l e t us say) G a l i l e o throws a cannonball o f f the 
top o f the Tower o f Pisa, i t w i l l i n v a r i a b l y f a l l t o 
the e a r t h . I f G a l i l e o throws h i m s e l f o f f , he too w i l l 
f a l l t o the e a r t h . I n t h i s p r imary sense, the e t e r n a l 
law i s simply the b l a n k e t o f n e c e s s i t y which covers 
animate and inanimate t h i n g s . There i s another sense, 
however, i n which human beings may be s a i d t o 'par-
t i c i p a t e * m the e t e r n a l law i n a manner which i s 
w h o l l y p e c u l i a r t o themselves -
f o r they are able t o g i v e d i r e c t i o n t o them-
selves and o t h e r s , and so become sharers i n the 
a c t i v i t y o f d i r e c t i o n . 8 0 
I n o t h e r words, man alone, i n v i r t u e o f h i s unique 
r a t i o n a l i t y , can b r i n g h i s a c t i o n s d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t o 
c o n f o r m i t y w i t h c e r t a i n standards which he knows t o be 
w r i t t e n i n t o the e t e r n a l law, and which correspond t o 
the n a t u r e o f man h i m s e l f . At the most general l e v e l , 
he i s able to f o r m u l a t e a fundamental t a u t o l o g y -
namely, t h a t good ought t o be done and e v i l avoided. 
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Prom t h i s u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e of r i g h t reason, a l l 
the more d e t a i l e d precepts o f n a t u r a l law - r e l a t i n g 
t o s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , sexual r e l a t i o n s , s o c i a l l i f e , 
and so on - are p r a g m a t i c a l l y d e r i v e d through the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of ' p r a c t i c a l reason' to the q u e s t i o n , 
'What, g i v e n the k i n d o f c r e a t u r e t h a t man i s , i s 
the good t o be done and the e v i l avoided m the g i v e n 
circumstances 7• I t i s not suggested t h a t a d e t a i l e d 
o r exhaustive l i s t o f ' n a t u r a l laws' could be s t a t e d 
i n the form o f ' r u l e s ' . Rather, the suggestion i s t h a t , 
as r a t i o n a l beings, we have i t w i t h i n our power t o 
d i s c o v e r by r e f l e c t i o n and i n the l i g h t o f the p r i n c -
i p l e t h a t good ought to be done and e v i l avoided what 
the ' n a t u r a l l y r i g h t ' t h i n g i s i n a p a r t i c u l a r p r e -
dicament. And t h a t p a r t o f the e t e r n a l law i n which 
human beings ' p a r t i c i p a t e ' i n t h i s way i s designated as 
' n a t u r a l law'. 8 1 
The i n c l i n a t i o n to f o l l o w the n a t u r a l law i s s a i d 
t o be a h a b i t o f mind which, u s i n g a term favoured by 
the Eastern Fathers, Aquinas c a l l s synderesis (a 
somewhat obscure word, of which the most s a t i s f a c t o r y 
t r a n s l a t i o n i s probably 'conscience'.). A l l who do 
n o t have t h i s h a b i t o f mind are e i t h e r u n u s u a l l y 
s t u p i d or u n u s u a l l y c o r r u p t . I t i s important to note, 
however, t h a t man i s not s a i d t o be bound t o a c t upon 
n a t u r a l law as a matter o f n e c e s s i t y . G a l i l e o i s not 
f o r c e d t o r e f r a i n from doing e v i l i n the way t h a t he 
i s f o r c e d to f a l l t o the ground. P r e s c r i p t i v e n a t -
u r a l laws, m o t h e r words, do not simply describe 
s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s i n the way t h a t s c i e n t i f i c n a t u r a l 
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laws, which f o r m u l a t e a p p a r e n t l y i n v a r i a b l e r e g u l a r -
i t i e s , do. And i t i s p r e c i s e l y i n respect o f h i s 
a b i l i t y t o act r a t i o n a l l y m r e l a t i o n t o na t u r e t h a t 
man's p o s i t i o n i s s a i d t o d i f f e r from t h a t o f the r e s t 
o f c r e a t i o n . As Aquinas puts i t , 
Since the r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the 
law by i n t e l l e c t and reason, h i s share o f the 
e t e r n a l law i s c a l l e d 'law' i n the s t r i c t sense 
o f the term, f o r law belongs t o reason....The 
n o n - r a t i o n a l being, on the o t h e r hand, does not 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n law through reason. His share o f 
i t can t h e r e f o r e be c a l l e d 'law' o n l y i n a meta-
p h o r i c a l sense.®^ 
I n s h o r t , only man can be under o b l i g a t i o n s ; and o n l y 
man can i n c u r the stigma o f g u i l t when he f a i l s t o 
discharge h i s o b l i g a t i o n s . 
This p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c t i n g upon r a t i o n a l l y - d i s c o v e r e d 
' n a t u r a l ' p r i n c i p l e s does, however, r a i s e a problem -
namely, t h a t posed by the very g e n e r a l i t y o f 'laws' 
which are u n i v e r s a l i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n and f o r c e . 
For such laws are, i n the very n a t u r e o f the case, 
r a t h e r remote from p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . Reason 
r e f l e c t i n g upon man's place i n God's e t e r n a l o rder 
can, i t i s s a i d , d i s c o v e r general p r i n c i p l e s f o r i t s e l f . 
For example, since n a t u r e t e l l s him t h a t he i s a soc-
i a b l e being, the reason o f the i n d i v i d u a l concludes, 
n e g a t i v e l y , t h a t he ought not to o f f e n d those amongst 
whom he l i v e s and, p o s i t i v e l y , t h a t he ought as f a r as 
p o s s i b l e t o seek the common good o f h i s group. This 
i s a g e n e r a l ' n a t u r a l ' precept which ( s i n c e the u n i -
232. 
f o r m i t y o f nature i s taken as an absolute presuppos-
i t i o n o f the argument) i s u n i v e r s a l l y b i n d i n g upon 
a l l men always and everywhere. M a n i f e s t l y , however, 
such a precept does not take us very f a r . Although 
we can l i v e i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h such v e r y 
a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s , we p l a i n l y cannot l i v e by_ them. 
And t h i s i s so c h i e f l y because our predicament con-
s i s t s i n a succession o f p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, 
m r e l a t i o n t o which we o f t e n r e q u i r e more s p e c i f i c 
guidance than i s g i v e n by a general p r i n c i p l e . Given tha 
the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e 'do not harm your neighbour' may be 
s a i d t o 'stand t o reason', I s t i l l r e q u i r e t o know 
whether I s h a l l i n f a c t harm my neighbour i f I 0. 
I n a d d i t i o n , there are many p u r e l y contingent matters 
upon which the law o f nature does not pronounce a t a l l . 
To take a modern i l l u s t r a t i o n , i t i s n e i t h e r ' n a t u r a l ' 
nor the reverse t o d r i v e on the r i g h t o r the l e f t hand 
side o f the road. The ' n a t u r a l ' r u l e here would be 
t h a t I should secure the common good by doing what 
everybody else does. But the que s t i o n o f what the 
common p r a c t i c e should be, o f how i t should be dec-
ided upon, how enforced, and so f o r t h , are not them-
selves answered by n a t u r a l law; and n e i t h e r i s any 
one such p r a c t i c e m i t s e l f u n i v e r s a l o r immutable. 
I n a word, then, n a t u r a l law i s i n need o f p a r t i c -
u l a r i s a t i o n , extension and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . And t h i s 
r e q u i r e s r u l e s o f a t h i r d k i n d - namely, r u l e s es-
t a b l i s h e d by p u r e l y human enactment or 'human law'. 
I n t h i s connection, and i n words which once more i l l -
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u a t r a t e h i s a f f i n i t y w i t h A r i s t o t l e , Aquinas makes 
the f o l l o w i n g remarks: 
I n the sphere o f p r a c t i c a l reason, man n a t u r a l l y 
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the n a t u r a l law i n the form o f 
c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s ; but these do not 
o f themselves provide r u l e s f o r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s . 
. . . I t i s t h e r e f o r e necessary t o proceed by human 
reasoning beyond f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s t o the s e t t i n g 
up o f c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r r u l e s . 
P r a c t i c a l reason i s concerned w i t h t h a t which i s 
capable o f being a l t e r e d by a c t i v i t y - t h a t i s 
t o say, w i t h whatever i s i n d i v i d u a l and c o n t i n -
gent r a t h e r than (as w i t h t h e o r e t i c a l reason) 
w i t h what i s necessary. Human laws, t h e r e f o r e , 
cannot have the f i n a l c e r t i t u d e and i n f a l l i b i l i t y 
o f the deductive sciences. N e i t h e r i s i t necessary 
t h a t every standard should have such f i n a l c e r t -
i t u d e and i n f a l l i b i l i t y , provided only t h a t i t 
has as gr e a t a degree o f c e r t a i n t y as something 
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o f i t s k i n d i s capable o f having. 
I n connection w i t h the second o f these two passages, 
we note t h a t , a l t h o u g h the f o r m u l a t i o n o f human laws 
lessens the g e n e r a l i t y o f n a t u r a l law, i t does not 
e n t i r e l y e l i m i n a t e i t . Aquinas' p o i n t i s the same as 
A r i s t o t l e ' s : t h a t i t i s a mistake t o demand o f e t h i c s 
more p r e c i s i o n than the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r i s capable o f 
y i e l d i n g . When we 'proceed by human reasoning...to 
the s e t t i n g up by l e g i s l a t i o n o f c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r 
r u l e s ' , we are engaging i n a process o f deduction -
o f moving from what i s g e neral t o what i s p a r t i c u l a r . 
We might, f o r i n s t a n c e , proceed along the f o l l o w i n g 
l i n e s . 
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I t i s wrong t o do harm t o my neighbour; 
To s t e a l from my neighbour i s t o do him harm; 
Therefore I ought not t o s t e a l from my neighbour. 
Thus, a human law ( p r o s c r i b i n g t h e f t ) might i n a sense 
be s a i d t o ' f o l l o w from' the gen e r a l ' n a t u r a l ' pre-
cept t h a t i t i s wrong t o do harm. The three s t a t e -
ments g i v e n above are n o t , a f t e r a l l , merely thrown 
t o g e t h e r a t random. But, a t the same time, t h i s f e a t 
o f ' p r a c t i c a l reasoning' - t h i s ' p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m ' 
- does not f u r n i s h the f o r m a l c e r t a i n t y o f (say) 
ge o m e t r i c a l deduction: i t does n o t provide r u l e s 
which determine t h e i r own a p p l i c a t i o n . Thus, r u l e s 
o f conduct deduced i n t h i s somewhat loose sense from 
general p r i n c i p l e s must be f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t e d i n 
the l i g h t o f what the circumstances i n which they are 
t o apply a c t u a l l y are. Thus, even a f t e r the human 
law p r o s c r i b i n g t h e f t has been f o r m u l a t e d , the ques-
t i o n o f which p a r t i c u l a r acts count as t h e f t remains 
open. Human laws, i n s h o r t , r e q u i r e constant admin-
i s t r a t i o n and a d j u d i c a t i o n i n the l i g h t o f p r a c t i c a l 
reason. I n t u r n , such reasoning must be conducted i n 
the l i g h t o f what i s n a t u r a l l y r i g h t , but the n a t u r a l 
law i t s e l f does not pro v i d e guidance on p o i n t s o f 
d e t a i l and a p p l i c a t i o n . 
This i n h e r e n t ambiguity o r 'spongmess' o f bot h 
n a t u r a l and human law b r i n g s us c o n v e n i e n t l y t o 
Aquinas' c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the na t u r e and r o l e o f d i v i n e 
law. F i r s t o f a l l , d i v i n e law d i f f e r s from the e t e r n a l 
and t h e r e f o r e from the n a t u r a l , law i n t h a t i t i s pos-
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i t l v e . I n o t h e r worda, i t i s a product o f God's w i l l 
r a t h e r than an aspect o r m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f h i s r a t i o n a l 
n a t u r e . As such, i t could be changed from time t o 
time. Indeed, such changes have occurred - the d i v i n e 
law i s d i v i d e d i n t o an o l d law and a new, contained i n 
the Old and Mew Testaments r e s p e c t i v e l y . E t e r n a l law, 
on the o t h e r hand, i S j as one might expect, immutable: 
God may w i l l d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s from time t o time, but 
he w i l l n ot deny h i s own n a t u r e by a c t i n g against 
reason. (Whether he could a c t against reason o r not 
i s a vexed question; but t h i s , f o r our present pur-
poses, i s n e i t h e r here nor t h e r e . ) And s i m i l a r r e -
marks apply to n a t u r a l law, except t o the extent t h a t 
secondary precepts d e r i v e d from n a t u r a l law may be 
d e f e a s i b l e m r e l a t i o n t o p a r t i c u l a r circumstances. 
The p o s i t i v e d i v i n e law, however, i s necessary i n add-
i t i o n t o the o t h e r forms o f law f o r the f o l l o w i n g 
reasons. F i r s t , n a t u r a l law only provides guidance 
towards the achievement o f the common good o f men on 
e a r t h . I t does not immediately bear upon the achieve-
ment o f the u l t i m a t e end o f e t e r n a l b e a t i t u d e . And 
th e r e are many t h i n g s which do bear upon t h i s u l t i m a t e 
end which are not immediately obvious t o the reason: 
keeping h o l y the sabbath day and not worshipping graven 
images are examples. Second, and as we have seen, 
human laws c o v e r i n g the same k i n d o f behaviour may 
vary w i d e l y from one another from place to place o r from 
time t o time, p r e c i s e l y because they do n o t have 'the 
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f i n a l c e r t i t u d e and i n f a l l i b i l i t y o f the deductive 
sciences.' Indeed, they may m a l l good f a i t h come 
a c t u a l l y i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h one another, simply because 
d i f f e r e n t men evaluate d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s i n d i f f -
e rent ways. There are, however, no two ways about 
the achievement o f b e a t i t u d e ; and a ma t t e r o f such 
moment c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s d e t a i l e d and unambiguous 
i n s t r u c t i o n . T h i r d , human l e g i s l a t i o n can be drawn 
up o n l y w i t h r e g a r d t o p u r e l y e x t e r n a l m a t t e r s ; but 
the f a c t i s t h a t many t h i n g s are si n s which are not 
crimes. I t i s o n l y from s c r i p t u r e , f o r example, t h a t 
we know t h a t covetousness i s s i n f u l . Thus, since 
human law was unable adequately t o r e s t r a i n 
and d i r e c t inward a c t s . . . i t was necessary t h a t 
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the d i v i n e law be added t o i t f o r t h i s purpose. 
F i n a l l y , human law i s f a l l i b l e . Not o n l y i s i t the 
case t h a t not every o f f e n d e r against human law i s 
caught and punished. I t i s also the case t h a t human 
law sometimes d e l i b e r a t e l y abstains from a c h i e v i n g 
a l l t h a t i t might achieve. I t r e f r a i n s from t a k i n g 
every e x t e r n a l a c t i n t o account since, i f i t were 
t o t r y t o e l i m i n a t e a l l e v i l s , i t would i n e v i t a b l y 
d e s t r o y much t h a t i s good a l s o . 
I n order, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t no e v i l should remain 
unproscribed and unpunished, i t was necessary 
t h a t a d i v i n e law be added, by which a l l s i n s 
are f o r b i d d e n . 8 6 
I n view o f i t s s t a n d i n g m r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r a l law 
on the one hand and d i v i n e law on the o t h e r , i t i s 
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easy t o see t h a t human law must operate under c e r t a i n 
l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . F i r s t of a l l , as we have alread y 
seen, matters u l t i m a t e l y r e l a t i n g t o s a l v a t i o n f a l l 
o u t s i d e i t s scope. These are covered by the d i v i n e 
law contained m s c r i p t u r e ; and what t h i s means i n 
e f f e c t , o f course, i s t h a t they are the s p e c i a l resp-
o n s i b i l i t y o f the Church, which i s e n t r u s t e d w i t h the 
a p p l i c a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s c r i p t u r e . This 
d i v i s i o n o f r o l e s i s such as t o imply, once again, 
t h a t the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l o r s p i r i t u a l power i s s u p e r i o r 
t o the s e c u l a r o r temporal. I t e s t a b l i s h e s t o 
Aquinas' s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t " t o the Summus Sacerdos, 
the successor o f Peter and the V i c a r o f C h r i s t , ' a l l 
kings i n Christendom should be s u b j e c t , as t o the 
Lord Jesus C h r i s t h i m s e l f . ' " ^ U s i n g the k i n d o f 
s i m i l e o f which bo t h P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e had been fond, 
St Thomas suggests t h a t the r o l e o f the Prince i s l i k e 
t h a t o f the ship's carpenter. His j o b i s t o keep 
the v e s s e l i n good r e p a i r f o r the d u r a t i o n o f the 
voyage. The Church, on the o t h e r hand, i s l i k e the 
ship's master, whose f u n c t i o n i s t o s t e e r a c c u r a t e l y 
t o the appointed d e s t i n a t i o n . This s i m i l e i s h a r d l y 
f l a t t e r i n g t o the Prince; but t h a t , so f a r as St 
88 
Thomas i s concerned, i s too bad. 
Second, so f a r as the st a n d i n g o f human law i n r e -
l a t i o n t o n a t u r a l law i s concerned, St Thomas' remarks 
echo the dictum o f the Decretum t h a t 'anything accepted 
as custom o r i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o l e g i s l a t i o n which i s 
c o n t r a r y t o the n a t u r a l law i s to be considered n u l l 
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and v o i d . ' And i t seems t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , he has i n 
mind s i t u a t i o n s o f two k i n d s . F i r s t , and most ob-
v i o u s l y , there i s the case o f the human law which 
stands m f l a g r a n t breach o f a precept o f n a t u r e , o r 
which winks a t the i n f r i n g e m e n t o f such a precept. (A 
p o s i t i v e law p e r m i t t i n g , e n j o i n i n g or not f o r b i d d i n g 
usury would be a case i n p o i n t . ) Any such law i s not 
r e a l l y 'law' a t a l l : i t s enforcement - indeed, i t s 
ve r y existence - amounts t o n o t h i n g more than an a c t 
o f v i o l e n c e . Second, there are the laws o f the ' r u l e s 
o f the road' type - i . e . the range o f laws which are 
m o r a l l y n e u t r a l matters of convenience, which do not 
e i t h e r i n f r i n g e o r uphold a precept of n a t u r e . I n 
s p e c i a l circumstances, such r u l e s as these might be 
r e q u i r e d t o g i v e way t o the h i g h e r requirements o f 
n a t u r a l j u s t i c e ; and an a c t u a l example o f t h i s de-
f e a s i b i l i t y i s p r o v i d e d by Aquinas' treatment o f the 
laws which r e g u l a t e p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . 
I t i s i n t h i s connection important t o note t h a t 
Aquinas does not share the P a t r i s t i c a t t i t u d e towards 
the i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . That i s , he does 
n o t regard i t t o u t c o u r t as ' u n n a t u r a l ' - as a r e g r e t -
t a b l e but necessary consequence o f the f a l l . Indeed, 
h i s view i s best i l l u s t r a t e d i n h i s own words: 
E x t e r n a l t h i n g s may be considered m two senses. 
F i r s t , as to t h e i r n a t u r e , which does not f a l l 
w i t h i n the power o f mankind, but o n l y w i t h i n t h a t 
o f the d i v i n e power whose w i l l a l l t h i n g s obey. 
Second, as t o the use o f such t h i n g s ; and here 
man has a n a t u r a l c o n t r o l over e x t e r n a l s , since he 
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i s able by means o f h i s reason and w i l l t o make 
use o f e x t e r n a l t h i n g s f o r h i s own purposes, as 
though i t were f o r t h i s t h a t they were made. For 
... i m p e r f e c t t h i n g s always e x i s t f o r the b e n e f i t 
o f more p e r f e c t t h i n g s . On t h i s p r i n c i p l e , the 
Philosopher ( i . e . A r i s t o t l e ) shows t h a t the 
possession o f e x t e r n a l t h i n g s i s n a t u r a l t o man. ®* 
As f a r as Aquinas i s concerned, any r e s t r i c t i o n im-
posed upon the use o f e x t e r n a l s by one i n d i v i d u a l as 
agains t another would be r e p r e h e n s i b l e as an i n f r i n g e -
ment of the common ' n a t u r a l c o n t r o l over e x t e r n a l s ' . 
P r i v a t e ownership as such, however, does not i n the 
o r d i n a r y way contravene the requirements o f n a t u r e . 
On -the c o n t r a r y , i t i s a convenience which f a c i l -
i t a t e s the o r d e r l y p u r s u i t o f p r a c t i c a l purposes, 
and i s intended f o r no purpose more m o r a l l y momentous 
than t h a t o f se c u r i n g t h i s convenience. I t s f u n c t i o n 
a l i t y i n t h i s respect a r i s e s out o f the f o l l o w i n g 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
F i r s t , because everyone i s more concerned w i t h ob 
t a m i n g t h a t which has t o do w i t h no-one but him-
s e l f than w i t h t h a t which i s common t o a l l o r 
shared by many; since everyone, w i s h i n g t o avoid 
l a b o u r , leaves t o others whatever concerns the 
community as a w h o l e . . . . S i m i l a r l y , because human 
a f f a i r s are c a r r i e d on w i t h g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y 
when each man has h i s own p a r t i c u l a r business t o 
a t t e n d t o - the r e would be u t t e r confusion i f 
everybody t r i e d t o do e v e r y t h i n g . And, t h i r d , 
because t h i s produces a more peaceful s t a t e o f 
t h i n g s between men (assuming, t h a t i s , t h a t every 
one i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h what he has.). Quarrels 
are most l i k e l y to break out between people who 
own p r o p e r t y m common and j o i n t l y . 90 
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There i s , then, a d i s t i n c t i o n ( d e r i v e d from A r i s t o t l e ) 
t o be observed i n d i s c u s s i n g the p r o v i s i o n s o f n a t -
u r a l law concerning p r o p e r t y . The d i s t i n c t i o n i s one 
between p r i v a t e ownership i n the sense o f the power 
t o a c q u i r e and dispose o f goods, and common possession 
i n the sense o f a common r i g h t t o the use o f such goods. 
P r i v a t e ownership i s not a p a r t of n a t u r a l law; but 
i t does not i n f r i n g e i t , e i t h e r , provided t h a t the 
n a t u r a l r i g h t o f common use i s not disregarded* 
The possession o f t h i n g s i n common i s t o be a t t -
r i b u t e d t o n a t u r a l law, not because n a t u r a l 
law s t i p u l a t e s t h a t a l l t h i n g s are t o be h e l d 
i n common w i t h o u t p r i v a t e ownership, but be-
cause p r o p e r t y - d i s t i n c t i o n s are i n accordance 
w i t h human agreements r a t h e r than w i t h n a t u r a l 
law. I n o t h e r words, they are a p a r t o f pos-
i t i v e l a w . . . . P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i s t h e r e f o r e not 
c o n t r a r y t o n a t u r a l law, but an a d d i t i o n to n a t -
u r a l law, devised by human reason. ^ 
I n view o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , however, the r e w i l l 
o b v i o u s l y be occasion upon which p o s i t i v e laws es-
t a b l i s h i n g p r i v a t e ownership w i l l be ove r r i d d e n o r 
n u l l i f i e d by more pressing claims, themselves r e s t i n g 
upon the requirements of n a t u r a l law. Thus, 
The p r o v i s i o n s o f a human law cannot p o s s i b l y 
derogate from those o f n a t u r a l o r d i v i n e laws. 
Now, according t o the law o f n a t u r e , i n s t i t u t e d 
by the d i v i n e providence, m a t e r i a l goods are i n -
tended f o r the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f human needs. The 
d i s t r i b u t i o n and a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f such t h i n g s , 
t h e r e f o r e - which proceeds from human law - must 
not stand m the way o f the a c t u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n 
o f human needs by such t h i n g s . Thus, whatever a 
man has m g r e a t e r q u a n t i t y than he needs i s , 
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under n a t u r a l law, due t o the poor f o r t h e i r 
support....Since there are many who are i n need, 
and since they cannot a l l be r e l i e v e d from the 
same source, i t i s l e f t t o the d i s c r e t i o n o f each 
man t o provide from h i s own p r o p e r t y f o r the 
r e l i e f o f the needy. But i f there i s such urgent 
and evident n e c e s s i t y as t o create an i m p e r a t i v e 
need f o r e s s e n t i a l r e l i e f ( i f , f o r example, a 
person i s imminently i n danger of having no means 
o f p r o v i d i n g f o r h i m s e l f a t a l l ) , then he may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y take what i s necessary from the 
p r o p e r t y o f another. S t r i c t l y speaking, t h i s 
i s n e i t h e r f r a u d nor t h e f t . ^ 
So f a r as those laws which a c t u a l l y i n f r i n g e n a t u r a l 
laws are concerned, i t must be remembered t h a t , though 
t h e r e i s very l i t t l e room i n the predominantly h i e r -
a r c h i c a l p o l i t i c a l conceptions o f the middle ages f o r 
the c l a s s i c a l i d e a l o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t i s 
nevertheless Aquinas' view t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e can 
pro v i d e the means whereby the h i g h e r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
o f human nature may be r e a l i s e d . P o l i t i c a l l i f e i s 
s a i d once more t o be n a t u r a l t o man; and, i n face 
o f t h i s , the s t a r k nature-convention d i s j u n c t i o n o f 
e a r l i e r C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l thought goes i n t o abeyance. 
Canon law had, i n f a c t , a l r e a d y proposed t h a t an appeal 
t o n a t u r e might serve as a remedy, i n the hands o f the 
Church, f o r the worst defects o f an i n h e r e n t l y unnat-
u r a l system. But, under Aquinas' t u t e l a g e , n a t u r a l 
law i s erected as a l a s t - r e s o r t e t h i c a l c r i t e r i o n by 
which man can evaluate, and i f necessary condemn, a 
g i v e n o r g a n i s a t i o n i n terms o f i t s correspondence or 
lac k o f correspondence w i t h a n a t u r a l model. 
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I n human a f f a i r s , something i s s a i d t o be j u s t 
when i t p r o p e r l y corresponds t o the r u l e o f rea-
son; and, as we have seen al r e a d y , the primary 
r u l e o f reason i s n a t u r a l law. A l l man-made laws, 
t h e r e f o r e , are m accordance w i t h reason t o the 
extent t h a t they are de r i v e d from the n a t u r a l law. 
And i f a human law departs i n any s i g n i f i c a n t 
respect from n a t u r a l law, i t i s no longer l e g a l . 
Rather, i t i s a c o r r u p t i o n o f law.93 
I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n must 
i t s e l f be c o n d i t i o n a l upon the j u s t i c e o f the laws 
which the i n d i v i d u a l i s c a l l e d upon t o comply w i t h -
or, more s t r i c t l y , upon the r u l e s which he i s r e q u i r e d 
t o f o l l o w a c t u a l l y having the moral s t a t u s o f law. 
No-one i s bound t o comply w i t h r u l e s which are r e a l l y 
no more than a c t s o f f o r c e : 
Such laws, t h e r e f o r e , are not b i n d i n g i n conscience, 
except perhaps m order to av o i d scandal o r d i s -94 
turbance. * 
Man i s bound t o obey the s e c u l a r p r i n c e s i n s o f a r 
as the order o f j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s . On the o t h e r 
hand, i f the Prince's a u t h o r i t y i s not j u s t but 
usurped, o r i f he commands what i s u n j u s t , h i s 
sub j e c t s are not bound t o obey him, except per-
haps i n s p e c i a l circumstances, t o av o i d scandal 
o r danger. 95 
But Aquinas does not merely wish t o r e i t e r a t e the 
Aug u s t i n i a n i n j u n c t i o n t o 'ignore' or p a s s i v e l y t o 
disobey the Prince and s u f f e r the consequences. On 
the c o n t r a r y , h i s a s s e r t i o n i s t h a t the u n j u s t Prince 
has no a u t h o r i t y , and t h a t h i s s u b j e c t s are e n t i t l e d 
t o take c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n against him. He does not 
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use the stock vocabulary o f p o l i t i c a l theory w i t h the 
p r e c i s i o n which we are now accustomed t o r e q u i r e . For 
example, he does not f i n d i t odd t o t a l k o f ' u n j u s t ' 
o r 'usurped' a u t h o r i t y r a t h e r than u n j u s t o r usurped 
power. Also, h i s q u a l i f i e r s might be thought a l i t t l e 
compromising - 'scandal and di s t u r b a n c e ' f o r whom9 
But h i s o v e r a l l meaning i s nev e r t h e l e s s c l e a r from h i s 
remarks. The u n j u s t or us u r p i n g Prince i s simply 
n o t r e a l l y a P r i n c e . His r u l e i s the u n n a t u r a l one 
o f the t y r a n t o r the keeper o f slaves: 
The regime o f the t y r a n t . . . i s n ot ordered towards 
the common good but towards the p r i v a t e good o f 
the r u l e r . This p o i n t i s made by the Philosopher 
i n Book Three o f h i s P o l i t i c s and Book Eight o f 
h i s (NicomachQan) E t h i c s . Consequently, t o d i s -
r u p t government o f t h i s k i n d i s n ot s e d i t i o n 
( p e r t u r b a t i o huius r e g i m i m s non habet rationem 
s e d i t i o n i s ) . . . . I n d e e d , i t i s the t y r a n t h i m s e l f 
who i s s e d i t i o u s , since he nourishes d i s c o r d and 
s e d i t i o n amongst h i s s u b j e c t s i n order t h a t he 
may dominate them the more e f f e c t i v e l y . This i s 
tyranny, which conduces t o the p r i v a t e good o f 
the r u l e r and t o the i n j u r y o f the multitude.96 
I t would n o t , however, be t r u e t o say t h a t Aquinas 
develops a n y t h i n g l i k e an unambiguous th e o r y o f r e s -
i s t a n c e . He does n o t , m f a c t , g i v e a c o n s i s t e n t * 
account o f how t h i s ' p e r t u r b a t i o n ' o f a t y r a n n i c a l 
government should be conducted, or o f how f a r i t should 
go. I n the e a r l y Scnptum Super L i b r o s Sententiarum. 
Aquinas f o l l o w s John o f S a l i s b u r y m a c t u a l l y suggest-
i n g t h a t , when a t y r a n t seizes power by f o r c e and ag a i n s t 
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the wishes of those who then become h i s ' s u b j e c t s ' , 
he may r i g h t l y be assassinated i f there i s no e a r t h l y 
s u p e r i o r t o whom h i s v i c t i m s can appeal. T h i s , how-
ever, does not appear to represent h i s mature judgment. 
L a t e r ( i n the De Reffimme Pnncipum and the Summa 
Theologica) he stresses the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f t a k i n g 
every p o s s i b l e p r e c a u t i o n a g a i n s t tyranny - by t r y i n g 
t o secure a Prince whose personal q u a l i t i e s predispose 
him a g a i n s t tyranny, and by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y l i m i t i n g 
h i s powers. Also, i n the De Regimme Pnncipum, he 
abandons t y r a n n i c i d e and suggests i n s t e a d t h a t the 
r u l e r who becomes a t y r a n t should be desposed peace-
f u l l y , by whatever means are a p p r o p r i a t e to l o c a l 
p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . The u n d e r l y i n g thought, however, 
i s c l e a r . We may look to n a t u r e , not o n l y f o r moral 
standards, but f o r p o l i t i c a l standards as w e l l . The 
basis o f p o l i t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e i s the c o n f o r m i t y o f 
the r u l e r t o values which he does not create and may 
not abrogate. And, on the p o s i t i v e s i d e , Aquinas i s 
prepared t o accept, c o n t r a Augustine, t h a t even pagan 
States have a c e r t a i n n a t u r a l value o f t h e i r own, 
i n v i r t u e o f being the expression o f a n a t u r a l and 
r a t i o n a l order 
The d i v i n e law, which s p r i n g s from grace, does 
not d e t r a c t from human law (non t o H i t I U S humanum), 
which springs from n a t u r a l reason. The d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the f a i t h f u l and the u n f a i t h f u l , t h e r e f o r e , 
taken by i t s e l f , does not take away the dominion 
and a u t h o r i t y o f i n f i d e l s over the f a i t h f u l . Such 
a r i g h t o f government can indeed be removed by the 
Church. But t h i s the Church sometimes does and 
sometimes does not do.-*^ 
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CHAPTER FIVE. RATIONALISM, INDIVIDUALISM, 
RADICALISM. 
This chapter w i l l be somewhat le s s e x p o s i t o r y than 
i t s predecessors. We could n o t , m a s i n g l e chapter, 
d w e l l upon the seventeenth and e i g h t e e n t h century hey-
day o f n a t u r a l law m any depth; and, as we have a l -
ready s a i d , there would i n any case be l i t t l e p o i n t 
i n t r y i n g t o do so. I t w i l l be as w e l l , t h e r e f o r e , 
t o t r e a t the matter very g e n e r a l l y . I s h a l l do so 
( c h i e f l y ) by expanding and commenting upon A.P. 
d'Entreves' d e f i n i t i o n o f the s o - c a l l e d 'modern' 
theory o f n a t u r a l law i n terms o f i t s ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' , 
1 
i t s ' i n d i v i d u a l i s m ' and i t s ' r a d i c a l i s m ' . And I 
s h a l l t r y t o emphasise an aspect o f the 'modern' 
d o c t r i n e which has tended t o be overlooked i n f a v o u r 
o f i t s ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' tendencies - namely, the ess-
e n t i a l c o n t i n u i t i e s which s u b s i s t between i t and i t s 
predecessors. 
I . 
' Rationalism'/'Secularism'. 
We lo o k , f i r s t , a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'modern' 
n a t u r a l law and i t s c l a s s i c a l and medieval precursors 
i n terms o f the a l l e g e d ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' o f the modern 
v e r s i o n . And we note at once t h a t both Professor d' 
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Entrevea and S i r Ernest Barker al s o use the word 
'secular' and i t s r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i n such 
a way as t o suggest t h a t ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' and ' s e c u l a r -
ism' come to much the same t h i n g . They do, o f course, 
emphasise t h a t 'modern' n a t u r a l law i s 'modern' l a r g e l y 
i n the sense t h a t an appeal t o i t i s made m r e l a t i o n 
t o very d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l circumstances 
from those p r e v a i l i n g m c l a s s i c a l a n t i q u i t y o r the 
middle ages. And, though these d i f f e r e n t circumstances 
are very f a m i l i a r , we might pause f o r a moment to 
sum them up i n the words o f S i r Winston C h u r c h i l l 
( w r i t i n g o f the p e r i o d between 1688 and 1815): 'Where-
as the o l d e r conceptions had been towards a r e l i g i o u s 
u n i t y , t h e r e now opened European s t r u g g l e s f o r n a t -
i o n a l aggrandisement, m which r e l i g i o u s c u r r e n t s 
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played a d w i n d l i n g p a r t . ' Nevertheless, b o t h d'Entreves 
and Barker seem also t o wish t o suggest t h a t 'modem' 
n a t u r a l law i s m some important sense l o g i c a l l y o r 
c o n c e p t u a l l y d i f f e r e n t from i t s o l d e r c o u n t e r p a r t s . 
And t h i s i s a suggestion which we are not e n t i t l e d t o 
accept w i t h o u t f i r s t l o o k i n g r a t h e r c a r e f u l l y a t the 
f o r c e o f these two words ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' and 'secularism'. 
A c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' o f modern n a t -
u r a l law i s a l i t t l e muddied by the f a c t t h a t the term 
' r a t i o n a l i s m ' may be used i n a number o f c l e a r l y d i s -
t i n g u i s h a b l e senses, a t l e a s t three o f which are app-
l i c a b l e to the matter i n hand. The senses m question 
are a l l well-known; but i t w i l l a i d c l a r i t y t o s t a t e 
them b r i e f l y 
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(a ) There i s the sense i n which ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' i s 
opposed t o 'empiricism' - as, f o r example, m the 
phrase ' c o n t i n e n t a l r a t i o n a l i s t s ' , as a p p l i e d t o 
L e i b n i z , Descartes and Spinoza. I n t h i s sense, i t 
denotes a theory o f knowledge which emphasises the 
a p r i o r i and which holds t h a t the c r i t e r i a o f c e r t -
a i n t y are w h o l l y o r mainly i n t e l l e c t u a l and deductive 
r a t h e r than sensory and i n d u c t i v e . 
(b) There i s the sense, p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n the 
study o f medieval j u r i s p r u d e n c e , i n which ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' 
i s opposed t o 'v o l u n t a r i s m ' . I n t h i s sense, ' r a t i o n -
a l i s m ' denotes the view t h a t law d e r i v e s i t s c h a r a c t e r 
from, o r has i t s o r i g i n i n , reason r a t h e r than w i l l . 
This i s a view which we have a l r e a d y glimpsed i n Aquina 
and t o which we s h a l l r e t u r n p r e s e n t l y . More spec-
i f i c a l l y , ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' i n t h i s sense holds t h a t 
n a t u r a l law i s an aspect o f the i n h e r e n t r a t i o n a l i t y 
o f t h i n g s r a t h e r than the r e s u l t o f an o p e r a t i o n o f 
God's w i l l . 
( c ) There i s the r a t h e r l o o s e r o r more 'popular' 
sense m which ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' i s a p p l i e d to (say) 
V o l t a i r e o r Condorcet or D i d e r o t . When so used, i t 
i n d i c a t e s , amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , a view o f the w o r l d 
and o f human a c t i v i t y which does not r e l y upon any 
pr e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f a r e l i g i o u s c h a r a c t e r . 
For our purposes, the f i r s t and second o f these 
senses tend t o blend m t o one another. Given t h a t 
n a t u r a l law i s an aspect o f the r a t i o n a l n a t u r e o f 
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t h i n g s , and g i v e n alao t h a t we are r a t i o n a l creatures 
who somehow have a share o f t h a t n a t u r e , then there i s 
a l s o a sense i n which n a t u r a l law i s an aspect o f our 
human n a t u r e . I n o t h e r words, i t i s a v a i l a b l e t o our 
reason as such, w i t h o u t our having the r e l y upon any 
s p e c i a l r e v e l a t i o n . This i s a view o f which we have 
a l r e a d y seen numerous i n s t a n c e s , and we f i n d a 'mod-
ern' r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f i t i n John Locke's Essays on the 
Law o f Nature: 
I admit t h a t a l l people are by nature endowed w i t h 
reason, and I say t h a t n a t u r a l law can be known 
by reason, but from t h i s i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
f o l l o w t h a t i t i s known t o any and every one. 
For t h e r e are some who make no use o f the l i g h t 
o f reason but p r e f e r darkness and would not wish 
t o show themselves t o themselves. ^ 
But since we are searching now f o r the p r i n c i p l e 
and o r i g i n o f t h i s law and f o r the way i n which 
i t becomes known t o mankind, I declare t h a t the 
f o u n d a t i o n o f a l l knowledge of i t i s d e r i v e d from 
those t h i n g s which we p e r c e i v e through our senses. 
From these t h i n g s , then, reason and the power o f 
a r g u i n g , which are both d i s t i n c t i v e marks o f man, 
advance t o the n o t i o n o f the maker o f these t h i n g s . , 
and a t l a s t they conclude and e s t a b l i s h f o r them-
selves as c e r t a i n t h a t some D e i t y i s the author 
o f these t h i n g s . As soon as t h i s i s l a i d down, 
the n o t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l law o f n a t u r e b i n d i n g 
on a l l men n e c e s s a r i l y emerges.^ 
I n the second o f these passages, we note t h a t , a l t h o u g h 
God comes i n t o the p i c t u r e , n a t u r a l law i s not s a i d 
t o be revealed by God or t o be a c r e a t i o n o f h i s w i l l . 
Rather, the argument i s t h a t we can i n f e r n a t u r a l law 
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from the evidence given t o us by our senses o f design 
i n the un i v e r s e . I t has t o be granted t h a t t h i s i s 
q u i t e c l e a r l y a mistake. I t i s a mistake made by a 
l a r g e number o f exponents o f the argument from design 
- namely, t h a t o f i l l i c i t l y c o n f l a t i n g the n o t i o n o f 
or d e r w i t h t h a t o f purpose. When we look a t a watch, 
we see an o r d e r l y r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g between i t s 
p a r t s . ^ When we look a t the un i v e r s e , we see an orde r -
l y r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g between i t s p a r t s (so, a t 
l e a s t , i t i s s a i d ) ; but we are not e n t i t l e d to i n f e r 
from our knowledge o f the f a c t t h a t a watch has been 
made f o r some purpose t h a t the universe a l s o has been 
made f o r some purpose. Let us not d i g r e s s , however. 
For the present, l e t us simply note t h a t Aqumas and 
Locke bo t h agree t h a t our knowledge o f n a t u r a l law 
does not depend upon r e v e l a t i o n , and t h a t the e x i s -
tence o f n a t u r a l law i s not accounted f o r as an act 
o f God's w i l l . Both o f them are i n a c l e a r sense 
' r a t i o n a l i s t s ' ; but t h i s i s n ot t o say t h a t e i t h e r 
o f them takes a view o f the w o r l d i n v o l v i n g no r e l i g -
ious p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . 
( T h i s i s i n c i d e n t a l , but i t i s proper to glance 
a l s o a t Locke's suggestion t h a t we de r i v e our knowledg 
o f n a t u r a l law 'from those t h i n g s which we perceive 
through our senses 1 - an u n f o r t u n a t e way o f p u t t i n g i t 
b ut one which i s nevertheless c l e a r . This i s enough 
t o dispose o f the o b j e c t i o n ( r a i s e d by S i r James 
Stephen, f o r example) t h a t Locke's espousal o f n a t u r a l 
law c o n f l i c t s w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e , i n the Essay Con-
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c e r n m g Human Understanding, t h a t t h e r e are no i n n a t e 
ideas. Stephen's o b j e c t i o n was, o f course, made lo n g 
before Professor von Leyden's e d i t o r i a l work on Locke's 
Essays on the Law o f Nature. But he does seem to have 
overlooked the d i s t i n c t i o n drawn by Locke i n the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding between an i n n a t e 
moral idea (which i s nonsense) and a ' n a t u r a l law': 
I would not be here mistaken as i f , because I 
deny an i n n a t e law, I thought there were none but 
p o s i t i v e laws. There i s a great deal o f d i f f -
erence between an i n n a t e law and a law o f n a t u r e ; 
between something i m p r i n t e d on our minds i n t h e i r 
v ery o r i g i n a l , and something t h a t we, being i g -
norant o f , may a t t a i n t o the knowledge o f by the 
use and a p p l i c a t i o n o f our n a t u r a l f a c u l t i e s . ^ 
I n h i s own use o f the term ' r a t i o n a l i s t i c ' and i t s 
grammatical r e l a t i v e s , i t seems t h a t P rofessor d'En-
tr e v e s c o n f l a t e s the f i r s t and t h i r d o f the senses 
g i v e n above. He wishes to i n d i c a t e t h a t the seventeenth 
and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y d o c t r i n e , as adopted by Hobbes, 
Locke, Pufendorf, J e f f e r s o n o r the French R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s 
o f 1789, 'has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h theology. I t i s a 
p u r e l y r a t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , though i t does not r e f -
use t o pay homage t o some remote n o t i o n o f God.' 
And, s t r i c t l y speaking, o f course, t h i s i s an unacc-
e p t a b l y loose way o f p u t t i n g i t . N a t u r a l law has never 
had a n y t h i n g ' to do w i t h theology* i n any f o r m a l sense. 
I t i s an aspect, not o f theology, but o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e 
and moral and p o l i t i c a l thought. I t i s t r u e t h a t , 
i n the middle ages, these were matters w i t h which men 
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who also happened t o be theologians - o r a t l e a s t 
churchmen - were concerned. But the medieval Church's 
v i r t u a l monopoly o f l i t e r a c y and l e a r n i n g i s p u r e l y 
c o n t i n g e n t . I t does not t e l l us a n y t h i n g about the 
i n n e r r a t i o n a l e of e i t h e r medieval o r modern n a t u r a l 
law. I t c e r t a i n l y does not e s t a b l i s h t h a t the f o r -
mer i s a species o f theology, and i t i s odd t h a t 
t h i s p o i n t should so commonly have escaped n o t i c e . 
Also, we n o t i c e t h a t the use o f the word 'secular' 
which we have mentioned does not make any c l e a r d i s -
t i n c t i o n between two important senses o f the word -
namely, ' n o n - e c c l e s i a s t i c a l * and ' n o n - r e l i g i o u s ' . 
This i s a d i s t i n c t i o n i n respect o f which confusion 
i s apt t o a r i s e and i t i s , f o r our purposes, an 
important d i s t i n c t i o n . 
We n o t i c e , then, t h a t there i s an e s s e n t i a l con-
t i n u i t y between the p o s i t i o n o f St Thomas and t h a t o f 
Locke ( a l t h o u g h v i r t u a l l y any two examples would have 
i l l u s t r a t e d such a c o n t i n u i t y ) . I n the f o l l o w i n g 
pages, we s h a l l a m p l i f y t h i s c o n t i n u i t y by c o n s i d e r i n g 
two themes. F i r s t , we s h a l l n o t i c e t h a t the ' r a t i o n -
a l i s m ' o f the 'modern' theory o f n a t u r a l law i s , 
a f t e r a l l , not a p a r t i c u l a r index o f i t s modernity. 
Second, we s h a l l a l s o n o t i c e t h a t , i f 'secular' i s 
taken to mean ' n o n - r e l i g i o u s ' (a sense which i t s use 
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the ambiguous word ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' 
tends to promote), then i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o the 'modern' 
theory o f n a t u r a l law i s simply beside the p o i n t . The 
n a t u r a l - l a w argument has never been h e l d t o depend 
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upon r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , and r e c o g n i t i o n o f i t s sep-
arateness from such b e l i e f f a r predates what are 
c a l l e d 'modern' times. And from t h i s , i t w i l l emerge 
t h a t the o t h e r (and weaker) sense o f the word 'secular' 
- i . e . ' n o n - e c c l e s i a s t i c a l ' - i s the o n l y sense i n 
which the term r e a l l y a p p l i e s i n the present c o n t e x t . 
I I . 
I t i s customary t o regard Hugo Gro t i u s as the 
founding f a t h e r o f the 'modern' v e r s i o n o f n a t u r a l law. 
This i s a judgment which a p p a r e n t l y goes back t o the 
f i r s t incumbent o f the f i r s t Chair o f N a t u r a l Law t o 
be endowed m a German U n i v e r s i t y ( H e i d e l b e r g ) -
Samuel von Pufendorf. The f o l l o w i n g judgment of T.A. 
Walker i s , however, r a t h e r nearer the mark: 'There 
was l i t t l e n o v e l i n the l e g a l system o f G r o t i u s , and 
t h e r e was e q u a l l y but l i t t l e o r i g i n a l i n e i t h e r the 
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arrangement o r the matter o f h i s work.' Moreover, 
the frequent s u p p o s i t i o n ( o r apparent s u p p o s i t i o n ) 
t h a t G r o t i u s was engaged i n an academic c r i t i q u e o f 
previous w r i t e r s on n a t u r a l law i s q u i t e unfounded. 
His e a r l i e r and l i t t l e - k n o w n work, the De l u r e Praedae, 
was w r i t t e n m the Dutch i n t e r e s t as p a r t o f a d i s -
pute w i t h Spain and P o r t u g a l over the Dutch s e i z u r e 
o f a Portuguese vessel i n the S t r a i t s o f Malacca; and, 
on h i s own account, the more famous De l u r e B e l l i et 
Pacis was motivated by s t r i c t l y p r a c t i c a l , a l b e i t f a r 
wider, concerns. « 
G r o t i u s , however, i s c e r t a i n l y ' r a t i o n a l i s t i c ' , and 
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he c e r t a i n l y makes some very heterodox-sounding claims. 
I t i s p o s s i b l e , he suggests, t o 
r e f e r the proofs o f t h i n g s which concern the laws 
o f n a t u r e t o c e r t a i n fundamental conceptions which 
are beyond question - t h a t i s , which are such t h a t 
no-one can c o n t r a d i c t them w i t h o u t doing v i o l e n c e 
t o h i m s e l f . For the p r i n c i p l e s o f t h a t law...are 
i n themselves manifest and c l e a r . Indeed, they 
are almost as evident as are those t h i n g s which 
we perceive e x t e r n a l l y by means of the s e n s e s . ^ 
The l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s o f n a t u r a l law are, G r o t i u s sugg-
e s t s , as much s e l f - e v i d e n t when considered i n the ab-
s t r a c t as are the p r i n c i p l e s o f mathematics i t s e l f . 
What i s more, 
The law o f n a t u r e . . . i s immutable. Not even God 
h i m s e l f can change i t . L i m i t l e s s as i s God's 
power, we can nevertheless i d e n t i f y c e r t a i n areas 
i n t o which i t does not extend.... Thus, j u s t as 
God cannot make two and two equal n o t - f o u r , so 
al s o he cannot cause t h a t which i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
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e v i l t o be n o t - e v i l . 1 
F i n a l l y , o f course, there i s h i s o f t - q u o t e d c l a i m t h a t 
what he has t o say about n a t u r a l law would s t i l l 'be 
v a l i d ' 
Even i f i t were to be conceded t h a t God does not 
e x i s t (which concession cannot be granted w i t h o u t 
the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e wickedness), or t h a t he 
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takes no i n t e r e s t m human concerns. 
I t i s w o r t h r e i t e r a t i n g , however, t h a t , m s p i t e o f 
the immediately s t r i k i n g appearance o f a l l t h i s , 
G r o t i us simply does not have the 'modernity' which has 
so o f t e n been a t t r i b u t e d to him. Even i n the f i e l d o f 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, which i s supposed to be his own 
special province, he had been to a large extent a n t i -
cipated by the Spanish schoolmen Francisco Suarez and 
Francisco de V i t t o r i a . And we note, i n a d d i t i o n , that 
his treatment of n a t u r a l law i s based upon consider-
ations of a kind which have been f a m i l i a r since the 
time of Plato: 
Amongst the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of man i s a press-
ing desire f o r society - not of any and every 
kind, but f o r a s o c i a l l i f e which i s peace-
f u l and organised as f a r as the l i m i t s of 
the i n t e l l e c t allow w i t h others of his kind. 
...This maintenance of the so c i a l order... 
which i s consonant w i t h the human i n t e l l e c t 
i t s e l f . . . i s the o r i g i n of law properly so-
ca l l e d . This sphere of law includes r e f r a i n i n g 
from taking that which belongs to another; 
r e s t o r i n g to another anything of his that 
we might have, together w i t h any gains 
derived from i t ; the o b l i g a t i o n to honour 
promises; the making-good of any losses 
which arise out of our own f a u l t ; and the 
i n f l i c t i o n of penalties upon offenders 
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according to what they deserve. 
Also, although his assertion that n a t u r a l law has a 
quasi-mathematical exactitude may be c i t e d as an 
instance of the seventeenth-century -fascination 
w i t h deduction, we must not forget that Aquinas himself 
- and, f o r that matter, Plato and A r i s t o t l e - had 
adopted the deductive method as the means by which 
we are to a r r i v e at the precepts of natu r a l law. As 
Aquinas puts i t , 
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Theoretical reasoning begins from indemonstrable 
f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s which are known by nature, and 
produces from these the conclusions of a l l the 
d i f f e r e n t sciences. This knowledge i s not nat-
u r a l l y i n t r i n s i c to us, but i s acquired by e f f o r t 
of reasoning. I n the same way, i n the prac-
t i c a l realm, reason begins from the precepts of 
n a t u r a l law, which are universal and indemon-
stra b l e p r i n c i p l e s ; but i t must proceed to a 
more p a r t i c u l a r deduction of s p e c i f i c rules. 14 
F i n a l l y , i t i s as w e l l to be clear that Grotius does 
not push the theme of God's possible non-existence 
very hard or very f a r . Immediately a f t e r the famous 
'even i f God did not e x i s t ' passage, he goes on to 
say that 
The precise opposite of t h i s view has been i n c u l -
cated i n us, p a r t l y by reason and p a r t l y by a 
continuous t r a d i t i o n . What i s more, i t has been 
supported by many proofs and by unanimously-
attested miracles. Prom t h i s , i t follows that 
we must always obey God our creator, to whom 
we owe a l l that we are and a l l that we have.... 
The law of nature, proceeding as i t does from 
essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s implanted m man, 
can nevertheless r i g h t l y be a t t r i b u t e d to God, 
since i t i s he who has w i l l e d that there should 
be such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s m us.^5 
Grotius' point, i n short, i s that the laws of nature 
derive t h e i r v a l i d i t y from no more than t h e i r being 
appropriate to what we are. The state of a f f a i r s 
c o n s t i t u t e d by our a c t u a l l y being what we are, how-
ever, i s a t t r i b u t e d to God. I n other words, Grotius' 
'rationalism' does not seem to be accompanied by a 
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notion of God which i a only 'somewhat remote'. What 
i s more, i t very quickly becomes clear that t h i s 
'rationalism' i s i t s e l f by no means a d i s t i n c t i v e 
signal of his 'modernity'. 
This i s immediately apparent from the b r i e f e s t 
glance at the ' r a t i o n a l i s t ' (as d i s t i n c t from 
' v o l u n t a n s t •) theory of na t u r a l law developed, not 
only by Aquinas, but also by Gabriel B i e l , Francisco 
Suarez, Gabriel Vasquez and others. One of the cen-
t r a l contentions of t h i s theory i s that God has not 
made the natu r a l law and cannot change i t . The 
nat u r a l law i s simply timeless reason m i t s a p p l i c a t i 
to the human predicament, and not even God can act 
against reason, since reason i s a part of his very 
being. He cannot, f o r example, cause the past to be 
other than i t i s ; and he cannot command us to hate 
him. Stating the matter at i t s most general, God 
cannot act i n any way which w i l l i n f r i n g e the law 
of c o n t r a d i c t i o n . As Aquinas puts i t , 
There does not f a l l under the scope of God's 
omnipotence anything i n which a con t r a d i c t i o n 
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i s implied. 
(We can only regret the fa c t that t h i s passage, taken 
l i t e r a l l y , i s a piece of the purest nonsense. ) Indeed 
on one occasion, Aquinas suggests that i t would be 
blasphemous even to suggest that God could act i r r -
a t i o n a l l y . I n short, then, of the two p o s s i b i l i t i e s -
that God w i l l s us to obey the n a t u r a l law because i t 
i s r i g h t , and that i t i s r i g h t that we should obey the 
257. 
n a t u r a l law because God w i l l s i t - the ' r a t i o n a l i s t ' 
theory opts f o r the former. I t i s conceded - by 
Suarez, f o r example - that the command of God may 
properly be said to be that which binds us to obey 
the n a t u r a l law as law i n the s t r i c t sense of the term} 
f o r law i s by d e f i n i t i o n that which i s commanded by 
a superior. But although God's w i l l may be said to 
make na t u r a l law obligatory, i t does not create i t 
and i t does not make i t r i g h t . I t i s r i g h t i n i t s e l f , 
qua r a t i o n a l , and independently of any v o l i t i o n . 
Thus, the independence of the Tightness of n a t u r a l 
law from any creative or v o l i t i o n a l act of God i s 
not, a f t e r a l l , a peculiar feature of the 'modern' 
theory of n a t u r a l law, distinguished by i t s ' r a t i o n -
alism* and/or 'secularism'. I t c e r t a i n l y i s not an 
invention of Grotius, and i t does not betoken a s t r i k i n g 
new exclusion of God from seventeenth and eighteenth 
century discussions. Indeed, i t i s most i n t e r e s t i n g 
to note the way m which the f o l l o w i n g passage from 
the f i f t e e n t h century Gabriel B i e l anticipates the 
more celebrated dictum of Grotius* 
Even i f God, who i s divine reason, did not e x i s t 
(which i s impossible).. .anyone who acted aga*mst 
r i g h t reason, whether angel or human being or 
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anything else, would s t i l l s i n . 
The hypothetical non-existence of God i s introduced, 
by B i e l and Grotius a l i k e , not as a remark about God, 
but about the ont o l o g i c a l and episteraological standing 
of n a t u r a l law i t s e l f . E s s e n t i a l l y , t h e i r point comes 
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down to t h i s : The f a c t that an action i s condemned by 
a superior being i s - at most - an i n d i c a t i o n that 
the action m question i s wrong. I t cannot be the 
ground upon which i t i s wrong unless the claim that 
there i s an absolute or objective value involved i s 
abandoned altogether. I f ( l e t us say) the needless 
i n f l i c t i o n of pain i s wrong per se t then i t would be 
wrong even i f the superior being did not condemn i t . 
S i m i l a r l y , the superior being himself would be wrong 
i f he re f r a i n e d from condemning i t - which i s why i t 
i s said that God cannot act contrary to n a t u r a l law: 
i t i s by d e f i n i t i o n impossible f o r us to say that God 
i s i n the wrong. Also, and ex hypothesi, i t would 
be wrong even i f there were no superior being to 
condemn i t . I f values are absolute, then they hold 
independently of what anyone thinks or w i l l s . This 
i s part of what i t i s f o r a value to be absolute. 
Thus, i f you wish to operate w i t h the concept of 
na t u r a l law, you can, as i t were, take God or leave 
him. The f a c t that natural-law t a l k i n the middle 
ages i s very t i g h t l y bound up w i t h God t a l k does not, 
as we have said, establish that n a t u r a l law i s i n some 
sense a branch of theology. And, on the other hand, 
there i s plenty of God-talk m the allegedly 'secular' 
w r i t i n g s of 'modem' t h e o r i s t s . We saw t h i s a l i t t l e 
while ago m Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature; and 
Thomas Jefferson, too, speaks of a time when men 
dissolve the p o l i t i c a l bands...and...assume the 
separate and equal s t a t i o n to which the laws of 
nature and of nature's God e n t i t l e them. 1 8 
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Edmund Burke, also, v i l i f i e s anti-Catholic l e g i s l a t i o n 
as a v i o l a t i o n of, amongst other things, 
the w i l l of Him who gave us our nature and, i n 
gi v i n g , impressed an i n v a r i a b l e law upon i t . ^ 
To take one more example - the significance of which 
has come to be p a r t i c u l a r l y noticed i n recent years: 
even the allegedly a t h e i s t i c a l Thomas Hobbes q u a l i f i e s 
his account of the 'laws of nature* as follows: 
These dictates of reason men used to c a l l by the 
name of laws, but improperly* f o r they are but 
conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth 
to the conservation and defence of themselves; 
whereas law, properly, i s the word of him that 
by r i g h t hath command over others. But yet, i f 
we consider the same theorems as delivered m the 
word of God, that by r i g h t commandeth a l l things. 
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then they are properly called laws. 
There are, then, c l e a r l y good reasons f o r looking 
more closely at the d i s t i n c t i o n between two of the 
possible meanings of the word 'secular 1 and at the 
sense i n which the 'rationalism' of modern theories 
of n a t u r a l law i s supposed to be a p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n -
iendum of 'modernity'. Broadly speaking, the 'modern' 
doctrine cannot be considered apart from the accel-
e r a t i n g transformation of medieval Christendom i n t o 
u n i f i e d nation-states. Moreover, undoubtedly the 
single most important c u l t u r a l f a c t o r m t h i s pro. 
cess was the passing away, under the pressure of the 
Reformation, of the universal a u t h o r i t y of the Church 
of Rome. The continued vigour of n a t u r a l law i n these 
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changing circumstances i s indeed pla u s i b l y to be ex-
plained i n terms of i t s having become disengaged from 
i t s e c c l e s i a s t i c a l connections. But to say t h i s i s to 
poi n t , not to any fundamental l o g i c a l or conceptual 
change, but to an h i s t o r i c a l contingency. And Pro-
fessor d'Entreves rather misses the point when he 
says that 'The self-evidence of na t u r a l law has made 
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the existence of God superfluous.' On the one hand, 
i t i s demonstrable that many 'modern* exponents of 
n a t u r a l law do, m f a c t , invoke the name of God i n 
what they have to say. I t i s not immediately obvious 
what warrant there i s f o r the assertion that such 
invocations are merely l i p - s e r v i c e . On the other 
hand - and t h i s i s the crux of the matter - n a t u r a l 
law has, throughout i t s h i s t o r y , i n v a r i a b l y been seen 
as i n some sense 'self-evident' - as 'standing to 
reason'. I t i s precisely by reason of i t s s e l f -
evidence that n a t u r a l law i s said to be distinguished 
from p o s i t i v e law and from r e v e l a t i o n . I t constitutes 
a body of norms which are what they are simply m 
v i r t u e of our being what we are - a body of norms 
s p e c i f i c a l l y appropriate to us and available to us 
as r a t i o n a l beings. To say that God made us r a t i o n a l 
beings or sociable animals, or to say i n general 
terms that nature i s as i t i s because God has created 
i t m one way rather than another - t h i s i s speculative 
anthropology or cosmology; but i t i s not moral or 
s o c i a l philosophy. I t has nothing to do w i t h n a t u r a l 
law i t s e l f . That i s , i t t e l l s us nothing about the 
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l o g i c of n a t u r a l law. Even St Augustine's insistence 
that we are cut o f f from s i n from the inherent 'Tight-
ness ' of the n a t u r a l order unless and u n t i l God release 
us by Grace, i s an observation, not about n a t u r a l law, 
but about the perverted condition of the human i n t e l l -
ect and w i l l . Furthermore, i t was never essential to 
the argument that God be postulated as the commander 
through whose w i l l n a t u r a l law acquires i t s obligatory 
character. We are not, i n other words, i n e v i t a b l y 
committed by our acceptance of law to a concurrent 
acceptance of the command theory of law. I f i t be 
possible r a t i o n a l l y to i d e n t i f y a given course of action 
as the r i g h t course, then command may be regarded as 
simply i r r e l e v a n t to the question of whether or not 
we are obliged to pursue i t . I t makes perfect sense 
to say that we are obliged to pursue i t , not because 
we are commanded (although we may be commanded), but 
because i t i s r i g h t ; f o r what else does the word 
' r i g h t ' mean but 'that which we are obliged to do' 9 
A modern exponent of t h i s view i s , of course, 
Immanuel Kant. 
Through reason, we are conscious of a law to which 
a l l our maxims are subject, as i f at the same time 
a n a t u r a l order must be originated from our own 
w i l l . 2 2 
We can become conscious of pure p r a c t i c a l laws 
j u s t as we are conscious of pure t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n -
c i p l e s , by attending to the necessity w i t h which 
reason prescribes them and the el i m i n a t i o n of a l l 
empirical c o n d i t i o n s . 2 ^ 
Kant's point ( t o put i t very b r i e f l y ) i s t h i s The 
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nature of m o r a l i t y cannot be determined by r e f e r r i n g 
to any s p e c i f i c end i n the external world. Consequen-
t i a l i s t moral theory, f o r instance, i s not s a t i s f a c -
t o r y , because i t leaves unanswered the question of 
whether we should pursue one consequence m preference 
to another. Indeed, there are no a p r i o r i reasons f o r 
p r e f e r r i n g any one end to any other, so that ends-
means reasoning i s not an appropriate preparation f o r 
moral action. M o r a l i t y must simply be the a c t i v i t y 
of a r a t i o n a l being w i l l i n g according to a universal 
p r i n c i p l e of duty. Only acts done 'on p r i n c i p l e ' are 
moral acts, and we are obliged to act according to 
moral p r i n c i p l e s f o r no reason other than that they 
are moral p r i n c i p l e s - they are such that we see i t 
to be our duty to act on them. I do not suggest that 
Kant's moral theory has nothing wrong w i t h i t . On 
the contrary, I thi n k i t contains f a t a l flaws. But 
i t i s at least enough to show that we are not nec-
e s s a r i l y committed to the idea t h a t , i f a maxim i s 
to be binding on us, i t must be put as a command by 
an acknowledged commander. 
I n a n u t s h e l l , then, m discussing the 'modern' 
theory of n a t u r a l law, we are not j u s t i f i e d i n saying, 
w i t h d'Entreves, that 'the existence of God' has 
become 'superfluous', f o r the existence of God has 
always been a contingent feature, and never a necessary 
presupposition, of the doctrine. At any point i n i t s 
h i s t o r y , therefore, the doctrine could have survived 
the subtraction of God - j u s t as, i f there i s s t i l l 
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anything of value i n Newtonian physics, such value i s 
ne i t h e r increased nor diminished by the f a c t that 
Newton himself thought i t proper to postulate God as 
the creator of the mechanical universe. I f the laws 
of motion hold, they do so quite independently of 
whether or not the universe was created by God, or 
of whether or not i t was created at a l l . And so, too, 
to draw an invidious p a r a l l e l , i t i s quite possible 
to hold that there are 'natural laws' which bind us 
morally and s t i l l be uncommitted as to any r e l i g i o u s 
question. 
The conclusion which we may draw from a l l t h i s i s 
that the alleged 'rationalism' and/or 'secularism' of 
'modern' n a t u r a l law are to a large extent red herr-
ings. What i s d i s t i n c t i v e about modern n a t u r a l law 
i s not the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f or otherwise of i t s ex-
ponents. Neither i s i t t h e i r contention that reason 
i s a moral f a c u l t y , nor t h e i r commitment to a p a r t i c u l a r 
understanding of what i t i s to be r a t i o n a l . Rather, 
i t i s the disentanglement of n a t u r a l law from the 
i d e o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y surrounding the CJhurch, and i t s 
redeployment i n other areas of moral and p o l i t i c a l 
discourse. We must now pass to a very broad con-
si d e r a t i o n of the kind of discourse i n r e l a t i o n to 
which 'modern' n a t u r a l law c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y stands. 
I I I . 
I n d i v idualism and Radicalism. 
Ernst Troeltsch remarks that the n a t u r a l law theories 
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of the middle ages were 'predominantly conservative'. 
This conservatism he a t t r i b u t e s m large measure, 
and no doubt c o r r e c t l y , to 'The Christian doctrine of 
i n h e r i t e d sm....Por' (he remarks) 'the realm of nat-
u r a l law was overshadowed and dominated by the King-
dom of God or the Church, and m t h i s way, and on the 
assumption that nature could never be free from the 
t a i n t of s i n , the natural-law p r i n c i p l e s of autonomy 
and r a t i o n a l s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n were kept w i t h i n d e f i n i t e 
l i m i t s and prevented from going too f a r . • 2 / * I n short, 
the damnosa haereditas of Ambrose and Augustine acted 
as a damper upon the elaims which might possibly be 
made on behalf of n a t u r a l law. We r e c a l l that the 
idea of a c t u a l l y doing away w i t h (ra t h e r than merely 
condemning and ignoring) bad laws by reference to 
n a t u r a l standards had emerged under the auspices of 
the canon lawyers. This development, however, only 
r e f l e c t e d the deep pessimism i n f e c t i n g the esteem i n 
which the Church held human nature. Also, there i s 
no doubt that i t was l a r g e l y directed towards the 
conservation of the Church's j u r i s d i c t i o n against lay 
encroachment, or i n defence of the Church's own claims 
to be e n t i t l e d to intervene i n temporal a f f a i r s . I t 
was c e r t a i n l y not an abstract assertion of the primacy 
of 'the people' or of t h e i r r i g h t to change or abolish 
a government. 
Prom the discussion m the foregoing sections, i t 
i s clear t h a t , although judgments emanating from Chris-
t i a n b e l i e f s as to the ' f a l l e n ' condition of man may 
bear upon the kind of appeals which are made to nat-
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u r a l law, they do not bear upon i t s fundamental l o g i c . 
S i m i l a r l y , the 'modern' r a d i c a l i s a t i o n and m d i v i d u a l -
i s a t i o n of n a t u r a l law, though they may be held to 
r e f l e c t changed d o c t r i n a l and s o c i a l perceptions, 
are themselves not l o g i c a l or conceptual changes i n 
the r a t i o n a l e of n a t u r a l law. Rather, they indicate 
a change of ap p l i c a t i o n occasioned by such changed 
e x t r i n s i c perceptions. S p e c i f i c a l l y , 'the doctrine 
of i n h e r i t e d sin has crumbled away; and i t s place has 
been taken by a convinced optimism i n regard to human 
nature and reason, and a b e l i e f t h a t , i f l e f t to them-
selves, men w i l l f o l l o w the lead of t h e i r n a t u r a l m-
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terests i n the community.' 
I t i s , however, as w e l l to stress once more the as-
pect of c o n t i n u i t y which holds as between medieval 
and 'modern' natural-law theories of legitimacy. We 
r e c a l l , f o r example, t h a t , i n the t w e l f t h century, 
John of Salisbury had uttered a defence of tyrannicide 
and, as Mcllwam points out, John of Salisbury was by 
no means unique m t h i s respect. 'Tyrannicide, i n 
t r u t h , had been i m p l i c i t i n current p o l i t i c a l thought 
ever since the acceptance of Isidore's dictum that one 
i s a king only so f a r and j u s t so long as his acts 
are k i n g l y . I t always was and always remained a doc-
t r i n e of tyrannicide, never of regicide, and the very 
glory of true kingship which so marks the theory of 
John of Salisbury and of a l l i n his age, tends also 
by i n e v i t a b l e l o g i c to widen the g u l f between t h i s 
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and i t s opposite.• We note the way m which t h i s 
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theory i s u l t i m a t e l y rooted i n the conception of 
n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . We are e n t i t l e d to r e s i s t the 
Prince, says Peter Abelard, only to the extent t h a t , 
i n so doing, we are r e s i s t i n g something which comes, 
not from above - i . e . not from transcendent and unmade 
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standards - but from w i t h i n himself. And t h i s d i s t -
i n c t i o n between l i c i t and i l l i c i t resistance reappears, 
of course, m John Locke 
May the commands, then, of a Prince be opposed 9 
May he be r e s i s t e d as often as anyone s h a l l f i n d 
himself aggreived, and but imagine he has not 
r i g h t done him9...To t h i s I answer that force i s 
to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlaw-
f u l force, whoever makes any opposition m any 
other case draws on himself a j u s t condemnation 
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both from God and man. 
I n Aquinas, too, there i s a theory of what we might 
c a l l 'bloodless r e v o l u t i o n ' , superimposed upon his 
own e a r l i e r defence of tyrannicide. I n circumstances 
where the t y r a n n i c a l Prince has been elected by his 
subjects, the subjects may depose him. I n circum-
stances where there i s a superior power w i t h a r i g h t 
of appointment and dismissal, the aggreived subjects 
may appeal to the superior to dismiss him. I n e i t h e r 
case, a form of resistance to tyranny, presupposing 
a moral purpose m p o l i t i c a l l i f e , i s depicted as 
being a j u s t i f i a b l e public act of the whole people. 
For Aquinas, and f o r medieval t h e o r i s t s generally, 
the o f f i c e of r u l e r i s a trusteeship - a notion which 
was also to be r e l i e d upon heavily by Locke. The 
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power of i t s incumbent i s l e g i t i m a t e i f , and only i f , 
he acts f o r the common good i n conformity w i t h law -
and, u l t i m a t e l y , i n conformity w i t h the n a t u r a l law. 
The 'convinced optimism' which Troeltsch i d e n t i f i e s 
as the obverse of the doctrine of o r i g i n a l s i n i s 
accompanied m 'modern' expositions of n a t u r a l law by 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c presuppositions as to the nature of 
so c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I t has m recent years 
been claimed t h a t , m the case of the Levellers or 
Hobbes or Locke or Pufendorf, t h i s i n dividualism i s 
not as marked or thoroughgoing or, we might say, as 
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'genuine' as i t seems. The suggestion here i s that 
i t i s , i n r e a l i t y , made the occasion f o r a piece of 
covert special-pleading on behalf of the a c q u i s i t i v e 
ideology of an i n c r e a s i n g l y - p o l i t i c i s e d bourgeoisie. 
And, i n t h i s connection, we do indeed note the way 
i n which the 'natural r i g h t ' to property which we found 
i n Aquinas has, m the hands of the Levellers or 
Locke, become a r i g h t to appropriate and dispose of 
property, rather than a r i g h t to common use. As G.B. 
MacPherson puts i t , 'The i n d i v i d u a l was seen n e i t h e r 
as a moral whole nor as a part of a larger s o c i a l 
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whole, but as an owner of h i m s e l f - the keynote i s 
not moral autonomy but p r o p r i e t o r i a l freedom. And, 
m the l i g h t of t h i s , i t might be supposed that 
grandiloquent claims to 'natural r i g h t s ' r e a l l y b o i l 
down to nothing more d i g n i f i e d than a demand to be 
allowed to compete without r e s t r a i n t m the cut-throat 
forum of a competitive market society. These consid-
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erations are not, however, very important f o r our 
purposes. They do not a l t e r the c e n t r a l meaning of 
the term 'individualism' - that i t i s the atomic man 
rather than the molecular u n i t who i s to be r i g h t l y 
i d e n t i f i e d as the basic u n i t of p o l i t i c a l discussion 
and p r e s c r i p t i o n . 
I n contrast to t h i s individualism, both the class-
i c a l and medieval forms of n a t u r a l law were group-
centred. They stressed the rol e of the i n d i v i d u a l as 
a component of a p o l i t i c a l whole and, u l t i m a t e l y , as 
a denizen of a r a t i o n a l and purposeful cosmos, form-
ing, f o r him, an i n t e l l i g i b l e matrix of o b l i g a t i o n . 
This organic conception i s perhaps most r e a d i l y and 
f u l l y seen m John of Salisbury's a m p l i f i c a t i o n of 
an analogy already f a m i l i a r to us from A r i s t o t l e . 
The place of the head i n the body of the common-
wealth i s f i l l e d by the Prince, who i s subject 
only to God and to those who exercise his o f f i c e 
and represent him on earth, even as m the human 
body the head i s quickened and governed by the 
soul. The place of the heart i s f i l l e d by the 
Senate, from which proceeds the i n i t i a t i o n of 
good works and i l l . The duties of eyes, ears and 
tongue are claimed by the judges and the govern-
ors of provinces. O f f i c i a l s and soldiers corres-
pond to the hands....The husbandmen correspond to 
the f e e t , which always cleave to the s o i l . - ^ 
I n short, the whole body p o l i t i c i s a v e r s a t i l e , many-
functioned organism composed of d i f f e r e n t and unequal 
parts, a l l of which make d i f f e r e n t and unequal c o n t r i b -
utions to the corporate l i f e . And we may note th a t , 
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i n a d d i t i o n , a t i n c t u r e of r e l i g i o u s s a n c t i t y was 
imparted to t h i s view during the middle ages by the 
wr i t i n g s of the so-called Pseudo-Dionysius or Pseudo-
Denys. The Dionysius i n question i s supposedly the 
Dionysius ('the Areopagite') who i s said to have been 
converted to C h r i s t i a n i t y by St Paul during the l a t t -
er' s v i s i t to Athens. Thus, an 'almost Pauline' 
a u t h o r i t y i s brought i n as s t i f f e n i n g to the already 
considerable reputation of the 'father' of the organic 
theory of the* State, Plato. The Pseudo-Dionysian 
w r i t i n g s provide a source which i s ' f o r inscrutable 
reasons usually overlooked, although i t exercised 
throughout the Middle Ages a very great influence 
upon both e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and ro y a l governments.' I n 
f a c t , on the strength of external and the very scanty 
i n t e r n a l evidence, there i s reason to suppose that the 
tr e a t i s e s o r i g i n a t e d m Syria m about the year 500; 
although t h e i r actual provenance remains no t o r i o u s l y 
obscure. Their mysterious author's i n t e l l e c t u a l her-
itage, however, i s H e l l e n i s t i c , neo-Platonic and Pauline; 
and his a u t h o r i t y i s considerable. His w r i t i n g s were 
c i t e d as authentic by Pope Martin I during the f i r s t 
Lateran Council of 649; a t r a n s l a t i o n and commentary 
was produced m about 858 by John Scotus Enugena, 
and f u r t h e r commentaries were made by Hugh of St 
Vic t o r , Robert Grosseteste and Albertus Magnus. 
Curious though i t may sound, the Pseudo-Dionysian 
t r e a t i s e s remind us of nothing so much as of Max 
Weber's theory of bureaucracy. The orderly conduct 
of a f f a i r s , Pseudo-Dionysius t e l l s us, i s possible 
* O J uilmann fWtfewil fVUfctod Theom, f P M 
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only when power i s contained w i t h i n a t i g h t l y - s t r a t i f i e d 
system of rankings, w i t h each member of the system 
subordinate to the one immediately above him. God 
i s the p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y from which a l l power i s 
derived. I t i s he who stands, so to speak, at the 
apex of a pyramid of power, and the p r i n c i p l e of an 
orderly d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i s to be found exemp-
l i f i e d m the c e l e s t i a l hierarchy. Good order on earth, 
therefore, depends upon t h i s h i e r a r c h i c a l p r i n c i p l e 
being reproduced m the conduct of human a f f a i r s . 
And t h i s theory, as we might expect, provided a use-
f u l recourse both f o r those who wished to assert the 
Papal plenitudo potestatis and f o r exponents of the 
theory of monarchical divine r i g h t . The Pseudo-
Dionysian w r i t i n g s are used, f o r example, m the 
correspondence of Gregory I and i n the B u l l Unam 
Sanetarn 0 f Boniface V I I I . I t i s indeed rather strange 
that an a u t h o r i t y of the stature of J.N. Figgis should, 
i n h is book on The Divine Right of Kings, make no men-
t i o n of Pseudo-Dionysius at a l l . - ^ 
Within t h i s way of conceiving r e l a t i o n s h i p s of power, 
there i s p l a i n l y no place f o r individualism. By con-
t r a s t , however, the 'modern' theory of n a t u r a l law 
i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c both as to i t s presuppositions 
about the nature of society, and m i t s s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l 
recommendations. Here, a conception of society i s ad-
vanced w i t h i n which the 'body p o l i t i c ' has no c o l l -
ective l i f e above or beyond or i n addition to the l i f e 
of each member. Society i s no longer seen as an enter-
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prise i n which, through co-operation, some mysterious 
p e r f e c t i o n beyond the i n d i v i d u a l can be re a l i s e d . I t 
i s seen simply as a means to the r e a l i s a t i o n of per-
sonal i n t e r e s t s . The i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c conception of 
the State embodies what Hegel would c a l l c i v i l society, 
while the organic understanding of human co-operation 
which Hegel was to characterise as the State properly 
so-called f a l l s i n t o a long, though temporary, abey-
ance. The venerable and f a m i l i a r arguments from a 
God-made normative cosmos jto the i n d i v i d u a l as an 
h i e r a r c h i c a l component now give place to an •inverted 1 
argument s t a r t i n g from the i n d i v i d u a l as r a t i o n a l 
creature and as bearer of unique and personal r i g h t s , 
and j u s t i f y i n g or condemning a p o l i t i c a l association 
i n the l i g h t of how i t answers to the requirements of 
the i n d i v i d u a l . What i s more, the old notion of n a t u r a l 
e q u a l i t y now comes to the fo r e , m support of the 
ce n t r a l contention that each man's r i g h t s have the 
same s a n c t i t y , and are held i n the same measure and 
on the same conditions, as those of every other. 
Rights of some kind, of course, had always been 
i m p l i c i t i n the doctrine of n a t u r a l law. I f i t i s 
to be argued at a l l that we are n a t u r a l l y obliged i n 
r e l a t i o n to others to 0, then i t i s inescapable, 
whether made e x p l i c i t or not, that those others have 
a r i g h t to expect us to 0 i n r e l a t i o n to them. This 
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i s a point made by Jacques Maritam, f o r example, and 
i t i s , indeed, an i n e v i t a b l e part of the l o g i c of 
•nghts-and-duties' t a l k . We saw something of t h i s 
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kind i n connection w i t h the Stoics, f o r example. To 
hold that each man has a duty to include others 
w i t h i n the widening scope of his o i k e i o s i s i s 
necessarily to imply that such others have a corr-
e l a t i v e r i g h t to be so included. I n the 'modern' 
form of the doctrine, however, the avowal of r i g h t s 
- of possible claims against others - becomes ce n t r a l 
and e x p l i c i t . Broadly speaking, n a t u r a l r i g h t s are 
stated as s p e c i f i c and i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s of l i f e , 
l i b e r t y , property, freedom of conscience, freedom 
of expression, 'the pursuit of happiness', and so on. 
And so the kind of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y towards which 
'modern' n a t u r a l law points i s to be directed, not 
towards the preservation of a generalised, c o l l e c t i v e 
'natural j u s t i c e 1 , but to the preservation and assertion 
of the s p e c i f i c r i g h t s of t h i s man. Moreover, one 
of the accompaniments of t h i s i s a theory of govern-
ment called - by one of the weightiest contemporary 
exponents of individualism - the 'minimal State', 
l i m i t e d to the narrow functions of protection 
against force, t h e f t , fraud, enforcement of 
contracts, and so on...Any more extensive State 
w i l l v i o l a t e persons' r i g h t s not to be forced 
to do c e r t a i n things, and i s unjustified.34" 
I n other words, the functions of government are neg-
« 
a t i v e and p r o t e c t i v e , and freedom consists m being 
l e f t alone as f a r as i s consistent w i t h the maintenance 
of the lowest acceptable common denominator or peace. 
The character of t h i s i ndividualism may perhaps best 
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be i l l u s t r a t e d by reference to the t h e o r i s t who i s , 
on the face of i t , i t s most 'extreme' exponent -
namely, Thomas Hobbes. To Hobbes' mind, the l i f e 
of p o l i t i c s i s not 'natural' i n the sense of e x i s t i n g 
ab i n i t i o . I n other words, i t i s at least possible 
f o r us to conceive of a 'state of nature' - i . e . a 
state from which formal coercive or regulative mach-
inery i s e n t i r e l y absent - out of which i t would be 
necessary to move, by way of a 'social compact', 
i n t o p o l i t i c a l engagement. Such a move would, however, 
be necessary m a v i v i d l y and easi l y comprehensible 
sense. This i s ao f o r reasons which are too w e l l -
known to require more than the b r i e f e s t exposition, 
but which ar i s e precisely out of the f a c t that man 
i s an i n d i v i d u a l . S p e c i f i c a l l y , he i s a highly com-
plex pleasure-seeking and pam-avoidmg mechanism. 
Moreover, a l l men, when c u l t u r a l or s o c i a l or society-
dependent s k i l l s are subtracted, are a l l more or less 
equal w i t h one another. Also, ' f e l i c i t y ' - the maximum 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of desire f o r the minimum expenditure of 
r i s k - i s a scarce resource* i t often happens that 
your desires can only be s a t i s f i e d m a way which 
occasions loss to me, and vice versa. The state of 
nature, therefore, w i l l p l a i n l y be i n t o l e r a b l e to 
each of the in d i v i d u a l s l i v i n g i n i t . Not even the 
strongest i s so strong as to be able to f e e l secure 
against ambush or conspiracy. The state of nature i s 
a 'war of every man against every man'. I n i t (and 
i t would be a p i t y to depart from hallowed t r a d i t i o n 
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by o m i t t i n g to quote t h i s passage), 
there i s no place f o r industry, because the f r u i t 
thereof i s uncertain, and consequently no c u l -
ture of the earth; no navigation nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by sea; no 
commodious b u i l d i n g ; no instruments of moving and 
removing such things as require much force; no 
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account 
of time; no a r t s , no l e t t e r s , no society, and 
which i s worst of a l l , continual fear, and danger 
of v i o l e n t death, and the l i f e of man s o l i t a r y , 
poor, nasty, b r u t i s h and short. ^5 
P o l i t i c a l engagement, therefore, i s not r e a l l y some-
thing that the i n d i v i d u a l can take or leave. P o l i t -
i c a l association and s o c i a l co-operation are e n t i r e l y 
coextensive - or, at l e a s t , v i r t u a l l y so. I n other 
words, the formation of p o l i t i c a l commitment i s ess-
e n t i a l i f men are to s a t i s f y needs which are n a t u r a l 
i n the sense of being determined by t h e i r unalterable 
psychological d i s p o s i t i o n s . Commentators frequently 
remark t h a t , i n Hobbes' view, p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s 
unnatural. But t h i s i s only true i n the sense that 
the State, as he understands i t , i s an a r t i f a c t - as 
i t i s f o r Plato and A r i s t o t l e . I n other respects, the 
fo l l o w i n g words of Spinoza might equally w e l l have 
come from the pen of Hobbes: 
I...conclude that the r i g h t of nature proper to 
the human race can hardly be conceived except 
where men have r i g h t s m a community and are thus 
able to defend t h e i r possession of lands which 
they can inha b i t and c u l t i v a t e ; to protect them-
selves, to repel a l l force, and to l i v e according 
275 
to the common judgment of a l l . For...the more men 
there be who thus come together, the more r i g h t 
they c o l l e c t i v e l y possess. And i f i t i s because 
men m a state of nature can hardly be possessed 
of t h e i r own r i g h t that the Scholastic philosophers 
wish to say that man i s a sociable creature, I 
have nothing to say against them. 
Whether, f o r Hobbes, the 'laws of nature' which 
form 'convenient a r t i c l e s of peace upon which men may 
be drawn to agreement' are genuinely moral laws or not 
has, f a i r l y recently, become the subject of a rather 
complex debate. Whether they are or not, however, i t 
i s important to r e a l i s e that Hobbes1 argument begins 
from an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c standpoint presupposing s e l f -
love. I f you and I are i n a state of nature, and that 
state of nature i s i n t o l e r a b l e to us both, the f a c t 
that i t i s i n t o l e r a b l e to you i s not of the s l i g h t e s t 
consequence to me, and the f a c t that i t i s i n t o l e r a b l e 
to me likewise does not matter to you. I f we make an 
arrangement to submit ourselves to the d i r e c t i o n of 
a government, I do not enter i n t o that arrangement w i t h 
you to secure any remission or advantage f o r you. On 
the contrary, my only wish i s to secure peace and sec-
u r i t y f o r myself; and I give up only as much of my 
• r i g h t of nature' as i s necessary to enable me to sec-
ure my own ends. I n Hobbes, we f i n d no suggestion of 
a theme which recurs throughout the w r i t i n g s of class-
i c a l a n t i q u i t y and the middle ages, and which emerges 
again m much nineteenth-century p o l i t i c a l thought. 
That i s , we f i n d no trace of the notion of ' s e l f -
r e a l i s a t i o n ' understood m terms of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
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th a t , by submitting to rules and government, we may 
m some sense make our l i v e s s p i r i t u a l l y r i c h e r or 
more noble. Hobbes' laws of nature, whether moral or 
not, point towards the setting-up of the State as a 
r a t i o n a l imperative. Such an imperative i s said to 
be deductively available to men as users of reason. 
But Hobbes* view i s merely that p o l i t i c a l l i f e allows 
men to do i n safety what they would have wanted to do 
i n any case. Nowhere does he consider i t a p o s s i b i l -
i t y that the State might enable i t s c i t i z e n s to r e a l i s e 
to the f u l l t h e i r s p i r i t u a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l capac-
i t i e s as human beings. The State, according to Hobbes, 
comes i n t o being so that men may l i v e . But he does not 
go on, w i t h A r i s t o t l e , to say that i t enables them to 
l i v e w e l l . 
At least broadly speaking, then, we may sum up much 
of what the 'modern' theory of na t u r a l law has to say 
i n terms of the san c t i t y w i t h which i t invests the 
fo l l o w i n g themes. F i r s t , there i s the theme of r i g h t s . 
I t i s said that n a t u r a l law confers upon men c e r t a i n 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s , which he holds, not by reason of his 
membership of a group or his standing as a component 
of a p o l i t i c a l 'organism 1, but simply as an i n d i v i d u a l 
who, m a l l important respects, i s the equal of every 
other i n d i v i d u a l . Such r i g h t s are said to be univer-
s a l . They adhere to each i n d i v i d u a l regardless of a l l 
adventitious considerations; and, as such, they hold 
even between men who have no common background at a l l 
i n terms of cul t u r e , language, creed or p o l i t i c a l a f f i l -
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i a t i o n . 
The promises and bargains f o r truck, etc., between 
the two men i n the desert island mentioned by 
Garcilasso de l a Vega m his History of Peru, or 
between a Swiss and an Indian, i n the woods of 
America, are binding to them, though they are 
p e r f e c t l y m a state of nature i n reference to 
one another. For t r u t h and keeping of f a i t h 
belong to men as men, and not as members of soc-
i e t y . 3 7 
Such r i g h t s are, moreover, indefeasible or imprescrip-
t i b l e . They are not p r e s c r i p t i v e or socially-sanctioned. 
They cannot, therefore, be u n i l a t e r a l l y taken away, 
and, i f t h e i r exercise i s impeded by any u n i l a t e r a l 
a c t i o n , then an offence has been committed against an 
unmade law. 
Second, there i s the theme of the ultimate p o l i t i c a l 
sovereignty of the i n d i v i d u a l . Since being under gov-
ernment i n e v i t a b l y involves the curtailment of the 
exercise of r i g h t s , and since i t i s by d e f i n i t i o n 
wrong to deprive a man of what i s his against his w i l l , 
i t follows that the s e t t i n g up and maintenance of gov-
ernment requires the consent of each of those who are 
to be the government's subjects. And t h i s i s one of 
the most important of the thoughts underlying the 
s o c i a l contract theory of legitimacy. I t must be said, 
of course, that contractual theories of government were 
not new to or unique m the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. They occur, f o r example, i n the c l a s s i c a l 
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l i t e r a t u r e and m the Old Testament. Again, we note 
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that the old notion of na t u r a l equality had already 
been pressed i n t o service by Nicholas of Gusa, Richard 
Hooker and Francisco Suarez as a basis f o r a theory of 
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government by consent. Also, during the middle ages, 
the Ciceronian notion of a res publica or res populi, 
i n which governmental power i s somehow the property of 
the whole people, issues i n many actual examples of 
'contracts of government' and 'contracts of submission'. 
I t i s , however, important to be clear that the seven-
teenth-century contract i s not a corporate agreement. 
I t i s not an agreement between the whole of a governed 
people and t h e i r sovereign. I t i s a s o c i a l contract -
an agreement of each i n d i v i d u a l member of the assoc-
i a t i o n w i t h every other member that each of them w i l l , 
on c e r t a i n specified conditions, submit themselves to 
government. 
Moreover, the argument from contract i s , i n t h i s form, 
coupled not only w i t h an avowal of na t u r a l r i g h t s , but 
also w i t h a f a r more cent r a l and e x p l i c i t theory of 
resistance than has been met w i t h h i t h e r t o . I t i s 
at t h i s point that the 'radicalism' of modern n a t u r a l 
law comes i n t o play. The theory of resistance here i n 
question takes the fo l l o w i n g paradigmatic form. Given 
that the legitimacy of a government must be established 
by - indeed, can only be established by - the consent 
of those who are to be under i t , i t i s equally the case 
that t h i s consent must be capable of withdrawal at need. 
What w i l l count as a s u f f i c i e n t l y pressing need i s , of 
course, extremely d i f f i c u l t to specify, and depends to 
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a great extent upon the other assumptions of the par t -
i c u l a r t h e o r i s t . To Hobbes' mind, f o r example, people 
w i l l t o l e r a t e v i r t u a l l y anything rather than confront 
the horrors of the state of nature. Thus, i n the 
Leviathan, the s o c i a l compact i s made the basis f o r 
absolute government. For his part, John Locke, a l -
though much readier to envisage possible circumstances 
of r e b e l l i o n , can only present us w i t h a rather 
vague formula when i t comes to specifying what such 
circumstances might be* 
Such revolutions happen not upon every l i t t l e 
mismanagement of public a f f a i r s . Great mistakes 
m the r u l i n g p art, many wrong and inconvenient 
laws, and a l l the s l i p s of human f r a i l t y w i l l 
be borne without mutiny or murmur. But i f a long 
t r a i l of abuses, prevarications and a r t i f i c e s , 
a l l tending the same way, make the design v i s i b l e 
to a l l the people...it i s not to be wondered that 
they should then rouse themselves and endeavour 
to put the rul e i n t o such hands as may secure to 
them the ends f o r which government was at f i r s t 
erected.^ 1 
Obviously, there i s an acute p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y here 
- or a c l u s t e r of such d i f f i c u l t i e s . Who i s to decide 
when the government has gone too far? On what basis 
i s such a decision to be made9 and so f o r t h . Leaving 
t h i s d i f f i c u l t y aside, however, the point remains t h a t , 
at the l a s t analysis, r e a l sovereignty r e s t s , not w i t h 
the p o l i t i c a l sovereign, but w i t h those over whom his 
sovereignty i s exercised. Since men are held to enter 
a p o l i t i c a l community out of s e l f - i n t e r e s t and m order 
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to secure c e r t a i n ends specified i n terms of t h e i r 
'natural r i g h t s ' , they w i l l p l a i n l y not remain w i t h i n 
such a community i f i t f a i l s or ceases to secure t h e i r 
'natural r i g h t s ' , or i f i t a c t u a l l y attacks them. 
This assumed s e l f - i n t e r e s t may, i n c i d e n t a l l y , i t s e l f 
be thought to serve as a check upon abuses of govern-
ment. The sovereign w i l l no more wish to court rev-
o l u t i o n than his subjects w i l l wish to submit to tyranny. 
Thus, Spinoza remarks, 
Only very r a r e l y does i t happen that sovereigns 
issue commands which are t o t a l l y absurd. For 
t h e i r chief task i s to plan f o r the common good 
and d i r e c t everything according to what reason 
dictates - i f they are to safeguard themselves 
and r e t a i n t h e i r sovereignty. For, as Seneca 
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puts i t , no-one can continue as a ty r a n t f o r long. 
The 'modern' theory of na t u r a l law, then, embodies 
a theory of resistance - indeed, a theory of moral 
transformation through revolutionary actio n . Such 
a theory ( o f t e n present i n some form m the past, 
but now cent r a l and e x p l i c i t ) turns upon the related 
notions of n a t u r a l r i g h t s and i n d i v i d u a l consent. 
These themes f i g u r e prominently m the polemical 
discussions of the period of the English C i v i l Wars, 
f o r example: 
To every i n d i v i d u a l m nature i s given an i n d i v -
i d u a l property by nature, not to be invaded or 
usurped by any. f o r everyone as he i s himself, 
so he has a s e l f - p r o p r i e t y , else could he not 
be himself, and on t h i s no second may presume 
to deprive any of, without manifest v i o l a t i o n 
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and a f f r o n t to the very p r i n c i p l e s of nature.... 
Every man by nature being a king, p r i e s t and 
prophet m his own n a t u r a l c i r c u i t and compass, 
whereof no second may partake, but by deputation, 
commission and free consent from him, whose 
4-3 
n a t u r a l r i g h t and freedom i t i s . 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that the Leveller l i t e r a t u r e i s , 
i n r e a l i t y , only an expression of 'the glorious hope 
of men who lacked a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of gaining power.• ^4 
But as an i n d i c a t o r of the potency of the doctrine of 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s as a f a c t o r m revolutionary a c t i o n , 
we may point out that i t s perhaps best known assertions 
were both made as deliberate contributions to successful 
instances of such action. The assertions i n question 
are, of course, the American Declaration of Independence 
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the C i t i z e n . The f o l l o w i n g i s , of course, the opening 
of the American Declaration of 1776: 
When m the course of human events i t becomes nec-
essary f o r one people to dissolve the p o l i t i c a l 
bands which have connected them w i t h another, 
and to assume among the powers of the earth the 
separate and equal s t a t i o n which the laws of nature 
and of nature's God e n t i t l e them, a decent respect 
to the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to 
the separation. We hold these truths to be s e l f -
evident, that a l l men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by t h e i r creator w i t h c e r t a i n unalienable 
r i g h t s , that among these are l i f e , l i b e r t y and the 
pursuit of happiness. That to secure these r i g h t s , 
governments are i n s t i t u t e d among men, d e r i v i n g t h e i r 
j u s t powers from the consent of the governed. That 
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whenever any form of government becomes destructive 
of these ends, i t i s the r i g h t of the people to 
a l t e r or abolish i t , and to i n s t i t u t e new govern-
ment, l a y i n g i t s foundation on such p r i n c i p l e s , 
and organising i t s powers m such form, as to them 
s h a l l seem most l i k e l y to e f f e c t t h e i r safety and 
happiness.^ 
This, quite c l e a r l y , i s a revolutionary document. I t 
contains statements which are f a r more than merely 
academic or piously moral statements of what 'ought 
to be'. Rather, these statements are p o l i t i c a l claims 
and assertions as to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l 
transformation. They are accompaniments to p r a c t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y and symbols of the aspirations by which such 
a c t i v i t y i s claimed to be in s p i r e d . 
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CHAPTER SIX A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE. 
A survey of n a t u r a l law, however b r i e f and superfic-
i a l , discloses a ' t r a d i t i o n of c i v i l i t y ' which extends 
backwards as f a r as our knowledge of human r e f l e c t i o n 
i t s e l f . I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that i t i s only w i t h i n 
comparatively recent times that the doctrine has been 
turned i n t o a r e l a t i v e l y pugnacious assertion of r i g h t s 
which may, i f necessary, be enforced against an i n t r a n s -
igent sovereign. But i t s h i s t o r y i s , nevertheless, 
' p e r f e c t l y continuous' to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes. 
No clear d i s t i n c t i o n can be sustained, f o r example, 
between the c l a s s i c a l and medieval and the 'modem' 
forms m terms of the 'secularism'/'rationalism' of 
the l a s t . And, i n view of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y , 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to assent to the well-known words 
of S i r Ernest Barker. 'The o r i g i n of the idea of 
na t u r a l law may be ascribed to an old and indefeasible 
movement of the human mind...which impels i t towards 
the notion of an eternal and immutable j u s t i c e ; a 
j u s t i c e which human authority^expresses, or ought to 
express - but does not make.' 
Even though, from the point of view of p r a c t i c a l l i f e , 
i t s heyday may be said to have occurred during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and i n s p i t e of 
i t s lengthy eclipse by moral theories which repudiate 
'any advantage...derived...from the idea of abstract 
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r i g h t as a t h i n g independent of u t i l i t y 1 , n a t u r a l law 
i s s t i l l v e ry much a l i v e and k i c k i n g . To be su r e , 
the phrase ' n a t u r a l law', c h a s t i s e d by K a r l Popper 
f o r i t s ambiguity, has almost died out, save m the 
w r i t i n g s of C a t h o l i c m o r a l i s t s (and even here i t i s 
much l e s s p r e v a l e n t than i t w a s ) . But i t would not 
be too f a n c i f u l to see a recrudescence of B a r k e r ' s 
•old and i n d e f e a s i b l e movement of the human mind' i n 
John Rawls' mighty attempt to r e h a b i l i t a t e the s o c i a l -
c o n t r a c t argument. Moreover, contemporary r e f e r e n c e s 
to 'human r i g h t s ' , 'the r i g h t s of man', and so f o r t h , 
a l l c l e a r l y d e r i v e from the t r a d i t i o n which we have 
been c o n s i d e r i n g . 
Indeed, the most obvious contemporary case i n p oint 
i s the U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n of Human Ri g h t s , adopted 
aid proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 10th December, 1948. T h i s i s a c u r i o u s 
document, even the t i t l e of which i s r i d d l e d w i t h 
ambiguity. Does the a d j e c t i v e ' U n i v e r s a l ' q u a l i f y 
the noun ' D e c l a r a t i o n ' o r ' R i g h t s ' 9 I f the former, 
then the t i t l e i s pure nonsense, s i n c e the D e c l a r a t i o n 
i s not ' u n i v e r s a l ' , but merely the d e c l a r a t i o n of the 
s i g n a t o r y n a t i o n s . I f the l a t t e r , then i t i s h a r d l y 
l e s s absurd, s i n c e many of the r i g h t s claimed to be 
' u n i v e r s a l ' are p a l p a b l y nothing of the k i n d . But we 
s h a l l not d i g r e s s i n t o y e t another c r i t i q u e of the 
U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n of Human Ri g h t s . What i s i n t -
e r e s t i n g , from our point of view, i s the - presumably 
not unintended - s i m i l a r i t y between i t s wording and 
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that of the famous eighteenth-century declarations 
of the r i g h t s of man. 
WHEREAS recognition of the inherent d i g n i t y and 
of the equal and inalienable r i g h t s of a l l mem-
bers of the human family i s the foundation of 
freedom, j u s t i c e and peace i n the world; 
WHEREAS disregard and contempt f o r human r i g h t s 
have resulted i n barbarous acts which have out-
raged the conscience of mankind, and the advent 
of a world m which human beings s h a l l enjoy 
freedom of speech and b e l i e f and freedom from fear 
and want has been proclaimed as the highest asp-
i r a t i o n of the common people;... 
WHEREAS the peoples of the United Nations have 
m the Charter reaffirmed t h e i r f a i t h m funda-
mental human r i g h t s , m the d i g n i t y and worth of 
the human person and m the equal r i g h t s of men 
and women, and have determined to promote s o c i a l 
progress and b e t t e r standards of l i f e m larg e r 
freedom,... 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
PROCLAIMS t h i s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a common standard of achievement f o r a l l people 
and a l l nations, to the end that every i n d i v i d u a l 
and every organ of society, keeping t h i s Declar-
at i o n constantly m mind, s h a l l s t r i v e by teaching 
and education to promote respect f o r these r i g h t s 
and freedoms and by progressive measures, n a t i o n a l 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l , to secure t h e i r universal and 
e f f e c t i v e recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of the Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of t e r r i t o r i e s under t h e i r j u r i s -
d i c t i o n . 
The root p o s i t i o n here being enunciated i s c l e a r l y , m 
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essence, the same d e o n t o l o g i c a l one as t h a t adopted 
by seventeenth and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y advocates o f 
n a t u r a l r i g h t s . There are, i t i s claimed, c e r t a i n 
fundamental r i g h t s which are simply p a r t o f the def-
i n i t i o n o f what i t i s to be a human being. These are 
sa i d to be immediately obvious t o the 'conscience o f 
mankind' - j u s t as Locke's Swiss and I n d i a n , though 
having no common sovereign and no mutual c u l t u r e , 
know by the l i g h t o f reason t h a t each has the r i g h t 
t o r e q u i r e the o t h e r to deal f a i r l y . I n f ringements o f 
such r i g h t s amount t o a v i o l a t i o n o f the d i g n i t y s a i d 
t o be i n h e r e n t m 'the human person' as such. They 
are not co n t i n g e n t upon what i s p o s i t e d i n any p a r t -
i c u l a r system o f law. They do not depend upon mem-
bersh i p o f or s u b s c r i p t i o n to any one creed o r denom-
i n a t i o n , upon c o l o u r o r n a t i o n a l i t y o r t a l e n t , o r upon 
any o t h e r c o n t i n g e n t f a c t . They are j u s t human r i g h t s ; 
and a l l human beings everywhere can appeal to them -
o r ought to be able to appeal t o them - again s t opp-
r e s s i o n o r p e r s e c u t i o n and i n pursuance o f ' b e t t e r 
standards o f l i f e ' . 
I n s h o r t , we are s t i l l very much i n medias res as f a r 
as n a t u r a l law and n a t u r a l r i g h t s are concerned. This, 
i n i t s e l f , i s s u f f i c i e n t to warrant a b r i e f c r i t i c a l 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , intended to discover, as f a r as poss-
i b l e , e x a c t l y what can be made o f the n a t u r a l law 
t h e o r i s t s ' claims as set out m t y p i c a l form m our 
i n t r o d u c t i o n , and as subsequently i l l u s t r a t e d . 
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I . 
'Hume'3 F a l l a c y ' . 
The development of the argument which i t w i l l be 
convenient t o c a l l 'Hume's f a l l a c y ' has long been 
appealed to as the event which administered a coup 
de grace to the t r a d i t i o n a l claims o f n a t u r a l law. 
For, according to Hume, the view t h a t 'there are 
e t e r n a l f i t n e s s e s and u n f i t n e s s e s o f t h i n g s which 
are the same f o r every r a t i o n a l being t h a t considers 
3 
them' i s simply founded upon a fundamental l o g i c a l 
e r r o r . 7/hat Hume takes t o be the t r u t h o f the m a t t e r 
i s put i n the f o l l o w i n g r a t h e r s t r i k i n g way 
'Tis not c o n t r a r y to reason t o p r e f e r the dest-
r u c t i o n o f the whole w o r l d to the s c r a t c h i n g of 
my f i n g e r . 'Tis not c o n t r a r y t o reason f o r me 
to choose my t o t a l r u i n t o prevent the l e a s t 
4 
uneasiness o f . . . a person w h o l l y unknown t o me. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g passage, Hume draws a t t e n t i o n to the 
l o g i c a l e r r o r which he supposes h i m s e l f t o have det-
ected 
I n every system o f m o r a l i t y which I have h i t h e r t o 
met w i t h , I have always remarked t h a t the author 
proceeds f o r some time m the o r d i n a r y way o f 
reasoning...when, o f a sudden, I am s u r p r i s e d t o 
f i n d t h a t , i n s t e a d o f the us u a l c o p u l a t i o n s of 
p r o p o s i t i o n s ' i s ' and ' i s n o t 1 , I meet w i t h no 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i s not connected w i t h an 'ought* 
or 'ought n o t ' . This change i s i m p e r c e p t i b l e ; 
but i t i s , however, o f the l a s t consequence. For 
as t h i s 'ought' o r 'ought n o t ' expresses some new 
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r e l a t i o n o r a f f i r m a t i o n , ' t i a necessary t h a t i t 
should be observed and explained and, a t the same 
time, t h a t a reason should be given f o r what seems 
a l t o g e t h e r i n c o n c e i v a b l e , how t h i s new r e l a t i o n can 
be a deduction from others which are e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t from i t . - * 
A l i t t l e l a t e r on, i n c i d e n t a l l y , Hume makes the p o i n t 
which, more than a n y t h i n g e l s e , accounts f o r the now 
v i r t u a l disuse o f the term ' n a t u r a l ' m moral discourse. 
' N a t u r a l ' , he p o i n t s out, i s n o t h i n g i f not imprecise. 
I t can bear at l e a s t three c o n s t r u c t i o n s . I t can mean 
the reverse of 's u p e r n a t u r a l ' , i t can mean 'frequent' 
o r 'common', and i t can mean ' n o n - a r t i f i c i a l ' o r 'non-
c o n v e n t i o n a l ' . But he here also repeats the p o i n t which 
i s , f o r the moment, our concern t h a t none o f these 
p o s s i b l e meanings helps us i n the l e a s t to determine 
what i s moral and what i s n o t . To take a contemporary 
and t o p i c a l example th e r e would seem t o be a sense 
m which homosexual p r a c t i c e s are 'un n a t u r a l ' - t h a t 
i s , they are r e l a t i v e l y i n f r e q u e n t o r uncommon. And 
i t seems also t o come very e a s i l y t o us to say t h a t 
they are t h e r e f o r e wrong - t h a t 'tfrongness' f o l l o w s 
d e d u c t i v e l y from 'unnaturalness'. I t i s p r e c i s e l y 
t h i s a l l e g e d l y deductive move which Hume takes t o be 
an e r r o r ; and we must now c l a r i f y what he holds t o 
be the natu r e o f t h i s e r r o r . 
We may do so by way o f a quick and elementary glance 
a t the nature o f deductive reasoning. Deduction has 
always recommended i t s e l f as a p e c u l i a r l y r e l i a b l e 
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procedure - p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the seventeenth century, 
when i t became something o f a mania amongst ph i l o s o p h e r s . 
And t h i s appeal stems c h i e f l y from the f a c t t h a t ded-
u c t i o n i s a process o f necessary i n f e r e n c e . I n o t h e r 
words, v a l i d deductive i n f e r e n c e s have the c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c o f being s e l f - e v i d e n t l y o r n e c e s s a r i l y such. 
What t h i s means, f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes, i s t h a t t here 
i s a simple and b u i l t - i n t e s t by means o f which we can 
s a t i s f y ourselves as to the v a l i d i t y o r otherwise o f 
any deductive i n f e r e n c e . I f i t i s v a l i d , we s h a l l f i n d 
t h a t to deny i t and sim u l t a n e o u s l y to a f f i r m the pre-
misses from which i t i s d e r i v e d i s t o u t t e r a s e l f -
c o n t r a d i c t i o n . To take the most standard o f a l l poss-
i b l e examples. to say t h a t a l l men are m o r t a l and t h a t 
Socrates i s a man, y e t t o deny t h a t Socrates i s m o r t a l , 
i s to g i v e v o i c e , not o n l y to nonsense, but t o demon-
s t r a b l e o r obvious nonsense. And t h i s t e s t works 
because the process o f deduction i s a process o f a n a l y s i s . 
That i s t o say, a s c r u t i n y or a n a l y s i s o f the premisses 
i s o f i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t t o y i e l d a l l the elements o f 
the conclusion there i s no need t o import any ad-
v e n t i t i o u s m a t e r i a l i n t o the sequence o f reasoning. 
By the same token, i t i s c l e a r t h a t an i n f e r e n c e w i l l 
n o t be ' s e l f - e v i d e n t ' o r ' a n a l y t i c a l l y v a l i d * unless 
a l l the evidence f o r i t s v a l i d i t y i s a l r e a d y contained 
somewhere i n the premisses from which i t i s h e l d t o 
follow.''' I n the l i g h t o f these remarks, then, l e t us 
look at one o f the commonest and most c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
instances o f what p u r p o r t s to be n a t u r a l - l a w reasoning* 
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the p r o h i b i t i o n o f a r t i f i c i a l means o f b i r t h - c o n t r o l 
set out m the Papal E n c y c l i c a l s C a s t i Gonnubii and 
Humanae V i t a e ( t h e remarks which apply i n t h i s context 
w i l l a l s o apply to the homosexuality argument mentioned 
above). The f o l l o w i n g passage i s taken from Pope 
Paul VI's Humanae V i t a e 
The Church...m u r g i n g men t o an observance o f 
the precepts o f n a t u r a l law...teaches as a b s o l u t e l y 
r e q u i r e d t h a t m any use whatever o f marriage there 
must be no impairment of i t s n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y to 
procreate human l i f e . 
The same argument i s s t a t e d more f u l l y by Dr John Rock 
( q u o t i n g from a C a t h o l i c marriage manual), i n a book 
published f o u r years before Humanae V i t a e 
•The reason why the a r t i f i c i a l p r a c t i c e o f b i r t h 
c o n t r o l i s immoral i s w r i t t e n i n t o the very n a t -
ure o f the sexual organs and the m a r i t a l a c t i t -
s e l f . The sex organs were made by God to r e p r o -
duce the human race. Only when husband and w i f e 
u n i t e n a t u r a l l y i s the union o f sperm p o s s i b l e . 
Therefore the primary purpose o f the m a r i t a l act 
Q 
i s the conception o f human l i f e . ' 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t i c e - which i t s proponents do 
not - t h a t the argument, put l i k e t h i s , makes any 
attempt t o impede the f e r t i l i t y o f r a b b i t s o r mosquitoes 
immoral too, but l e t us not chase red h e r r i n g s . 
On the face o f i t , the f o r e g o i n g argument appears t o 
recommend to our moral sense an e l e g a n t l y b r i e f chain 
o f deductive reasoning - t h a t since the n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n 
o f the sexual organs i s to 'procreate human l i f e ' , we 
t h e r e f o r e ought not to do anything t o hamper the discharge 
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o f t h i s f u n c t i o n . R e f l e c t i o n soon d i s c l o s e s , however, 
t h a t there does not appear to be a shred o f evidence 
i n favour o f any conclusion as to what ought to be done 
contained w i t h i n the p u r e l y f a c t u a l statement t h a t the 
n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n o f the organs o f r e p r o d u c t i o n i s 
r e p r o d u c t i o n . To put i t more f u l l y : i f I were t o 
accept t h a t the n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n o f the g e n i t a l organs 
i s indeed r e p r o d u c t i o n , w h i l e a t the same time o p t i n g 
not to reproduce and to take steps t o prevent myself 
from doing so, I should not be ' a c t i n g out a c o n t r a -
d i c t i o n ' , so to speak. I t w i l l not be as i f I had 
s a i d , ' A l l men are m o r t a l , Socrates i s a man; t h e r e f o r e 
Socrates i s not m o r t a l ' , o r as i f , having s a i d ' I love 
l i f e ' , I had s t r a i g h t w a y blown out my b r a i n s . On the 
c o n t r a r y , i s there not a common and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
sense i n which my d e c i s i o n to adopt c o n t r a c e p t i v e means 
and my d e c i s i o n as t o which o f the a v a i l a b l e means t o 
choose could p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d eminently r a t i o n a l 
d e c i s i o n s 9 Such deci s i o n s would, a f t e r a l l , be d i r -
ected towards the achievement o f formu l a t e d and des-
i r e d ends, and they would be reached m the l i g h t o f 
c e r t a i n kinds o f knowledge* o f p h y s i c a l and chemical 
r e a c t i o n s , o f mammalian physiology, and so on. I n a 
n u t s h e l l , though I might i n c u r the censure o f m o r a l i s t s 
o f a c e r t a i n complexion once I had taken such d e c i s i o n s , 
I c e r t a i n l y should n o t , i n t a k i n g them, expose myself 
t o the r i d i c u l e o f a l l who understand the laws o f l o g i c . 
And t h i s indeed would be the case were the deduction i n 
question a v a l i d one. I f anyone wishes to disagree w i t h 
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t h i s and accept the i n f e r e n c e w i t h which we are quarr-
e l l i n g , then they must als o accept t h a t , since the 
' n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n ' o f a r a t t l e s n a k e ' s fangs i s t o 
i n f l i c t f a t a l i n j u r i e s , they ought to submit peaceably 
to being b i t t e n by one should the occasion ever a r i s e . 
As f a r as I can see, the p o i n t o f p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v e d 
m each case i s the same. 
To put i t a t i t s most general, then, i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t there i s no formal r e l a t i o n o f entailment between 
statements about what i s the case and statements which 
e n j o i n t h a t one i s o b l i g e d t o a c t o r t o r e f r a i n from 
a c t i n g m c e r t a i n ways. I n the modern parlance, de-
s c r i p t i o n s do not e n t a i l p r e s c r i p t i o n s . Statements o f 
f a c t and statements o f value simply occupy d i f f e r e n t 
l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s , and the argument or assumption 
t h a t one can move by ' r a t i o n a l ' steps from one c a t -
egory to the o t h e r t u r n s out, a f t e r the most cursory 
t r i a l , t o be mistaken. Yet, at f i r s t s i g h t , i t seems 
t h a t t h i s i s a t r a p i n t o which n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s 
have c o n s i s t e n t l y walked they seem t o have claimed 
to be able to d e r i v e i n d u b i t a b l e moral p r e s c r i p t i o n s 
from a l l e g e d l y f a c t u a l statements about human e q u a l i t y , 
the n a t u r e o f the w o r l d o r cosmos, 'human n a t u r e ' , and 
what have you. An e a r l y instance o f t h i s tendency t o 
mix up f a c t and value would seem t o be p e r c e p t i b l e 
m the Pythagorean d o c t r i n e t h a t moral goodness can 
somehow be secured by o r through mastering the math-
emat i c a l s t r u c t u r e of r e a l i t y . More e x p l i c i t l y , of 
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course, i t appears i n the seventeenth-century view so 
c l e a r l y e x e m p l i f i e d i n G r o t i u s and Hobbes: t h a t i t 
i s p o s s i b l e t o a r r i v e a t moral recommendations by a 
process o f reasoning d i r e c t l y analogous t o t h a t used 
m mathematical c a l c u l a t i o n . According to Hume, the 
s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t such moral 'computation' i s p o s s i b l e 
simply r e s t s upon a f a i l u r e t o a p p r e c i a t e the categ-
o r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s which c h a r a c t e r i s e our u t t e r a n c e s 
as being o f d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , and upon e mistaken b e l i e f 
i n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f hopping from one category t o anothe 
I f i t can be shown t h a t n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s have 
- or even t h a t they have m the main - indeed t r i e d t o 
d e r i v e p r e s c r i p t i v e i n f e r e n c e s from premisses which 
are p u r e l y f a c t u a l , then the o b j e c t i o n j u s t sketched 
w i l l c l e a r l y be f a t a l to t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e . There are, 
however, a t l e a s t three c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which may be 
brought forward m defence o f the view t h a t , f o r the 
most p a r t , they have not committed t h i s e r r o r . F i r s t , 
and most g e n e r a l l y , i f we look a t n a t u r a l - l a w reason-
i n g as a whole, we s h a l l f i n d t h a t i t tends t o pro-
ceed upon the basis o f c e r t a i n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s which 
are themselves e v a l u a t i v e m character. P l a t o , f o r 
example, i s o b v i o u s l y an exponent of deduction. The 
mind o f the man who has achieved knowledge m the 
f u l l sense mpves 'from Ideas to Ideas (and) f i n a l l y 
r e s t s a t Ideas'. But, according t o P l a t o , the source 
from which a l l moral knowledge i s d e r i v e d i s the Idea 
o f the Good. And to d e r i v e or deduce good from Good 
i s not to d e r i v e good from f a c t , except i n the sense 
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i n which i t might be s a i d t h a t the Idea o f the Good i s 
i n f a c t Good. S i m i l a r l y , from c l a s s i c a l a n t i q u i t y 
onwards, we f i n d i t c o n s t a n t l y taken f o r granted t h a t 
the u n i v e r s e i s m some i n t r i n s i c sense a r e p o s i t o r y 
o f values o r purposes. Most commonly, we encounter 
the assumption t h a t i t i s the c r e a t i o n o f a D e i t y 
who has commanded t h a t humanity s h a l l have c e r t a i n 
ends (such as e a r t h l y happiness and u l t i m a t e b e a t i t u d e ) , 
and whose commands are both i n t e l l i g i b l e m the w o r l d 
and b i n d i n g upon those who apprehend them. 
The second p o i n t i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the f i r s t . 
To the extent t h a t they have appealed t o deduction as 
such r a t h e r than (as m the case of St Paul o r the 
U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n ) to conscience or d i r e c t moral 
i n t u i t i o n , n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s have tended t o take 
as the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e i r deductions statements 
which are themselves o f an e v a l u a t i v e c h a r a c t e r . St 
Thomas Aquinas' account o f n a t u r a l law, f o r example, 
takes i t s departure from the s e l f - e v i d e n t p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t good ought to be done and e v i l avoided - a 
p r i n c i p l e which i s not o n l y t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n , but 
a l s o normative i n a l l i t s p o s s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
S i m i l a r l y , the n i n e t e e n 'laws o f n a t u r e ' i d e n t i f i e d 
by Thomas Hobbes are a l l s a i d t o be given a n a l y t i c a l l y 
i n a s i n g l e normative p r i n c i p l e - namely, do unto others 
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as you would have them do unto you. 
F i n a l l y , we might do worse than r e c a l l t h a t , a f t e r 
a l l , the motive i n f o r m i n g n a t u r a l - l a w reasoning from 
P l a t o onwards i s not simply a s c h o l a r l y w ish t o engage 
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i n pure t h e o r e t i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n . I t i s a d e s i r e t o 
discover, by r a t i o n a l means, how best t o achieve ends 
which are, on the whole, assumed t o be n a t u r a l to us 
- namely, the goals o f s o c i a l c o -operation. St Thomas' 
dictum t h a t good ought to be done and e v i l avoided i s , 
o f course, devoid o f f a c t u a l content m i t s e l f . But, 
when he comes to the question o f what m f a c t we ought 
t o do, h i s answer, put most b r o a d l y , i s t h i s : man's 
e a r t h l y good cannot be achieved unless he acts m such 
a way as t o make s o c i a l l i f e v i a b l e ; and the p r a c t i c a l 
reasoning by which we a r r i v e a t moral conclusions 
from the o r i g i n a l general p r i n c i p l e must take t h i s 
f a c t i n t o account. The assumption here - which i s a t 
l e a s t as o l d as Protagoras - i s simply the t r u i s m t h a t 
men have c e r t a i n needs and desires which they cannot 
s a t i s f y single-handed, t h a t man i s 'by n a t u r e ' a p o l -
i t i c a l animal and/or a s o c i a l animal. I n s h o r t , t h i s 
k i n d o f reasoning does not pretend to move from the 
p u r e l y f a c t u a l to the p u r e l y moral. N e i t h e r , i n c i d e n -
t a l l y , does i t c l a i m to be 'deadly accurate' m the 
way t h a t (say) geometry or algebra i s . Rather, i t 
s e ts out t o c l a r i f y o r s p e c i f y c e r t a i n e v a l u a t i v e 
f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s which i t e i t h e r takes f o r granted as 
matters of f a i t h o r conscience, o r which i t holds t o 
be simply obvious m the l i g h t of our experience of 
s e l f and o t h e r s . 
( I n c i d e n t a l l y , we ought also to beware o f seeing 
deductive i n f e r e n c e s i n statements where no such i n -
ferences are intended. Thomas J e f f e r s o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
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does not wish us to accept t h a t the 'bald f a c t ' t h a t 
a l l men are created equal i m p l i e s t h a t they have 
c e r t a i n ' u n a l i e n a b l e ' r i g h t s ( o r , as the legendary 
American s c h o o l c h i l d put i t , 'unamiable' r i g h t s ) -
which c l e a r l y would be a mistake. Rather, h i s p o i n t 
i s t h a t i t i s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t r u e b o t h t h a t God has 
created a l l men equal and t h a t he has endowed them 
w i t h the r i g h t s m question. Nothing o f the k i n d i s 
s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t r u e , o f course - or can o n l y be made 
so a t the cost o f gr e a t a r t i f i c i a l i t y . But t h i s i n -
a p p r o p r i a t e use o f l o g i c a l t e rminology f o r r h e t o r i c a l 
purposes does not c o n v i c t J e f f e r s o n o f 'Hume's f a l l a c y ' . 
The most important conclusion t o a r i s e out o f these 
remarks i s t h i s : Deductive reasoning which a r r i v e s 
a t p r e s c r i p t i o n s from premisses a t l e a s t one o f which 
i s i t s e l f an e v a l u a t i o n ( o r a c r y p t o - e v a l u a t i o n ) i s 
p l a i n l y n ot f a l l a c i o u s m the manner complained o f . 
I t i s not a case o f a r r i v i n g a t a statement 'from 
others which are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from i t . ' The 
f o l l o w i n g are examples by way o f i l l u s t r a t i o n : 
0mg i s wrong, 
6 i s a case o f 0ing, 
t h e r e f o r e , you ought not to 0. 
x i s good, 
y i s a means t o x, 
t h e r e f o r e y i s r i g h t . 
Provided we accept the - s u r e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and 
p u r e l y l e x i c o g r a p h i c a l - p o i n t t h a t you 'ought n o t ' 
t o do what i s 'wrong' and t h a t i t i s ' r i g h t ' to do what 
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i s a means t o 'good', then the two s y l l o g i s m s j u s t 
g i v e n are indeed unexceptionable. S i m i l a r l y , t h i s 
provides us w i t h a way o f rescu i n g the C a t h o l i c Church 
te a c h i n g on c o n t r a c e p t i o n , or the t r a d i t i o n a l condemn-
a t o r y a t t i t u d e towards homosexuality 
You ought not t o f r u s t r a t e the w i l l o f God; 
To employ a r t i f i c i a l means o f contraception/engage 
i n homosexual p r a c t i c e s i s t o f r u s t r a t e the w i l l 
o f God; 
t h e r e f o r e you ought not to employ a r t i f i c i a l means 
o f contraception/engage m homosexual p r a c t i c e s . 
I n a word, v a l i d deductive reasoning m the sphere o f 
morals i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e , given o n l y t h a t t h e r e 
i s a p r i o r consensus between the reasoning p a r t i e s 
over such f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s as ' 0mg i s wrong' o r 
10 
'x i s good'. Provided t h a t we are agreed i n the f i r s t 
place as to ends, as t o what are the r u l e s and p r i n -
c i p l e s to which we are committed, as to what s h a l l 
count as unacceptable behaviour, and so f o r t h , then 
t h e r e i s no l o g i c a l problem. A l l t h a t we then have 
to do i s proceed to the set t l e m e n t o f c e r t a i n prac-
t i c a l issues - t h a t © i s indeed a case o f 0mg; t h a t 
Mr Capone has indeed ©ed, and so f o r t h . The settlemen 
o f these matters may i n v o l v e us m a l l s o r t s o f d i f f -
i c u l t i e s , and the d i f f i c u l t i e s may be very i n t r a c t a b l e 
ones. But they w i l l not be d i f f i c u l t i e s o f a l o g i c a l 
k i n d . And, when we have s e t t l e d them, a normative 
c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s i n a p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e way. 
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These remarks, however, do not enable us a l t o g e t h e r 
t o dispose o f Hume. For, though you can make premisses 
o f a c e r t a i n k i n d y i e l d conclusions which f u n c t i o n as 
moral i m p e r a t i v e s o r e x h o r t a t i o n s , you cannot by a 
s i m i l a r process o f i n f e r e n c e a r r i v e a t the premisses 
themselves. And i t i s here, i t would seem, t h a t the 
r e a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t begin. 
For he wishes t o c l a i m something more than t h a t moral 
reasoning i s p o s s i b l e w i t h i n an agreed framework o f 
commitment to f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . He wishes to e s t a b l i s h 
a u n i v e r s a l and necessary m o r a l i t y on an o b j e c t i v e 
b asis by an appeal to n a t u r a l i s r a t i o . I n o t h e r words, 
he wishes to h o l d t h a t there are c e r t a i n f i r s t p r m c i p l 
of the k i n d '0mg i s wrong' or 'x i s good' which them-
selves 'stand t o r e a s o n 1 , and which do so m such a 
way t h a t they are able to command the assent o f a l l 
r i g h t - t h i n k i n g persons. I t i s t h i s c l a i m t h a t we 
must now examine. 
For the purposes o f the argument, l e t us engage m 
the k i n d o f exercise which R.M. Nozick has c a l l e d a 
•thought experiment'. I n o t h e r words, l e t us make 
c e r t a i n assumptions w i t h o u t , f o r the moment, w o r r y i n g 
about whether such assumptions are j u s t i f i a b l e o r n o t . 
Let us assume, f o r example, t h a t there i s , w i t h i n 
the community o f which our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t i s a 
member, an i n d i v i d u a l who claims t h a t he does not r e -
gard any aspect o f t h a t community's l e g a l and moral 
systems as b i n d i n g upon h i m s e l f . Let us suppose t h a t , 
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having consulted Hume's essay Of the O r i g i n a l Contract, 
he I n s i s t s t h a t , i f he were not a poor peasant o r a r t -
i s a n , he would not remain i n the community a moment 
longer* the only t h i n g h o l d i n g him there i s h i s i n -
a b i l i t y t o leave. More r a d i c a l l y , l e t us assume t h a t , 
on h i s t r a v e l s , our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t comes across 
a community whose form of l i f e i s u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t i n 
a l l respects from h i s own - whose 'language-game'is 
c o n s t i t u t e d by r u l e s which are, to him, t o t a l l y unfam-
i l i a r . Having made these assumptions, our question i s 
as f o l l o w s . How might our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t , placed 
i n some p o s i t i o n o f t h i s k i n d , show - simply by an 
appeal t o the ' n a t u r a l reason' which i s a l l e g e d l y 
common t o a l l mankind - t h a t (say) 0mg i s wrong, or 
t h a t x i s good, or t h a t a l l men have c e r t a i n i n t r i n s i c 
and i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s , o r t h a t a l l men are equal m 
mo r a l l y r e l e v a n t respects, or t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n s o f 
race, creed, c o l o u r , and so f o r t h are not m o r a l l y 
r e l e v a n t 7 (We are assuming, o f course, t h a t such n o t i o n s 
are f o r e i g n and repugnant to h i s hearers.) I n the 
f i r s t place, g r a n t i n g t h a t such an appeal would, i n . 
an i n t e l l i g i b l e sense, be an appeal t o 'human r a t i o n a l i t y ' , 
he q u i t e c l e a r l y i s n ot here m a p o s i t i o n t o appeal 
to conscience o r to moral i n t u i t i o n . The very f a c t 
t h a t such disagreements as those w i t h which he i s d e a l -
i n g have a r i s e n a t a l l i s s u f f i c i e n t to i n d i c a t e t h a t 
such an appeal would be a sheer waste o f time. I t 
would seem, then, t h a t only two r a t i o n a l resources are 
open t o him. deduction and i n d u c t i o n . And, u n f o r t u n -
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a t e l y , b o t h these resources succumb t o d i f f i c u l t i e s 
s u f f i c i e n t t o i n d i c a t e t h a t there i s no way o f demon-
s t r a t i n g to anyone who i s not a l r e a d y convinced t h a t 
any one set of values i s m o r a l l y p r e f e r a b l e t o any 
o t h e r on s o - c a l l e d r a t i o n a l grounds. 
On the one hand, i f our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t were 
to appeal to deduction, he would a t once have t o con-
cede the p o i n t which we have c a l l e d 'Hume's f a l l a c y ' . 
He would have to admit, on the grounds already adduced, 
t h a t he could not have derived an e v a l u a t i v e conclusion 
by i n f e r e n c e from premisses which do not have a v a l u e -
statement l u r k i n g m them somewhere. But i f h i s hearer 
then demanded a demonstration o f the e v a l u a t i v e premiss 
o r premisses, he would immediately f i n d h i m s e l f back 
t o square one. And he would f i n d h i m s e l f m a n o t -
d i s s i m i l a r predicament i f he pur p o r t e d t o produce an 
i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i s a t i o n - f o r example, t h a t 0mg i s 
wrong because a l l o r most past instances of i t have 
been accompanied by mischievous consequences. I t 
i s p l a i n enough ( t h i s p o i n t has been hammered f a r 
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harder than i t need be by such w r i t e r s as A.J. Ayer) 
t h a t e m p i r i c a l evidence can o n l y s e t t l e questions o f 
f a c t - i . e . questions which are capable o f being v e r -
i f i e d , o r a t l e a s t f a l s i f i e d , by experience o r e x p e r i -
mental data.. I n the case which we are c o n s i d e r i n g , 
however, the very most t h a t such evidence ( m the 
form o f past successions o f event 0 and event c) 
could show would be t h a t cn are consequences o f 0. 
No amount o f such evidence could o f i t s e l f e s t a b l i s h 
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t h a t cn are mischievous consequences r a t h e r than j u s t 
consequences. And i f the m o r a l i s t r e q u i r e s t h a t i t 
be j u s t taken f o r granted t h a t consequence c be accep-
ted as mischievous, then he i s asking h i s hearer merely 
to accept another value-judgment - c i s mischievous -
which no more stands to reason than does '0mg i s 
wrong 1. And t h i s , o f course, once again puts him back 
to square one. 
Exponents of n a t u r a l law, i n supposing t h a t i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t o reason w i t h anyone anywhere i n much the 
same way, have c o n s i s t e n t l y assumed t h a t the s t r u c t u r e 
of r e a l i t y - o f 'nature* - determines the s t r u c t u r e o f 
thought and language m some f i n a l and absolute way. 
I t i s t h i s which enables them to b e l i e v e i n a common 
or ' u n i v e r s a l ' m o r a l i t y . But i n view o f the apparent 
immunity o f moral disagreements t o what one might 
o r d i n a r i l y be tempted to c a l l ' r a t i o n a l argument', i t 
i s n o t i m p l a u s i b l e t o suggest t h a t no one form o f moral 
language d e p i c t s a moral o r d e r a v a i l a b l e to anyone 
who uses the c o r r e c t method o f discovery. Indeed, t h i s 
i s a suggestion which, m some hands, i s c a r r i e d t o 
great l e n g t h s , w i t h a r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g r e s u l t : 
namely, the ' h i s t o n c i s t ' suggestion t h a t language i n 
g eneral does not r e f e r to e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l o b j e c t s which 
are p o t e n t i a l l y the common p r o p e r t y of a l l . I n s t e a d , 
i t i s h e l d , a l l forms o f understanding are merely 
h i s t o r i c a l and c o n t i n g e n t . Each' such form depends 
upon a p a r t i c u l a r //e 11anschauung - or, more a c c u r a t e l y , 
i s an inseparable p a r t o f a p a r t i c u l a r U e 1 1 a n s c h a u u n g . 
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On t h i s view, the cate g o r i e s o f t h e o r e t i c a l understand-
i n g and the basic values a p p r o p r i a t e to each Weltan-
schauung are simply inseparable from each o t h e r , not 
even m p r i n c i p l e i s i t p o s s i b l e t o d i s s o c i a t e judgments 
o f f a c t from judgments o f value. Thus, f o r example, 
the values o f modern, Western, t e c h n o l o g i c a l c a p i t a l i s t 
s o c i e t i e s are e n t i r e l y c o n t ingent upon t h e i r being 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l and c a p i t a l i s t i c m t h e i r world-view. 
S u b s t i t u t e another w o r l d view, and you n e c e s s a r i l y 
s u b s t i t u t e another set o f values. Take, f o r example, 
the values b u i l t - m t o our modern e d u c a t i o n a l system, 
which i s almost e n t i r e l y geared to the p r o d u c t i o n o f 
s k i l l e d r e c r u i t s t o the c a p i t a l i s t mode o f p r o d u c t i o n , 
which values the p r o d u c t i o n o f s c i e n t i s t s more than 
o f a r t i s t s , and so on. No matt e r how i n s i s t e n t l y 
educators might c l a i m to be i n s t r u c t i n g t h e i r charges 
i n a b s o l ute or basic values, they are doing ( o r so 
the h i s t o n c i s t argument runs) n o t h i n g o f the s o r t . 
C h r i s t i a n i n s t r u c t i o n , too, i s not a communication 
o f absolute values. I t i s merely the communication 
o f the k i n d o f values which w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e t o 
a w o r l d m which the vast m a j o r i t y o f men must be 
a l i e n a t e d , poor and r e l a t i v e f a i l u r e s , and who w i l l 
b e n e f i t b o t h from i n j u n c t i o n s t o be humble and meek 
and from the promise o f a t e r r i b l e revenge m the w o r l d 
t o come. On t h i s account, since every conception o f 
good and r i g h t belongs t o a s p e c i f i c Weltanschauung 
which i s m t u r n determined by a p a r t i c u l a r mode o f 
pr o d u c t i o n , there cannot be a n a t u r a l law s p e c i f y i n g 
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t h a t some t h i n g s are r i g h t independently o f o p i n i o n . 
I n o rder t o expose the weaknesses of n a t u r a l law, 
however, i t i s not necessary to r e l y upon t h i s r a t h e r 
extreme form o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and moral s c e p t i c i s m . 
I n s t e a d , the problem can be s p e c i f i e d m the f o l l o w i n g 
r a t h e r l e s s d r a s t i c way. Deadlocks m moral discourse 
do not n e c e s s a r i l y ( o r , I would imagine, o f t e n ) a r i s e 
out o f complete f a i l u r e s to grasp the n a t u r e o f the 
language-game being played. That i s , they do not nec-
e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e our not understanding the k i n d o f 
discourse which we are h e a r i n g , or being b a f f l e d by a 
Weltanschauung which, from where we stand, i s u t t e r l y 
incomprehensible. A f t e r a l l , I can l i s t e n t o a man 
whose manner of viewing the w o r l d i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t from mine and s t i l l understand p e r f e c t l y 
w e l l what he means. I can see how he ' p i c t u r e s the 
w o r l d ' , but I s t i l l don't agree w i t h him. I t would 
seem, m a word, t h a t the k i n d o f t h i n g which we have 
been c o n s i d e r i n g need be n o t h i n g more e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y 
s p e c t a c u l a r than a simple case of disagreement. The 
problem c o n f r o n t i n g the devotee o f n a t u r a l law i s 
no t - or not n e c e s s a r i l y - the r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t -
f o r w a r d one o f making h i m s e l f understood. I t i s t h a t , 
when disagreements o f a c e r t a i n k i n d occur, there i s 
s i m p l y n o t h i n g t o which he can p o i n t to break the 
deadlock which such disagreements occasion. 
This i s not t o suggest t h a t the p a r t i e s t o a moral 
disagreement have n o t h i n g a t a l l t o say t o one another. 
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I t may be p o s s i b l e , perhaps, f o r one p a r t y t o p o i n t 
out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s or incoherences w i t h i n the moral 
scheme favoured by the o t h e r - and to have h i s p o i n t 
taken. Again, the p a r t i e s may perhaps g i v e each o t h e r 
advice as to the best means of achieving; ends which 
are acknowledged by each t o be beyond a d j u d i c a t i o n 
as t o t h e i r goodness or otherwise. Moreover, such 
advice may q u i t e i n t e l l i g i b l y and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y 
be s a i d t o be r o o t e d m an understanding o f 'nature'. 
I t might be t e c h n o l o g i c a l advice, f o r example. There 
c l e a r l y i s a sense i n which the ' r i g h t ' way t o (say) 
d i s c o v e r o i l i s by i d e n t i f y i n g o i l - b e a r i n g rock and 
b o r i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e s o r t o f hole m i t t o the 
c o r r e c t depth. S i m i l a r l y , there i s a sense m which 
i t would be 'wrong' to t r y to discover o i l by d i s -
embowelling chickens and p r a y i n g to A p o l l o . And a l l 
t h i s i s q u i t e a p a r t from such questions as whether i t 
would be ' r i g h t ' o r 'wrong' t o r u i n a b e a u t i f u l l a n d -
scape, to depopulate a v i l l a g e , or t o expose workmen 
to h o r r i b l e dangers m the quest f o r o i l . But i t i s 
moral r i g h t and not mere t e c h n i c a l e f f i c a c y which i s 
o f i n t e r e s t t o us. And so f a r as moral issues as such 
are concerned, t h e r e i s , as Hume says, n o t h i n g i r r a t i o n a l 
i n p r e f e r r i n g p ain t o pleasure, falsehood to t r u t h o r 
t o t a l personal r u i n to a v o i d the most t r i f l i n g i n c o n -
venience to a s t r a n g e r . Confronted, then, by a man 
whose moral l i f e m conducted q u i t e c o h e r e n t l y and 
q u i t e p u r p o s e f u l l y , but m a manner u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t 
from and m i m i c a l t o h i s own, the n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t 
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i a not l o g i c a l l y e n t i t l e d to say t h a t he i s being 
' i r r a t i o n a l ' . His r a t i o n a l i t y may be d i f f e r e n t from 
t h a t o f the n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t , b u t, i f he can 
gi v e reasons f o r what he does, i t i s s t i l l a r a t i o n -
a l i t y - 'being able t o g i v e reasons f o r what you do' 
i s s u r e l y a l a r g e p a r t o f what we mean by 'being 
r a t i o n a l * . For t h e i r p a r t , n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s 
have c o n s t a n t l y supposed t h a t 'reason* i s a ' t h i n g ' 
'out t h e r e ' , l i k e the Clapham omnibus, d e m o c r a t i c a l l y 
a v a i l a b l e 'by nature' t o anyone who wishes t o cat c h 
i t . But there seem t o be good grounds f o r supposing 
t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y , l i k e l o v e , i s a many-aplendoured t h i n g . 
And we can accept t h a t t h i s i s so w i t h o u t f o r one 
moment abandoning the time-honoured dictum t h a t man i s 
'by n a t u r e ' a r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e , and w i t h o u t adopting 
a thoroughgoing ' h i s t o n c i s t ' account o f what i t i s 
t o have knowledge. The p l a i n f a c t would seem t o be 
t h a t , when Jones and Smith disagree over a moral issue 
o f a fundamental k i n d , i t i s impossible f o r the s e l f -
appointed ' r a t i o n a l man' to lead them by the i n t e l l e c -
t u a l nose towards b l a n k e t , u n i v e r s a l l y - a p p l i c a b l e 
p r e s c r i p t i o n s o f the n a t u r a l - l a w k i n d . I n a n u t s h e l l , 
whoever wishes t o hol d t h a t (say) a c e r t a i n course 
o f a c t i o n i s o b j e c t i v e l y o r ' n a t u r a l l y ' r i g h t , come 
h e l l o r h i g h water, w i l l i n e v i t a b l y succumb t o the 
s c e p t i c who says, 'Prove i t . ' 
The extent o f t h i s problem i s d r a m a t i c a l l y i l l u s -
t r a t e d over and over again by the l i t e r a t u r e o f s o c i a l 
anthropology - a l i t e r a t u r e u n a v a i l a b l e when Hobbes, 
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w i t h b l i t h e asides about 'the savage peoples o f North 
America', was d e l i v e r i n g h i m s e l f o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s 
about human na t u r e . The po s s i b l e examples are so 
numerous t h a t we might as w e l l content ourselves w i t h 
one. But l e t us approach i t by way of the improbable-
sounding r o u t e o f Immanuel Kant. 
Kant's moral philosophy ( t o the scope o f which we 
can h a r d l y hope to do j u s t i c e here) i s m many ways 
a d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o r e h a b i l i t a t e n a t u r a l law from 
the s t r i c t u r e s o f Hume. On the one hand, Kant declares 
h i m s e l f to be, a t l e a s t m some sense, an exponent o f 
n a t u r a l law m the f o l l o w i n g passages 
O b l i g a t o r y laws f o r which an e x t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
i s p o s s i b l e are c a l l e d g e n e r a l l y e x t e r n a l laws. 
Those e x t e r n a l laws, the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f which 
can be recognised by reason a p r i o r i even w i t h -
out an e x t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , are c a l l e d n a t u r a l 
laws.1^ 
Law...is d i v i d e d i n t o n a t u r a l law and p o s i t i v e 
law. N a t u r a l law r e s t s upon pure r a t i o n a l p r i n -
c i p l e s a p r i o r i , p o s i t i v e or s t a t u t o r y law i s 
what proceeds from the w i l l o f a l e g i s l a t o r . ^ 
On the o t h e r hand (and we have touched b r i e f l y on t h i s 
i n the previous chapter) Kant repudiates the consequ-
e n t i a l i s t o r ' u t i l i t a r i a n ' moral philosophy espoused 
by Hume. He does so on three grounds. U t i l i t y , he 
says, cannot be regarded as an absolute standard o f 
value, f i r s t , because i t depends upon the e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d and t h e r e f o r e upon circumstances which are them-
selves s u b j e c t t o change, second, because there i s 
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no a p r i o r i reason why u t i l i t y as such should be sought 
as an end; and, t h i r d , because u t i l i t a r i a n a c t i o n i s 
p r u d e n t i a l or i n s t r u m e n t a l c a l c u l a t i o n . I n o t h e r words, 
i t proceeds according t o maxims o f the form ' I f you 
d e s i r e so-and-so, you ought to do such-and-such' -
statements which Kant c a l l s ' h y p o t h e t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s ' , 
and which he regards as something very d i f f e r e n t from 
moral i m p e r a t i v e s . By c o n t r a s t , pure moral a c t i o n 
i s n e i t h e r dependent upon any f e a t u r e o f the e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d , nor i s i t undertaken as a means of b r i n g i n g 
about any consequence m the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . Rather, 
i t i s the a c t i o n o f a r a t i o n a l being on the pure and 
sole a p r i o r i b a sis o f duty. And h i s conception o f 
duty i n v o l v e s , f i r s t , t h a t one should a c t on p r i n c i p l e 
r a t h e r than m a n t i c i p a t i o n o f c a l c u l a t e d r e s u l t s and, 
second, t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s or maxims according to 
which moral a c t i o n s are conducted should be what he 
c a l l s ' c a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e s ' . F i n a l l y , a c a t e g o r i c a l 
i m p e r a t i v e i s the k i n d of t h i n g 'the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f 
which can be recognised...even w i t h o u t an e x t e r n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n . ' This r e c o g n i t i o n i s p o s s i b l e because a 
c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e i s ' u n i v e r s a l 1 , m the sense 
of being capable, m p r i n c i p l e , o f being acted on by 
every s i n g l e member o f the human race. The basic idea 
i s t h a t , before a c t i n g , one ought t o ask oneself, 'What 
would happen i f everybody d i d what I am now about t o 
d o " and r e f r a i n from doing a n y t h i n g which could not 
be done by a l l . 
There i s undoubtedly much amiss w i t h what Kant has 
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t o say. For example, granted t h a t there i s no a 
p r i o r i reason f o r pursuing u t i l i t y as an end, what 
a p r i o r i reason i s t here f o r supposing t h a t we ought 
to a c t on ' u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e maxims' 7 Doing so would 
c e r t a i n l y i n v o l v e us f r e q u e n t l y m s i t u a t i o n s o f a 
k i n d which most m o r a l i s t s would wish to deplore -
f o r example (and see below), i t would r e q u i r e us t o 
t e l l the t r u t h even when, by t e l l i n g a l i e , the most 
abominable catastrophes might be ave r t e d . Again, i t 
seems t h a t there must, i n every s p e c i f i c d e c i s i o n as 
to whether a given maxim i s ' u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e ' o r n o t , 
be an i m p l i e d judgment as to the probable outcome of 
an a c t i o n based on t h a t maxim m terms of i t s good o r 
bad consequences. But any i n s t a n c e o f t h i s procedure, 
of course, w i l l produce only a h y p o t h e t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , 
which i s s a i d by Kant h i m s e l f t o be inadequate as a 
standard f o r moral a c t i o n . Leaving a l l t h i s t o one 
s i d e , however, l e t us consider Kant's treatment o f 
one p a r t i c u l a r case, t h a t o f l y i n g o r making an i n -
s i n c e r e promise Suppose t h a t you y o u r s e l f i n t e n d t o 
act on the maxim, ' T e l l a l i e whenever i t serves your 
t u r n t o do so.' Apply the t e s t o f u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y . 
Ask y o u r s e l f what would happen i f everyone decided to 
act on t h a t maxim. C l e a r l y , the outcome would be l o g -
i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y preposterous. Lying depends 
upon there being a c e r t a i n minimum o f t r u s t on the p a r t 
of those t o whom you might l i e , since you cannot success-
f u l l y l i e unless people are, m the mam, prepared t o 
b e l i e v e you. Lying, m ot h e r words, i s p a r a s i t i c upon 
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t r u t h - t e l l i n g . But what i f everybody adopts the maxim, 
'Lie whenever i t s u i t s you' 9 I n these circumstances, 
the necessary minimum o f t r u s t would vanish. The prac-
t i c e o f t e l l i n g the t r u t h would t h e r e f o r e atrophy, since 
no-one would b e l i e v e anyone anyway. And so the prac-
t i c e o f l y i n g , which depends upon t h a t o f t r u t h - t e l l i n g , 
would i t s e l f cease t o be p o s s i b l e . No form o f co-
o p e r a t i o n or c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t y would be p o s s i b l e ; 
t h e r e f o r e , you ought not to l i e (and s i m i l a r remarks 
aPPly» °f course, t o such t h i n g s as s t e a l i n g , murder, 
and what have you). 
And so we come, by way o f Kant, back t o s o c i a l a n t h -
ropology. The argument about - o r aga i n s t - l y i n g 
which we have j u s t o u t l i n e d seems, on the face o f i t , 
t o be q u i t e unanswerable. One might very r e a d i l y be 
f o r g i v e n f o r supposing t h a t here, a t l e a s t , we have 
a u n i v e r s a l moral p r i n c i p l e which 'stands t o reason' 
- t h a t , i r r e s p e c t i v e of time or place, t e l l i n g the 
t r u t h most o f the time i s an a b s o l u t e l y necessary p r e -
r e q u i s i t e o f s o c i a l v i a b i l i t y . But now consider the 
B a - I l a t r i b e o f Northern Rhodesia. 'They l i e m the 
most bare-faced and strenuous manner...without the 
l e a s t shame. They l i e o f t e n when i t i s to t h e i r ad-
14 
vantage t o t e l l the t r u t h . ' I n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l s 
t h a t such behaviour i s q u i t e coherent w i t h t h e i r view 
o f the w o r l d . ' I f a man b e l i e v e s , as the Bantu does, 
t h a t any o f h i s neighbours may be, and t h a t some o f them 
m f a c t are, endowed w i t h s u p e r n a t u r a l powers which 
may be used t o do him and h i s neighbours harm; and i f 
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he f u r t h e r b e l i e v e s t h a t g i v i n g them i n f o r m a t i o n 
provides them w i t h the means o f u s i n g these powers, 
we have a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s m which not mutual t r u s t 
and confidence but mutual f e a r and s u s p i c i o n are l i k e l y 
t o f l o u r i s h . I n such circumstances, t r u t h - t e l l i n g 
15 
i s not l i k e l y to be regarded as a v i r t u e . ' 
Instances such as t h i s do indeed r a i s e , m an acute 
form, the question o f whether o r not there i s any 
f i x e d datum a t a l l i n the b e w i l d e r i n g w o r l d o f moral 
experience. Indeed, such instances seem t o p o i n t 
r a t h e r c l e a r l y m the d i r e c t i o n o f a p u r e l y p o s i t i v i s t i 
understanding o f law and m o r a l i t y - to the view, t h a t 
i s , t h a t t h e i r content could be a n y t h i n g at a l l . But 
i t i s time, now, t o l e t our imaginary n a t u r a l law t h e o r 
i s t have a say. 
I I I . 
A 'Minimum Content' o f Natu r e ! Law. 
Since t h e r e i s s t i l l a l o t t o be s a i d f o r d i a l e c t i c 
as a means o f c l a r i f y i n g i ssues, l e t us a t t r i b u t e t o 
our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t the f o l l o w i n g speech 
'While I see the f o r c e o f much o f what you say, 
I cannot see t h a t any o f i t i s u l t i m a t e l y f a t a l 
t o the k i n d o f p o s i t i o n which I h o l d . Of course 
I accept t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o prove t h a t 
an e v a l u a t i v e o r p r e s c r i p t i v e statement i s ' t r u e ' 
i n the way t h a t you might prove t h a t metal expands 
when heated or t h a t temporal precedence i s t r a n s -
i t i v e but i r r e f l e x i v e . I n s h o r t , I accept t h a t 
e t h i c s , physics and l o g i c are ' c a t e g o n a l l y d i s -
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t m c t ' . But the weak p o i n t o f your argument comes 
when you i n v i t e the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t I encounter, 
not only the d i s a f f e c t e d c i t i z e n but - 'more r a d -
i c a l l y ' - 'a form o f l i f e u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t i n 
a l l r e s pects' from my own. That you are y o u r s e l f 
aware o f your weakness here i s shown by your own 
words - ' l e t us make c e r t a i n assumptions w i t h o u t , 
f o r the moment, w o r r y i n g about whether such ass-
umptions are j u s t i f i a b l e o r n o t . ' I t h i n k they 
are n o t . Indeed, I s t r o n g l y suspect you o f t r y i n g 
on a p e t i t i o p r i n c i p n . I n order t o make the p o i n t 
t h a t the content o f law and m o r a l i t y could be any-
t h i n g a t a l l , you f i r s t choose t o assume t h a t any 
conceivable form o f l i f e ( o r Weltanschauung, or 
what have you) would be p o s s i b l e . And t h i s , of 
course, i s one o f the very questions a t i s s u e . 
My p o i n t i s t h a t , g r e a t as I know human d i v e r s i t y 
to be, i t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e t o p o i n t to c e r t a i n 
p r i n c i p l e s which must be accepted, and w i l l be 
accepted, human nature and the nature o f the w o r l d 
being what they are.' 
This i s the p o s i t i o n which we must now consider. 
I n f a c t , one o f the curious f e a t u r e s of the n a t u r a l -
law debate i s the way i n which even i t s most implac-
able opponents a l l o w themselves t o be betrayed i n t o 
making statements which look remarkably l i k e those o f 
the very t r a d i t i o n they c r i t i c i s e . By way o f i l l u s -
t r a t i o n , l e t us b r i e f l y examine some instances o f 
t h i s . F i r s t , l e t us consider the account which David 
Hume o f f e r s m place of n a t u r a l law as an e x p l a n a t i o n 
o f moral commitment. One o f the uses t o which we 
ftut reason, he suggests (and here h i s p o s i t i o n i s 
n ot u n l i k e t h a t o f Hobbes on the same s u b j e c t ) i s 
the encompassing o f valued goals - s p e c i f i c a l l y , to 
312. 
the d e v i s i n g o f r u l e s which we expect t o accomplish 
them and, most g e n e r a l l y , t o the achievement of an 
acceptable degree o f s o c i a l peace and harmony. What 
a c t u a l l y causes us t o value goals and t o venerate 
r u l e s which secure them, however, i s not reason i t s e l f , 
but what Hume c a l l s 'passion 1 ( t h a t i s , what we should 
now, br o a d l y speaking, c a l l 'emotion'). As he puts 
i t , 
Reason i s , and ought o n l y t o be, the slave o f the 
passions, and can never pretend to any o t h e r 
1 f> 
o f f i c e than to serve and obey them. 
Undeniably, t h i s i s r a t h e r a curious way o f p u t t i n g i t . 
I f reason i s the slave o f the passions and can never 
pretend t o a n y t h i n g else, what i s the p o i n t o f saying 
t h a t i t 'ought o n l y t o be' s o 9 But l e t us not s p l i t 
h a i r s . I n essence, Hume's t h e s i s i s t h a t the r u l e s 
and p r i n c i p l e s by which we l i v e are u l t i m a t e l y matters 
o f preference and h a b i t r a t h e r than o b j e c t i v e s which 
are 'out t h e r e ' , p r i o r to any convention, and d i s c -
overable by ' n a t u r a l reason'. They o r i g i n a t e , he 
suggests, i n the most general and inescapable o f a l l 
our preferences - namely, the preference f o r pleasure 
and i t s corresponding a v e r s i o n from what i s unpleasant 
or p a i n f u l . What has mi s t a k e n l y been taken f o r 
' n a t u r a l reason' i n the past i s no more than the pres-
ence, m man, of 'calm passions' (such as benevolence) 
e x i s t i n g alongside such t u r b u l e n t and imp u l s i v e pass-
ions as anger and s e l f - l o v e . Rules o f j u s t i c e become 
r u l e s o f j u s t i c e , not because they partake o f some 
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i n t a n g i b l e but i n t e l l i g i b l e n a t u r a l j u s t i c e , but be-
cause t h e y have been i d e n t i f i e d a s s u c c e s s f u l means 
o f s a t i s f y i n g the d e s i r e to l i m i t human i m p u l s i v e n e s s 
and s e l f i s h n e s s s u f f i c i e n t l y to e s t a b l i s h g e n e r a l con-
d i t i o n s o f peace and s e c u r i t y . H a ving d e v i s e d and 
adopted s u c h r u l e s , we r e f l e c t upon them and approve 
o f them u n t i l they do i n d e e d seem to ' s t a n d to r e a s o n ' . 
But a l l t h a t r e a l l y happens i s t h a t our 'calm p a s s i o n ' 
o f sympathy f o r the w e l l b e i n g o f s o c i e t y i s h a b i t -
u a l l y engaged by them And t h i s engagement i s n o t 
e n t i r e l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d , o f c o u r s e , s i n c e , m the lo n g 
run, t h e i n t e r e s t s o f s o c i e t y a s a whole a r e a l s o the 
i n t e r e s t s o f e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l member. 
T h i s i s a l l v e r y w e l l , but i t s t i l l seems c l e a r t h a t 
Hume's t h e o r y o f 'moral s e n t i m e n t s ' i s m an ob v i o u s 
s e n s e a t h e o r y about 'human n a t u r e ' . Reason, he s a y s , 
cannot e s t a b l i s h what i t i s t h a t we ought to d e s i r e 
I t can o n l y show us ways o f a c h i e v i n g what we do m 
f a c t d e s i r e . But i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s conceded t h a t we 
a r e c r e a t u r e s whose needs, d e s i r e s and b e h a v i o u r a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e s u c h t h a t we must f o r m u l a t e r u l e s 
o f j u s t i c e i f we a r e to s e c u r e o ur d e s n e d ends i t 
i s p a r t o f our n e t u r e to need s u c h r u l e s , j u s t a s i t 
i s p a r t o f o u r n a t u r e to d e s i r e what we do d e s i r e 
E q u a l l y , i t i s p a r t o f our n a t u r e to be a b l e to u s e 
our i n t e l l e c t to f o r m u l a t e the r u l e s by which we l i v e 
Hume has shown, c o n v i n c i n g l y enough, t h a t you cannot 
deduce 'ougnt' from ' i s ' - o r , at l e a s t , that you can 
oaly uo so i i L n • L q 1 S r p r l i i , „n o n l(- i n ( j a 
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But he has also concluded t h a t our 'oughts' are form-
u l a t e d m the l i g h t o f what i s by creatures who are 
' n a t u r a l l y r a t i o n a l ' m the s i g n i f i c a n t sense of being 
able to make sense o f and cope w i t h t h e i r experiences. 
And so i t i s s u r e l y s t i l l open to anyone t o claim t h a t 
'nature' r e q u i r e s t h a t there be r u l e s o f conduct, and 
t h a t our 'nature* i s such t h a t we can discover by 
the p r a c t i c a l exercise of reason what r u l e s w i l l best 
s u i t our requirements. And t h i s c l a i m i s p e r f e c t l y 
compatible w i t h the admission - made, a f t e r a l l , by 
A r i s t o t l e - t h a t moral reasoning does not have the 
formal e x a c t i t u d e o f deduction as i t f i g u r e s i n such 
a c t i v i t i e s as geometry. 
Second, l e t us consider Jeremy Bentham. Bentham, 
as we r e c a l l from the I n t r o d u c t i o n , inveighs w i t h some 
a s p e r i t y against those who chase the 'obscure phantom' 
of n a t u r a l law. S p e c i f i c a l l y , he has no patience at 
a l l w i t h the cl a i m t h a t there are ' n a t u r a l r i g h t s ' . 
The f o l l o w i n g i s perhaps h i s most celebrated broadside 
on the subject 
How stands the t r u t h of t h i n g s 7 That there are 
no such th i n g s as n a t u r a l r i g h t s - no such things 
as r i g h t s a n t e r i o r to the establishment o f govern-
ment - no such t h i n g s as n a t u r a l r i g h t s opposed t o , 
m c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o , l e g a l . . . . That which has 
no existence cannot be destroyed - t h a t which 
cannot be destroyed cannot r e q u i r e anything to 
preserve i t N a t u r a l Rights i s simple nonsense, 
n a t u r a l and i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e r i g h t s , r h e t o r i c a l 
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nonsense - nonsense upon s t i l t s . 
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I n place o f t h i s nonsense, Bentham's system, m best 
Gradgnnd and Bounderby f a s h i o n , p u r p o r t s to d e l i v e r 
a p r i n c i p l e which, i f a p p l i e d by l e g i s l a t o r s to t h e i r 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s , w i l l enable them to fo r g e good laws 
w i t h f a c t o r y p r e c i s i o n , namely, the Greatest Happiness 
p r i n c i p l e . A good law i s t h a t which secures the g r e a t -
est happiness o f the g r e a t e s t number and, by e x t e n s i o n , 
a good government i s one which recognises i t s o b l i g a t i o n 
to make such laws as f a r as p o s s i b l e . According t o 
Bentham, a l l the r u l e s which confer r i g h t s and impose 
d u t i e s are created by governments. We do not d i s c o v e r 
them. We make them - or, r a t h e r , we should make them 
- i n the image o f the Greatest Happiness p r i n c i p l e . 
But ( q u i t e apart from the grotesque inadequacies o f 
Bentham's system as i t stands) what k i n d o f t h i n g does 
t h i s Greatest Happiness p r i n c i p l e t u r n out t o b e 7 What 
general conclusions as to the nature of law and morals 
does acceptance o f i t commit us t o 9 I t would seem t h a t 
we here have a p r i n c i p l e - t h a t i s , a general r u l e f o r 
the making and a p p l y i n g o f more p a r t i c u l a r r u l e s -
which cannot be c o n v e n t i o n a l . I t i s not p o s t e r i o r m 
date t o the establishment o f government. On the con-
t r a r y , i t i s i t s e l f s a i d t o be the p r i n c i p l e upon which 
any government worth i t s s a l t i s founded. I t i s , t h e r e -
f o r e , ' a n t e r i o r to the establishment o f government'. 
I n o t h e r words, there seems t o be a t l e a s t one p r i n -
c i p l e which i s ' n a t u r a l ' m the f a m i l i a r sense o f being 
p r i o r to and c o n t i t u t i v e o f conventions. And i f a 
government i s s a i d t o be under a non-conventional 
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o b l i g a t i o n to secure the g r e a t e s t happiness o f the 
g r e a t e s t number o f i t s s u b j e c t s (which i s what i t 
b o i l s down t o ) , i t i s s u r e l y not absurd t o say t h a t 
the s u b j e c t s have a non-conventional r i g h t t o r e q u i r e 
o r expect i t t o do so. Nothing much i s l o s t i f we 
ref u s e to c a l l non-conventional r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s 
' n a t u r a l ' . The p o i n t s t i l l s u r v i v e s t h a t they are 
non-conventional - quod e r a t demonstrandum. 
As a f i n a l i n s t a n c e , we might c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o the 
r a t h e r p e c u l i a r s t a t u s , i n M a r x i s t thought, o f the 
s o - c a l l e d 'theory o f a l i e n a t i o n ' . On the one hand, 
M a r x i s t s are d i s q u a l i f i e d on the grounds o f ' h i s t o n c -
ism' from espousing a theory o f n a t u r a l law. On the 
oth e r hand, what i s the ' a l i e n a t e d man' a l i e n a t e d 
from, i f not h i s ' t r u e n a t u r e ' , which i s suppressed 
or d i s t o r t e d by the demands made upon him by the cap-
i t a l i s t mode of production? As Sidney Hook p o i n t s 
o u t , adoption o f the theory o f a l i e n a t i o n - which i s , 
he says, ' f o r e i g n t o Marx's concept o f man' - 'would 
e n t a i l the acceptance o f a n a t u r a l law m o r a l i t y ' , 
i n v o l v i n g as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l and moral 
1 R 
argument the 'standard o f the un a l i e n a t e d s e l f . ' 
There i s , however, no need t o m u l t i p l y examples any 
f u r t h e r . I t i s enough, g e n e r a l l y speaking, t o say 
t h a t t h i s i s o n l y a minute s e l e c t i o n o f ways o f thought 
which are o v e r t l y opposed to the claims o f n a t u r a l law, 
yet which t u r n out m the end to seem remarkably f a v -
ourable to them. And the incidence o f t h i s k i n d o f 
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t h i n g might w e l l be taken as l e n d i n g credence t o the 
p o i n t which we are here c o n s i d e r i n g - t h a t t h e r e i s 
something u l t i m a t e l y inescapable about the view t h a t 
the v e r y nature of t h i n g s compels us t o c e r t a i n con-
c l u s i o n s about 'ought' and 'ought n o t ' . There i s good 
reason, t h e r e f o r e , to consider whether t h e r e i s , a f t e r 
a l l , what H.L.A. Hart c a l l s 'a core o f good sense' t o 
be discovered m the d o c t r i n e o f n a t u r a l law, i f o n l y 
we can s t r i p away i t s questionable or too-ambitious 
claims, i t s ' e s s e n t i a l i s m ' , i t s t e l e o l o g y , and so on. ^9 
I f f a c t , there has been, m recent years, a number of 
attempts to i d e n t i f y such a core - to s p e c i f y something 
which can reasonably be regarded as e i t h e r a f o r m a l or 
a s u b s t a n t i v e 'minimum content' o f n a t u r a l law. Some 
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o f these attempts are h i g h l y a b s t r a c t and s p e c u l a t i v e ; 
but we may at l e a s t consider some o f the most funda-
mental and l e a s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l aspects o f the case. 
Before we can make any progress a t a l l , however, i t 
i s necessary t o take three basic p o i n t s f o r granted. 
I do not myself experience any d i f f i c u l t y i n doing so, 
but, m any case, they must here be s t a t e d f o r what 
they are worth. F i r s t o f a l l , we must agree t h a t 
human beings are, m the mam, c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a 
powerful i n s t i n c t o r 'passion' f o r s u r v i v a l . We 
c l e a r l y must accept t h i s i f we are t o get anywhere 
since, as H.L.A. Hart p o i n t s out, 
To r a i s e . . . a n y . . . q u e s t i o n concerning how men 
should l i v e t o g e t h e r , we must assume t h a t t h e i r 
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aim, g e n e r a l l y speaking, i s to l i v e . 
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But t h e r e are good grounds f o r a c c e p t i n g i t anyway. 
C e r t a i n l y , we may o c c a s i o n a l l y run a c r o s s a s u i c i d a l 
maniac. Also, Lon F u l l e r holds t h a t 'the p r o p o s i t i o n 
t h a t the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of men w i s h to s u r v i v e 
even a t the c o s t of hideous misery...seems...of doubt-
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f u l t r u t h . ' But the e x i s t e n c e (however temporary) of 
a s u i c i d a l maniac or two does not show anything, and 
to say t h a t a point may be reached f o r a l l of us when 
l i f e c e a s e s to be worth l i v i n g does not damage the 
c l a i m t h a t the d e s i r e to s u r v i v e i s , m the mam, ver y 
s t r o n g . Perhaps i t i s unwise to take anything on 
t r u s t ; but the cause of i n t e l l e c t u a l r i g o u r i s not w e l l 
served by f l y i n g m the f a c e of c l e a r h i s t o r i c a l and 
s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e . The s h e e r v i g o u r of past s o c i a l 
movements of the desperate - the t r a g i c crusades of 
the poor m the e l e v e n t h to the f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , 
f o r example - f u r n i s h e s evidence of how s t r o n g the 
i n s t i n c t f o r s u r v i v a l i s . 
Second, we must accept t h a t , at l e a s t as a broad 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , the o l d dictum that man i s by n a t u r e 
a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e holds good. To accept t h i s i s to say 
only t h a t , given the l i m i t a t i o n s of human s t r e n g t h and 
v e r s a t i l i t y , the desideratum of s u r v i v a l and o t h e r 
l e s s p r e s s i n g d e s i d e r a t a can only, or can b e s t , be met 
through communal l i v i n g and co-operation. Again, i t 
i s p o s s i b l e to c i t e e x c e p t i o n s . But to point to A l e x -
ander S e l k i r k , h e r mits, f e r a l c h i l d r e n , and what have 
you, only s e r v e s to r e i n f o r c e the dictum m quest i o n . 
Such c a s e s a r e , a f t e r a l l , so very s t r i k i n g because 
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they are so a t v a r i a n c e w i t h our o r d i n a r y experience 
and e x p e c t a t i o n s . They a r e , so to speak, the exceptions 
which prove the r u l e . 
T h i r d , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to accept t h a t , as Hobbes, 
Hume and Hart point out m t h e i r d i f f e r e n t ways, w h i l e 
man has need of the s o c i e t y of o t h e r s , he i s not so 
t o t a l l y or so c o n s i s t e n t l y a l t r u i s t i c as to be a b l e 
to enjoy i t f o r any l e n g t h of time u n l e s s h i s a c t i o n s 
a r e governed by r u l e s r e i n f o r c e d by c o e r c i v e s a n c t i o n s . 
And t h i s g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i s amply backed up by the 
f i n d i n g s of s o c i a l anthropology, which - f o r a l l the 
d i v e r s i t y which i t has uncovered - r e v e a l s no s o c i e t y , 
however ' p r i m i t i v e ' or ' s t a t e l e s s ' , which does not 
have a system of e n f o r c e a b l e r u l e s , however scanty 
o r rudimentary. I n any case, i t would be p o s s i b l e to 
s a l v a g e something of t h i s p o i n t even i f the c l a i m 
t h a t men a r e i n c l i n e d to be s e l f i s h and s h o r t - s i g h t e d 
were d i s a l l o w e d . Aquinas, we r e c a l l , had i n s i s t e d 
t h a t government would have been n e c e s s a r y even i f the 
f a l l had not occu r r e d . Even men of c o n t i n u a l g o o d w i l l 
would have d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t s , p u r s u i t s and i n t e r e s t s , 
and so would r e q u i r e the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of wise and 
a b l e l e a d e r s h i p . 
I f these t h r e e p o i n t s are accepted, then i t w i l l 
not be o b j e c t i o n a b l e to say t h a t law i t s e l f , c o n s i d e r e d 
i n a b s t r a c t o . i s ' n a t u r a l ' . I n o t h e r words, we may 
say that men need moral and/or l e g a l r u l e s of some 
ki n d i f the needs and d e s i r e s of t h e i r 'nature' a r e 
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to be met - or, a t l e a s t , are to be met w i t h a s a t i s -
f a c t o r y degree of s a f e t y and c o n s i s t e n c y . And i t 
would a l s o be reasonable to make the point t h a t there 
are c e r t a i n b a s i c formal requirements which any l e g a l 
system must s a t i s f y i f i t i s to answer a t a l l to the 
nature of law - requirements which may, perhaps ( t o 
s t r e t c h the meaning of the term 'content' a b i t ) , be 
s e t down as the 'minimum content' f o r which we a r e 
seeking, o r a t l e a s t as par t of t h a t content. A 
novel , o r a volume of v e r s e , or the r u l e s of chess 
a r e not codes of law. They would not be codes of law 
even i f they were w r i t t e n by the P r e s i d e n t or the Prime 
M i n i s t e r or even by the whole of Parliament m c o l l a b -
o r a t i o n . A code of law must meet c e r t a i n requirements. 
I t must be a body of r u l e s . I t must i s s u e from an 
acknowledged law-making a u t h o r i t y - i . e . from an auth-
o r i t y capable of s e c u r i n g the compliance of those sub-
j e c t to i t . I t must make c o e r c i o n l e g i t i m a t e ( o t h e r -
wise, to paraphrase Hart, there would be no d i f f e r e n c e 
between a l e g i s l a t o r and a gunman). And i t must be 
s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t or n o n - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . These requirements 
are not merely a r b i t r a r y s t i p u l a t i o n s p u l l e d out of 
t h i n a i r on c a p r i c e . On the c o n t r a r y , they a r e some of 
the requirements which the law must meet i f i t I s to do 
what law i s f o r - namely, r e g u l a t i n g the l i f e of the 
community whose law i t i s . To a s s e r t t h a t something 
from which these requirements a r e wholl y absent i s 
'law' would simply be to use the word 'law' m a ve r y 
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unusual sense. 
Rather more broadly - i . e . moving away from law as 
such - i t i s p o s s i b l e to argue that the r e g u l a t i o n of 
a f f a i r s cannot s a t i s f a c t o r i l y be conducted u n l e s s the 
o l d p r i n c i p l e of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y i s taken f o r g r a n t e d 
- a t l e a s t m ia modernised or r e h a b i l i t a t e d form. T h i s 
form i s the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r i n c i p l e t h a t s i m i l a r c a s e s 
should be t r e a t e d m s i m i l a r ways. And t h i s i s a point 
which i s favoured by S i r I s a i a h B e r l i n and Ghaim 
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Perelman. The argument here, i t must be noted, i s 
not merely t h a t e q u a l i t y of treatment or the ' e q u a l i t -
a r i a n presumption' i s 'simply one among many e t h i c a l 
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p r i n c i p l e s v y i n g f o r our a l l e g i a n c e ' . I t i s not even 
t h a t i t i s a v e r y b a s i c , or the most b a s i c , p r i n c i p l e 
of m o r a l i t y a t a l l . Rather, the point i s t h a t the 
p r i n c i p l e ' s i m i l a r treatment f o r s i m i l a r c a s e s ' i s a 
p a r t of what c o n s t i t u t e s r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f . To ignore 
i t would ( i t i s claimed) be to a c t absurdly, as a man 
would be a c t i n g i f he i n s i s t e d t h a t , i n a s i n g l e and 
i s o l a t e d c a s e , two and two a r e f i v e i n s t e a d of f o u r . 
And what t h i s b o i l s down to from the point of view of 
p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s t h i s : t h a t i f the a d m i n i s t r a t o r 
d i s r e g a r d s the ' s i m i l a r treatment f o r s i m i l a r c a s e s ' 
p r i n c i p l e - i f he a c t s e n t i r e l y a t whim or a r b i t r a r i l y 
- he s imply w i l l not be a b l e to a c h i e v e the k i n d s of 
t h i n g t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s m f a c t wish to a c h i e v e . 
So f a r , so good. But these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e of a 
p u r e l y formal kind. They are answers to the q u e s t i o n , 
What must law or r a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e 9 r a t h e r 
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than attempts to s p e c i f y a minimum content m the 
s t r i c t sense of the word. A l e g a l t h e o r i s t might 
p e r f e c t l y w e l l take a l l these formal p o i n t s , y et 
s t i l l be an out-and-out p o s i t i v i s t - Hans K e l s e n 
i s a contemporary case m p o i n t . K e l s e n 1 s view i s 
t h a t a code of law i s indeed n e c e s s a r y - o r ' n a t u r a l ' 
- i n the sense t h a t , without such a code, s o c i a l l i v i n g 
c ould not be c a r r i e d on; and he understands a ' l e g a l 
system' to be an i n t e r n a l l y - c o n s i s t e n t s e t of r u l e s 
d e r i v e d from a b a s i c or fundamental norm. But he w i l l 
not commit h i m s e l f to the view t h a t any one b a s i c norm 
i s of i t s e l f to be p r e f e r r e d to any other. Indeed, 
h i s view i s t h a t no norm could be anything more than 
a p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e , r a t h e r than a b a s i s 
f o r law and m o r a l i t y which i s ' o b j e c t i v e ' i n i t s own 
r i g h t . I n o t h e r words, any b a s i c norm might generate 
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a ' l e g a l system'. Here, then, we encounter an awk-
ward p o s s i b i l i t y namely, t h a t , on the one hand, 
c e r t a i n formal d e f i n i e n d a of l e g a l systems w i l l be 
accepted as ' n a t u r a l ' - i . e . as axiomatic and i n e s c a p a b l e 
coupled w i t h , on the other, an i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a l e g a l 
system could c o n t a i n anything a t a l l , provided only 
t h a t the formal c r i t e r i a were not breached. On K e l s e n l s 
account, as Edgar Bodenheimer puts i t , 'Even the 
p u r e l y c a p r i c i o u s and p e r s o n a l r u l e of a despot i s 
an order of law as long as the b a s i c norm of h i s S t a t e 
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s a n c t i o n s t h i s type of a r b i t r a r y regime.' And t h i s 
i s h a r d l y l i k e l y to s a t i s f y the n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t , 
who wishes to regard s u b s t a n t i v e j u r i s p r u d e n c e as i t -
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a e l f a d i s t i n c t i v e l y moral e n t e r p r i s e . 
A l s o , although the p r i n c i p l e of s i m i l a r treatment 
f o r s i m i l a r c a s e s i s indeed p l a u s i b l y to be considered 
as a fundamental p r e r e q u i s i t e of r a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s not r e a l l y h e l p f u l to the expo-
nent of n a t u r a l law. E v e r s i n c e the p r i n c i p l e was 
f i r s t f u l l y formulated (by A r i s t o t l e - though we saw 
a s u g g e s t i o n of i t when we considered the Pythagoreans), 
i t has run up a g a i n s t a r a t h e r obvious d i f f i c u l t y . I n 
a l l c a s e s of any g r e a t complexity, the persons whose 
treatment i s a t i s s u e are not equal or s i m i l a r m every 
r e s p e c t . What the p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s i s t h a t , i f we 
t r e a t two i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r e n t l y , we g i v e a j u s t i f -
i c a t i o n of such d i f f e r e n t or unequal treatment m terms 
of d i f f e r e n c e s which a r e r e l e v a n t . And i f the p r i n -
c i p l e i s to have any moral f o r c e - which i t must, i f 
i t i s to be of use to the n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t - then 
these d i f f e r e n c e s must be m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . 
But what are we to do w i t h the man who i n s i s t s t h a t , 
so f a r as he i s concerned, having woolly h a i r or a 
hooked nose or blue eyes or blonde h a i r , and so on, 
a r e m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s 7 I n the l i g h t of 
'Hume's f a l l a c y ' , i t i s c l e a r t h a t he cannot prove 
t h a t they a r e . But i t i s by the same token c l e a r 
t h a t the exponent of n a t u r a l law cannot prove that they 
are not. ( I am assuming, of course, t h a t n a t u r a l 
law t h e o r i s t s would w i s h to hold such grounds f o r d i s -
c r i m i n a t o r y treatment m abhorrence. I imagine t h a t 
t h i s assumption r e q u i r e s no e l a b o r a t i o n . ) I t 
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i s t r u e t h a t any given j u s t i f i c a t o r y argument might, 
i n p r i n c i p l e , be s u b j e c t to d i s p r o o f . Thus, i f h i s 
opponent were to c l a i m j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r unequal 
treatment of Jews on the grounds t h a t Jews are l e s s 
i n t e l l i g e n t than Aryans, the n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t 
would not, a t t h i s s tage, be l e f t h e l p l e s s . By com-
par i n g the r e s u l t s o f a s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e number of 
un-rigged IQ t e s t s , he might be a b l e to show that 
the a s s e r t i o n m q u e s t i o n i s m f a c t f a l s e . But t h i s 
i s not the p o i n t . The r e a l d i f f i c u l t y i s the man 
whose view of the world i n c l u d e s the unshakeable 
b e l i e f t h a t merely being Jewish or negroid or whatever 
the case may be, c o n s t i t u t e s a m o r a l l y - r e l e v a n t ground 
f o r d i s c r i m i n a t o r y treatment; f o r such an i n d i v i d u a l 
would indeed be l o g i c a l l y impregnable. 
L e t us, then, t u r n from p u r e l y a b s t r a c t and formal 
matters to the q u e s t i o n of whether there i s any 
s u b s t a n t i v e content - a 'content' m the more obvious 
sense of the word - which might be acknowledged as a 
'minimum content of n a t u r a l law'. I n t h i s connection, 
a v e r y v a l i d point i s made by H.L.A. Hart, when he 
remarks t h a t a system of laws i s h a r d l y l i k e l y to 
s u r v i v e f o r long u n l e s s i t commands, f o r most of the 
time, the a l l e g i a n c e of most of those who a r e s u b j e c t 
to i t . He p o i n t s out that a l e g a l system which does 
not meet, or which a c t u a l l y f r u s t r a t e s , the fundamental 
needs of the community whose system i t i s w i l l v ery 
l i k e l y not endure - s i n c e the members of the community 
w i l l have no motive f o r keeping and e n f o r c i n g i t , and 
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may, indeed, have e x c e l l e n t reasons f o r breaking and 
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s u b v e r t i n g i t . Such a doomed l e g a l system w i l l be 
i n t e l l i g i b l y c r i t i c i s a b l e on ' n a t u r a l ' grounds, pre-
c i s e l y because i t f a i l s to meet the n a t u r a l needs of 
human beings. And i t would seem t h a t we can, i n 
broad terms, and by r e f e r e n c e to nothing more contro-
v e r s i a l than human biology, i d e n t i f y the k i n d of 
requirements which would count as ' n a t u r a l needs'. 
Human beings, a f t e r a l l , r e q u i r e a t l e a s t something 
i n the way of food, and t h e r e f o r e some means of pro-
ducing or o b t a i n i n g food, i f they a r e to keep a l i v e . 
S i m i l a r l y , t h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y c r e a t e s a need f o r 
c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s f o r s h e l t e r and p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
a t t a c k . And t h e i r s e x u a l i t y , coupled w i t h the pro-
t r a c t e d h e l p l e s s n e s s of the human i n f a n t , makes nec-
e s s a r y a t l e a s t some r u l e s p r o v i d i n g f o r an a p p r o p n a t 
environment f o r the r e a r i n g of o f f s p r i n g . On grounds 
such as these, then, we might suggest t h a t , i f there 
a r e to be c o n v e n t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a t a l l , they must 
ac h i e v e c e r t a i n t h i n g s d i c t a t e d by 'nature' i f they 
are not to v i t i a t e the very purposes f o r which they 
are brought i n t o being. T h i s i s a suggestion which 
has indeed been made f a i r l y r e c e n t l y by a t l e a s t two 
American w r i t e r s - P a u l Sigmund and Thomas D a v i t t -
who w i s h to adopt a r e h a b i l i t a t e d form of n a t u r a l law. 
Also , i t i s a suggestion which r e c e i v e s c o n v i n c i n g 
support from the f i n d i n g s of s o c i a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . 
Research m s o c i a l anthropology has tended to confirm 
and e l a b o r e t e the p o s i t i o n of the Roman j u r i s t s who 
326. 
grounded the concept of ma gentium on the b a s i s of 
elements common to a l l known l e g a l systems. However 
much v a r i a t i o n there may be between s o c i e t i e s , the 
experience of r e s e a r c h e r s so f a r i n d i c a t e s that there 
i s indeed a ' u n i v e r s a l ' s u b s t a n t i v e element - mainly 
p r o h i b i t i v e or minatory - common to them a l l . There 
i s no s o c i e t y m which some form of homicide i s not 
p r o h i b i t e d - the l i v e s of members of the same comm-
u n i t y are p r o t e c t e d even amongst headhunters and cann-
i b a l s . There i s no s o c i e t y m which some form of 
property r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not r e c o g n i s e d . There i s none 
i n which s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s a r e allowed to be e n t i r e l y 
promiscuous. And there i s none m which mother-son 
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marriages a r e not p r o h i b i t e d as i n c e s t u o u s . I n s h o r t , 
i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h by e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g -
a t i o n a b a s i c code of u n i v e r s a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s of t h i s 
k i n d , then i t i s a t l e a s t not unreasonable to spec-
u l a t e t h a t these p r e s c r i p t i o n s a r e the minima which 
must be present i f s o c i a l l i v i n g i s to be p o s s i b l e a t 
a l l . So much, then, stands on the c r e d i t s i d e of our 
n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t ' s c l a i m t h a t there are ' c e r t a i n 
p r i n c i p l e s which must be accepted, and w i l l be accepted, 
human nature and the nature of the world being what 
they a r e . ' 
IV. 
C o n c l u s i o n s . 
There are o b v i o u s l y e x c e l l e n t reasons f o r a c c e p t i n g 
these arguments m favour of a 'minimum content' of 
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n a t u r a l law. But we ought not to f o r g e t something which 
' t h e o r i s t s ' a r e , perhaps, r a t h e r apt to f o r g e t , namely, 
that the t r a d i t i o n w i t h which we a r e d e a l i n g i s supposed 
to have - d e f i n i t e - and o f t e n v e r y ambitious - p r a c t i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t i s not merely a matter of a b s t r a c t 
or a r mchair i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e r e s t . On the c o n t r a r y , 
i t i s supposed to y i e l d i n d i c a t i o n s of what we should 
a c t u a l l y do - what we should submit to and what we 
should r e s i s t , what we should p r a i s e and what con-
demn. And, viewed m t h i s l i g h t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
see t h a t the l i n e which we have j u s t followed -
however unexceptionable - c a r r i e s the argument f o r n a t -
u r a l law ve r y f a r . The minimum content t h e s i s , whether 
presented as an account of the formal requirements of 
law or, more s t r i c t l y , as a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of an 
a e t u a l content, c e r t a i n l y does not i n v o l v e 'Hume's 
f a l l a c y 5 of i l l i c i t l y d e r i v i n g 'ought' from ' i s ' . I t 
c l a i m s no more than t h a t , m view of our knowledge 
of the na t u r e of the world and of human nature, 
there a r e c e r t a i n non-conventional c r i t e r i a o r pro-
v i s i o n s which law must s a t i s f y or c o n t a i n i f i t i s 
not to thwart i t s own purposes. But t h i s i s s u r e l y 
only of ve r y minimal h e l p to us when i t comes to 
the making of s p e c i f i c e t h i c o - l e g a l judgments -
judgments, l e t us say, of the k i n d which the Nurem-
burg judges wished to make. 
The case of Nazi Germany i s , m f a c t , a u s e f u l ex-
ample m more ways than one. F i r s t , the war-crimes 
t r i a l s which followed the Second 7 o r l d ,Yar c e r t a i n l y 
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were conducted m what we might c a l l a ' n a t u r a l - l a w 
s p i r i t ' . The a l l i e d p a r t i c i p a n t s m the t r i a l r e g a r d -
ed themselves as p e r f e c t l y J u s t i f i e d m condemning 
those v/ho had complied w i t h the l e g a l requirements 
of t h e i r S t a t e ; and t h i s condemnation was i t s e l f 
j u s t i f i e d m terms of an appeal to standards h e l d to 
be h i g h e r than p o s i t i v e law. Second, I assume t h a t 
the T h i r d R e i c h was a regime which most contemporary 
w r i t e r s would regard as the v e r y i n c a r n a t i o n of p o l -
i t i c a l wickednesses - u n f a i r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a r b i t r a r y 
behaviour, and so on. And, t h i r d , the c e l e b r a t e d 
debate between Lon P u l l e r and H.L.A. Hart on the 
r e l a t i o n between law and m o r a l i t y turned v e r y l a r g e l y 
upon the question of whether or not the l e g a l system 
of the T h i r d R e i c h can p r o p e r l y be regarded as a 
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l e g a l system a t a l l . F o r our pre s e n t purposes, the 
point i s t h i s . I n the T h i r d R e i c h , there undeniably 
was a system of r u l e s . The r u l e s were kept a t l e a s t 
c o n s i s t e n t l y enough to prevent the c o l l a p s e of the 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l o r d e r whose r u l e s they were. 
There was machinery f o r t h e i r enforcement, e x t e n s i v e 
planning f o r the 'thousand y e a r ' f u t u r e , and so on. 
So f a r as I know, s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s were r e g u l a t e d w i t h 
unusual s t r i c t n e s s , the l i v e s and p r o p e r t y - r i g h t s of 
the members of the community were p r o t e c t e d , and so 
on. I t i s t r u e enough t h a t the community's 'language 
game' i n v o l v e d a use of 'community' m such a way as 
to exclude and earmark f o r p e r s e c u t i o n c e r t a i n spec-
i f i e d m i n o r i t i e s . But we - p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a ve r y d i f f -
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erent 'language game' - could no more show t h a t t h i s 
use of 'community' i s 'wrong' as a g a i n s t our ' r i g h t ' 
use than we could show t h a t the r u l e s of bridge are 
b e t t e r than the r u l e s of hockey. As we have seen, 
no amount of evidence, and no amount of reasoning, 
however r i g o r o u s , would provide formal proof t h a t 
the v a l u e s of Nazi Germany were d e f e c t i v e , or t h a t 
they 'ought' to have been other than they were. And 
i t i s obvious t h a t , here, an appeal to a 'minimum 
content' of n a t u r a l law simply w i l l not help us. 
I f we examine the l e g a l system of the T h i r d R e i c h 
i n the l i g h t of such an appeal, we s h a l l f i n d t h a t i t 
was indeed the l e g a l system of a v i a b l e s o c i a l order. 
As a community, however narrowly d e f i n e d , the T h i r d 
R e i c h s a t i s f i e d the ' n a t u r a l ' requirements of i t s 
members m every sense m which those requirements 
could c o n c e i v a b l y be h e l d to be demonstrable. And 
i t would not be o b v i o u s l y absurd to e x p l a i n i t s even-
t u a l c o l l a p s e , not m terms of i t s moral degeneracy, 
but by r e f e r e n c e to i t s d e f eat by overwhelming m i l -
i t a r y o p p o s i t i o n . I n s h o r t , i f , out of our p a s s i o n a t e 
' i d e o l o g i c a l ' commitment to the p o s i t i o n that m i n o r i t i e s 
should not be persecuted, we wished to 'convert* an 
adherent of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m , we might coerce him 
or preach a t him - but we could not, s t r i c t l y speaking, 
reason w i t h him. He should have to f a l l back upon a 
standpoint not so ve r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of Gorgias -
to a c o n c l u s i o n that t here are c e r t a i n a r e a s of exper-
i e n c e such t h a t , m the event of a disagreement, our 
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only r e c o u r s e i s to the a r t of r h e t o r i c . And, though 
i t may be true t h a t r h e t o r i c i s i t s e l f a form of r a t -
i o n a l i t y , i t c e r t a i n l y i s not a form through which 
we can i d e n t i f y ' s e l f - e v i d e n t ' p r i n c i p l e s of r i g h t -
p r i n c i p l e s which are a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t , r e g a r d l e s s of 
what anybody t h i n k s . 
Arguments about p o i n t s of d e t a i l a p a r t , there c l e a r -
l y a r e good reasons f o r a c c e p t i n g as constant ( o r v e r y 
n e a r l y so) c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s and c e r t a i n b a s i c 
m a t e r i a l p r o v i s i o n s of lav/ and m o r a l i t y . 7/ithout 
these, we s h a l l e i t h e r not be able to a c t a t a l l , or 
our a c t i o n s w i l l simply not achieve t h e i r purposes. 
And i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t t h i s i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y the point made long ago by S o c r a t e s , i n 
h i s debate w i t h Thrasymachus. But to take t h i s p oint 
i s s u r e l y to accept no more than that we l i v e i n the 
world and that the number of p o s s i b l e arrangements 
open to us i s l i m i t e d by what i s the c a s e . There p l a i n l y 
i s a sense m which a l l our a c t i v i t i e s a r e rooted m 
'nature' - m what we a r e and m our environment. I t 
i s e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t , u n l e s s c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s a r e 
p r e s e n t , we cannot even s u r v i v e . But these c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n s form only a very g e n e r a l backdrop to our immed-
i a t e concerns - to the a c t i v i t y of making our way 
from day to day i n a contingent and u n p r e d i c t a b l e 
world or, as Michael Oakeshott puts i t , of 'keep(mg) 
a f l o a t on an even k e e l ' m the 'boundless and bottomless 
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s e a ' of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . E x perience p o i n t s to, and 
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l o g i c does not p r o h i b i t , the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , s u b j e c t 
only to the most g e n e r a l of c o n d i t i o n s , s u c c e s s i n 
t h i s e n t e r p r i s e does not depend upon our s u b s c r i b i n g 
to any one s e t of s p e c i f i c moral or l e g a l v a l u e s as 
a g a i n s t any other. The number of p o s s i b l e v i a b l e 
forms of l i f e may indeed not be i n f i n i t e , but i t i s 
a t l e a s t v e r y l a r g e . And to point to s i m i l a r i t i e s of 
form or content e x i s t i n g m the l e g a l or moral codes 
of a l l known s o c i e t i e s may be a procedure j u s t i f i e d on 
e m p i r i c a l grounds; but to do so i s to point only to 
the same k i n d of f a m i l y resemblances i n v i r t u e of 
which poker and n e t b a l l are both games. Both the 
statement t h a t there a r e such resemblances, and the 
nature of the resemblances themselves, are matters 
of such extreme g e n e r a l i t y t h a t they a r e , f o r p r a c -
t i c a l purposes, simply t r i v i a l . The d i f f e r i n g p a s s -
ion s and commitments of men a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y so 
w i d e l y d i v e r g e n t as to render compromise and m u t u a l i t y 
i m p o s s i b l e . But i f they do diverge so w i d e l y as to 
be i n i m i c a l to one another, i t seems that there i s 
no i m p a r t i a l standard of Good by r e f e r e n c e to which 
the ' r a t i o n a l man' can a d j u d i c a t e between them. The 
most, i t seems, t h a t we could p o s s i b l y say i s t h a t 
a moral or p o l i t i c a l system i s adequate i f i t i s app-
r o p r i a t e to the form of l i f e of those whose system i t 
i s . And to say t h i s , o f course, i s only to r e - s t a t e 
the dictum of Protagoras - t h a t 
Whatever seems r i g h t s and p r a i s e w o r t h y to a 
p a r t i c u l a r S t a t e i_s r i g h t and p r a i s e w o r t h y 
to i t , f o r as long as i t holds i t to be so. 
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Perhaps, then, there i s a g r e a t d e a l to be s a i d f o r 
the c o n s e r v a t i s m of Protagoras or Burke or Popper -
which recommends that we a b s t a i n from t h e o r i s i n g and 
a c c e p t the d e v i l we know i n p r e f e r e n c e to the d e v i l 
we don't. Also , however - s i n c e we are now concerned 
w i t h p r a c t i c a l i t i e s - we can h a r d l y help reminding 
o u r s e l v e s of the importance to p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of 
s h e e r power, the 'power of the m a j o r i t y to a c t and 
conclude the r e s t ' ; the c u l t u r a l a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m of 
the masses dreaded by w r i t e r s so f a r a p a r t m time and 
temperament as P l a t o , J.S. M i l l and T.S. E l i o t ; and 
the d i s p o s i t i o n o r s t a t e of mind of the r e l a t i v e l y 
new m i n o r i t i e s who w i e l d i n c r e a s i n g l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d , 
r e l e n t l e s s and i m p l a c a b l e means of c o e r c i o n and man-
i p u l a t i o n . The c y n i c might be f o r g i v e n f o r supposing 
t h a t , when i t comes to p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s , moral 
arguments a r e - l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a p a r t - merely 
i r r e l e v a n t , s i n c e you need not argue w i t h someone 
l e s s powerful than y o u r s e l f , and you cannot argue 
w i t h someone more powerful than y o u r s e l f . Even the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of moral d i s c o u r s e v a n i s h e s when you a r e 
confronted w i t h someone who does not have to g i v e a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of what he does - who does not c a r e , 
and who does not need to c a r e . I f you l i v e under a 
t y r a n n i c a l regime, you a c h i e v e nothing m the way of 
a c t u a l improvement of your p o s i t i o n by t h e o r i s i n g . 
Indeed, not even the most highly-developed p h r o n e s i s 
or p r a c t i c a l wisdom i s of i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t to h e l p 
me as a p r a c t i t i o n e r . I t i s p r a c t i c a l achievement t h a t 
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l a important i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e ; but p r a c t i c a l g a i n s 
are s u r e l y achieved only when p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s 
combined w i t h a degree of f o r c e s u f f i c i e n t to g i v e i t 
e f f e c t . I f a R u s s i a n peasant of the 1930s were to 
p l a y S o c r a t e s to S t a l i n ' s Thrasymachus and a s s u r e him 
th a t h i s conception of r u l e r s h i p were a l l wrong, he 
might s u f f e r the consequences w i t h the equanimity of 
one c o n f i d e n t m r i g h t e o u s n e s s , or w i t h the noble 
r e s i g n a t i o n of one who knows t h a t h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t s 
a r e being unwarrantably i n f r i n g e d . But he would not 
thereby evade the p r a c t i c a l outcome of being on the 
wrong s i d e of the d i s p o s i t i o n of f o r c e s . Nothing 
could compel him to s u b s c r i b e to the r a d i c a l S o p h i s t 
t h e s i s t h a t 'might i s r i g h t ' . But he could h a r d l y 
a b s t a i n from conceding t h a t r i g h t without might i s 
h e l p l e s s . 
I t might be thought r e g r e t t a b l e that a study of so 
long a t r a d i t i o n of moral and p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e 
should y i e l d such s c a n t y , such unfavourable and such 
' C a l l i c l e a n ' c o n c l u s i o n s . But i f such u n s c h o l a r l y 
disappointment be allowed to creep i n t o a p r o f e s s e d l y 
s c h o l a r l y examination, there i s perhaps some g r a i n of 
comfort m the r e f l e c t i o n t h a t moral commitment has 
a t l e a s t one t h i n g i n common w i t h r e l i g i o u s commitment 
i f n o thing can count as evidence f o r i t , n othing can 
count as evidence a g a i n s t i t , e i t h e r - l e coeur a sea 
r a i s o n s que l a r a i s o n connait p o i n t . I do not imagine 
t h a t our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t ' s z e a l f o r n a t u r a l law 
or 'human r i g h t s ' would be weakened f o r one moment by 
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any amount of scepticism as to the concept's l o g i c a l 
d e f e n s i b i l i t y or p r a c t i c a b i l i t y . However weighty the 
arguments against him, he might f i n d refuge i n the 
response to the Professor who saw ' m the growing p i l e 
of c i v i l i s a t i o n only a f o o l i s h heaping that must inev-
i t a b l y f a l l back upon and destroy i t s makers' given by 
the anonymous narrator of H.G. '.Veils' The Time Machine. 
' I f that i s so, i t remains f o r us to l i v e as though 
i t were not so.' 
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